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SOVIET POLITICS

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SOVIET
POLITICS

At Home and Abroad



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TO
CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM

PREFACE

IN LOOKING BACKWARDS upon the first half of the 20th Century, the men and women of times to come may quite possibly decide that the two events which were most momentous for the future fortunes of mankind were both happenings which passed almost unnoticed when they occurred. Their dates—the 16th of April, 1917, and the 2nd of December, 1942—evoke few echoes even now. No crucial battles were fought, nor were any great resolves made by captains or kings. Yet two episodes, both destined to change the lives of all peoples forever after, transpired during these particular rotations of the planet. Both were unheralded and indeed unknown to all save a few participants.

On the earlier day a small man, wearing a derby hat and possessed by a Vision, arrived in the capital of Russia. He was the son of a physics teacher. He was returning to his native land after 10 years of exile. Thanks to his gifts for leadership in the work to which he put his heart, brain and hands, his coming was to transform his country and his world beyond recognition. On the later day, success was achieved in a secret experiment at the University of Chicago. The place was the squash court under the football stand at the west end of Stagg Field. The chief experimenters were an Italian émigré and an American physicist, both working on the basis of work already done in radioactivity, relativity and nuclear physics by a French-Polish chemist, a German-Jewish mathematician, a woman refugee from Hitler's Reich, a Danish researcher, a British scientist, and sundry others. The test resulted in the first self-sustaining "chain reaction" in atomic fission to be engineered by the mind of man.

The first of these events led within seven months, in the largest and most populous of the European nation-states, to the explosion of the most destructive and creative social revolution of all time. Its outcome was the realization of a philosophers' dream at least as old as Plato: the establishment of a society based upon common ownership

of productive property. The second event marked the discovery of the "philosopher's stone," long sought after by all the alchemists since the Alexandrine Greeks and Arabs. By its magic, metals could be transmuted into other metals. Plutonium and its kinsman, U-235, proved susceptible of further transformation into barium and krypton, with a fraction of matter remaining. The fraction became energy in accordance with Einstein's formula of 1905: $E = mc^2$ —i.e., energy equals mass multiplied by the square of the speed of light.

Results seldom mirror anticipations. Looking-glass house is just the same as our house, "only the things go the other way." The USSR in 1946 is not the Republic of Plato, nor does it resemble any of the fancied Utopias of the past. Neither are the new alchemists concerned with changing copper and mercury into silver and gold. Soviet Communism is a new civilization, but its contours deviate widely from the first paper plans of its architects. Atomic energy promises a new epoch of abundance for all, but its immediate impact confirms the fears of Tertullian who predicted that "wicked angels," in bringing to man knowledge of the elements, would bring woe along with wisdom. In Old Mexico the site of the test-explosion of the first atomic bomb was called "*La Jornada del Muerto*": The Journey of Death. Nuclear fission suggests less the conversion of the earth into a paradise than the opening of the Sixth Seal of the Last Judgment, when "there came a great earthquake; and the sun became black as sackcloth of hair; and the moon became as blood."

The incapacity of Western mankind to make a rational adjustment, after the lapse of three decades, to the world-shaking impact of the Russian Revolution augurs ill for a rational adjustment to the world-shaking impact of atomic power. Time, unfortunately, declines to wait. Only by the narrowest of margins did all the world between 1935 and 1945 escape enslavement and annihilation at the hands of men like devils, driven to madness by the inability of man to adapt himself to social change. Between 1945 and 1955 the contemporary world society will either meet successfully the double challenge posed by the USSR and by U-235 or will sentence itself to suicide.

Bolshevism is not the Beast of Revelation, as many outraged Christians and capitalists long assumed. But the atomic bomb already recalls the vial of wrath poured out by the Fourth Angel: "And power was given unto him to scorch men with fire. And men were scorched with great heat, and blasphemed the name of God, which hath power over these plagues; and they repented not to give him glory."

It has long since become a platitude to say that salvation depends upon the future shape of relations between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union and that these depend upon mutual understanding among their peoples. Such understanding has been conspicuous by its absence during most of the past quarter-century, thanks to the suspicion and secretiveness of the rulers of the "socialist sixth of the world" and to the ignorance, panic and rage with which many among the Western peoples have been led to view the USSR. Americans can contribute only indirectly, by example and honest effort in forging new bonds of unity, to the wider opening of Russia's windows on the West. They can contribute directly toward their own understanding of the USSR by cultivating facts instead of fancies and by refusing to rely for enlightenment upon passionate lovers and hysterical haters. The former have perhaps done less harm than the latter, but both are poor surrogates for searchers after truth. The most dangerous dispensers of falsehood are the ex-lovers who are transmuted into haters by a strange political alchemy. These sick souls find solace only through corrupting truth-seekers and defaming those who decline to be corrupted.

These pages have been written in the certain knowledge that they will be denounced with equal vigor by the professional heroizers and hate-mongers. Their justification is the hope that they may aid others, in a modest way, to come closer to truth regarding the domestic and foreign affairs of the Soviet Union. The peoples of the two most powerful communities on earth have each given generously of the blood of their sons in mortal combat against common foes. Said General Eisenhower on the dissolution of the SHAEF (July 14, 1945): "It is my fervent hope and prayer that the unparalleled unity which has been achieved among the Allied nations in war will be a source of inspiration for, and point the way to, permanent and lasting peace." The Soviet peoples gave a hundred lives for each American life lost in World War II. Americans are bound thereby to be at least several times more active and vigilant than their Soviet neighbors in building peace. Those of us who were not privileged to serve in the armed forces of the United Nations have a special obligation to do what lies in our power to see that the fruits of victory are not again cast away into a fear-haunted abyss of doubt and discord.

Of this book I would say, with a far greater sense of urgency, what I said in the Preface to my first book 18 years ago: "It is the author's sincere hope that this volume may make some small contribution to a

better understanding of a much-muddled issue of contemporary statecraft and to the attainment of clearer thinking and more sympathetic appreciation in the relations between the two largest and most populous white nations of the earth." I am persuaded now, as I was then (and more now than then), that the good society is one in which a maximum measure of personal liberty and representative democracy is combined with a maximum diffusion of private enterprise and ownership of property. The major foes of freedom in our time are unemployment, intolerance and war. The USSR has contributed mightily, albeit by illiberal methods, to the conquest of all three. Its leaders and people are committed to the ultimate ideals of liberalism, though they have much to learn from Anglo-Saxony about civil rights, democracy and political toleration. Thanks to a long past under free institutions, Americans are more firmly committed to the ways of freemen, but they have much to learn from Russia about racial tolerance and fraternity and about the uses of public authority to promote economic security and progress. Unless the corruption of Democracy by Money (in Spengler's sense) and the debasing of Socialism by Despotism can be halted, unless the best of two worlds can be brought together in a new synthesis, One World will be irreparably shattered and all the hopes of liberalism will wither and perish.

Travel in Russia notoriously confirms the prejudices of the traveler. I will make no pretense of being an exception. By a curious happenstance, due to the fact that I had left America some weeks before my first book was published and had spent some intervening months in Normandy, Paris and Berlin, I saw a printed copy of my earliest brain-child for the first time in Moscow on the desk of Maxim Litvinov in his office in the Narkomindel. I still recall with interest and some amusement our discussion of American political trends in 1928. Also fresh in memory are many experiences of this journey to the Russia of the NEP: my inexpensive room in Leningrad in a magnificent 18th Century palace, overlooking the river, and used as a refuge for impecunious intellectuals; my dictionary conversation in Dr. Horsley Gantt's apartment with the janitor who turned out to be the former owner of the building, thus symbolizing in his person the reality of social revolution; the graceful sweep of the Admiralty, Uritsky Square, the Winter Palace and the Neva delta from the dome of St. Isaac's; the Iberian Gate and the Church of the Savior in Moscow, both long since gone, along with the original wooden tomb of Lenin; my tour of the Kremlin grounds with Comrade Economist Obolensky-

Ossinsky, since fallen upon evil days; visits and talks and walks among the shabby but hopeful multitudes of Muscovy; my confirmation of Paul H. Douglas' sage opinion that the chief difference between American and Soviet politicians was about 40 pounds; and the crash landing, happily without casualties, of the not-so-good ship D-1445 of Deruluft, grounded in the middle of Lithuania in transit to Königsberg. . . .

The Russia of the war years I have not seen. But another and far more extensive tour of the Russia of the Five Year Plans revealed the dizzy tempo of the socialist offensive and much else of things past, present and to come. In the company of a small but hardy band of Chicagoans, I ranged freely from the Gulf of Finland to Mt. Kazbek and Batum, and from the Polish plains to the valley of the Don. Russian life had become grim and gray with the all but super-human effort of building socialism the hard way—and as swiftly as taut nerves and tired bodies would permit. Fear of war and hope of plenty drove all to miracles of labor. Speculators, bureaucrats and beggars mingled with consecrated men and women. The age-old Russia of ignorance and filth sprawled over the “hard” coaches of the Leningrad-Moscow express, leered out of the cruelly stricken villages of the Ukraine, and festered in slums around shining new factories. The tractor plant and the skyscrapers of Kharkov (now in ruins) pointed the way to the future. But dyes and textiles were still doubtful: young ladies on the beach at Yalta carefully took off new bathing suits before entering the water! . . . In Tiflis, Sophie, the beautiful Armenian guide, wept at the insult of a proffered gratuity but dreamed of marrying a rich American and living in Hollywood. . . . The Tsarist palace at Livadia, where later the “big three” were to meet, was a sanitarium for workers. . . . Tatiana Krasnochokeva, Intourist guide and invariably efficient mentor for harassed voyagers, represented a new womanhood—with a heart as old as Eve. . . . Old and new, frustration and creative joy, hot embers of ancient greed and the pure fire of resolve to build a new age, were all blended in a great adventure, at once magnificent and pathetic, wherein were inextricably mixed the shame of naked power and the bold weaving of a life of new opportunity.

But this book is no travelogue. I have resisted the temptation to dwell on the shapes and scenes of fleeting yesterdays spent in the USSR. These chapters are designed to relate from today's perspective the story of Party and State and political man in the Soviet land, with enough background to make the tale intelligible, enough detail to

make it real, and enough use of the words of the major participants to make it alive. My further purpose has been to re-explore the long and devious road of the Soviet Union in diplomacy and war and to suggest the vital connections between internal and foreign affairs, for neglect of which Anglo-American comprehension of the USSR has often remained befogged. "There is no more erroneous or harmful idea," said Lenin, rightly, "than that of separation of foreign and domestic policies." The path of the explorer is beset with difficulties. Not all of them have been overcome in these pages, but all have been grappled with and at least partially surmounted. The result, I would like to believe, is as full and meaningful a record of Soviet political experience as can be encompassed within a single volume.

Emphasis has been placed on beginnings and endings and on dynamic phases of change rather than on political and social statics. This choice has not been dictated by any thirst for melodrama, since the Soviet story, even in its dullest aspects, is incomparably the most dramatic story of our time. I have proceeded rather on the assumption that the genetics and mutations of political practices offer the best clues to trends and prospects in all communities, and particularly in one conceived in revolt and dedicated to revolutionary goals.

Whether the interpretations offered are sane and helpful is for others to say. In times long out of joint, sanity is relative. These pages will scarcely prove rewarding (save in eliciting indignation) for those so filled with spites and phobias that they can see only vice in the USSR, nor for those so filled with ecstasy and piety that they can see only virtue. Intolerant Marxists and anti-Marxists may well find much of the presentation intolerable. I have touched only lightly on the higher exegesis and eschatology of these creeds. I have preferred to view the Russian adventure as a progressive quest in problem-solving on the part of human beings who, like all others, are often bewildered and fear-stricken and sometimes self-defeated. Soviet man differs from Western man in attaching greater importance to social solidarity and to political unity, conformity and unanimity—all imperatives of survival flowing from the painful ordeals of the Slavic past, both before and since October. Soviet man differs also from his Atlantic counterpart in placing a higher premium on organized public action as a means toward the freedom which goes with social security and integration. Here the Vision of Marx, Engels and Lenin is controlling. But both breeds of men, each in their several ways, have preserved and enriched their common heritage of ethical values de-

rived from Israel, Athens and Rome. In this circumstance lies the hope of tomorrow.

Some aspects of this story have been written about by others in greater detail than is possible here. Other aspects are here dealt with for the first time in some detail and in their various interrelationships—e.g., Soviet constitutionalism and federalism, the evolution of the Party, election procedures, the nature and scope of liberty, the diplomacy of war and victory, the post-war pattern of Soviet policy in Europe and Asia, the men of the Politburo, the composition of the elite, the economic causes of the decay of world revolution, the problems of world order, etc. If the parts of the mosaic are a mingling of familiar and unfamiliar themes, the entire design is new, for the designer has striven (with what success others must decide) to see steadily and to see whole the total fabric of Soviet politics, from the barbarian migrations to the Changchun Railway Co., from Marx in the British Museum to the Soviet Intelligentsia, from the peasant rebellions to collective agriculture, from Portsmouth and Brest-Litovsk to Potsdam and Lancaster House.

Since "total" politics touches all phases of life, many aspects of Soviet experience have been touched on here, however briefly. There is need however, for numerous other detailed studies if American ignorance of the USSR is to be vanquished. The structure and operation of the Narkomindel deserves exposition by some American scholar able to visit Moscow and the capitals of the Union Republics. The history, theory and practice of Public Administration and Public Law in the USSR have received little systematic treatment as yet from American students. A solid, up-to-date treatise on Soviet Economy is urgently called for. New studies of the family, the church, the trade unions, the cooperatives, the national cultures, the collectives, and the techniques of industrial planning and management are all required if Americans are to achieve adequate comprehension. No less necessary are comparable Soviet studies of American life. Contrary to popular clichés, mutual understanding is no guarantee of "friendship," nor is friendship, however defined, any guarantee of peace. Peace is not threatened by lack of international friendship but by lack of international government. Yet mutual understanding is an objective worthy of pursuit for itself. Americans and Russians have much to contribute to one another. A gradual fusion of their divergent ways of life offers the last, best hope of achieving world order rather than mutual annihilation.

Barriers to understanding (apart from the barrier of language which is not insuperable) are not all made in Moscow nor yet in Washington, New York or Emporia. Stalin's advice to Senator Claude Pepper is good advice to both peoples: "Do not either praise us or scold us. Just know us and judge us as we are and base your estimate of us upon facts and not rumors." To contend, as did *The New York Times* (Oct. 2, 1945), that Soviet censorship renders this ideal unattainable is to ignore the legacy of fear which explains, even if it does not justify, continued suspicions and restrictions, and to forget current facts which render odious any assumption of American moral superiority. Truth is seldom served by pots calling kettles black. Systematic defamation of the USSR is far more prevalent in the United States than are similar Soviet offenses against America. Five days after the *Times* editorial, on the occasion of Pulaski Day in New York, Senator James M. Mead, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Newbold Morris, Jonah J. Goldstein, William O'Dwyer and a distinguished group of military officers and federal, state and city notables reviewed, with apparent approval, a parade of Polish-Americans carrying placards denouncing the Warsaw Government, assailing Russia, and calling for a new crusade against "Communism."

The USSR has no counterpart of the Hearst press and the McCormick-Patterson papers. Liberty of criticism in the United States, to be sure, helps to negate the influence of the preachers of war, and Soviet publicists commit a gross disservice to the cause of amity when they ridicule "freedom of speech." Soviet restraints on freedom of travel and reporting similarly play into the hands of those Americans who specialize in disseminating fables and in provoking alarm and disunity. For both sides the advice of the Carpenter is still good advice: "First cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye. . . . Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the prophets. . . . Strait is the gate and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life. . . . Beware of false prophets which come to you in sheep's clothing. . . . By their fruits ye shall know them."

No American desirous of arriving at truth about the USSR need be deterred either by Soviet censorship or the two aspects of the Russian verb. Abundant materials are available in English. In the Notes of this volume, I have deliberately cited books and articles in English, wherever possible, and documents in translation, wherever available.

Sources in Russian have been cited where no translations or equivalents are to be had. The references do not comprise a full bibliography which, if compiled, would make a volume almost as large as this one. But the Notes refer, in intent at least, to the most helpful books and articles on Soviet politics and diplomacy likely to be found in well-equipped American libraries.

Since no wholly satisfactory and standardized system is available for transliterating Russian names, I have tried to follow a rule of common sense—than which nothing is less common or less sensible. The rule is simply to avoid, as far as possible, unwieldy and confusing combinations of consonants and to render Russian words in the smallest possible number of English letters suggesting, in their ordinary pronunciation, the approximate sounds of their Cyrillic equivalents. Even by this rule “Boodyonny” might (perhaps) be preferable to “Budenny,” “Molotoff” to “Molotov,” “Khirghiz” to “Kirgiz,” etc. But in this one matter at least, I have preferred brevity. May the Slavic philologists be indulgent!

My indebtedness to others in the preparation of this volume is so great as to render full acknowledgments impossible. I trust that no lack of gratitude will be inferred by those unnamed if I express personal appreciation: to John S. Reshetar, Jr., for extending invaluable aid in the translation of extensive passages from the Soviet press and from various books, in particular the writings of Andrei Y. Vyshinsky; to Toby Cole Irwin, Librarian of the American-Russian Institute of New York, for unfailing zeal in tracking down answers to many questions in the admirable files of the Institute Library; to Harriet L. Moore, Research Director of the Institute, for making available to me files of Soviet newspapers and various books and pamphlets from the USSR; to Sally Carlton Foote for indispensable stenographic and clerical aid, gladly rendered at a time when she was preoccupied with a far more important creative enterprise; to Dorothy Smullyan and Janice Dannenberg for similar help in the last stages of the adventure; to Alida M. Stephens, Librarian, and Ethel Richmond, Reference Librarian, of Williams College, for cheerful assistance in obtaining materials not readily available; to Dr. William Card, Director of the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship, for various Soviet publications; to Charles Prince of the United States Chamber of Commerce and Sidney Harcave, formerly of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, for other materials and useful analyses of Soviet law, politics and propaganda; to Hallie C. Fish for much-appreciated aid

in the preparation of the Index; and to my wife for assistance in research and writing and for helpful criticisms of many sections.

In a broader area of obligation, I am grateful to Director Ernest J. Simmons, to Williams College and President James Phinney Baxter III, to Cornell University and President Edmund E. Day, and to the Rockefeller Foundation for the opportunity to participate in the summer of 1944 in the Cornell Program for the Intensive Study of Contemporary Russian Civilization. For priceless stimulation, enlightenment and advice I am indebted to my Cornell colleagues: Vladimir D. Kazakevich, Sir Bernard Pares, Professor Simmons, Robert S. Lynd, and the various specialists who came week by week to the "workshop seminars." I am also grateful to Anne de la Vergne and Lois McCullough for clerical and stenographic aid at Cornell; to my students at Cornell in "Soviet Government and Foreign Policy" and at Williams in "Political Science 18"; to the late Samuel N. Harper of the University of Chicago for first arousing my interest many years ago in Russian developments; to Mr. S. Jesmer of Chicago for facilitating one of my trips to the USSR; to Professor Arthur Weil, Mr. and Mrs. Harold Finder, Mr. and Mrs. Bernard Friedman and Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Radovsky, all of Chicago, for sharing with me and my wife our explorations of the land of the Soviets; to various Intourist officials for the success of the journey; and to all the members of that goodly company of scholars and journalists who, through the years, have contributed to American understanding of the Soviet Union.

None of those named (save my wife) has had an opportunity to make a critical appraisal of any part of the manuscript. That it would have benefitted from their comments is obvious. Since the exigencies of publication, in the face of many difficulties, precluded consultation, I can only thank them for whatever merits this work may possess and absolve them for all inaccuracies and inadequacies.

Last, but far from least, I am beholden to International Publishers, as are all students of Soviet affairs, for making available in translation most of the writings of Lenin and Stalin; to Random House for permission to reprint Pushkin's "The Prophet"; to the University of California Press for permission to reprint Konstantin Simonov's "Wait for Me"; to *The New Republic* for permission to reprint "Stalingrad" by Major George D. Brodsky; to Yale University Press for permission to quote various passages from the writings of David J. Dallin with whom, I fear, I disagree on many matters; and to other publishers

mentioned in the Notes for sundry quotations from, and references to, their publications.

These pages went to press amid the gloom induced by the deadlock at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, which terminates the narrative portions of this study. But the initial difficulties of peace-making, however prolonged, are no occasion for despair if a politically effective majority of Americans, Britishers and Russians perceive that the rebirth or death of contemporary world civilization depends almost exclusively upon the unity or disunity of the Super-Powers. Discord and rivalry for power represent the road to death.

This work is frankly intended to foster unity through a fuller understanding of the USSR on the part of the citizens of the Atlantic communities. Should it serve this purpose, even in small degree, it will have justified to the writer the time devoted to its preparation and, to the reader, the time required for its perusal. This book is long not because I lacked time to make it short but because the story here told cannot be made simple and brief without doing violence to the facts. Even when the hour is late and crucial issues press for immediate decisions, constructive action requires hindsight, insight and foresight. Some of each, I hope, will be found in what follows.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Williamstown, Mass., October 25, 1945.

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SOVIET POLITICS

I

FAITH AND WORKS

A Book of Origins

"Give them not a golden mountain, nor a honeyed river, and vineyards. Give them not heavenly manna! They will not know how to manage that mountain; it will be beyond their strength, and they will not taste the manna. Princes and noblemen, pastors, officials and merchants will hear of that mountain, and they will take away from them the golden mountain and honeyed river, the vineyards and heavenly manna; they will divide up the golden mountain among themselves according to their ranks, but the poor people will not be admitted, and there will be much murder, and much spilling of blood. The poor will have nothing to live on, nothing to wear, and nothing to protect themselves with against dark night; the poor will die of starvation, will freeze to death in cold winter. Give them rather Thy holy name and word. . . ."

*—Ivan the Theologue to Christ the
Heavenly King, in an old Russian
folk tale.*

THE PROPHET

Athirst in spirit, through the gloom
Of an unpeopled waste I blundered,
And saw a six-winged seraph loom
Where the two pathways met and sundered.
He laid his fingers on my eyes:
His touch lay soft as slumber lies,—
And like an eagle's, his crag shaken,
Did my prophetic eyes awaken.
Upon my ears his fingers fell
And sound rose—stormy swell on swell:
I heard the spheres revolving, chiming,
The angels in their soaring sweep,
The monsters moving in the deep,
The green vine in the valley climbing.
And from my mouth the seraph wrung
Forth by its roots my sinful tongue;
The evil things and vain it babbled
His hand drew forth and so effaced,
And the wise serpent's tongue he placed
Between my lips with hand blood-dabbled;
And with a sword he clove my breast,
Plucked out the heart he made beat higher,
And in my stricken bosom pressed
Instead a coal of living fire.
Upon the wastes, a lifeless clod,
I lay, and heard the voice of God:
"Arise, oh, prophet, watch and harken,
And with my Will thy soul engird,
Roam the gray seas, the roads that darken,
And burn men's hearts with this, my Word."

—ALEXANDER PUSHKIN, 1826.

(Translation by Babette Deutsch)¹

1. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc., from *The Works of Alexander Pushkin*, edited by Avrahm Yarmolinsky (New York, 1936), pp. 61-62.

APOCALYPSE

1. HOME-COMING

KARL MARX PROSPECT, known in the old times as Samsonevski Prospect, runs from north to south through the factories and tenements of the Viborg District. It parallels Bolshaya Nevka, one of the larger branches of the Neva delta. To the west, stretching flatly toward the sea among the winding waterways, are the scattered bits of land where the Great Tsar Peter began the building of the city—Aptekarsky, Petrovsky, Kristovsky, Yelagin and Kamenny Ostrov. The Prospect comes to an end on the main channel of the river, south of which lies the central section of the modern metropolis. Two blocks back from the water-front, and a half mile east of the point where the Prospect meets the Neva, stands a modest railway terminal known as the Finland Station.

Here, 50 minutes before midnight, a late train pulled in on the evening of April 16, 1917. On board, among others returning from exile, was a short, bald man with bull neck, barrel chest and bulging forehead. He wore a derby hat, a nondescript grey suit, and a new pair of shoes purchased in Stockholm a few days before. His eager face had keen hazel eyes, a broad nose, heavy lips, and a red moustache and chin-beard. After almost 10 years abroad, he was filled with excited anticipation on arriving in the capital city of the land of his birth. He was accompanied by his wife, a woman of severely plain appearance with goitrous eyes protruding from a round, intelligent face. They had no children. Eight days before they had been living in Zurich in a modest rented room near a sausage factory. Most of their daylight hours they spent in the

libraries. They ate little. Their income was small. War-time inflation reduced them almost to desperation.

"We have no money, no money!! That is the main difficulty!" he wrote in the fall of 1914. "As for myself," he wrote two years later, "I must say I've *got* to earn some money. Otherwise, I shall crack up, really! The high cost of living is just diabolical and I have nothing to live on. . . ."

The husband was a year younger than the wife. Six days later he would have celebrated his 47th birthday, if he had had time for trivialities. His father had been Ilya Nikolayevich Ulianov, come from Astrakhan to Simbirsk (now Ulianovsk) on the Volga. As a public school inspector, the father had attained the rank of "State Counsellor" and therewith become a member of the lesser honorary nobility. He had taught mathematics and physics. The teacher's wife was Maria Alexandrovna Blank, Lutheran daughter of a Russian army surgeon of Volga-German origin. Six of her seven children grew to maturity: Anna, Alexander, Vladimir, Olga, Dmitry and Maria. The man who reached Tsar Peter's city a month after the end of the Tsardom was her second son, born April 22, 1870, and named Vladimir Ilich. Like his brother Alexander, he attended the Simbirsk Classical High School. The then principal was Fedor Kerensky, blessed with a son also named Alexander and also born in Simbirsk when Vladimir Ilich was 11 years old. Inspector Ulianov, always a sober, studious and industrious citizen, died of a stroke in January, 1886.

From these parents the son who reached the Finland Station inherited much in the texture of his bones and flesh and still more in the qualities of character and mind which life in this household had fostered. Domed head and wide nose, broad face and high cheeks, sharp and slightly slanted eyes—these were the marks of father and son alike. They were also a hint that their forebears had lived along the Volga during the remote centuries when the irresistible Mongols had come out of Asia to conquer the land and rule its people and mingle with them until the descendants of both were subtly changed. To his *Hausfrau* mother, Vladimir owed traits (once deemed "German," before the great Germanic madness) which set him apart from many members of the old Russian intelligentsia: industry, punctuality, neatness and an aura of puritanism, even in his fiercest battles against convention, which made him abhor the drunkenness, promiscuity and idle disputation often

carried on by his fellows in a disarray of cigarette butts, soiled laundry and scattered books and papers. To the Ulianovs, problems were not things to be talked about but challenges calling for action. Disorder was not something to be tolerated but something to be turned into order.

A month before Vladimir graduated from High School, he and his family were horrified by the news that brother Alexander, then a zoology student in St. Petersburg, had been arrested, along with sister Anna, for participating in a terrorist plot. The target of the proposed assassination was another Alexander, surnamed Romanov and crowned Tsar as the third of his name in the reigning dynasty. Vladimir had loved his older brother to the point of devotion and imitation. They had grown apart since their boyhood adventures, not the least of which was playing long chess games. Alexander was self-centered and moody, Vladimir mischievous and boisterous. But the bonds between them were perhaps as close as those between brothers can ever be. At the age of 17 Vladimir Ilich, having lost his father but a year before, was temporarily bereft of his mother who hurried to her imprisoned children in the capital. He was now to lose forever the most cherished comrade of his childhood. Anna, who knew nothing of the plot, was released. Alexander boasted of his convictions and admitted that he had helped to make the bomb intended to kill the Tsar. Despite his mother's pleas, he was judged guilty and hanged on May 20, 1887. He who had sought to take a life in the name of justice lost his own in the name of justice. To the brother in Simbirsk, this justice was injustice.

The bereaved and embittered Ulianov family moved that summer to Kazan, still clinging, as if for safety, to the friendly banks of the broad Volga. Vladimir entered the law school at the University. But in December he was arrested for attending an illegal student assembly. His punishment was expulsion, plus exile in a nearby village. When he returned to Kazan in the summer of 1888, he was still barred from the University. He played chess with his younger brother, Dmitry,* and began reading Karl Marx.

As he left the train in the Finland Station, Vladimir Ilich gave no thought to these events of 30 years before. Neither was he

* Dmitry Ulianov, an early member of the Bolshevik group, practiced medicine for many years in the Crimea and died at Gorki, near Moscow on July 16, 1943, at the age of 69.

imbued with any patriotic pride, nor with any joy over the abdication of Nicholas II and the appointment of Alexander Kerensky, son of his old school principal, as Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government of the new republic. Another world-shaking event, 10 days old, likewise left him cold: the declaration of war by the Congress of the United States of America against the Hohenzollern Reich, which had already inflicted a crushing defeat upon Russia. The returning émigré was preoccupied with more immediate matters. A delegation greeted him on the platform and presented him, amid smiles and tears, with a bouquet of roses. In apparent embarrassment he hurried on, coat unbuttoned and face pale, to the special waiting room once reserved for the Tsar. There, to his chagrin, he was met by the President of the new Petrograd Soviet, Nikolai Semenovich Chkhcheidze, leader of the Menshevik faction of the Social Democrats, whom the man from Zurich had bitterly fought for many years.

Chkhcheidze, addressing the traveller by the pen name through which he was known in revolutionary circles, declared somewhat pompously: "Comrade Lenin, in the name of the Petrograd Soviet and of the whole revolution, we welcome you to Russia . . . but we consider that at the present time the principal task of the revolutionary democracy is to defend our revolution against every kind of attack, both from within and without. . . . We hope that you will join us in striving toward this goal."

Lenin looked at the ceiling and fingered his roses. He finally spoke not to Chkhcheidze or the welcoming committee but to the surrounding crowd:

Dear comrades, soldiers, sailors and workers, I am happy to greet in you the victorious Russian Revolution, to greet you as the advance guard of the international proletarian army. . . . The war of imperialist brigandage is the beginning of civil war in Europe. . . . The hour is not far when, at the summons of our comrade, Karl Liebknecht, the people will turn their weapons against their capitalist exploiters. . . . Not today, but tomorrow, any day, may see the general collapse of European capitalism. The Russian Revolution you have accomplished has dealt it the first blow and has opened a new epoch. . . . Long live the International Social Revolution!

He went out to the platform. An officer saluted him and called a detachment of Kronstadt sailors to attention. A larger crowd cheered, shouting "Lenin! Lenin!" while searchlights flooded the

scene and a band played *La Marseillaise*. It was a welcome by the revolutionary sailors and workers of the capital. Lenin took off his derby and spoke a greeting, warning his hearers not to believe the promises of the Provisional Government. ". . . They are deceiving you. . . . The people needs peace; the people needs bread; the people needs land. And they give you war, hunger, no bread—leave the landlords still on the land. . . . We must fight for the social revolution, fight to the end, till the complete victory of the proletariat!" The crowd carried Lenin on broad shoulders to an armored car outside the Station. From the car he made another brief speech amid red banners and placards.

A kind of triumphal procession moved westward, crossed Samsonovski Prospect, poured over the bridge across Bolshaya Nevka to Aptekarsky Island, and soon came to rest before a high stone wall a few blocks northeast of the Arsenal and the Fortress of Peter and Paul. Within the gates was a garden. Within the garden was the palatial villa of the ballet dancer Kshesinskaya, a mistress of the last Tsar. Here the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats had set up HQ (needless to say, without the permission of the owner) in a confusion of luxurious candelabra, upholstery and statuary.

From a balcony of the villa Lenin had to make another speech to another crowd. He went in, was called out again, made a second speech, came back, listened impatiently to addresses of welcome in the ballroom, and then spoke again for two hours to the assembled throng. He was all fire, fury, denunciation. Even his best friends were shocked. "We don't need any parliamentary republic," he declared. "We don't need any bourgeois democracy. We don't need any government except the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies!"¹ Such phrases stirred skepticism rather than enthusiasm. He was reprimanding the compromisers among his comrades. The man from Zurich had no doubt as to what course he should take on the morrow. The night was almost gone. He went with his wife to the home of her relatives where they found a room.

Lenin was but one of many returning exiles. They sought, often in bitter struggles with one another, to give shape and direction to the hopes, fears and dreams, formless and stormy, of a liberated but confused people. They sought therewith to ride to power on the crest of the revolutionary wave. Lenin's train had on board 32

émigrés, including 18 other Bolsheviks, 6 representatives of the Jewish Socialist Bund, and 3 "internationalists" who had supported the paper *Nashe Slovo* (*Our Word*), published in Paris by Trotsky from January, 1915, to September, 1916. The latter group included the leader of the "internationalist" wing of the Mensheviks, Yulii O. Tsederbaum, whose revolutionary *nom-de-plume* was L. Martov. The grand old man of Russian Marxism, George V. Plekhanov, returned to Petrograd from France on April 13. He had become the pro-war and pro-Entente leader of the Mensheviks. The Russian exiles in Switzerland had naturally sought to return at once upon learning that the Tsar had abdicated.

As soon as the news had reached Zurich, Lenin had made up his mind as to what must be done. On March 16 and 17 he had sent letters to America through Alexandra M. Kollontai, formerly a Menshevik but now a supporter of Lenin's position. To her he wrote that no confidence whatever must be placed in the new Provisional Government, in Guchkov, Miliukov and Kerensky and also none in Chkheidze, Trotsky and other Mensheviks and compromisers. All efforts must be made to oppose the war, to promote social revolution, to establish a government of Soviets, to foster world-wide proletarian revolt. This view also found expression in the draft theses of March 17 which Lenin prepared with Gregory Zinoviev, and in the "Letters from Afar" (March 20-April 8) which Lenin sought, with only limited success, to have forwarded to Petrograd for publication.²

How to get back to Russia? The French and British Governments were certain to refuse passage to revolutionary firebrands who opposed continued Russian participation in the war. To pass through Germany would require special arrangements and would expose the exiles to the accusation of cooperating with "German Imperialism." But this was a risk which most of them felt justified in taking, since the alternative was to remain abroad indefinitely. Martov proposed that Berlin should permit the group to go through the Reich in exchange for a corresponding number of Germans and Austrians interned in Russia. Robert Grimm, a Swiss Socialist, was asked to approach his Government and to request its good offices. The Swiss authorities, however, refused to act. Another Swiss Socialist, Fritz Platten, then approached the German Embassy in Berne with a proposal from Lenin which the German Government and General Staff accepted two days later.

The other intermediaries in these negotiations were Alexander L. Helphand (Parvus), a brilliant and money-hungry German-Russian Socialist who made a fortune as a war speculator in the Balkans, and Jacob Hanecki, a Polish Socialist who was in Stockholm in the double capacity of Parvus' commercial agent and Lenin's political collaborator. The proposal was that Platten would accompany the exiles in an extraterritorial railway car which none of the passengers would leave at any time during transit.

The group did in fact pass through Germany in a "sealed car" to Copenhagen and thence proceeded to Stockholm and Petrograd. In their collective defense of this decision, presented by Lenin and Zinoviev to the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet immediately after their arrival (cf. *Pravda*, April 18, 1917), the exiles declared that "the Miliukovs would certainly make it easy for men like Liebknecht to return to Germany if they were in Russia. The Bethmann-Hollwegs have the same attitude toward the Russian internationalists. The internationalists of all countries have a right and a duty to utilize this gamble of the imperialist governments in the interest of the proletariat without changing their course and without making the slightest concession to the governments. . . . We consider admissible a revolutionary war against imperialist Germany—after the proletariat has seized political power in Russia." A group of Left Socialists in Berne, comprising Swedish, Norwegian, Swiss, Polish, French and German Marxists, took the same position in a formal declaration. From these circumstances arose the absurd story that Lenin was Ludendorff's agent or, in modern terminology, Quisling, sent to Russia to betray his country to the Reich. In fact Ludendorff, as he said in 1921 and repeatedly thereafter, had never heard of Lenin before 1917 and merely approved the wishes of the Chancellor, sharing his hope that the exiles would promote confusion and defeatism among the enemy. The exiles, in their turn, were merely using Berlin as a means of getting home with no illusions as to German motives.³

Other revolutionists returned to Petrograd as best they could from the far corners of the earth or from the remote provinces of the Empire to which many of them had been sent by Tsarist courts. From Siberia in late March came Lev Borisovich Rosenfeld, *alias* Kamenev, to become an editor of *Pravda* (*Truth*) and

leader of the Petrograd Committee of Bolsheviks. While still in Siberia he had sent a telegram of greeting to "Citizen Michael Romanov" upon learning that the Grand Duke, brother of the Tsar, had renounced the throne. He was at the outset favorably disposed toward the Provisional Government. Also from Siberia on April 1 came Iraklii G. Tsereteli, a Georgian and a Menshevik, chairman of the Social Democrats in the Second Duma and now doubly honored by being made a member of the Petrograd Soviet and Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government.

Among others who came back were Angelica Balabanov, female firebrand in Socialist circles all over Europe; Nikolai Bukharin, early Bolshevik and colleague of Trotsky on the staff of *Novy Mir* in New York; Dr. Fedor Dan, Menshevik member of the Petrograd Soviet and on the staff of *Izvestia*; Maxim Gorky (Alexei Peshkov), novelist and playwright who had organized a school at Capri for Russian Social Democrats; Nikolai V. Krylenko, Bolshevik agitator and friend of Bukharin who had been in the Tsarist Army where he became active in organizing revolutionary cells; Anatolii V. Lunacharsky, Bolshevik dramatist; Ivan Maisky, economist and Menshevik who was not to join the Bolshevik until after the civil war; Vyacheslav Molotov, underground Bolshevik agitator in Petrograd after 1914—arrested, exiled to Irkutsk province, escaped and now back as a leader of the Petrograd Soviet; Georgii L. Pyatakov, ex-anarchist but now a Bolshevik who had escaped from Siberia to Japan and returned to Russia by way of the United States and Europe; Gregory Y. Sokolnikov, Bolshevik exile who returned from western Europe and became an editor of *Pravda*; and Mikhail S. Uritsky, Menshevik in the early 1900's, "internationalist" during the war, Bolshevik early in 1917. Scores of other leaders, small and great, of all parties and factions flooded in upon Peter's city on the Neva, all knowing that here the destiny of the revolution would be decided.

Among them was a brilliant Jew, Lev Davidovich Bronstein, better known as Leon Trotsky, born October 26, 1879, son of a prosperous farmer in the Ukraine. The fall of the Tsar found him in New York where he had arrived with his family from Barcelona on the 13th of January. He had been expelled from France at the behest of the Tsarist Embassy for his revolutionary and defeatist articles in *Nashe Slovo*. He lived in an apartment in the Bronx (rent: \$18.00 per month), lectured in Russian and German to

immigrant audiences, and joined the staff of *Novy Mir* (*New World*) along with Bukharin, Volodarsky, Chudnovsky and other revolutionary émigrés. The news of mid-March left him in no doubt that the proletarian revolution in Russia was around the corner. He had long been a Menshevik searching for some middle ground between the two factions of the Russian Social Democrats. The outbreak of World War I found Trotsky "internationalist" (i.e., anti-nationalist) and anti-war (i.e., defeatist and seeking, like Lenin, to transmute world war into world revolution). He was not to join the Bolsheviks until July. But he sought to return to Petrograd at once. On March 27 he sailed with his family on a Norwegian vessel, only to be taken off and put into a concentration camp as a dangerous radical by the British police at Halifax. Not until April 29 was he released, thanks to representations made by the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government. It was early May before he arrived in Petrograd.⁴

Another who returned was a man who was less an intellectual than most of the rest and more of a patient and stubborn revolutionary fighter in the underground movement of the homeland. He was born on December 21, 1879, in the Georgian town of Gori near Tiflis. Vissarion Djughashvili, a peasant-cobbler, was his father. His mother, Catherine, a deeply religious woman probably of Ossetian ancestry, saw three of her babies die before the fourth was born. She named him for St. Joseph—Josef Vissarionovich—and dedicated him to God. Little "Soso" (his pet name) was scarred by smallpox at the age of seven. His father died when he was eleven. Through hard work his mother, always desperately poor, managed to send him to the seminary in Tiflis. "Soso was always a good boy," she told an American newsman 40 years later. "Soso was my only son. . . . His father said he would make a good cobbler. . . . But I didn't want him to be a cobbler. I didn't want him to be anything but a priest."

Before his 19th birthday, however, he had become a revolutionist and left the seminary behind him. His mother always insisted that he was not expelled. His first revolutionary name was "Koba." In 1917 he was in Siberian exile in the village of Kureyka in the Turukhansk district near the point where the great river Yenesei crosses the Arctic Circle. He had been arrested for the nth time in February, 1913. For four years he hunted and fished, cut wood and lived almost alone in the loneliness of the northland, sharing

a hut for a time with Jacob Sverdlov but having no real companions save his own thoughts. In March of 1917 he was free. With Kamenev and Muranov he came to Petrograd. The three took over the direction of the Bolshevik group and the editorship of *Pravda*. The man from Georgia also entered the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet by direction of his comrades. He had followed the fashion of many of his fellows in taking a name denoting strength. Thus Kamenev (really Rosenfeld) was The Stone, Molotov (actually Scriabin) The Hammer, and so on. The Georgian from Gori called himself Stalin.

2. THE VISION

Most of those who streamed from far places to the city at the mouth of the Neva in the spring of 1917 were burning with the fervor of a great faith. By its fire they were relentlessly driven to throw themselves into the vast conflagration springing from the loves and hates, the despairs and hopes, the frustrations and resentments of humble millions. In the eyes of their enemies and prospective victims, the flame within them made them dangerously mad adventurers and unscrupulous fanatics. Such twisted souls, filled with venom, lust for power and visionary schemes of reform, would, if they had their way, reduce to ashes all the shrines of piety, property and patriotism and leave all a ruin of black anarchy, tempered by despotism and bloodshed. But in the eyes of their sympathizers and followers, those who were glowing with the inner fire were holy men. Their eyes had seen the glory. Their hearts were uplifted. Like others before them who believed greatly, they had pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor to a great crusade. The mission to which they were dedicated was to lead the lowly into a kingdom of heaven on earth.

The long and passionate debate among the infidels as to which of these two judgments is correct is futile as a means to truth, whatever its uses may be in the arena of controversy. Both judgments are warranted, even if the truth of each is more often in the eye of the observer than in the persons observed. In a larger sense professional revolutionists cannot be distinguished from other mortals by attributing to them a greater or lesser degree of vice or virtue or a smaller or larger share of wisdom or folly. Like all children of Adam, they are neither beasts nor gods but humans—

that is to say, unstable and fluctuating mixtures of bestiality and divinity held together in that baffling synthesis whose paradoxical qualities have no name save "humanity."

What sets these violent souls apart from others is an experience which has become part of their very being and of their every act. It is an experience which all men and women know a little of, but which only the chosen few ever know to the full. That experience is one of sudden insight, followed by inspiration and consecration. The crucible from which the flame leaps up with a fierce white light is commonly called "religious conversion." In a secular age belief in a personal Deity and in individual immortality are not needed for this type of exaltation, nor are prayer, confession or the performance of the sacraments in church or temple a necessary part of its sustenance. Atheism, materialism and grim certainty that the grave is the end of the self are not incompatible with deep religiosity, if these convictions are part of a creed with which the believer is emotionally identified.

To be "religious," to experience "conversion," is to find oneself by losing oneself in a vision of the Good, the Beautiful and the True, in the service of which one gives all to one's fellows and demands all from them. Those who are so blessed or cursed are at once men like gods and men like beasts. For they know beyond all doubting that cruelty to others is often the price that must be paid for the salvation of the greater good, and that the self-denying sacrifice of the self is the ultimate proof of devotion to the ideal. Such men and women are infinitely valuable and infinitely dangerous. In past time they have frequently been fiends, imbued with a devilish fanaticism and driven to repudiate and destroy, through evil means toward ends they think good, all that is most precious in terms of human dignity and decency. They have as frequently been angels, inspired with a sublime heroism which has conserved and enriched the human legacy, albeit in the cause of ends often regarded by others as utterly evil.

The dedicated men and women of the Bolshevik Revolution all found enlightenment, power and inspiration to sacrificial devotion in the Vision. Each found it in his own way. All, having found it, ultimately came together to quarrel about its meaning or to unite in order to fashion the millennium which it forecast. It came to young Vladimir Ulianov when he was living with his mother in a small apartment in the old Tartar quarter of Kazan in the fall

of 1888, after he had been refused readmission to the University. He was at once filled with proselyting enthusiasm. Most of the local converts were arrested in the following spring, but Vladimir had been taken by his mother to a small estate in the province of Samara. He cultivated the peasants rather than the fields and was no success as a farmer and landlord. In 1891 he was permitted to take the law school examinations at the University of St. Petersburg. His grade was the highest of the 124 who participated. His joy was darkened by the death of his sister Olga who was also a student in the capital. She worked herself to exhaustion and contracted typhoid. Then as always in grief and adversity, he was sustained by his new faith.

Vladimir Ulianov later returned to Samara and dabbled at the practice of law. But in the autumn of 1893 he went again to St. Petersburg, where he began writing revolutionary pamphlets. A year and a half later he went abroad: Salzburg, Switzerland, Paris, Berlin. On his return at the close of 1895 he got himself arrested as a rebel and sentenced to imprisonment and then to exile in central Siberia. From January of 1897 until February of 1900 he was obliged to live in the village of Shushenskoye near Minusinsk, not far from the upper waters of the Yenesei. He began writing articles signed "N. Lenin" and also completed a book: *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. In July, 1898, he married Nadezhda Konstantinova Krupskaya, whom he had met in St. Petersburg. She too had seen the Vision. For both of them it was now the Resurrection and the Life.

To others the Vision came in such ways and at such times as seemed good to whatever gods preside over revelations. In 1898, while the young Russian who was to be Lenin was toiling diligently over his first book near the borders of Mongolia, the young Georgian who was to be Stalin was experiencing the Vision in Tiflis, not in the seminary, which he had left, but in workers' clubs and study circles in the rapidly industrialized Oriental city south of the Caucasus. Two years previously the Vision had come to the Jewish kulak's son who was to be Trotsky. He was studying in Nikolayev in the Ukraine and meeting radical students and forbidden books in the cabin of a Czech gardner. In 1898 it came to another young Jew whose talent for business was so exceptional that he was already, at the age of 22, the salaried manager of a sugar factory in Kiev. His name was Meer Wallach. Late in the

year he applied for membership in the secret brotherhood of those who had seen the light. He was at once accepted. He was to become famous later under the name of Maxim Litvinov. So to others, one here, a handful there, all imperceptibly gravitating, like moths toward a lamp, in the direction of a common center and a common dream of salvation, the Vision came, bringing to those whose lives it illumined a solemn and terrifying zeal to change man and change the world. By such brave resolves the early Christians must have been moved.

The Vision which stirred such fervor in certain segments of the Russian intelligentsia was in every case wrapped up in the covers of a book. It was far removed from the recorded word of the Prophets of Israel and from the Holy Writ of Christendom, even if it had some things in common with both. Its title was variable: *Capital* or *The Poverty of Philosophy* or *The Holy Family* or *The Communist Manifesto* or *Anti-Dühring*. But its message was always the same and its authors were the same: Karl Marx and/or Friedrich Engels. To sketch the life and work and impact on modern mankind of these two iconoclasts and seers would require a whole library of books. Few of the world's libraries are large enough to house all the books already devoted to these themes. "Revolutions," wrote Trotsky, "are always verbose."

Suffice it to say that Marx, born May 5, 1818, was the son of a Jewish lawyer of Treves who became a convert to Protestant Christianity when little Karl was six years old. In his youth the boy prodigy studied at Bonn and Berlin and achieved his Ph.D. at the age of 23. His radicalism precluded a university career. He became an editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* in 1842. The paper was suppressed early the following year. In the summer of 1843 he married Jenny von Westphalen, daughter of a public official and a descendant of the Duke of Argyle. Their marriage and family life through almost four decades was a model of tender affection and bourgeois respectability.

The young Marx was much under the influence of the philosophical followers of George Wilhelm Hegel and much interested in the ferment of Utopian and revolutionary socialism bubbling up among intellectuals and workers throughout western Europe. He went to Paris in the fall of 1843 and there wrote, among much else, that the emancipation of the Jews would require the liquidation of Judaism (by which he meant "capitalism" rather than the

faith of Abraham) and that the freedom of Germany and of the world would be possible only through a revolutionary reconstruction of human society undertaken by the new industrial working class or proletariat. In Paris he became a friend of Heinrich Heine. He also met Friedrich Engels. This robust and lusty German radical, born in Barmen, November 28, 1820, was the son of a wealthy cotton-spinner. At the age of 24 he had gone to Manchester, near which his father's firm had a factory, and established sympathetic contacts with the Owenites and the Chartists. After 1844 he was Marx's constant collaborator, even during the nineteen years (1850-1869) when he worked in Manchester in his father's business. At the age of 44 Engels took to wife an Irish working girl named Lizzy Burns, though he spurned a marriage ceremony until 1878 when, to please her on her deathbed, he consented to become her husband in law as well as in fact.

With his expulsion from France at the request of the Prussian Government, Marx went to Brussels, where he was joined by Engels and where he wrote sharp criticisms of Proudhon, Feuerbach and other Utopian radicals and post-Hegelian philosophers. In Brussels the two companions in rebellion founded a "German Workers' Society," took over a German weekly journal, and joined an international secret revolutionary organization called "The League of the Just." It was presently renamed "The League of the Communists." Toward the end of 1847 they wrote *The Communist Manifesto*. The revolutionary upheavals of 1848 found them back in Paris and then in Cologne where they founded the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* as "an organ of democracy." Marx was arrested, tried for treason, acquitted, expelled from Prussia and then expelled from France once more. He went to London where he lived for the rest of his life.

He dissolved the Communist League. He wrote articles. He endured poverty in Soho with his family and their faithful servant, Helene Demuth. The household was more often than not a welter of broken and dusty furniture, unwashed dishes, heavy pipe smoke, scattered books and papers and disorderly cooking. Sometimes they had only potatoes to eat. At other times Marx managed to pawn articles of clothing or to borrow money from friends. He and Jenny saw three of their children die in infancy. Three others, Jenny, Laura and Eleanor, grew up and in the fullness of

time married, respectively, Charles Longuet, Paul Lafargue and Edward Aveling. Marx suffered from boils, piles, liver trouble and recurrent pulmonary ailments. He had no regular income until he became a correspondent of the *New York Tribune*, edited in the 1850's by Horace Greeley.

Marx quarrelled with Ferdinand Lassalle and broke with him over Lassalle's support of the French cause in the French-Austrian war of 1859 in Italy. Marx studied the appalling human misery which spread in sooty slums all over the green land of England as the new machines and the "dark, satanic mills" poured out goods and profits and devoured men, women and children into a new slavery which was far worse than the serfdom of old. He thundered in righteous indignation at injustice and, like a new Jeremiah turned statistician and social scientist, forecast punishment of the wicked and the doom of the bourgeois world. The first volume of *Das Kapital* was published in 1867. Three years previously Marx had become one of the founders of the "International Working Men's Association," later to be known as the First International. This loose federation of world revolutionists broke up in consequence of sharp frictions between Marx and Mikhail Bakunin, coupled with other cleavages arising out of the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune of 1871. In the Commune, Marx saw the prototype of the proletarian dictatorship of the future which was to remake the world. The general council of the International moved to New York in 1872 and was formally dissolved at a conference in Philadelphia in 1876.

In his later years Marx, with grizzled beard and red-rimmed eyes, poor digestion and poorer family finances, was much of the time absorbed in his research in the British Museum. What he had believed were the death agonies of capitalism he saw now were growing pains. But he had no doubt of its ultimate destiny nor of the triumph and liberation of the wage-slaves. He remained a loving husband and father, but would never sacrifice the Cause for the comfort of his family or himself. Frau Marx died on December 2, 1881. Thirteen months later Marx's favorite daughter, Jenny, also passed away. The aging scholar and fighter was now broken in body and spirit. Engels called at the house a week before the beginning of spring to see whether Marx, confined to his bed with a lung abscess, was better or worse. He found that his friend had

gotten up, gone to his study desk, and there fallen into his last sleep. Marx was buried in Highgate Cemetery. Engels spoke at the simple funeral:

On the fourteenth of March (1883), at a quarter of three in the afternoon, the greatest living thinker ceased to think. Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history. . . . Marx was before all else a revolutionary. . . . He was consequently the best hated and most calumniated man of his time. . . . And now he has died—beloved, revered and mourned by millions of revolutionary fellow-workers, from the mines of Siberia to California, in all parts of Europe and America—and I make bold to say that though he may have many opponents he has hardly any personal enemies. His name will endure through the ages, and so also will his work! ⁵

Engels carried on Marx's work in London and completed *Das Kapital*. Even in his seventies he brought to his labors much more good food, good humor, wine and song than Marx would have deemed seemly. He lived until August 5, 1895.

That the work of Marx should have become a cult, even in his lifetime, was no source of joy to the author of the new gospel, even though he was a vain and somewhat intolerant man. He once exclaimed in irritation at his more sycophantic worshippers that *he* at least was "not a Marxist." But his words acquired peculiar magic by virtue of the very contradictions and conflicts within the body politic and body economic of the new civilization of the machine age which he set himself to analyze. The Marxist mythos lacked only the element of the supernatural to make it a fullblown religion. In an age of skepticism the lack was more than made good by the conscious identification of Marxism with the new deities of "Reason" and "Science." All else was here: the persecuted, bearded Prophet; the flaming summons to salvation; the ponderous Book to be cited and argued about by all and to be read by few; the fatalism of Destiny coupled with the demand for purposeful action; the millennial vision of a golden future; the heroes, saints and martyrs of the present and the past; the clash of the faithful and the infidels; and the more bitter clash of the orthodox and the heretics.

As with all new doctrines of social significance, Marxism was attacked by its foes not because it was wrong or irrational but because it was disturbing, dangerous and therefore detestable to

those whom it threatened with doom. It was similarly embraced by its converts not because it was right or rationally best among competing doctrines but because it was emotionally satisfying to those who were assured by its precepts that their sufferings were monstrous, their resentments were the voice of justice, and their triumph and salvation were written in the stars. Like all faiths that move men deeply, Marxism was both a new beginning and a summation of what had gone before. In Lenin's words: "Marx was the genius who continued and completed the three chief ideological currents of the 19th Century, represented respectively by the three most advanced countries of humanity: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines."⁶

3. THE GOSPEL

The true faith according to Marx and Engels is at once a cosmology, a philosophy of history, a hypothesis about society, a body of economic "laws," a theory of the State and of politics, and a call to social revolution. As an explanation of the Universe, Marxism postulates that the ultimate reality is not Mind but Matter, not Ideas but Things. But nothing is static, all things are in flux, as Heraclitus long ago contended. The anatomy of change is borrowed from Hegel at the same time that Hegel's idealism is repudiated in favor of materialism. The formula which explains how all things change is a triad: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. In the Hegelian dialectic, each entity begets, and is confronted by, its opposite. Out of interaction or conflict between them emerges a new entity, embracing both and yet different from both. This in turn becomes the point of departure for a further sequence of change.

In Marx's hands the word patterns used to describe this process became the ideological system of "dialectical materialism." The formula purports to explain social change no less than biological and physical change. All past human societies have been hierarchies characterized by a propertied, exploiting, ruling class at the top and a propertyless, exploited, ruled class at the bottom. History is the record of the struggle between classes, with each major conflict eventuating in a new synthesis which finally evolves into a new contradiction. Hence the term "historical materialism" to refer to this view of the human drama. Men's public acts are al-

leged to be determined, directly or indirectly, by their economic and class interests. Their civic conduct is thus not a product of any free choice or capricious Will but is shaped by the configuration of economic and social relations in which they live and move and have their being. Political power is a derivative of economic power. The State is the public organization of the ruling class to protect and further its interests. In his "economic determinism" Marx followed a view at least as old as Plato and one embraced, with variations, by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison and, before them, by James Harrington who wrote in his *Oceania* (1656) that the distribution of political power in society follows the distribution of property and that "bread-givers are always law-givers."

The most significant feature of the modern Western societies in the age of the machine, according to the Marxist dispensation, is the displacement of the feudal aristocracy by the bourgeoisie as the possessor of the most important means of production. Technological changes beget changes in the relationship of productive forces, and these beget changes in the class structure of society, of which all other aspects of culture are the superstructure. But the bourgeoisie cannot produce without bringing into being a proletariat to work the machines. The owners grow progressively richer and fewer while the workers grow poorer and more numerous. Commodities have value in proportion to the labor required to produce them or make them available. The laborer, however, does not receive in wages the equivalent of the value produced by his labor. The difference is "surplus value" which is expropriated by the capitalist who owns the tools of production. Capitalism is thus described as a vast scheme of exploitation by which the bourgeoisie robs the proletariat. Ultimately, through conflict between the robbers and the robbed, the system must disintegrate and be transformed into a new synthesis. This transition is represented as inevitable not necessarily because capitalism is ethically outrageous but because the laws of its own development lead to its destruction by making it increasingly impossible for the laborers to buy back the product of their labor at prices profitable to the owners of property.

Government is always the executive committee of the ruling class. The feudal State existed to enable the landowners to exploit the serfs. "The executive of the modern State is but a committee

for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." Politics is either a struggle for advantage among groups and factions within the ruling class, each seeking control of the rule-making and coercive apparatus of the State, or is a war between classes in which rulers and ruled are pitted against one another. The great struggle of today and tomorrow is between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The latter, by revolutionary action, must and will destroy the bourgeois State and build a new State in the form of a dictatorship of the proletariat which will end capitalism by expropriating the expropriators. This State will fashion the cooperative commonwealth of the toilers. In so doing it will establish, for the first time in history, a classless society. And since the State is always the instrumentality of class domination and exploitation, the State will wither away as the cooperative commonwealth achieves its goal. This ultimate synthesis will therefore inaugurate a wholly new and glorious epoch in the life of mankind in which freedom, equality and brotherhood will for the first time become concrete realities.

In the words of the original *Communist Manifesto*:

A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies. Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? . . . It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the spectre of Communism with a manifesto of the party itself.

The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of a feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: It has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat. . . . The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left no other nexus between man and man than

naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. . . .

Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. . . . The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!

To add a critique of this credo to the already gigantic mass of published criticism in all languages of the modern world would be a work of supererogation. Yet attention may usefully be directed to two aspects of Marxism, one of which is often forgotten by its converts and the other by its enemies. The former has to do with the social origin of Marxist verbalizers, organizers and leaders, and the latter with the historical relationship between the new faith and modern Liberalism.

Marxism was founded and propagated as a gospel for urban "wage-slaves." American workers have in the main been oblivious, indifferent and often actively hostile toward revolutionary agitators in general and toward Marxists in particular. But most of the mass following of Marxist parties in Russia, Germany, England, Italy, France and, at one time, China has in fact been recruited from the ranks of the toilers in factory, mill and mine. Marxist propagandists and political leaders, however, have almost without exception been individuals of bourgeois or aristocratic ancestry. One of the two founders was the son of a lawyer, the other a manufacturer. Lenin was the son of an official belonging to the lesser nobility. Trotsky was the son of a kulak. Almost all of their major

collaborators were lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists and even businessmen and landowners. Those who were not were commonly the sons or daughters of bourgeois or noble parents. Stalin, son of a cobbler, is the only notable exception. Even he was destined by his mother for the priesthood—scarcely a proletarian vocation. Marxist movements elsewhere have similarly been led by middle and upper class intellectuals and almost never by industrial workers.

The question of why this has been so is more easily asked than answered. Children who grow up in the homes of aristocrats, businessmen or professional people have greater opportunities to develop the arts of using words and influencing people than do the children of workers, and these talents are the stock-in-trade of the revolutionist. Children taught by well-to-do parents to reverence democratic and humanitarian values readily give meanings to these ideals which are subversive to the bases of their parents' income. Sons have unconsciously hated their fathers, even while consciously loving them, long before Sigmund Freud dramatized the fact. Priest and policeman, Pope and Prince, God and King, Church and State are father-symbols. Young men who become atheists and professional challengers of the *status quo* have displaced their private father-hatred onto public objects.⁷ The young Marx himself declared "I hate all the gods," though in the end he came close to worshipping the new Trinity of the Dialectic. Whatever the explanation, almost all the great rebels who have called the proletariat to revolt against the rich have been sons of fathers possessed of independent incomes or remunerative professional skills.

They have also been the heirs and devotees of the middle class creed of Liberalism. This ideology, as reflected in the great books and documents of the Dutch, English, American and French Revolutions, has been the peculiar cult of the modern bourgeoisie. Its noble and timeless ideals of human dignity, equality, freedom and brotherhood, to be sure, found eloquent expression in earlier epochs in the Protestant Reformation, in medieval communes, in the Roman Republic and in the immortal traditions of pristine Christianity, ancient Athens and early Israel. The champions of these values include the Hebrew Prophets, Pericles, Demosthenes, the Gracchi, Cicero, Jesus of Nazareth, the early Church Fathers and sundry theologians and reformers, along with William the

Silent, Cromwell, Mirabeau, Danton, Paine, Jefferson and Lincoln. Yet the modern mass faith of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity has been in a special sense the contribution of the rising middle class of burghers to the endless quest of man for self-realization.

Marxism, no less than anarchism, syndicalism and the Utopian socialisms, stems from this tradition. Its teachers and preachers, appealing to workers in the name of a new vision of freedom, were middle class intellectuals wholly and passionately committed to the democratic gospel. They identified themselves emotionally with the poor and lowly and sought to guide them toward a richer life and a more perfect democracy. Such was the call, as they themselves saw it, of Marx and Engels and of Owen, St. Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Edward Bellamy, William Godwin, Leo Tolstoy, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Georges Sorel and a host of others. In their pursuit of justice, the disciples of the Vision felt obliged to commit or condone injustice as a sometimes necessary means to a greater end. In their dedication to love and brotherhood, they were constrained by the exigencies of the quest for power (without which the Vision must needs remain unrealized) to preach and practice hatred and cruelty. In their crusade for a more perfect democracy, they came to sanction dictatorship. These aspects of the Soviet State, which is "dialectical" with a vengeance, inevitably obscure the genesis of the faith upon which it is built. The crucial question of whether and in what degree the means to the end have destroyed the end and made its servants the enemies of all they claim to serve will be considered in due course in these pages. Here it is enough to note that Marxism—first called "Communism" by its founders, later called "Social Democracy" and once more called "Communism" by Lenin and his followers—is as much in its professed ideals as in the social origins of its prophets and high priests the legatee of bourgeois democracy, egalitarianism and humanism, even when its immediate practices negate its ultimate purposes.⁸

If the evolution of modern democracy be envisaged in dialectical terms (an analytical procedure which non-Marxists and even anti-Marxists may occasionally find helpful), it may fairly be said that bourgeois Liberalism as a credo and a way of life represents the historical synthesis which emerged out of the protracted conflict between blue-blooded aristocrats (e.g., Cavaliers, nobles, slave-owners) and moneyed businessmen (e.g., Roundheads, Jaco-

bins, Abolitionists). But the new ruling class of merchants and artisans, butchers and bakers, candlestick-makers and bankers lost its initial solidarity under the impact of machine technology. Part of it, supplemented by recruits from a peasantry newly emancipated from serfdom, evolved into the modern proletariat, owning little property and selling its labor for wages and salaries paid by employers. The rest of it became the modern bourgeoisie in the Marxist sense—i.e., on the one hand, the great employers, entrepreneurs and financiers, usually owning large properties and living on income derived from control of capital, and on the other hand the lesser bourgeoisie or *Kleinbürgertum*, usually owning small properties and living on fees or profits from the sale to customers, clients or patients of their services as retailers, brokers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, engineers, journalists, professors, etc.

This new dichotomy of bourgeoisie and proletariat, comprising a thesis and antithesis in the Hegelian-Marxist sense, was paralleled by a growing ideological and spiritual cleavage reflecting the interests and aspirations of the new social entities. Originally the democratic values and ideals embodied in the concepts and customs of private property, enterprise for profit and large pecuniary rewards for commercial, managerial or speculative skills were inseparable from the democratic values and ideals embodied in the developing concepts and customs of universal suffrage, representative government, constitutionalism, civil liberties, and social and political equality. But for the new rich, and for the lesser bourgeoisie which aspired to wealth, the former set of values and practices was more important than the latter in the everyday business of living. Property and profits are inevitably valued more highly than democracy and freedom by those for whom the civic virtues of Liberalism are incidental to the enjoyment of the fruits of commercial and industrial enterprise. For the new poor, on the contrary, freedom and democracy seemed empty ideals so long as they offered no escape from want and fear.

This new confrontation of opposites, slowly emerging in the 19th Century, has assumed sharp and violent form in the 20th. Many spokesmen of mass discontent declared, in effect, that private property in the means of production had become incompatible with democracy, equality and social justice. Were not the latter a set of shams devoid of human content so long as the former bred economic inequality, oligarchy and exploitation? Many mar-

velled, with Anatole France, at that majestic equality of the law whereby the rich and poor alike were forbidden to steal bread or to sleep under the bridges at night. Such views commended themselves to many among *les misérables* who already perceived, dimly and gropingly, that political liberty fell somehow short of expectations so long as men without property or money had to choose between hunger and economic dependence on others. If those without property and without the freedom which goes with private wealth cannot enjoy these benefits, they easily embrace the conviction, engendered by frustration and envy of their social superiors, that no one should enjoy property or the freedom which goes with private wealth.

Marx and Engels exploited such sentiments with phenomenal success. In doing so they called for the abolition of Property as a means of preserving and fulfilling Democracy. In the eyes of their enemies the determination of Marxists to destroy private enterprise was more conspicuous than their devotion to a democracy of toilers, a judgment seemingly vindicated by observation of the subsequent practice of Soviet Communism. If the bourgeoisie increasingly sacrificed equality and liberty on the altar of Mammon, it is no less true that the only Marxists who have been politically effective have sacrificed democracy and freedom in order to abolish private ownership of capital. The original Marxist formula contemplated the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, the socialization of the means of production via the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the inauguration of the cooperative commonwealth which was to lead to the classless society, the withering away of the State and the millennial realization in a new context of the age-old ideals of the Good Society for which freemen have always fought.

Others found later a different answer to the dilemma. Many of those throughout the Western world who cherished property and privilege above democracy and equality—since the former made them great while the latter made them small—were to conclude at long last that the things they valued more could be preserved only by the sacrifice of the things they valued less. Private enterprise was menaced, so they believed, by political democracy and could be maintained only by political despotism. Since despots can no longer rule by divine right, they must find a new basis of mass support. The basis was to be supplied by the frenzied fanaticism

of the *Kleinbürgertum*, finally reduced to impoverishment by the maladjustments and stagnation of capitalist economy (as Marx had predicted) but still bitterly opposed (as Marx had not foreseen) to its own degradation to the level of the proletariat. The mad-dened little burghers, in their desperate anxiety to save themselves, embraced crazy creeds of reaction in the name of which all democratic values were repudiated. The monster born of this unholy marriage between the propertied few and the lunatic mob is called Fascism.

Not yet has modern mankind found the way to a new synthesis of these conflicting interests and aspirations. The practical application of Marxism in the USSR has produced a society rich in the realization of the ideals of fraternity and equality but poor in the values which accrue from private property rights and from political freedom and democracy. The fruits of fanatical anti-Marxism in the Fascist totalitarian States have been the temporary preservation of privilege and property at the expense of liberty and human decency, followed by the most appalling paroxysm of hatred and fear, blood and fire, ruin and death which the modern world has yet experienced. In the Atlantic communities the competing demands of propertied élites, fearful of the loss of income and opportunity, and worried masses, fearful of joblessness and want, remain poised in uneasy equilibrium. As Sir John Maynard puts it:

Freedom—or so it seems at present—is to be divided between East and West in mutually exclusive fractions: the one getting such freedom as depends upon economic equality, and the other such freedom as legal and political equality may be capable of creating. . . . But democracy itself is in flux: and is to be respected rather for its potentialities than for its achievements. The missing half of it—the economic half—is still to be supplied in the West. The long isolation of Russia from the West, and of the West from Russia, has kept the two halves of Democracy apart from one another. Are we to witness the coming together of the two in a complete whole? Only wishful thinking can answer, with conviction, Yes.⁹

Meanwhile the opinion may be ventured that Marxism, whatever its merits as a new religion may be, falls short of fulfilling its claims to being "scientific" in several important respects. The inadequacies and errors of its economic analysis of capitalism have many times been pointed out, as have its philosophical inadequacies.

cies and confusions. But these are less significant for the present and future than other shortcomings. Like classical economic theory, it assumes that man is essentially Economic Man, moved to action primarily by rational self-interest. So indeed he often is. But this component of human motivation is, at most, one-third of man, dubbed by Freud the "Ego" and governed by the reality-principle—i.e., by reason. Another third is the "Id," governed in Freud's terminology by the pleasure-principle. It is the merit of Marx that he called attention to the fact that economic interest plays a larger role in human affairs than most people are able to recognize or willing to concede. Freud, in turn, insisted that sex plays a larger role than is generally observed or acknowledged. The two views are by no means irreconcilable. Hunger and sex, in all probability, are both here to stay. The remaining third of man was termed by Freud the "Super-Ego," governed by the morality-principle. Conscience and libido cannot be explained as products of reason or of physical structure and needs. Nor are egotism and lust explicable in terms of ethics, nor religiosity and rationality in terms of sexual drives.¹⁰ Marxists themselves, with their passion for self-sacrifice and self-punishment, have been motivated far more by compassion (i.e., fully socialized libidinal impulses) and by ethical idealism (i.e., culturally inherited moral standards) than by rational calculations of self-interest. Marxism is thus inadequate in its description of human nature and therefore falls short of being a reliable psychology.

The hypothesis, moreover, that the meaning of history and of social change lies in the record of class struggles overlooks the fact that most men in most places through most of recorded time have cheerfully acquiesced in the class stratifications of the societies in which they found themselves and have indeed been disposed to regard them as part of the immutable fundamentals of the Universe. Willing collaboration among upper and lower classes is the norm through historic time. Class conflict is abnormal and exceptional. The present age, to be sure, is an abnormal and exceptional time and has been so for a century and a half at least. Class war is a helpful clue to social and political dynamics in periods of crisis, though even in such epochs people are as often moved to public action by the symbols of nation, race or creed as by those of class. To make the class struggle a universal principle of historical interpretation is to do violence to the known facts of the

human adventure through the ages. Marxism is thus inadequate in its description of social relationships and processes and therefore falls short of being a reliable sociology.

The Marxist view that the State is merely an instrumentality of oppression utilized by the ruling class in its own interest, and is therefore destined to disappear in a "classless" society, likewise is at variance with observable realities. In all actual and imaginable human communities, the many are led and commanded by the few. The State is everywhere a set of symbols and practices through which the few, through the more or less wise and masterly distribution of force, fraud and favors, mobilize the obedience of the multitude. It therefore appears likely that the State will persist regardless of the class structure or the "classlessness" of any conceivable society. Like laissez-faire liberals and philosophical anarchists, Marxists regard the State as evil. Whereas liberals have invariably viewed it as a necessary evil, Marxists would abolish it in the wake of social revolution. While anarchists have deemed it an unnecessary evil, to be abolished forthwith by mass repudiation of its edicts, Marxists have looked upon it as the essential instrument of the transition from capitalism to the cooperative commonwealth. In any case, however, the State in fact fulfills needs and satisfies desires which transcend the exigencies of class interest and class rule. Marxism is thus inadequate in its evaluation of the social role of government and therefore falls short of being a reliable political science.

Finally, Marxism was wholly in error, as judged by the easy wisdom of hindsight, in postulating that the lower middle class would be merged into the proletariat and that the proletariat would become the most numerous social stratum in the age of advanced industrial capitalism. The progress of technology, the rationalization of production and the constantly increasing efficiency of labor have everywhere meant that the number of factory workers has declined, relatively and sometimes absolutely, in relationship to the number of managers, engineers, advertisers, salesmen, middlemen, retailers and sundry dispensers of skills and services. The sickness of mature capitalism has become more a phenomenon of the insecurity of this large and ever growing lower middle class than of the poverty of the proletariat. Wherever such insecurity has become intolerable, its victims have not only refused to make common cause politically with their social

inferiors but have instead denounced and attacked organized labor, furiously persecuted all Marxists, adopted fantastic cults of salvation and assisted their social superiors in the establishment of new despotisms of corrupt demagogues and swashbuckling desperados.¹¹ Marxism was thus inadequate in its political prognosis and therefore fell short of being a reliable guide to the actual course of the world revolution of our time. The proletarian dictatorship, which should have come first in the most advanced industrial countries, came first in rural Russia by virtue of unique historical circumstances having little to do with the Marxist "laws" of capitalist development. It never came at all in Germany, France, England and America and has for the present at least passed out of the realm of the politically possible.

These *lacunae* and *errata* of Marxist theory can of course be matched by comparable or graver shortcomings in all other bodies of social doctrine. It is never given to man to know the whole truth, least of all about himself, lest he go blind or mad. He possesses only the power to detect untruth in the mouths of those who claim a monopoly of truth. Every political philosophy is a revelation to its converts and a jumble of nonsense to its critics. All must nevertheless concede that no other gospel with a similar mass following has ever come closer than Marxism to being an effective weapon of social analysis and prediction as well as a faith moving men to action. Its errors have in part been recognized and rectified by its disciples. Yet the errors themselves, and the very process of correcting them or denying them, explain much that is otherwise baffling in the theory and practice of Soviet Communism, in the activities of the Comintern, and in the politics and diplomacy of the USSR.

RED OCTOBER

1. THE APOSTLES

KARL MARX was more surprised than pleased to learn in the autumn of 1868, the year after the first volume of *Das Kapital* had been printed in German, that a Russian edition was being prepared in St. Petersburg. It was the first translation. To the end of his days Marx waited in vain for an English version. "It is an irony of Fate," he wrote to his friend, Dr. Ludwig Kugelmann, "that the Russians, whom I have fought for twenty-five years, and not only in German but in French and English, have always been my 'patrons.'" For many years Marx had seen in Russia only a fortress of reaction. His quarrels with the Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1871), did not alter his judgment. Engels began studying Russian in 1852 in order to meet the enemy on more equal terms. He ridiculed the notion of Alexander Herzen that the Russian peasant commune offered promise that Russia might be the first nation to lead Europe to socialism.

Only belatedly did Marx study Russian and take a lively interest in Russian developments. By 1877 he could write that "this time the revolution will begin in the East, hitherto the unbroken bulwark and reserve army of counter-revolution."¹ Engels opined in 1875 that "the overthrow of Russian Tsardom, the dissolution of the Russian Empire, is one of the first conditions for the final victory of the German proletariat. . . . A foreign war might greatly hasten it. . . . Russia is on the eve of a revolution . . . which, possibly started by the upper classes of the capital, perhaps even by the government itself, must be rapidly carried further, beyond the first constitutional phase, by the

peasants . . . of a revolution which will be of the greatest importance for the whole of Europe if only because it will destroy at one blow the last, so far intact, reserve of the entire European reaction.”² Six years later, shortly before he died, Marx toyed cautiously with the idea that Russia might not be obliged to pass through all the stages of capitalistic development but might conceivably develop a collectivized agriculture and a socialist industry in the wake of revolution . . .³

The gospel of socialism, like the later practice of socialism, came earlier to Russia than Marx and Engels had anticipated. The cause lay partly in the misery of the Russian proletariat which was a victim not of the stagnation of an old capitalism but of the painfully retarded development of a young capitalism. The cause lay also in the receptivity to “advanced ideas” of the radicalized intelligentsia. The authors of *The Communist Manifesto* and their immediate successors were necessarily preoccupied with the advanced industrialized communities of the West. The original “International,” established in 1864, had adherents as far east as Hungary and Poland but none in Russia proper, aside from the admirers of Bakunin who was expelled by the Marxists in 1872 and founded his own short-lived rival International. The Second International of Marxist Socialists was founded in 1889 at a conference in Paris. George V. Plekhanov (1856–1918) appeared at its first meeting to assert: “The Russian revolutionary movement will be victorious as a revolutionary movement of workers. There is and can be no other alternative.”

The Second International flourished during the years of greatest growth of Socialist parties in Germany, France, Italy and Britain. Its Bureau, of which Lenin was ultimately a member, met for the last time in Brussels at the end of July, 1914. The organization went to pieces with the outbreak of World War I when the Social Democratic leaders, despite years of talk of halting war through the international solidarity of the revolutionary workers, discovered that they were better nationalists than internationalists and better patriots than revolutionists. With few exceptions they supported their respective governments in the “defensive” wars in which they claimed to be engaged. The Second International, with Communists excluded, was reestablished at the Hamburg Congress of May, 1923, at a time when the schism in every

country between the reformist, revisionist Marxists and the orthodox, uncompromisingly revolutionary Marxists had long since become complete.

The first thin and faltering dissonances of socialist agitation had long ago begun to make themselves heard among the "conscience-stricken gentlemen" of Muscovy. Among the revolutionary officers who sought, without popular support and without success, to achieve a constitution by rebellion in December, 1825, was one Colonel Paul Pestel who was a kind of early socialist seeking to effect reforms by political action. Prior to his exile in 1835, Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) was one of the young intellectuals at the University of Moscow, along with Bakunin, K. S. Aksakov and Vissarion Belinsky. Among such troubled spirits the soul-searing quest for truth and justice in the face of obscurantism and repression paved the way for the introduction and spread of Western social doctrines. Herzen was the illegitimate and wealthy son of a nobleman. He was a pioneer of socialism, of his own special variety, and saw hope in the humble peasant and the village *mir*. N. G. Chernyshevsky (1812-1889), whose books were much read by both Marx and Lenin, anticipated Marx in his quest for socialism through political action, industrialization and economic necessity. His novel, *What Is To Be Done?*, is a Fourierist picture of the cooperative commonwealth. Bakunin dreamed wildly and weirdly of the destruction of the State through an insurrectionary conspiracy, organized by a compact, disciplined elite.

Peter Lavrov, at one time editor of the revolutionary journal *Peoples' Will* (*Narodnaya Volya*), urged the intellectuals to go to the people, to arouse the masses of peasants and to kill oppressive officials. His group was nicknamed "The Marxists," though its members were far from Marxists. The mid-century Nihilists, who repudiated all established values and institutions, gave way in the 1870's to the Populists (*Narodniki*) who looked to the peasantry for revolution and preached and practiced terrorism. Stepan Khalturin (executed, 1882), a worker who organized workers and saw the hope of revolution in a general strike, complained: "As soon as we have started something going, bang!—the intellectuals have killed somebody, and the police are on us. Why don't they give us a chance to organize?"⁴ The Social Revolutionary party, preaching revolt to the peasantry and finding its

principal theoretician in Victor Chernov (1876-), was the residuary legatee of the Populist tradition. Socialism had come to Russia in these earlier movements, but not yet Marxism.

The Communist Manifesto appeared in Russian in a translation made by Bakunin in the early 1860's. It was published in Herzen's journal, *The Bell*, which was smuggled into the empire from abroad. *Das Kapital*, Vol. I, was published in Russian in 1872. Plekhanov, originally linked with the *Peoples' Will*, went to study abroad and became the first notable Russian missionary of Marxism. In September, 1883, six months after Marx's death, Plekhanov, along with V. I. Ignatov, L. G. Deutsch, Paul B. Axelrod and Vera I. Zasulich, founded in Geneva the "Emancipation of Labor Group." Their initial objective was to convert the Populists to Marxism. In 1884 and 1887 the Group prepared drafts of a program for a Social Democratic party, the earlier of which still countenanced individual terrorism which Marx had always opposed. The plot on the life of the Tsar, for which Lenin's brother was hanged, was one of the last outbreaks of terrorism in the closing years of the century, although the weapon of assassination was revived by some of the Social Revolutionaries ("SR's") after 1905 and again in 1918. By the early 1890's the little group of Russian Marxists had come to be known as Social Democrats, ("SD's") after the term long current in Germany.

The steel barbs of intellectual dissent and popular unrest, hurled against the flint-covered citadel of the Romanov autocracy, struck off small showers of sparks, some of which fell into inflammable material. One of the small fires thus kindled was the work of young Vladimir Ulianov. He had already penned attacks on the Narodniki and on the so-called "legal Marxists." He brought together in St. Petersburg in 1895 a score of small Marxist circles, ambitiously christened the "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class." He agitated and wrote strike leaflets. Even after his arrest in December, he issued pamphlets from jail and drafted a party program between the lines of a medical book, using milk as invisible ink. In October, 1897, the Jewish Social Democrats formed their Bund. With Lenin now in Siberian exile, his "League of Struggle" fell under the influence of such men as Peter Struve, S. Bulgakov and M. Tugan-Baranovsky. These "legal Marxists" and "Economists" had much in common with the "Revisionist" Marxism which was beginning to

take shape in Germany under the aegis of Eduard Bernstein. This father of reformism was already arguing that the expected cataclysm of capitalism, followed by proletarian uprising, was doubtful and that the ultimate goal might well be reached not by violent revolution but by gradual and peaceful evolution. His counterparts among the Russian Marxists urged that political objectives be minimized or postponed in favor of efforts to promote trade unionism and economic benefits for wage earners.

Another fire was lighted in the year 1898. It was at once extinguished. At the time it was scarcely noticed save by the few directly involved. But in retrospect it became a beacon by which the whole subsequent course of Marxism in Russia was charted and measured. Several local "Leagues of Struggle" (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav) joined with the Bund in sending delegates to a secret congress held in the month of March in the Byelo-Russian city of Minsk. Only nine delegates arrived. They were obscure local leaders.* All the outstanding Marxists were abroad or in Siberia. The nine proclaimed the founding of the "Russian Social Democratic Labor Party." They adopted a somewhat vague Manifesto, drawn up by Struve. They further named a "Central Committee." But they had no skill as yet in evading the Tsarist police. Very soon all were under arrest. Nothing actually resembling a "party" was left. The fire was out, leaving only scattered ashes and a little smoke. Yet this tiny gathering came later to be designated as the First Congress of the RSDLP. All the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are numbered from the meeting of the nine forgotten men in Minsk.

Lenin completed his sentence of exile early in 1900. He had carried on correspondence in which he assailed the "Economists." He had completed his book, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, and devoted himself to the problem of revolutionary strategy. During the spring he conferred in St. Petersburg and Pskov with Vera Zasulich, Martov, Struve and others over the split in the League of Russian Social Democrats abroad and over

* The names of the nine delegates who attended the first Congress of the RSDLP in Minsk were S. Radchenko (Moscow League of Struggle), A. Vannovsky (Ekaterinoslav League of Struggle), K. Petrusevich (Kiev League of Struggle), P. Tuchapsky, two delegates from a Kiev workers' paper by the names of Eidelman and Vigdorchik, and three delegates from the Bund: A. Kremer, A. Mutnik and S. Katz.

his project of publishing abroad a Marxist journal. At the end of May he was again arrested but soon released. In July he went to Germany and then to Switzerland where he made contacts with Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich and other exiles. An editorial board (Lenin, Zasulich and A. N. Potresov) was established in Munich for the new journal which was printed in Leipzig. Its first number appeared on December 11, 1900, as the organ of the RSDLP. It was named *Iskra* (*The Spark*). Its motto was taken from the reply of the Decembrists of 1825 to greetings sent them in Siberian exile by Russia's greatest poet, Alexander S. Pushkin (1799-1837): "From the spark will spring the flame!"

In the pages of *Iskra* during the second and third years of the new century there began to emerge Lenin's conception of the organization and activity of the Marxist Party of revolution. That conception was in sharp contrast to the views of the "legal Marxists," "Economists" and many others who favored a large, loose mass grouping of all available sympathizers. Consistently and stubbornly Lenin argued that the Party could never fulfill its task unless it became a small secret brotherhood of carefully selected disciples, highly trained, rigorously disciplined, pledged to unquestioning obedience to its leaders and prepared to give all to the cause. Only such a sect of professional revolutionists, he insisted, could protect itself from the political police and prepare itself, when the time should be ripe, to seize power. Loose talk, endless debate, public discussion and voting on goals and tactics, perpetual compromise in the democratic tradition among factions within and with critics outside, constant efforts to win more converts by opportunistic popular appeals—all these things, held Lenin, would be fatal to the enterprise. What was needed was a centralized, regimented conspiracy of those who would give all their time to the crusade and would be supported and financed by Party funds. Inside the brotherhood there would be democracy at the time when the Party should be able to become open and legal. Elected delegates of local groups would then meet in congress and decide by discussion what the Party line should be. But even then, once a decision should be voted, all members must carry it out at any cost and regardless of their personal views. This principle of organization came to be known later as "democratic centralism."

Lenin outlined this conception in the fourth issue of *Iskra*, May, 1901, under the title "Where to Begin?" During the winter of 1901-02 he developed it at length in a detailed criticism of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, journal of the Economists, Bernsteinists and compromisers. On the cover of this remarkable essay, published in Russian in Stuttgart in March, 1902, under the title *What Is To Be Done?* (*Shho Dyelat?*), Lenin quoted a letter from Lassalle to Marx of June 24, 1852: "Party struggles give a party strength and life. The best proof of the weakness of a party is its diffuseness and its blurring of clearcut differences. . . . A party becomes stronger by purging itself." It is worthy of note that in these pages Lenin commended the democratic practices of the German Socialists (though praising them for maintaining a continuity of central leadership which seemed to many far from democratic) and argued that the type of professional, conspiratorial Party which he was urging was necessitated by the lack of freedom of political action in Russia. He seems to be saying that fire must be fought with fire. But the principles of organization he advocated were destined to transcend by far the strategic necessity of battling the Tsarist autocracy and to persist in their fully developed form long after the Romanovs were no more. They are best put in Lenin's own words:

The Social-Democrat's ideal should not be a trade-union secretary, but a *tribune of the people*. . . . We must "go among all classes of the people" as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organizers. . . . He who forgets his obligation to *be in advance of everybody* in bringing up, sharpening and solving *every* general democratic question, is not a Social-Democrat. . . . *Iskra* desires to elevate working-class trade-union politics (to which, owing to misunderstanding, lack of training, or by conviction our practical workers frequently confine themselves) to Social-Democratic politics, whereas *Rabocheye Dyelo* desires to *degrade* Social-Democratic politics to trade-union politics . . .⁵

A small, compact core, consisting of reliable, experienced and hardened workers, with responsible agents in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organisations of revolutionists, can, with the wide support of the masses and without an elaborate set of rules, perform *all* the functions of a trade-union organisation, and perform them, moreover, in the manner Social-Democrats desire. Only in this way can we secure the *consolidation*

and development of a *Social-Democratic* trade-union movement, in spite of the gendarmes. . . . If we begin with the solid foundation of a strong organisation of revolutionists, we can guarantee the stability of the movement as a whole, and carry out the aims of both Social-Democracy and of trade unionism. If, however, we begin with a wide workers' organisation, supposed to be most "accessible" to the masses, when as a matter of fact it will be most accessible to the gendarmes, and will make the revolutionists most accessible to the police, we shall neither achieve the aims of Social-Democracy nor of trade unionism . . .⁶

(I contend:) 1. that no movement can be durable without a stable organisation of leaders to maintain continuity; 2. that the more widely the masses are drawn into the struggle and form the basis of the movement, the more necessary is it to have such an organisation and the more stable must it be (for it is much easier then for demagogues to side-track the more backward sections of the masses); 3. that the organisation must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolution as a profession; 4. that in a country with a despotic government, the more we *restrict* the membership of this organisation to persons who are engaged in revolution as a profession and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to catch the organisation; and 5. the *wider* will be the circle of men and women of the working class or of other classes of society able to join the movement and perform active work in it. . . . "Broad democracy" in party organisation, amidst the gloom of autocracy and the domination of the gendarmes, is nothing more than a *useless and harmful toy*. . . . Only abroad, where very often people who have no opportunity of doing real live work gather together, can the "game of democracy" be played here and there, especially in small groups . . .⁷

The only serious organisational principle the active workers of our movement can accept is: strict secrecy, strict selection of members, and the training of professional revolutionists. If we possessed these qualities, "democracy" and something even more would be guaranteed to us, namely: complete, comradely, mutual confidence among revolutionists. And this something more is absolutely essential for us because, in Russia, it is useless to think that democratic control can serve as a substitute for it.⁸

This blueprint for a Party of professional conspirators had little in common with the political conceptions of the SR's or of the liberals of the *Zemstvos* who in 1902 established the "Liberation" group which was to be the nucleus of the Constitutional Democrats or "Cadets." It bore indeed little resemblance to any

modern conception of a political party. Its prototypes must be sought in contexts far removed from legislative halls and election campaigns. Bakunin had dreamed of such a corps of dedicated comrades in his revolutionary vision of demolishing the State. Other foreshadowings are to be found in the 19th Century writings of Tkachev and Nechaiev, both early "Jesuits" of the revolutionary movement. The Carbonari who paved the way for the Italian *Risorgimento* were, in some measure, such a fellowship of conspirators, organized like a secret army to do or die. Political Freemasonry and Jacobinism before and during the French Revolution exhibit a certain resemblance to Lenin's view in their structure and strategy. A still closer approximation is furnished by the Society of Jesus, founded by Ignatius Loyola as the fighting arm of the Church in the Counter-Reformation.

Lenin in fact planned his Party as a militant monastic order of consecrated men and women, accepting the Gospel, inspired by the Vision and selflessly dedicated to the Cause. The political weapon thus forged, first in the heat of secret plotting and later in the fire of revolution, became Lenin's tool of victory, for it proved more potent than all weapons turned against it. Like a Slavic Siegfried, the man from the Volga fused broken fragments into a mighty sword and with it slew the dragon, defied the gods and brought the old order to an end. By this sword, as sharp in peace as in war, the Soviet Union has been hacked out of a formless human mass into its present shape. The blade has been greatly altered in the process. But it is still today in all its essential contours and qualities the weapon originally planned by Lenin.

This weapon was first tempered in the midst of bitter struggle among the Russian Marxists. Their controversies were marked by anger, frustration and fanaticism on all sides, by numerous rifts and schisms, and by schisms within schisms in bewildering profusion. Sweet reasonableness and friendly compromise seldom characterize political debates in which the participants envisage the issues as those of life and death or of eternal salvation and damnation. Democratic virtues are conspicuous by their absence in the history of the RSDLP, both before and after 1917. Its record, full of fierce clashes over revolutionary strategy and tactics amid an almost Byzantine atmosphere of theological disputation and intolerance, is too complex and tedious to be reviewed in all its tortuous details. A brief outline must serve to indicate the general

course of the turbulent stream which sprang almost imperceptibly from the Russian earth in 1898 and finally overflowed its banks, bursting all dams and barriers in October of 1917.⁹

Congress II of the Party met in Brussels on July 30, 1903, and presently moved to London under pressure from the Belgian police. There were 43 delegates from 26 scattered groups, most of them in exile. Three-quarters of them supported the line taken by *Iskra*, but even these were split between followers of Lenin and of Martov. The Congress adopted a program proposed by the *Iskra* group. It was to remain in force until Congress VIII, held in March of 1919. The program was divided into two parts, maximum and minimum. The former demanded all-out social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat; the latter called for the end of Tsarism, a democratic republic, and legislative measures on behalf of workers and peasants. In the debate on rules Lenin, here supported by Plekhanov, urged a monolithic and militant Party, while Martov pleaded for a larger and looser organization. The first vote was 28-22 in favor of Martov. But the withdrawal of the Bund delegates in protest at the refusal of the rest to recognize them as the sole spokesmen of Russia's Jewish workers gave the "hard" faction (i.e., the Leninists) a majority over the "softs." A Central Committee composed of Lenin's supporters was chosen. On his motion, the delegates elected Martov, Plekhanov and Lenin to the editorial board of *Iskra*, but Martov refused to join. Lenin's followers, having a majority of the delegates at the end, came to be called "Bolsheviki" or members of the majority. The minority group by the same logic were "Mensheviki." After the Congress, Mensheviks Martov, Axelrod and Trotsky, now joined by Plekhanov, obtained control of *Iskra*, then in its 52nd issue, and began a campaign against Lenin's views.

This cleavage between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was no isolated phenomenon of Russian Marxism. It was paralleled in all the Socialist movements of the world after the turn of the century, with one faction accepting Bernstein and the orientation of the Fabian gradualists, while the other adhered to unrevised revolutionary Marxism. The broader issue was less one of party structure than of basic assumptions and purposes. Will capitalism collapse or will it not collapse? Should Marxists aim at violent revolution or at slow reform? Should socialism be sought through the dictatorship of the proletariat or through parliamentary democracy?

Those who gave different answers to these questions began to separate after 1900. In 1914 the schism became irreparable. In the years since World War I and the Russian Revolution, Socialists (i.e., Mensheviks) and Communists (i.e., Bolsheviks) all over the globe have time and again fought one another with words and weapons, held aloof in mutual suspicion and hatred, cooperated briefly in uneasy alliance, and again clashed in bitter rivalry. The split in the RSDLP thus reflected a world-wide trend. Those who cried "Workers of the world, unite!" everywhere acted on the slogan: "Marxists of the world, disunite!"

War and revolution after 1904 found the two factions farther apart than ever. Many Mensheviks were disposed to support, or at least not oppose, the struggle of the Tsardom against Japan. Many Bolsheviks held that defeat would hasten revolution. In May of 1904 Lenin published "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," assailing the Mensheviks and urging anew the need of a small, disciplined Party with iron discipline and a duty of obedience. The immediate issue was who should control the Party machinery. In the summer the Mensheviks succeeded in taking over the Central Committee. Their rivals, under Lenin, held a conference in Switzerland and called for a Third Congress. It was held in London in April, 1905, but the Mensheviks refused to attend, preferring to hold a congress of their own in Geneva. Only 24 delegates, all Bolsheviks, came to the London gathering which revised the Party statutes and concentrated power in the Central Committee. Lenin commented grimly: "Two congresses, two parties!"

As they watched the upheavals in Russia from afar, Lenin's supporters came out for a proletarian-peasant alliance against the Tsardom, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks favored a proletarian-bourgeois coalition and non-participation by the Party in any democratic regime which might be established. In their eyes nothing beyond a bourgeois government would be possible in the immediate future. Even Lenin, in his brochure of July, 1905, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," denied that any new regime could be other than bourgeois-democratic. Its victory "will by no means as yet transform our bourgeois revolution into a Socialist revolution." There must be a proletarian-peasant dictatorship to break the power of the autocracy and the landlords. "But of course it will be a demo-

cratic (i.e., bourgeois in ideology and purpose), not a Socialist dictatorship." Yet Lenin was presently suggesting that the Russian workers and peasants might together be able to make the transition to socialism, even though neither group alone could do so, nor could any such combination prove immediately effective in other communities. Here is the germ of the idea of "Socialism in One Country" which was to flower in Lenin's thinking in 1915 and to come to fruition twenty years later.

In October of 1905 there appeared in St. Petersburg and Moscow local bodies called Soviets (Councils) of Workers' Deputies which sought to mobilize mass unrest into revolutionary action. Lenin neither foresaw nor originally welcomed these spontaneous groups, but with his sure eye for people and politics he soon perceived that they could be made to serve the cause. He returned to Russia in November, became editor of *Novaya Zhizn*, visited Moscow, agitated, propagandized, conferred, went hither and yon in a fever of activity and yet reflected earnestly about the lessons of the events around him. The St. Petersburg Soviet was under Menshevik control. The Moscow Soviet, led by Bolsheviks, staged an armed uprising and was bloodily suppressed in December. Plekhanov and the Mensheviks declared the armed revolt a mistake. Lenin denounced them as traitors. Also in December Lenin attended a Bolshevik conference in Tammerfors, Finland. Here he met for the first time the young Georgian who was to be called Stalin.

Congress IV of the Party met in Stockholm in April of 1906. Both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks (including Lenin) attended, with the former having a majority of the 111 delegates. The new Central Committee consisted of three from each faction. But the unity here achieved was only formal. With the failure of the revolutionary movement and the inauguration by Stolypin of a program of reaction and repression, questions of political strategy became more controversial than ever. At Congress V, held in London in May, 1907, there were no less than 336 delegates, comprising 105 Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks and the rest uncertain. Despite Trotsky's efforts to organize a quasi-Menshevik middle group, Lenin won a majority to his view that the Party must fearlessly combat the "Black Hundreds," fight the conservative "Octobrists" and "expose" the SR's and Cadets. But Lenin's

victory abroad was small compensation for the failure of revolution at home. The Tsar dissolved the Second Duma on June 16 after Stolypin had alleged (falsely) that the Social Revolutionary deputies had connived in a plot to kill the Sovereign and that the Social Democrats were conspiring to establish subversive cells in the bureaucracy and the Army. The 65 SD deputies were arrested and exiled to Siberia.

On his return to Russia Lenin went into hiding and busied himself by translating Marx's letters to Kugelmann and Sorge. In August of 1907 he attended the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International and became a member of its Bureau. He and his wife rested in Finland in the autumn, settling down *incognito* at Kuokkala. To his mother, to whom he regularly sent affectionate and newsy letters, he wrote in October: "We are settled like a happy family in the old place. . . . Please give Mitya (his brother Dmitri, now a doctor in Moscow province) my warm greetings. I am sorry it was impossible to see him this autumn for we should have had some splendid hunting together. It was a magnificent autumn. . . . Here there are books and work. We walk along the seashore. . . . I kiss you and embrace you tenderly, my darling, and wish you good health."¹⁰ But the police soon became too inquisitive for comfort. Lenin left in December for Switzerland. He was not again to return to Russia until April, 1917. Ten years were to elapse between Congresses V and VI of the Party.

2. THE CONSPIRATORS

The day was the 26th of June, 1907. The place was Erivan Square in the city of Tiflis or Tbilisi—named for its springs, from the Georgian word for "hot." The hour was 10:45 a.m. Two carriages under Cossack escort were conveying carefully guarded packages across the square from the Post Office to the State Bank. The packages contained notes, mostly in five hundred ruble denominations, to the amount of 341,000 rubles. A bomb was thrown, then another, followed by several more with an obligato of revolver shots. Three men died. Many were wounded. The frightened horses pulling one of the carriages dashed up a street. A man hurled a bomb under their feet. Another man in a uniform dashed up furiously in a phaeton in apparent pursuit of the thieves. All was

confusion. When the smoke and dust cleared, all the money was gone, all the highwaymen were gone and the officer in the phaeton was also gone.

The mysterious "officer" who had directed the operation in so daring and masterly a fashion was a young Armenian named Semyon Arshakovich Ter-Petrossian *alias* Kamo. He was born in Gori, birthplace of Josef Vissarionovich Djugashvili whose ultimate *alias* was Stalin and whose *alias* then was Koba. Kamo had been converted to Marxism by Koba in 1901. He was an expert in carrying out fantastically improbable enterprises in the service of the Social Democrats of Georgia. In November, 1907, he was arrested in Berlin for carrying concealed weapons. In his possession were found some 500 ruble notes of the serial numbers reported by the Tsarist Government to have been stolen in Tiflis. He feigned insanity with such realism and fortitude that he was repatriated to Russia and sent back to Tiflis in 1909 as an incurable lunatic. Two years later, after sawing through his chains and window bars, he jumped down a cliff, made his way to the seacoast, became a stowaway in a ship leaving Batum and ultimately reached Paris. Here he visited Lenin who jovially called him "the Caucasus brigand." Kamo performed numerous other feats of daring in the years that followed, only to be killed in a bicycle accident in 1921.

A later legend included among the Tiflis "expropriators" of 1907 one Meer Wallach, *alias* Maxim Litvinov. In fact Litvinov was in Paris at the time posing as a law student named Dethiarsk. On January 18, 1908, however, he was arrested in the *Gare du Nord* as he was buying a ticket for London. The French police, advised by the police of Munich and Geneva and also by the Tsarist Embassy, knew that Russian revolutionary exiles were being picked up in various places with 500 ruble bank notes. Litvinov, who told the police that his name was Abraham Boris-souck, had twelve of the notes on his person. When he convinced the authorities that he had been in France when the robbery occurred and that he had gotten the notes from revolutionary colleagues, he was released but forthwith expelled from the country. He went to London where he was to remain for many years and where he married Ivy Low. The then French Minister of Justice adhered to republican traditions in declining to extradite persons accused of political crime. His name was Aristide Briand.

The Tiflis "robbery" was in truth a political crime, although the

details of its planning and results are still in controversy. During these years revolutionary groups of various complexions—sometimes joined by dubious persons more interested in cash than causes—were forcibly “expropriating” funds all over Russia to finance their secret organizations. Such tactics were publicly condemned by Lenin and by the London Congress of the RSDLP. Those who claim to know the secret history of the Party, however, are disposed to believe that Lenin maintained contacts with two trusted comrades for the purpose of raising money in strange ways and using it to send propaganda and weapons into Russia in anticipation of a new revolution. One was the philosophical Dr. Alexander A. Malinovsky, *alias* Bogdanov, the other an engineer named Leonid B. Zimin, *alias* Krassin. Whether this Bolshevik “technical bureau” in St. Petersburg had anything to do with the Tiflis “expropriation” is unclear. An investigating commission of the Central Committee was said to have made a secret report implicating certain Party members in counterfeiting money as well as stealing it. Many of the faithful would undoubtedly have regarded such means to their ends as fully justified. But the official Party line condemned such activities along with political assassination. In the sequel the Transcaucasian Committee of the RSDLP, then dominated by Mensheviks, secretly expelled from the Party the local Bolshevik leader who was believed to have secretly planned Kamo’s Tiflis exploit—i.e., Koba or Stalin.¹¹

Whatever may be the ultimate truth of the Tiflis affair, such enterprises suggest the atmosphere in which many of the Bolshevik leaders found themselves during the decade before the Revolution. Stalin was long an obscure and almost unknown figure among them, for he was not a publicist. The exiles lived by verbalizing, to the extent of splitting hairs and fragments of hairs in endless and devious disputations. Stalin went abroad only when revolutionary business urgently required it. Yet his experiences during these years revealed his qualities and are not untypical of the activities of thousands of workers in the Bolshevik “underground” within the Tsarist Empire.

As early as 1898 he was an agitator among the workers in the railway shops of Tiflis. “Perhaps,” he declared in a speech in Tiflis in 1926, “I had a little more book learning than many of these comrades. But in the practice of revolution I was certainly a beginner. Here, among these comrades, I received my first baptism of

fire in revolution. Here, among these comrades, I became an apprentice of revolution. As you see, my first teachers were the workers of Tiflis." On May Day of 1901 a workers' demonstration in Tiflis was suppressed by a charge of Cossacks with numerous casualties. Stalin, described as an "intellectual" in the police report, went into hiding. Toward the end of the year he went to Batum where he was arrested for instigating a mob attack on a prison where one of his colleagues was held. He spent 18 months in jail and was condemned to three years exile in Siberia. He said later that he had his first exchange of letters with Lenin at this time. But he escaped within a month after his arrival in Novaya Uda in Irkutsk province and returned to Tiflis early in 1904.

He had already married the sister of one of his Georgian comrades, Catherine Svanidze, who died some years later of tuberculosis. They had one child, Jacob, who remained with his mother's relatives following her death until his father brought him to Moscow after the Revolution. Catherine was apparently a simple soul not unlike the Catherine who was Stalin's mother. No stable family life was possible for a professional revolutionist. The aftermath of "Bloody Sunday" in 1905 brought strikes and riots all over the land and revolutionary Soviets in Odessa, Rostov, Novorossiisk and Baku as well as in St. Petersburg and Moscow. In December Stalin met Lenin for the first time in Tammerfors. He was surprised by Lenin's simplicity and commonplace appearance. At the Stockholm Congress of 1906 Stalin represented the Georgian Bolsheviks and met Lenin for the second time. He made three short speeches and approved the views of Lenin who reviewed the lessons of the December hostilities and recalled Marx's maxim: "Insurrection is an art." Stalin was always to abide by another Marxist maxim: "The weapon of criticism is no substitute for the criticism of weapons."

In the spring of 1907 Stalin made a brief visit to London for Congress V. In the following March, while editing inflammatory journals in Tiflis and Baku, he was arrested once more. He spent eight months in jail, quoting Marx to the other political prisoners and on one occasion impressing them by walking upright, head unbowed and book in hand, between two rows of soldiers who were beating the prisoners with rifle butts. Exiled to Soloychegodsk in Vologda province, he escaped in July, 1909; spent a month in hiding in the capital; returned to Baku; was again ar-

rested (March, 1910); was again exiled to Soloychegodsk, this time for five years; escaped the next spring; was once more arrested (September 10, 1911); was exiled anew to Soloychegodsk; once more escaped; and was living in hiding in St. Petersburg by the close of 1911. Such a sequence of events, if related in a Hollywood scenario, would obviously be dismissed as utterly lacking in plausibility. There was indeed nothing remotely plausible in the experiences, activities and hopes of the little band of professional agitators and conspirators who plotted revolution during these years of waiting.

Lenin took refuge from current disappointments in philosophy. But philosophy, like everything else in his hands, was not a means of relaxation from the struggle but a weapon to be used like other weapons against the enemy and against the comrades who were less single-minded and inflexible than he. His one ambitious philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*¹² published in 1909, was a slashing attack on the epistemology of those Marxists (e.g., Bernstein, Kautsky, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Gorky, Bazarov, et al.) who had become Neo-Kantians or adherents of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach. In December of 1908, at the Fifth Conference of the Party, held in Paris, Lenin assailed both the "Liquidators" (Mensheviks favoring the liquidation of the illegal work of the Party and its transformation into a lawful political organization) and the *Otzovists* or "Recallers" who were urging the withdrawal of all Social Democrats from the Duma and from all legal organizations. Lenin held that the Party must participate in elections and legislative activities and must at the same time carry on underground revolutionary work. It was this controversy which led to a sharp break between Lenin and Trotsky, to the final split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, and to Stalin's membership in a new Central Committee.

Trotsky had begun his career as a revolutionary conspirator by helping to organize some of the factory hands of Nikolayev into a "South Russian Workers' Union." In the beginning was the Deed rather than the Word. His ideology was not yet crystallized and was, indeed, never to attain the granite-like solidity of those revolutionists who sacrificed their critical faculties to their faith. With other radical students, he arranged secret meetings and printed revolutionary hand-bills in darkened back rooms. The police nabbed all suspects in January, 1898. Some were beaten.

Trotsky composed revolutionary poetry in various prisons, read religious magazines and the Gospels, scribbled a long essay on Freemasonry in an exercise book and by gradual stages became a Marxist—though always with the qualifications and embellishments of a highly individualized mind. His conversion, as he later related it, was not sudden but slow.

In the transfer prison in Moscow he married a co-conspirator, Alexandra Lvovna Sokolovskaya. In the autumn of 1900 they began their Siberian exile in a tiny village on the Lena. Trotsky worked for a while as a clerk in a store, read Marx and fought cockroaches. He met Djerzhinsky and Uritsky. He became village correspondent for an Irkutsk paper. In the summer of 1902 he escaped, leaving behind two small daughters and a wife who resolved his doubts by saying "You must!" He joined an *Iskra* group in Samara and finally arrived in the autumn in London by way of Vienna, Zurich and Paris. Here he went at once to Lenin with whom he had been in correspondence. Studying, writing, lecturing in London and on the Continent became his life. He was known as Pero—"The Pen." In Paris he met Nataliya I. Sedova who was to become his second wife, after he had divorced the first. Trotsky was so absorbed in the revolutionary movement that he was of the opinion, said Sedova later, that Paris "resembles Odessa, but Odessa is better." Lenin, who thought highly of him, proposed that he be put on the editorial board of *Iskra*. But Plekhanov objected.

Those who seek the key to Trotsky's complex and tragic character in intellectual vanity, craving for adulation, and contempt for dissenters from his own views will find supporting evidence in his strange role among the exiles. With Lenin's brother he travelled in 1903 from Geneva to Brussels where he was a delegate at Congress II. In London, to which the delegates presently moved, the cleavage between "hards" and "softs" found Trotsky with the "softs," thanks to his ties with Martov, Zasulich and Axelrod. He felt that Lenin's attempts to remove Paul Axelrod and Vera Zasulich from the *Iskra* editorial board were "unpardonable, horrible and outrageous."¹³ He apparently opposed "centralism" then, as he was to do a quarter of a century later, less out of attachment to democratic methods than out of opposition to dictation by anyone but himself. For the next fourteen years he fought

Lenin. But he also quarrelled intermittently with the Menshevik leaders. He was detested by Plekhanov, though at times they made common cause against Lenin.

In October, 1904, Lenin wrote to the Siberian Union, which Trotsky had represented at the Congress, that the collaboration of Trotsky and Plekhanov on the new *Iskra* was "an unnatural and rotten political union."¹⁴ Trotsky in turn denounced Lenin as the "head of the reactionary wing of our party" and a "dull caricature of the tragic intransigence of Jacobinism." He further observed that Lenin's conception of centralism would lead to a situation in which "the organization of the Party takes the place of the Party itself, the Central Committee takes the place of the organization, and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee." The Bolsheviks under "Maximilien Lenin," he contended, were aiming at "a dictatorship *over* the proletariat."¹⁵

When the news of "Bloody Sunday" reached Geneva, Trotsky broke with the Mensheviks and went with his new wife to Russia, first hiding in Kiev and then, with the aid of Krassin, proceeding to St. Petersburg where he maintained contacts with Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike under the double alias of "Vikentiev" and "Peter Petrovich." An agent-provocateur brought about the arrest of his wife. He went into hiding and then sought safety in Finland. October, 1905—month of the general strike of workers all over Russia and of the Government's "concession" in the form of the Tsar's Manifesto—found Trotsky back in the capital and reunited with Sedova. He threw himself into the activities of the new St. Petersburg Soviet, whose official organ was *Izvestia* (*News*), and joined Parvus in various journalistic activities in which he used the name Trotsky. In November he joined the Mensheviks in starting the paper *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*). He became head of the "Presidium" of the Soviet, following the arrest of its president, Khrustalyov. Lenin arrived in November but played no active role in the Soviet which lasted less than two months before its suppression in December. Following the collapse of the revolutionary effort, Trotsky wrote a book to justify his role. He was to write later of these days: "Among the Russian comrades, there was not one from whom I could learn anything. On the contrary, I had to assume the role of teacher myself. . . . I was confident. . . . No great work is possible without intuition.

. . . The events of 1905 revealed in me, I believe, this revolutionary intuition, and enabled me to rely on its assured support during my later life.”¹⁶

This cocksure “intuition” was to lead Trotsky to great power and then to repeatedly mistaken analyses, rationalized in terms of Marxist orthodoxy, leading ultimately to his final ruin which he was to rationalize in terms of martyrdom at the hands of those who had “betrayed” the Revolution. After 1905 Trotsky’s “intuition” led him to new and embittered clashes with Lenin. After spending 15 months in prison (“a good school,” he said), during which he relished the oratorical opportunities of a mass trial, he was sent to Siberia to the far northern village of Obdorsk among the Zyryans and Ostyaks. He escaped by means of a week’s journey to the Urals in a sleigh drawn by reindeer. He rejoined his wife and infant son in the capital and then departed from the Finland Station to meet Martov and Lenin near Helsinki. May of 1907 brought him to London for Congress V, held in a socialist church. Here he met Maxim Gorky and renewed acquaintance with Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. After the Congress, in which Trotsky once more was neither Bolshevik nor Menshevik, he went to Germany and finally settled down with his family near Vienna where he soon became disillusioned with the Austrian Marxists.

In October, 1908, in collaboration with Adolf A. Joffe, he began to publish a bi-monthly journal called *Pravda* (*Truth*) which was smuggled into Russia. Its central theme was “permanent revolution”—i.e., the theory that revolution in Russia, once unleashed, could not end until it had destroyed capitalism first in Russia and then throughout the world. “In questions of the inner development of the Party,” he wrote later, anent his hopes that the Mensheviks would be forced to adopt a revolutionary program, “I was guilty of a sort of social-revolutionary fatalism. This was a mistaken stand.”¹⁷ Lenin called him a “Judas” and wrote that he “behaves like the most despicable careerist and factionalist. . . . He pays lip-service to the Party, but behaves worse than any other factionalist.”¹⁸

In the Party crisis of 1912, Trotsky sought to effect a reunion of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. The Sixth Conference of the RSDLP met in Prague in January. It was a Bolshevik gathering. Here it was that the decision was taken to expel the Mensheviks, to change the Party name to “RSDLP (Bolshevik)” and to

name a new all-Bolshevik Central Committee which included Sergei Ordjonikidze. Two more members were added by "co-optation" (i.e., by appointment by the seven members already chosen for the Central Committee, rather than by the whole Conference). Stalin was one of the two. He and Ordjonikidze were to function within Russia as an "executive bureau" while the rest of the Central Committee remained abroad. Stalin lived in hiding at St. Petersburg and worked on *Zvezda* (*Star*) and on the new St. Petersburg *Pravda*. He was arrested in April, condemned to three years exile in Tomsk province and escaped in September. Meanwhile Lenin was stoutly opposed to all attempts at reuniting the two sundered factions. "Lenin was right," Trotsky wrote in 1929. The Bolsheviks refused to attend a conference in Vienna in August of 1912. Trotsky declined to join the Bolsheviks or to support the Mensheviks against them. Martov accused him of "the worst habits of literary individualism."

Such language was mild compared to that which Lenin and Trotsky employed against one another at this time. The former called the latter a "poser" and "phrase-maker." The latter condemned the former for "sectarian spirit, individualism of the intellectual, and ideological fetishism." When Trotsky in Vienna formed the "August bloc" of Liquidators and Recallers, and, with the support of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Rykov, sponsored "Centrism" (i.e., reconciliation of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks), Lenin wrote: "People like Trotsky . . . are the plague of our time. . . . Trotsky today plagiarizes the ideology of one faction, tomorrow of another, and then declares himself above all the factions. . . . It is impossible to discuss principles with Trotsky, for he has no definite conceptions. . . . He is to be unmasked as a diplomat of the basest metal. . . . Trotsky has never had any political color; he comes and goes between the liberals and the Marxists, with shreds of sonorous phrases stolen from the Right and Left." Trotsky in turn wrote to Chkheidze that Lenin was a master at "petty squabbling" and that Leninism "flourishes on the dung-heap of sectionalism" and is "founded on lies and falsifications and carries within itself the poison germ of its own decomposition."¹⁹

In the sequel to these quarrels, Trotsky accepted an offer from the *Kievskaya Mysl* and went as a correspondent to the Balkan wars. He became an intimate friend of Christian Rakovsky, Bul-

garian-born Rumanian Socialist. Stalin and Trotsky had met casually in London in 1907 and again in Vienna some years later. Neither was impressed by the other. In December, 1912, Stalin joined Lenin in Cracow, to which Lenin had moved from Paris in July in order to be nearer to Russia. On Lenin's advice Stalin worked in Cracow and Vienna on an article: "The National Question and Social Democracy." It was his first article signed "Stalin" and was published in the review *Prosvyeshchenye* (*Enlightenment*). Lenin wrote to Gorky: "We have a wonderful Georgian here who is writing a great article . . ." On his return to St. Petersburg Stalin was arrested in February, 1913, and exiled to Siberia where he spent the next four years. In May of 1913 Lenin moved to the village of Poronino in Galicia. Here appeared, among various participants in party conferences, a comrade in whom Lenin had full confidence: Roman V. Malinovsky. He turned out to be a Tsarist police spy who was instrumental in thwarting another escape from Siberia by Stalin and in bringing about the arrest of various Bolshevik organizers in Russia. He was seized, exposed and executed by the Soviet authorities in 1918.

The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 led to the arrest of Lenin in Poronino—as a Russian spy! He was soon released, however, and arrived in Berne early in September. During the following months he lectured in various Swiss cities, carried on an extensive correspondence and wrote numerous articles. From the outset he bitterly denounced all Social Democrats who supported their governments in waging war. When the Bolshevik deputies in the Imperial Duma condemned the war, they were arrested and sent to Siberia. Lenin's own position was set forth in the Manifesto of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, "The War and Social Democracy," published on November 1, 1914, in No. 33 of the *Sotsial Demokrat*:

. . . Neither of the two groups of belligerent countries is behind the other in robberies, bestialities and endless brutalities of war. . . . The leaders of the (Second) International committed treachery toward Socialism when they voted for military appropriations, when they repeated the chauvinist ("patriotic") slogan of the bourgeoisie of their "country," when they justified and defended the war. . . . Our parliamentary representatives—the RSDLP fraction in the Imperial Duma—considered it its unquestionable Socialist duty not to vote for military appropriations and even to leave the meeting hall of

the Duma in order more energetically to express its protest. . . . The political slogan of the Social Democrats of Europe for the near future must be the creation of a republican United States of Europe. . . . The working masses will overcome all obstacles and create a new International. . . . Turning the present imperialist war into civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan. . . . Long live the international brotherhood of the workers united against the chauvinism and patriotism of the bourgeoisie of all countries! Long live a proletarian International, free from opportunism! ²⁰

The foundations of the Third International were laid in Switzerland during 1915-16. The earlier efforts of the leaders of the Second International to heal the breach between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had been fruitless. Under the shattering impact of the new Armageddon all the Socialist parties fell apart into similar factions. The Marxist International therewith pulled itself to pieces in a torment of controversy. Some of the pieces were ultimately to coalesce into a new Communist International. Other pieces were later to reassemble in a revived Second International, comprising the reformist and revisionist Social Democrats. In this process the original revolutionary rhetoric of most of the Western Marxists turned out to be, as Don Luigi Sturzo, founder of the Italian Populist Party, later said, "thick foam on a little beer at the bottom of a glass." In the words of one participant observer: "The Socialists had lived in a realm of imagination, and were surprised to see that they themselves were different from what they had believed themselves to be." ²¹

The intellectual and political agonies of this disintegration are more a part of the history of Marxism as a world movement than of the politics of the Soviet Union. The self-inflicted tortures of the various Social Democratic groups after 1914 gave rise to fearful outcries of pain and rage in almost innumerable conferences, congresses and mass meetings and quite innumerable articles, pamphlets, journals and books. They led finally to savage physical conflict in many bloodstained arenas, strewn with the mangled bodies of innumerable victims of persecution on both sides. Only a few of the crucial episodes in which the Bolshevik leaders played significant roles need be reviewed here. ²² At the Seventh Congress of the Second International in Stuttgart, August, 1907, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg assumed leadership in putting through a resolution against militarism. It declared that if war came, despite So-

cialist efforts to prevent it, the proletariat of all countries must do all in its power to halt the conflict and to use the crisis "to rouse the peoples and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule." Here Lenin sought for the first time but without success to form a Left group within the International. In September, 1911, after being reproved by Plekhanov and others for defending Rosa Luxemburg against her critics, Lenin slammed the door and stormed out of the meeting of the Bureau of the International in Zurich, violently cursing the compromisers and calling them "scoundrels." He half expected the revisionists of all the parties to betray the cause in 1914. Yet he found the fact at first incredible. To his old question—what is to be done?—he had a clear answer: organize a new International, wage a relentless struggle against the Social Democratic "defensists" and "chauvinists," and summon the workers of the world to revolution against the war-makers.

At the London Conference of Socialists of the Entente countries on February 14, 1915, Litvinov appeared to protest at the exclusion of the Bolsheviks and to explain why in any case he would refuse to participate. When the chairman sought to silence him, he picked up his papers and departed. In the view of the Bolsheviks, the resolutions passed were "utterly futile" and were merely camouflage for "social chauvinism."²³ On the initiative of Italian and Swiss Socialist leaders, a conference of left-wing Socialists assembled, September 5-8, 1915, in the little village of Zimmerwald near Berne. Among the 38 delegates from 11 countries were Lenin, Zinoviev, Axelrod, Martov, Radek, Chernov, Balabanov, Rakovsky, Grimm, Platten and Trotsky. The latter had fled from Vienna to Switzerland at the outbreak of the war. He became intimate with Karl Radek who had fled from Germany. His pamphlet, "The War and the International," was a denunciation of the chauvinist Social Democrats. In November, 1914, he went to Paris, still as a correspondent of his Kiev paper.

Although they were all people of the "Left," the Zimmerwald delegates at once split into Right, Center and Left factions. The first, including most of the Germans, the French, the Poles and the Russian Mensheviks, opposed an open break with the Second International. The middle group included Trotsky, Grimm and Balabanov. The Left group of eight, led by Lenin, favored a break and a call to revolutionary class war to put an end to the "impe-

rialist war." The Manifesto which was finally adopted closely followed a draft by Trotsky and represented a compromise. Lenin's group, known henceforth as the "Zimmerwald Left," issued a Manifesto of its own in October:

The battlefields are covered with millions of corpses. . . . The capitalists of all countries, who in time of war accumulate huge profits at the price of the bloodshed of the proletariat . . . led the masses into the slaughter because they wished to oppress and to exploit other peoples. . . . It is necessary to demand vigorously and without delay the cessation of the war. . . . The overthrow of the capitalist governments—this is the aim which the laboring class of all the belligerent countries must set itself.²⁴

The Zimmerwald Conference set up an "International Socialist Committee" in Berne. Its members felt, however, that their directives were inadequate as a guide to action and accordingly urged a new conference. The "Zimmerwald movement" was supported at this stage by the Socialist parties of Italy, Switzerland, Bulgaria and Portugal, the Independent Labor Party of Britain, the Socialist and Socialist Labor parties of the United States and, among the Russians, by the RSDLP, the Bund and the "Internationalist" wing of the Social Revolutionaries. The "Second Zimmerwald Conference" met at Kienthal, Switzerland, April 24-30, 1916. It was attended by 54 delegates from seven countries. Lenin, Zinoviev, Axelrod and Martov again appeared. The majority of the delegates, while moving leftward, were still unwilling to establish a Third International. On May 1 Karl Liebknecht made his memorable address in Berlin in support of revolutionary internationalism and announced the foundation of the Spartacusbund. He was at once arrested. The time for world revolution was not yet. The "Zimmerwald Left," which began its activities with a treasury of 100 francs raised by the Bolsheviks, was presently divided against itself by controversies over a variety of issues, including that of the demand for general "disarmament" on which Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg had opposing views. In December, 1916, Lenin wrote:

We should not permit ourselves to be blinded by the present imperialist war. . . . There can be wars against other bourgeois and reactionary countries waged by a socialism which has been victorious in one country only. Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. There will be no wars in a socialist society. Consequently disarmament will be

realized. But he is not a socialist who waits for the realization of socialism *without* a social revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship is a government power which leans directly on *violence*. In the epoch of the 20th Century, as in any epoch of civilization generally, violence is not a fist and a club, but an *army*. . . . The oppressed class which would not strive to learn to handle arms or to possess arms would deserve to be treated as slaves. . . . Our slogan should be: the arming of the proletariat in order to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie. . . . Unless the struggle against imperialism is bound indissolubly with the struggle against opportunism, it is but an empty phrase or a deception. One of the chief defects of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, one of the basic reasons for a possible fiasco of these embryos of the Third International, consists precisely in that the question of struggle against opportunism has not even been posed openly. . . . The chief defect of the demand for disarmament is precisely that it evades all concrete questions of revolution. . . . We do not wish to ignore the sad possibility that, at the worst, mankind will live to see a second imperialist war if in spite of numerous outbursts of mass ferment and mass discontent and in spite of all our efforts, a revolution does not grow out of this war . . .²⁵

A "Third Zimmerwald Conference" was held in Stockholm in September, 1917, on the invitation of the Petrograd Soviet, the International Socialist Bureau (Second International) and the International Socialist Committee which had transferred itself from Berne to Stockholm after the March revolution in Russia. The Allied Governments, however, refused to grant passports to delegates. Many Socialist and labor organizations in the Western democracies refused to confer with Socialists of enemy States. No delegates arrived from Britain, France or Italy. Those who reached Stockholm merely reaffirmed the Zimmerwald and Kienthal resolutions. After the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, the International Socialist Committee became little more than an apologist for the Soviet regime. The October Revolution and the end of World War I a year later brought about the disintegration of the whole Zimmerwald movement. The Right faction rejoined the Second International. The Center did likewise, after toying briefly with a Two-and-a-Half International. The Left group was formally dissolved at the First Congress of the Third (Communist) International in March, 1919. Lenin thus failed to establish a Third International until the mid-period of the Russian civil war. But his efforts demonstrate that he was no less interested in the effects

of World War on international Marxism than in the new opportunities for revolutionary action which it opened in Russia.

Meanwhile the man from Simbirsk who was soon to proceed from Zurich to the Finland Station continued to study, think and write in his Swiss exile. He dabbled in Swiss Socialist politics. He developed the idea of the necessity of national self-determination and colonial emancipation as necessary conditions of the liberation of the world proletariat. He quarreled with Parvus over the latter's leanings toward German "Social Patriotism." He condemned Bukharin and Pyatakof for their views on the national question. As late as February, 1917, he could write of his future collaborator: "What a swine that Trotsky is! Left phrases and a bloc with the Right against the aims of the Left! He ought to be exposed . . ." ²⁶ But his most important work during these troubled years was the writing and publication in 1916 of another short book: *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline*.

This new Marxist analysis of the world politics of the 20th Century has not been wholly outdated by the events of the succeeding thirty years, whatever may be the *addenda* and *errata* which non-Marxist students of imperialism may want to append to it. On the contrary its central thesis, originally buttressed with statistics and documentation of the preceding thirty years, has in some measure been confirmed. That thesis, insofar as it can be briefly stated in oversimplified form, is a development of a sentence spoken by Cecil Rhodes to Wickham Steed in 1895 and quoted incidentally by Lenin: "If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists." Capitalism, based on free competition among independent producers, begets the opposite of this in its late development—i.e., monopoly, fostered by great and growing combines, trusts and cartels. Groups of national monopolists, says Lenin, soon form international monopolies which divide up markets among themselves, combine for mutual benefit in the export of capital and bring about the progressive annexation and partition of colonial areas by the Great Powers. Monopoly begets stagnation and decay, breeding "parasitism"—i.e., the restoration of the home market through the exploitation of colonies. "The economic quintessence of imperialism is monopoly capitalism." All business interests, including the petty bourgeoisie and even the workers, share in the benefits. The defense of imperialism, even in Socialist

circles, and the rise of opportunism are results of this circumstance. Yet imperialism is "moribund capitalism" which is only postponing its own disintegration.

Lenin in these pages is seeking, in effect, to explain in Marxist terms why and how the original debacle of capitalism forecast by Marx and Engels has been deferred through territorial conquest and the exploitation of the conquered. Few reflective observers of the world scene in the wake of World War II will care to argue that the explanation is completely wrong. The thesis is an anticipation of at least some of the significant features of the social dynamics of Fascism. In dwelling upon the "unevenness of capitalist development," Lenin is also foreshadowing, in contrast to Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution," the prospect that "the victory of Socialism is possible first in a few or even in one single capitalist country."²⁷ Politics demands knowledge of what is to be done and how to do it in the here and now. Statesmanship demands foresight into the future and capacity to be its master rather than its slave. Lenin's writings in 1915-16 are evidence of the extent to which the obscure revolutionist and conspirator-in-exile had already become a statesman on the eve of the Russian Revolution.

3. "ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!"

Whether the practice of politics is an art or a science has long been a matter of idle disputation among political scientists and politicians. Artistry in politics aims at esthetic effects not as ends but as means to power. The creative political artist combines technical skills in the manipulation of symbols with inspiration in the management of human responses. The science which can be applied to the task consists in part of objective analyses of the determinants of human action and in larger part of rough-and-ready rules of thumb in winning friends and influencing people. In any case all politics is an exercise in adaptation to the wandering winds of popular desires. Success consists in coordinating announced purposes with the likes and dislikes, the hopes and expectations, of the multitude. The politician leads the public by becoming its follower. The statesman follows the public by becoming its leader.

Revolutionary politics is an exercise in adaptation to roaring tempests. The mortal storm rages with devastating violence when

vast throngs wrench themselves free from the ties of tradition and summon up out of the depths of their own despair the powers of hell in order to storm the gates of heaven. Fierce loves and hatreds, passionate demands and dreams shared by millions, are the forces to which the successful revolutionary leader must adapt his words and deeds. In every great revolution many are called to leadership but few are chosen. This task is the most difficult and dangerous of all political tasks. The leader is ever tempted to sacrifice his principles in order to win or keep a following among fickle and tumultuous mobs and is ever threatened with public repudiation if he adheres inflexibly to a fixed purpose.

In the Russian hurricane of 1917 Lenin was to show himself to be a consummate political artist and a skilled practitioner of what the myth-makers are pleased to call the "science of revolution." His strategy and tactics in riding the thunder and guiding the lightning display a unique genius. The qualities of his talents can be appreciated to the full only through a minute analysis of all the eddies and crosscurrents which swept over Russia between March and October of 1917. Such an analysis, however, is best left to the historians, many of whom have already written imposing and detailed accounts of these months of the whirlwind.²⁸ Here a brief weather report will serve to suggest the context within which Lenin assumed leadership of his Party and ultimately led the Party to mastery of all the Russias.

"That," cried Bogdanov, after listening to Lenin, "is the raving of a lunatic!" "Deliriums," wrote Plekhanov, "are occasionally interesting." "As regards Comrade Lenin's general line," wrote Kamenev in *Pravda*, April 21, 1917, "it appears to us unacceptable inasmuch as it proceeds from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution *has been completed* and it builds on the immediate transformation of this revolution into a Socialist revolution. . . . In a broad discussion we hope to carry our point of view as the only possible one for revolutionary Social Democracy insofar as it wishes to be and must remain to the very end the one and only party of the revolutionary masses of the proletariat without turning into a group of Communist propagandists."

Such was the reception accorded to Lenin's views by his fellow Marxists on the morrow of his arrival at the Finland Station. Bogdanov was at this time a Menshevik. Plekhanov was the respected elder statesman of Russian Marxism, though his caution and patri-

otism had cost him most of his followers save among the small group which came to be known as *Yedinstvo*. Kamenev, along with Muranov and Stalin, had come from Siberia to assume leadership of the Bolsheviks in the capital. What was lunacy to Bogdanov, unacceptable to Kamenev and delirium to Plekhanov was looked upon as dangerous madness by the Social Revolutionaries, as treason and anarchy by the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) and as sheer criminality by those who stood politically to the right of the Cadets.

The season was spring. The once mighty Romanov autocracy had almost miraculously melted away with the winter's snows. On March 15 a Provisional Committee of the State Duma, comprising spokesmen of all party groups save extreme conservatives and extreme radicals (i.e., the Bolsheviks), had established a "Provisional Government" headed by Prince George E. Lvov and composed of liberals and moderate socialists. All were agreed on the necessity of prosecuting the war and laying the foundations of a new democracy. The Minister of Justice was Alexander Kerensky, Social Revolutionary and leader of the group called "Populist Socialists" or "Trudoviki" in the Duma in March, 1917. Paul Miliukov, Constitutional Democrat, was Minister of Foreign Affairs. Officials of trade unions and cooperatives had already formed a "Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies" which called upon the workers and soldiers of Petrograd to elect representatives to a new Soviet in the tradition of 1905. The deputies thus chosen, along with sundry invited Socialist leaders, had met in Tauride Palace as early as March 12 and organized the Petrograd Soviet with Chkheidze as President and Kerensky and M. I. Skobelev (Menshevik) as Vice-Presidents. The Bolshevik deputies were in a minority and were divided among themselves. When some of them proposed on March 15 that the Soviet should repudiate the Provisional Government and set up a regime of its own, they received only 19 votes with many Bolsheviks voting in the negative. The great majority of the members of the Soviet felt that they should support the Provisional Government but not participate in it. Other Soviets, first by scores and then by hundreds, emerged in other cities all over the land and soon assumed functions of local administration. Some 400 representatives of the provincial Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets met in conference in the capital, April 11-16, on the eve of Lenin's re-

turn. They elected an All-Russian Central Executive Committee as a national Soviet body.

This "dualism" of authority was to persist all through the spring, summer and early autumn. When revolution has destroyed the magic of traditional power, politics becomes a struggle for control of such symbols of influence as remain and a competition in the fabrication of new symbols. Russia's political ambivalence in 1917 sprang from the co-existence of a Provisional Government, having the wish but not the means to govern, and a series of Soviet agencies, having the means but not the wish to govern. The new Ministers issued decrees but lacked sufficient mass support to insure obedience. The Soviets had mass support but preferred to issue demands and manifestos rather than decrees. Responsibility without power confronted power without responsibility. The liaison between the two was at best tenuous. The formula which all accepted for resolving the dilemma was to prepare elections for a Constituent Assembly which would draw up a constitution on the basis of which a permanent government with both power and responsibility would presumably come into being. But this would never come to pass, thanks to a series of crises precipitated by the clash between the hopes and intentions of the Ministers and the expectations of the populace as voiced through the Soviets and in direct mass action.

It was in this situation that Lenin promulgated the "April Theses" which aroused such contempt and opposition on all sides. His argument was starkly simple: the Provisional Government must be repudiated; the workers and poorest peasants must seize power and end the war by ending capitalism; the Soviet is "the only possible form of revolutionary government"; it must therefore establish a Soviet Republic which would nationalize all land and assume control of the production and distribution of goods. The Bolsheviks must explain these necessities to the masses and meanwhile call a Party Congress to amend their own program, change the Party name to "Communist" and prepare for the creation of a Third International.

In speech and writing Lenin defended his "Theses" and denounced his critics:

The masses must be warned. Revolution is a difficult thing. Errors are unavoidable. . . . One must not fear to be in the minority. . . . We want the masses to rectify their errors by actual ex-

perience. . . . The art of government cannot be gotten out of books. Try, make mistakes, learn how to govern. . . . You fear to break with old memories. But in order to change one's linen, one must take off the soiled and put on the clean. . . . Outside of Socialism, there is no deliverance of humanity from wars, from hunger, from the destruction of millions and millions of human beings. . . . Mr. Plekhanov, the ex-Marxist, has absolutely failed to understand the doctrine of Marxism about the State. . . . The mistake of Comrade Kamenev is that in 1917 he sees only the past. . . . In reality, however, the future has already begun. . . . Comrade Kamenev has not grasped the fact, the significance of the existing Soviets, their identity, as to their socio-political character, with the State of the Paris Commune. . . . Let us not imitate the woe-Marxians of whom Marx himself said, "I sowed dragons and I reaped fleas." . . . There is no other way out except a proletarian revolution. . . . We want to end this imperialist World War. We want to rebuild the world . . .²⁹

This voice crying in the wilderness had at first little effect on the Soviets nor even on Lenin's own Party. He stood alone. But he was also alone in having a firm and inflexible purpose, a correct analysis of realities and a clear grasp of means to ends. Day after day, week after week, he wrote, spoke, argued, explained and exhorted. His goals were to win over his own Party to his program, to convert the masses of workers, soldiers and peasants to the Party program, to secure therewith the approval of the program by the Soviets, which were the most important channels of popular expression and action, and finally to put the program into effect. Millions of war-weary soldiers, demoralized and embittered by costly defeats, were hoping for peace. Millions of peasants were hoping for a chance at long last to appropriate and partition the estates of the landlords. Millions of workers were hoping for the better life which they expected the revolution to give them, and were coming to believe that their hopes depended upon destroying capitalism as well as autocracy and achieving socialism as well as democracy. For all these millions Lenin's program was in the end to become the common denominator.

The political turmoil inside of the vast eruption which was Russia in 1917 was less a struggle between those demanding socialism and those opposing socialism than a struggle among rival camps of socialists. It was likewise less a struggle between advocates of war and proponents of peace than one among rival groups of peace-seekers bidding for support in a nation already defeated

and weary of war. The opponents of socialism, most of whom favored continuing the war, were divided against themselves. The liberal Cadets, speaking primarily for the business community and the lower middle class, stood for bourgeois democracy, a parliamentary republic and solidarity with France, Britain and America against the Central Powers. Various groups of conservatives and reactionaries, representing aristocrats, bureaucrats and officers, deplored the fall of the Tsar and weighed all issues of war and peace in the scales of their hopes at home. Both groups were progressively weakened and discredited by the fact that their conception of the future was widely at variance with the aspirations of most of the peasantry, the proletariat and the soldiery.

The men in the street, in the villages and in the trenches were all "socialists" in varying degrees. Some followed the leadership of the Social Revolutionaries, some that of the Menshevik Social Democrats, and some—few at first and many later—that of the Bolshevik Social Democrats. The rivalry for power over the populace became a battle of words and eventually of weapons in which the contestants were all socialists: Marxists (SD's) vs. non-Marxists (SR's) and Menshevik Marxists vs. Bolshevik Marxists. The issue was not socialism *or* capitalism, but what *kind* of socialism, how and when. The issue was not peace *or* war but what *kind* of peace, how and when. Victory was to go inevitably to the group which was most united, most disciplined, most realistic, most militant and most skillful in rendering mass demands articulate and identifying them with its own program. The group which in the end excelled all its rivals in these political arts was the crusading brotherhood of dedicated comrades which was to be mobilized into an army of revolution by Lenin.

The battlefield was chaos. The disposition of the fluctuating forces as they coalesced, dissolved, regrouped and disintegrated in a bewildering kaleidoscope of conflict took on the appearance of anarchic confusion. The Soviets were to give ultimate form to the disorder, but they were at the outset a tangled, weedlike growth, pushing upward from roots deep in the soil but having no clear shape, color or direction. The Provisional Government, on the contrary, seemed to be a neat and orderly group of serious-minded men. Miliukov informed all Russian diplomats abroad that the new authority would "remain faithful to international engagements entered into by the fallen regime and will honor Russia's word."

The United States, through Ambassador David R. Francis, granted the new Cabinet recognition as the Government of Russia on March 22, with the other Allied Powers following suit. The far-off but powerful voice of Woodrow Wilson asserted on April 2 that every American felt that "assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening in Russia. . . . The great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naïve majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor."

But a government must govern. The Provisional Government was less and less able to govern because its Ministers evoked neither fear nor respect from the people. They could therefore command neither confidence nor obedience. The first crisis was caused by Miliukov's note of May 1 declaring the determination of the new Russia to continue the war by the side of the Allies until victory should be won. Mobs at once demonstrated in protest, shouting "Down with the Provisional Government!" The slogan was Bolshevik but Lenin was not yet prepared for battle. The Central Committee of the Party endorsed the order of the Petrograd Soviet prohibiting street meetings. It also repudiated the slogan on the ground that power could pass to the proletariat only when the Soviets should see the need and purpose of taking power.

This time was not near. Minister of War A. I. Guchkov resigned on May 13 and Foreign Minister Miliukov two days later. On May 18 the Provisional Government was reshuffled into a greater semblance of a liberal-socialist coalition, with Kerensky becoming Minister of War, Tsereteli Minister of Posts, Skobelev Minister of Labor and Chernov Minister of Agriculture. M. I. Tereshchenko, financier, sugar magnate and friend of both Kerensky and British Ambassador Buchanan, became Foreign Minister. Popular longing for peace and mass hopes for socialism made Prince Lvov and his colleagues the targets of constant criticism. These sentiments found expression in the Soviets but the expression was garbled and the voice gave forth a many-tongued babel of discordant sounds. Not until autumn was a single nation-wide Soviet organization to emerge. Meanwhile the new freedom begot a profusion of conferences, congresses and committees.

The first All-Russian Congress of Peasant Deputies, representing the village Soviets, met at Peoples' House from May 17 to June 2. Half of the thousand delegates were SR's with most of the balance non-partisan. The SR's elected N. D. Avksentiey as chairman and controlled the Executive Committee of 30. The Congress voted support of the Provisional Government and the war. It rejected Lenin's proposal for immediate confiscation of land and transfer of political power to the Soviets. Its program was socialization of land after the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. A conference of factory-shop committees (June 12-16), on the other hand, voted approval of a resolution drafted by Lenin for workers' control of industry.

On June 16 the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opened with 285 SR Deputies, 248 Mensheviks, 105 Bolsheviks and 144 divided among lesser groups. Lenin spoke again, denouncing those Socialists who supported a war fought in the interest of capitalists and imperialists. When the Bolsheviks announced a demonstration for June 23 under the slogan "Down with the capitalist Ministers!" and "All Power to the Soviets!" the Congress forbade all street meetings for three days and accused the Bolsheviks of an effort to overthrow the Government. The Bolshevik Central Committee again acquiesced, albeit to the tune of denials, protests and plans for a later demonstration on July 1. This was the second occasion on which a Soviet body, though possessed of no formal governmental authority, had banned mass demonstrations in the capital for the sake of avoiding bloodshed. The nominal "Government," though fearing to act itself, was thus protected from mob pressure by the dislike and suspicion with which most of the Soviet deputies viewed the Bolsheviks. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee which the Soviet Congress elected on June 30 was of course strongly anti-Bolshevik. Soviet opposition to Bolshevism was matched by trade union opposition to Bolshevism. At the third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, July 4-11, only 80 out of 220 delegates were Bolshevik sympathizers. The majority voted down Bolshevik resolutions for class war and workers' control of industry.

Lenin and his followers refused to be discouraged by these rebuffs. At the beginning of the year the Party had some 23,000 registered members. By April it had 40,000. On May 7 the Party

opened the five-day session of its Seventh Conference. It was the first to be held openly on Russian soil. In size, as well as in the importance of its decisions, it approached the proportions of a Party Congress. There were 151 delegates, representing 79,204 Party members. Numerous cleavages developed. A group from Moscow stood by the formula of 1905: "A dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." Kamenev and Rykov opposed Lenin on the question of an immediate socialist revolution. Zinoviev opposed him on breaking with the Zimmerwald Union and forming a Third International. The Polish delegates, headed by Felix Djerzhinsky and supported by Bukharin and Pyatakov, opposed Stalin's proposals that national self-determination should include the right of secession. The resolutions adopted represented a compromise among divergent views. They nevertheless constitute a document remarkable alike for its sharp analysis of the current situation and for its formulation of the broad objectives which the Party of Lenin was to pursue during the months to come.³⁰

The question of whether the Party should seek to overthrow the Provisional Government by force was not sharply posed until October. The Bolshevik formula of a government by Soviets could not be translated into action as long as most of the Soviet deputies were anti-Bolshevik and had no desire to govern. The Party strove by all possible means to change their minds and then to use changed minds to seize power. Lenin had already developed his theory of the new State:

Mankind can pass directly from capitalism only into Socialism, i.e., into social ownership of the means of production and the distribution of products according to the work of the individual. Our Party looks farther ahead than that: Socialism is bound sooner or later to ripen into Communism, whose banner bears the motto: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." . . . The second part of the term "Social *Democracy*" is scientifically wrong. Democracy is only a form of State, while we Marxists are opposed to every form of State. . . . The difference between Marxism and Anarchism is that Marxism admits the necessity of the State during the transition from capitalism to Socialism; but (and here is where we differ from Kautsky and Co.) not the kind of State found in the usual, parliamentary, bourgeois, democratic republic, but rather something like the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Soviets of Workers' Deputies of 1905 and 1917 . . . as the harbinger of the "withering away" of the State as such.³¹

The Ministers of the Provisional Government, fearing the worst and hoping for the best, strove to direct the nation toward constitutional democracy. They made plans for the election of the Constituent Assembly. They championed civil liberties. They set up a Central Land Committee to propose agrarian reforms to the Constituent Assembly. They sponsored local self-government, universal suffrage, the eight-hour day, workers' councils in industry, autonomy for the minority nationalities. But they were unable to give land to the peasants, bread to the workers, or peace to the country.

War and diplomacy remained the areas of most violent controversy between governmental intentions and popular aspirations. Out of the clash grew the crisis of July. On the first day of the month General Brussilov's weary soldiers, temporarily stirred to new fervor by Kerensky's oratory, launched an offensive against the Austrians which gained some initial successes. But a German counter-attack soon led to defeat, disaster and retreat for the poorly supplied Russian troops. The enemy halted his advance on the central front for political reasons, but took Riga in the north in September. The Petrograd garrison was already dominated by Bolshevik sympathizers. On July 15 the Cadet Ministers resigned from the Cabinet in protest against the intention of their Socialist colleagues to grant autonomy to the Ukraine in advance of the Constituent Assembly. Mobs again paraded in the capital shouting "Down with the capitalist Ministers! All Power to the Soviets!" On the morning of the 16th delegates from the First Machine Gun Regiment called at the house of Kshesinskaya to ask Bolshevik direction of an armed demonstration against the Provisional Government. The Party leaders refused on the ground that the effort was premature.

On July 17 the streets of Petrograd were thronged with scores of thousands of demonstrating workers. Armed troops paraded with banners used in the Bolshevik demonstration of July 1. Disorganized soldiers sought, with no success, to arrest the bourgeois Ministers. Others assembled near Taurida Palace where the Central Executive Committees of the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies were in joint session. The Bolshevik Central Committee had meanwhile decided to summon soldiers and civilians to take up arms and participate in a "peaceful" demonstration. In the confused rioting and random firing which followed in various parts

of the city, a score of lives were lost and many score were wounded. In the Petrograd Soviet, in which the Bolsheviks already had a majority, the workers' deputies voted to seize power from the Provisional Government and named a committee to direct the new revolution.

Lenin, who had been in the suburbs for a week, returned and addressed the demonstrators from the balcony of Kshesinskaya House. Soldiers, sailors and workers ("soldiers and hooligans," said Krassin) roamed the streets, took over the Fortress of Peter and Paul, clashed with government troops and sought to induce the Soviet Central Executive Committee to support their demands. The Menshevik and SR members of these bodies toured the factories and workers' districts to persuade the masses to refrain from violence. That there was a Bolshevik "plot" to seize power, as alleged by Sukhanov and denied by Trotsky, is doubtful, though some Bolsheviks sought to use the occasion for revolutionary purposes. But there was still no way of transferring power to Soviet authorities who had no desire for power. Lenin in a night session of the Party Central Committee approved an appeal to workers and soldiers to halt the demonstration. Fearing arrest, he decided to spend the night away from home.

On the 18th the press carried a story, obviously inspired, that Lenin was an agent of the German General Staff which was said to have directed the demonstration. Some military units reaffirmed their loyalty to the Government and others adopted an attitude of "neutrality." Police raided the offices of the Bolshevik papers. Warrants of arrest were issued. Trotsky protested at his omission from the list and demanded that he share the honor. Troops occupied Kshesinskaya House and the Fortress of Peter and Paul. The arrest of Lenin was ordered on the 19th. He opposed the general strike urged by some of his colleagues and went into hiding in the home of the worker, Serge Alliluyev, whose only daughter was destined to become Stalin's second wife. Kamenev was apprehended on July 22, Trotsky and Lunacharsky on August 4. After much discussion with Krupskaya, Stalin, Zinoviev and others, Lenin decided not to give himself up, despite his desire to appear in court to answer the charge that he was a German agent. He had moved into a stable garret in the suburbs. On July 23 he moved again—into a tent beside a haystack some miles from the Razliv

Station. On August 3 he was formally indicted under the criminal code for treason and organization of an armed uprising.

Meanwhile Prince Lvov had resigned as Premier and was succeeded (July 21) by Kerensky who became a pseudo-dictator, sworn to save the country from Bolshevism. The new Cabinet, fully constituted by August 6, promised to call the Constituent Assembly on September 30 and asserted its resolve to fight all enemies at home and abroad. But it had no means of prosecuting the war successfully and it failed to crush the Bolsheviks. Lenin in hiding continued writing articles and declared that nothing short of an armed revolt of the workers could now save the Revolution from a military dictatorship.

The "July Days" thus amounted to a test of power between the Bolshevik Party and the Provisional Government. The test had not been sought on either side, however, and was a result of spontaneous mob action. Its aftermath, moreover, was confusion worse confounded. On the surface the Provisional Government had crushed the Bolsheviks by closing their press and driving their leaders to jail or into hiding. But the "semi-insurrection" was followed by a "semi-dictatorship" which indulged only in a "semi-suppression" of its enemies. The balance of forces was such that only half-measures were possible. Each contestant feared that forthright action against the other would alienate the "neutral" groups which were wavering between them and thus strengthen the rival camp. From this time forward the new Provisional Government was increasingly dependent upon the support of reactionary military elements which were soon to become a threat rather than a protection. And from this time forward the Bolshevik leaders, now obliged to work more or less under cover, were the political beneficiaries of growing sympathy for their position among the Soviets and were increasingly concerned with the preparation of an armed uprising.

4. PEACE, LAND AND BREAD

The decline and fall of the Provisional Government were as much attributable to the continuing crisis in foreign relations as to the clash of classes and factions within the frontiers. Here, as so often in Russia's history, the impact of outsiders upon the people of the

steppes and the effects upon the alien world of Russian aspirations were decisive factors in shaping the course of domestic development within the Russian State. The Tsardom was challenged by revolution in 1905 in consequence of its defeat at the hands of Japan. It was destroyed by revolution in 1917 in consequence of its defeat by the Central Powers. Most of the supporters of the Provisional Government, moreover, were inspired less by an indigenous Russian tradition than by a creed from the West: Anglo-French-American liberalism, with its corollaries of competitive capitalism and national patriotism. Lenin and his colleagues were similarly inspired by another creed from the West: Marxism, with its corollaries of socialism and internationalism. Which creed was to prevail in the new Russia was determined in the first instance, and likewise in the final test, by the mass reactions of Russians toward the treatment accorded to them by other governments and peoples.

A sorely tried populace was willing to continue fighting the war begun and lost by the Tsardom on condition that its purposes be redefined in terms consonant with the revolutionary vision of freedom and brotherhood and on condition, further, that victory should appear attainable without intolerable new sacrifices in blood and misery. The masses were at the same time hungry for peace—not at any price but on condition that its terms should offer an opportunity to harvest the anticipated fruits of the Revolution. “The army,” said Lenin, “voted for peace with its legs.” By mid-1917 a million deserters had left the ranks. Few were prepared to continue fighting for the “imperialistic” goals of Tsarist diplomacy. Few were prepared to stop fighting if the cost of peace should be the triumph of counter-revolution. Lenin proposed peace through proletarian revolt which should spread forthwith to enemy and Allied nations alike and end the war everywhere by overthrowing the governments and ruling classes which were waging it. If it could be realized, such a peace would end all danger of counter-revolution and open up millennial vistas of salvation. Kerensky proposed continued war in unity with the Allied and Associated Powers until the new Russia should share in the benefits of common victory.

Had the Provisional Government been able to make this prospect plausible to the multitude by demonstrating the possibility of victory and of new war aims, its deferment of land reform and of

other economic and political changes until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly would probably have evoked acquiescence from peasants and workers no less than from the middle class. Land and Bread could be had if Peace through victory were assured. But Bread and Land seemed unattainable so long as no Peace, with or without victory, was in sight. Kerensky and his aides were never able to resolve this problem. The political crisis of May was precipitated by the question of the aims of the war. The crisis of July coincided with the apparent demonstration, in the breakdown of the summer offensive, that the war could not be won. The crisis of September and the final crisis of October were likewise products in no small measure of popular dissatisfaction with the conduct of war and diplomacy.

Those who practiced high politics in Washington, London, Paris and Rome could doubtless have saved the Provisional Government had they acted in such a fashion as to convince the Russian masses of Allied willingness to embrace new purposes and Allied ability to aid Russia effectively and to win the war against the Reich. Such action would have required a larger degree of understanding of Russian revolutionary hopes and fears than was possessed by the foreign diplomats in Petrograd and by their superiors abroad. It would also have required more flexibility and astuteness in the conduct of political warfare than the Western statesmen were capable of. The year 1917 was one of limited successes and costly reverses for Allied arms—Vimy Ridge, the Champagne, Ypres, Passchendaele, Caporetto—coupled with disaffection in the French and Italian armies, severe shipping losses and relatively slow American mobilization. In war those seeking to win new friends or to retain old ones must either demonstrate that Might makes Right or, if they are weak, that Right makes Might. The Russians, who had already suffered the heaviest losses, were scarcely to be persuaded of the Might of their Allies by the record. What was done to persuade them that their allies were fighting for the Right proved to be too little and too late.

Allied officials were disturbed by the Provisional Government's espousal as early as May 18 of "a general peace . . . without annexation, without indemnities and on the basis of the self-determination of peoples." They were alarmed by Soviet appeals for peace through international revolutionary action. In a note of May 26 to the Provisional Government President Wilson cham-

pioned "liberty, self-government . . . and a common covenant to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another." But when Foreign Minister Tereshchenko asked the Allies in June for a conference to reconsider "the agreements concerning the ultimate aims of the war," he received little encouragement. During June and early July a special diplomatic mission from the United States toured Russia. It was headed by ultra-conservative Elihu Root and included three business leaders (Charles R. Crane, Cyrus H. McCormick and Samuel R. Bertron), one ex-Socialist (Charles Edward Russell) and one labor leader (James Duncan). The report of the Root mission, like the dispatches of Ambassador Francis, was naïvely optimistic regarding the Russian war effort and the prospects of democracy. Late in June a Russian mission, headed by Ambassador Boris Bakhmetev, reached Washington and also bespoke solidarity and confidence. Under the War Loan Acts, credits of \$325,000,000 were made available to the Provisional Government for the purchase of supplies and munitions. Against these, cash advances of \$187,729,750 were extended between July and November, constituting the principal of the Russian war debt to the United States Government.

But payments of money, professions of virtue and praise for unity were insufficient to persuade the Russian populace that the Provisional Government could provide peace through victory. After the July Days Ambassador Francis protested to Tereshchenko at the failure of the authorities to take more severe measures against the Bolshevik leaders. He felt certain that the execution of Lenin and Trotsky for treason would make everything right. He feared that Kerensky was "weak" but did what he could to persuade him to stay in office after being assured by Miliukov that Kerensky was Russia's only hope. President Wilson sent greetings on August 26 to the State Conference which Kerensky convoked in Moscow, expressing "confidence in the ultimate triumph of ideals of democracy and self-government against all enemies within and without." On October 9 the British, French and Italian Ambassadors (whom Francis declined to join in this demarche) presented a note to the much-annoyed Kerensky, asking that the war be prosecuted more vigorously.

As he saw his political fortunes passing into the shadows, Kerensky sought to strengthen his position by summoning a Provisional Council of the Republic (the "Pre-Parliament") and by encour-

aging high hopes for the promised Inter-Allied conference to redefine war aims. When Balfour and Bonar Law indicated that the conference would not discuss the aims of the war but only the methods of conducting it, the supporters of the Provisional Government began to despair of solving their problems. The Bolshevik press exulted in this new "proof" that the Allied Governments were determined to pursue "capitalistic" and "imperialistic" objectives. In an Associated Press interview of November 1 Krensky opined that Russia was exhausted, that the masses were disappointed and that the future was unpredictable. When *The Washington Post* published an abbreviated version of the interview under the headline "Russia Quits War," the State Department issued a denial: "There has been absolutely nothing in the dispatches received by the Department of State from Russia nor in information derived from any other source whatever to justify the impression . . . that Russia is out of the conflict. . . . Our own advices show that the Provisional Government in Petrograd is attacking with great energy the problems confronting it." Krensky was overthrown seven days later. That the leaders of the Western democracies should have been so ill-informed regarding realities was an evil omen for their future relations with the Russian Revolution. Those relations were to determine not only the emerging pattern of foreign policy in the new Russia but the shape of many things at home as well.³²

Lenin had meanwhile exhibited his customary skill in facing facts, drawing correct conclusions from them and devising a strategy appropriate to the occasion and to the temper of his followers and his enemies. From his hiding place he continued to write articles and to keep in close touch with the Central Committee. Between August 8 and 16 the Party held its Sixth Congress in Petrograd. A decade had elapsed since Congress V. Lenin, fearing arrest, did not attend but was elected honorary chairman and guided the discussions through Stalin, Sverdlov, Molotov and Ordjonikidze. Party members now numbered 240,000. There were 157 voting delegates and 128 others with no vote. They met in secret, first in the Viborg District and later in a school near the Narva Gate.

Congress VI was at once an evaluation of the July Days and a preparation for the October Revolution. The delegates accepted Stalin's view, which reflected Lenin's, that the slogan "All Power

to the Soviets!" must now be temporarily withdrawn so long as the Mensheviks and SR's controlled the Soviets. The new Party line was based on the proposition that power had passed from the Provisional Government to military reactionaries and Bonapartists, and that only an armed uprising of the proletariat, in alliance with the poorest peasants, could save the Revolution and achieve socialism. The Congress admitted to the Party the *Mezhrayontsi* or Centrists led by Trotsky and including Volodarsky and Uritsky. The preparation of a new Party program was again deferred but new rules were adopted: "All Party organizations are organized on the principles of democratic centralism"; members must accept the program, belong to a local organization, obey all Party decisions and pay dues of at least 1% of their wages; new members pay an initiation fee of 50 kopeks, are admitted by Party locals on the recommendation of two members and confirmed by the next general membership meeting of the local; those delinquent in dues for three months "without sufficient cause" are dropped; members may be expelled by a general meeting of the local, with appeal to the district or regional conference and, in the last resort, to the Party Congress; all locals pay 10% of dues and other receipts to the Central Committee; "regular Congresses are convened annually" and elect the Central Committee . . .

The resolutions of Congress VI are a lament over the degradation of the Soviets under Menshevik and SR leadership and an open declaration of war against the Provisional Government. Allied "imperialists" and "bankers" are accused of conspiring with counter-revolutionists against the Russian people.

"The liquidation of imperialist domination puts before the working class of that country which shall first achieve the dictatorship of the proletarians and semi-proletarians the task of supporting by every means (including armed force) the struggling proletariat of the other countries. This problem will become especially urgent for Russia, if, as is quite probable, a new inevitable upsurge of the Russian Revolution places the workers and the poorest peasants in power before the revolution takes place in the capitalist countries of the West. The sole means for a really democratic liquidation of the war is the conquest of power by the international proletariat, and in Russia the conquest of power by the workers and poorest peasants. . . . The Soviets are passing through agonizing torture, disintegrating because they failed to

take State power into their own hands at the proper time. . . . The correct slogan at the present time can be only complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Only the revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poorest peasantry, is strong enough to carry out this task, the task of a new upsurge. . . . The Party must take upon itself the role of front line fighter against counter-revolution. . . . The proletariat must not permit itself to be provoked by the bourgeoisie which is very anxious to provoke the proletariat at the present moment into premature battle . . ." A Party manifesto called upon the masses to prepare for the coming struggle for power:

The peasants want land, the workers want bread, and they both want peace. Over the entire globe the stormy petrels are flying. . . . The financiers of all countries are already gathering at secret conferences to discuss the general problems of the approaching danger. For they already hear the iron step of the marching workers' revolution. They already see the inevitable. Into this clash our Party is going with unfurled banners. . . . It will hold them high in the future, in the struggle for Socialism, for the brotherhood of peoples. For it knows that a new movement is rising and that the hour of the death of the old world is near. Prepare for new battles, militant comrades! Firmly, courageously, and calmly, without giving in to provocations, gather strength and form fighting columns! Under the banner of the Party, proletarians and soldiers! Under our banner, oppressed of the villages! Long live the revolutionary proletariat! Long live the alliance of the workers and the village poor! Down with the counter-revolution and its "Moscow Conference"! Long live the workers' world revolution! Long live Socialism! Long live the RSDLP (B)! ³³

The "Kornilov affair" of September paved the way for the Party's seizure of power. General Lavr G. Kornilov, son of a Siberian Cossack, had been forced to relinquish his command of the Petrograd military district in April on the demand of the Soviet. After the July Days Kerensky named him Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies as successor to Brussilov. At his insistence the Government reintroduced capital punishment at the front and sought to restore discipline by combating Bolshevik propaganda and reducing the authority of the soldiers' committees. He addressed the State Conference in Moscow on August

27 and became the idol of all who thirsted after "law and order." In the words of his friend, General Anton Denikin: "Kornilov became a banner—for some of counter-revolution, for others of the salvation of the Motherland." This simple-minded soldier regarded Kerensky as a windbag and argued that all political problems could be solved by hanging Lenin and all the members of the Soviets. Through various leaks and indiscretions in a tragic comedy of errors, Kerensky was soon convinced, and with justification, that Kornilov was plotting his overthrow through a military occupation of the capital. On September 9 the Premier dismissed the General as Commander-in-Chief. Kornilov breathed defiance and was supported by most of the higher officers, including General Denikin, on the southwestern front. But the temper of the troops was such that the officers could send no aid to the Commander-in-Chief. In Petrograd Boris Savinkov, then in charge of the War Ministry, urged Kornilov to resign as a means toward reconciliation, while Paul Miliukov urged Kerensky to resign in favor of General Alexiev. On September 11 Sir George Buchanan, on behalf of the representatives of the Allied Powers in the United States, offered to "mediate" between Kerensky and Kornilov in the cause of "averting civil war."

Kerensky was saved by the support of those who, a few weeks later, would destroy him. The Soviet leaders demanded the suppression of the Kornilov movement and asked the Bolsheviks to join them against the common enemy in a "Committee for the Struggle with Counter-Revolution." The result was the recruiting and arming in the capital of some 25,000 workers, constituting a popular militia which revived the half-suppressed Red Guard of the Bolsheviks. Kerensky spurned Miliukov's advice. Tereshchenko rejected Buchanan's offer. Kornilov remained in Moghilev. His detachments melted away before they reached Petrograd in the face of the energetic propaganda and military preparation of the new Committee. General Krymov, one of Kornilov's aides, committed suicide after Kerensky accused him of mutiny. Another aide, the Don Cossack Ataman Kaledin, sought safety in Novocherkassk. Kerensky assumed the post of Commander-in-Chief on September 12. Kornilov, Denikin and their co-conspirators were arrested in Moghilev. Their movement collapsed without bloodshed. Kerensky presently released them, suspecting that he might soon need the aid of the Right against the Left. In reality

he was now the helpless prisoner of his saviors. The workers of Petrograd retained their arms. The sailors of the Baltic fleet denounced the Premier. Within a week the Bolsheviks for the first time secured a majority in the city Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow. Many provincial Soviets displayed a similar trend. Trotsky, who had been released from prison on September 17, was elected President of the Petrograd Soviet on October 8.

Lenin, still in hiding, decided early in September to go to Finland. Wearing a wig, bearing a worker's passport and disguised as a fireman, he crossed the border on a locomotive. He lived for a time at Yalkala and then in Helsinki. Early in October he moved to Viborg. Not until October 22 did he return to the capital. But he remained the master strategist of the Party during his seclusion and found time in Helsinki to write six chapters of a book which he had sketched out in Switzerland. These pages were not published until 1918 and were never completed because, as he said in a postscript, "it is more pleasant and useful to go through the 'experience of the revolution' than to write about it." But they still remain, a generation later, one of the most illuminating expositions of the political gospel of the ruling Party of the USSR. A few excerpts will suggest, however inadequately, the thesis of these chapters which Lenin entitled *State and Revolution: Marxist Teaching About the Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*:

The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian State is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian State, i.e., of all States, is only possible through "withering away." . . . The proletariat needs State power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence, both for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiters and for the purpose of *guiding* the great mass of the population—the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie, the semi-proletarians—in the work of organizing Socialist economy. By educating a workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and of *leading the whole people* to Socialism, of directing and organizing the new order, of being the teacher, guide and leader of all the toiling and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie. . . . The form of bourgeois States are exceeding variegated, but their essence is the same: in one way or another, all these States are in the last analysis inevitably a *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to Communism will

certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*. . . .

The venal and rotten parliamentarism of bourgeois society is replaced in the Commune by institutions in which freedom of opinion and discussion does not degenerate into deception, for the parliamentarians must themselves work, must themselves execute their own laws, must themselves verify their results in actual life, must themselves be directly responsible to their electorate. Representative institutions remain, but parliamentarism as a special system, as a division of labor between the legislative and the executive functions, as a privileged position for the deputies, *no longer exists*. Without representative institutions we cannot imagine democracy, not even proletarian democracy; but we can and *must* think of democracy without parliamentarism, if criticism of bourgeois society is not mere empty words for us, if the desire to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie is our serious and sincere desire. . . .

We are not Utopians, we do not indulge in "dreams" of how best to do away *immediately* with all administration, with all subordination. . . . No, we want the Socialist revolution with human nature as it is now, with human nature that cannot do without subordination, control, and "managers." But if there be subordination, it must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and the laboring—to the proletariat. The specific "commanding" methods of the State officials can and must begin to be replaced—immediately, within twenty-four hours—by the simple functions of "managers" and bookkeepers, functions which are now already within the capacity of the average city dweller and can well be performed for "working men's wages." . . . A witty German Social-Democrat of the 'seventies of the last century called the *post-office* an example of the socialist system. This is very true. . . . To organize the *whole* national economy like the postal system, in such a way that the technicians, managers, bookkeepers as well as *all* officials, should receive no higher wages than "workingmen's wages," all under the control and leadership of the armed proletariat—this is our immediate aim. This is the kind of State and economic basis we need. . . .

We set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the State, i.e., every organized and systematic violence, every use of violence against man in general. We do not expect the advent of an order of society in which the principle of subordination of minority to majority will not be observed. But, striving for Socialism, we are convinced that it will develop into Communism; that, side by side with this, there will vanish all need for force, for the *subjection* of one man to another, and of one part of the population to another, since people will *grow accustomed*

to observing the elementary conditions of social existence *without force and without subjection*. . . . The State will be able to wither away completely when society has realized the rule: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs," i.e., when people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental rules of social life, and their labor is so productive that they voluntarily work *according to their ability*. . . . What is generally called Socialism was termed by Marx the "first" or lower phase of Communist society. Insofar as the means of production become *public* property, the word "Communism" is also applicable here, providing we do not forget that it is *not* full Communism. . . .

The distortion and hushing up of the question as to the relation of a proletarian revolution to the State could not fail to play an immense role at a time when the States, with their swollen military apparatus as a consequence of imperialist rivalry, had become monstrous military beasts devouring the lives of millions of people, in order to decide whether England or Germany—this or that finance capital—should dominate the world.³⁴

5. INSURRECTION

To translate the theory of revolution into practice now became the immediate task of Lenin's party. The Mensheviks were disintegrating. The SR's were split, with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries under Maria Spiridonova veering toward a semi-Bolshevik position. The Cadets were impotent. Kerensky felt his political support slipping out from under his feet and the rope of proletarian revolt tightening around his neck. He clutched at the device of summoning a "Democratic Conference" in Petrograd (September 27), composed of representatives of the Soviets, the co-operatives, the trade unions and local legislative bodies. The confused and divided delegates voted first in favor of a new coalition government, then in favor of excluding the Cadets and finally against any coalition. On October 8 Kerensky revamped his "coalition" Cabinet in which posts were now awarded to the industrialists, Konovalov and Tretyakov. The futile Democratic Conference was followed by the formation of a "Council of the Republic," including propertied and non-Socialist elements and intended to serve as a consultative "Pre-Parliament" pending the meeting of the often postponed Constituent Assembly. The Council assembled in Marinsky Palace in the capital. On Lenin's

orders the Bolshevik delegates walked out on the opening day, October 20. Real power—i.e., ability to command the masses—resided neither in Marinsky Palace nor in the Winter Palace where the Ministers met. Its new locus was Smolny Institute, originally a convent and then a girls' school near the Neva on the eastern side of the city. Here in a bleak expanse of bare classrooms and assembly halls the RSDLP (B) had set up new headquarters. Here also were the officers of the Petrograd Soviet. Here the uprising to come was planned, directed and carried out.

Lenin told the Central Committee that the Party, now in control of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, must take power immediately by organizing an armed insurrection. "To delay is a crime. To await the Congress of the Soviets (the Second Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies) is a shameful play at formality, treachery to the Revolution. . . ." To the objections that the Party could not retain power, he wrote that the 240,000 members could govern Russia in the interest of the poor against the rich as easily as 130,000 landlords had governed after 1905 in the interest of the rich against the poor. "A real, deep peoples' revolution is an incredibly tormenting process of the death of an old and the birth of a new social order, of a new way of life for tens of millions of people. Revolution is the sharpest, fiercest, most desperate class war and civil war . . . but it will conquer the whole world, because the socialist upheaval ripens in all countries."

Lenin's call for immediate insurrection was voted down. He argued and stormed and asked to be allowed to resign from the Central Committee. He was still in hiding, living after October 20, when he returned to the capital, in a large workers' tenement building in the Viborg district in the apartment of Marguerita Fofanova, an ardent Bolshevik. A dozen members of the Central Committee gathered in secret at Sukhanov's apartment on the evening of October 23 to meet the leader whose advice they had thus far resisted. Lenin reproached them for waiting. After an all-night discussion, relieved by tea and sandwiches, they passed a resolution by a vote of 10 to 2, declaring that "armed insurrection is inevitable and the time is quite ripe for it." A Political Bureau of seven was chosen: Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Sokolnikov, Bubnov, Zinoviev and Kamenev.

There was controversy in the inner circle as to the best date for the uprising. Despite the resolution, controversy also continued as

to whether the insurrection should be attempted at all. Kamenev and Zinoviev were the two who had voted against the majority. They now appealed to the Party against Lenin's view, arguing that an uprising would probably fail and that the Party should await the Constituent Assembly. They reiterated their objections on October 29 at a Party conference which voted 19 to 2 in favor of Lenin's resolution for "intensified preparation for an armed uprising." On October 31 the two dissidents published their objections in Maxim Gorky's paper, *Novaya Zhizn*, which then had a Menshevik orientation. They thus revealed publicly for the first time that the Bolshevik Central Committee was plotting revolution. Lenin denounced this intolerable and dangerous breach of Party discipline as treachery, called Kamenev and Zinoviev "strike-breakers" and demanded that the Central Committee expel them from the Party. They were not in fact expelled. Rykov and Nogin in Moscow shared their views. They were not the only doubters in the Petrograd organization.

Like most great crises of war or revolution, the events which ensued in Petrograd take on the retrospective appearance of inevitability or at least of a masterly program of action boldly executed by leaders blessed with dauntless courage, infallible vision and complete confidence in themselves and their supporters. Such appearances seldom correspond to contemporary reality. They flow from the fact that the events themselves alter the fate of millions of men for all time thereafter and thus come to be regarded as Destiny or as the unique achievement of unerring minds. Russia's "ten days that shook the world" were, for the participants at the time, less a self-conscious exercise in "the science of revolution" than a period of confusion, wrangling, heart-searching, fanaticism, skepticism, mistakes and sheer luck, good and bad, all jumbled into a chaos of words and deeds out of which, somehow, Lenin and his aides ultimately evolved the strategy of victory. The shape of the chaos and the unfolding of the strategy have many times been portrayed in day by day, hour by hour and almost minute by minute accounts.³⁵

The crucial decisions and events, seen with the wisdom of hindsight, were few and simple. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was originally scheduled to meet on November 3 and then deferred to November 7—i.e., October 25 by the old Russian calendar. It was soon a

parent that the Bolsheviks would have a majority of the delegates since most of the local Soviets of workers and soldiers (although not yet of the peasants) had moved away from the Mensheviks and SR's into the Bolshevik camp. The Bolshevik's slogan once more was "All Power to the Soviets!" The Petrograd Soviet in Smolny established a "Military Revolutionary Committee," consisting of 4 Anarchists, 14 Left SR's and 48 Bolsheviks. The function of the MRC was ostensibly to safeguard the Revolution against its enemies and actually to plan and lead the insurrection.

Each contestant—the Ministers of the Provisional Government on the one side, the Soviet and Bolshevik leaders on the other—sought to depict the other as the aggressor. The Government's efforts to move the Bolshevized Petrograd garrison to the front was hotly resented and resisted, as was its project of moving the capital to Moscow after the fall of Riga to the Germans and the naval defeat in the Baltic on October 23. Rodzianko, right-wing Cadet and last President of the Duma, wrote that the loss of Petrograd should be welcomed since it would destroy the Soviet and the demoralized Baltic fleet. Popular clamor compelled Kerensky to keep the Government on the Neva. But its capacity to govern was daily declining. On October 30 the harassed Premier told John Reed and two other foreign correspondents that "the Russian people are suffering from economic fatigue and from disillusionment with the Allies. The world thinks that the Russian Revolution is at an end. Do not be mistaken. The Russian Revolution is just beginning . . ."

On November 3 Lenin urged that the blow be struck on November 7 in order that power could be transferred forthwith to the Soviet Congress. The 4th was the "Day of the Petrograd Soviet"—an occasion for gigantic parades and mass meetings at which Bolshevik orators pledged their frenzied auditors to come out in the streets in support of the Soviet power when the signal should be given. On the same day the MRC, whose guiding spirits included Trotsky, Antonov-Ovseenko, Podvoisky and Chudnovsky, told the soldiers of the garrison that no orders addressed to them should be deemed valid unless they bore the Committee's signature. This was a major challenge to Kerensky. The Ministers concluded that they must reply or at once lose all respect and all possibility of retaining power.

Revolution temporarily strips the State of its credenda and miranda and reveals the central question of government in naked simplicity: who can command obedience? When those who issue orders in the name of the State are obeyed both by soldiers and civilians, their power is secure. When they are defied by civilians but still obeyed by soldiers, their power is in jeopardy but can yet be maintained, albeit precariously, by force and threats of force. When their orders are ignored by soldiers and civilians alike, they are powerless. Such was the position of the members of the Provisional Government in its dying days in Petrograd. The bulk of the populace, the soldiers of the garrison and the sailors of the fleet all obeyed the MRC of the Petrograd Soviet, though the Soviet power was not yet vested with the magic of the State. They looked with contempt on the Ministers in the Winter Palace who were masters of a magic which had lost its efficacy. The Ministers were obeyed only by a few policemen, by the yunkers or student officers, numbering only a few hundred, and by scattered and doubtful detachments of troops. Their efforts to summon reinforcements from the provinces and the front were as vain as their attempts to send the disloyal local troops out of the capital. The soldiers summoned refused to come. The soldiers ordered out refused to depart.

The final test began with incidents which were almost trivial. On the evening of November 5 the Cabinet decided to suppress the Bolshevik newspapers, to arrest the members of the Petrograd Soviet and its MRC and to call in troops from the suburbs. At 5:30 a.m. of November 6 a commissioner, backed by a detachment of yunkers, appeared at a printing plant where two Bolshevik papers were issued. He confiscated 8,000 copies of the morning editions already run off, broke up the type plates and put a seal on the door. Shortly afterwards the crew of the cruiser *Aurora* received an order to put out to sea. The MRC at once sent Red Guards to reopen the printing plant and ordered the *Aurora* to remain in the Neva estuary. The sailors obeyed. The printing of the papers was resumed. The MRC commanded the garrison to mobilize on a war footing to defend the Petrograd Soviet and to await further orders.

Kerensky, having no other means of asserting his authority, went to Marinsky Palace later in the day and made a speech to

the Council of the Republic. He spoke like a prosecuting attorney marshalling evidence against the defense:

Ulianov-Lenin, a State criminal . . . has invited the proletariat and the Petrograd garrison . . . to immediate insurrection. Particularly should be noticed the activity of the present President of the Petrograd Soviet, Bronstein-Trotsky. . . . Given the state of mind of the masses, any movement at Petrograd will be followed by the most terrible massacres which will cover with eternal shame the name of free Russia. . . . I place myself at the point of view of the Right, and I propose immediately to proceed to an investigation and make the necessary arrests. . . . Those who have dared to lift their hands against the free will of the Russian people must be liquidated with precision! . . . Let the population of Petrograd understand that it will encounter a firm power.

The hall was in an uproar as Kerensky, pale and perspiring, departed. Gotz, for the SR's, denounced the Bolshevik policy as criminal but also denounced Kerensky for doing nothing about land and peace. Martov, for the Mensheviks, condemned the Premier for insulting the populace. The Left carried its motion, demanding "a decree transmitting the land to the peasants' Land Committee . . . and an energetic course of action abroad in proposing to the Allies a proclamation of peace terms and a beginning of peace parleys." Kerensky, hoping for a vote of confidence, regarded the motion as an expression of lack of confidence. He threatened to resign and complained bitterly to Gotz, Dan and Avksentiev, President of the Council. They asserted that no criticism of the Government was intended . . .

Later in the day (November 6) the Bolshevik Central Committee met again to plan the uprising. Zinoviev and Lenin were not present. Lenin sent a message through Marguerita Fofanova urging the seizure of power at once. But he now decided to move to Smolny. He put on a wig and proceeded to his destination. Krupskaya followed him that evening. They moved into a small room on the second floor of the Institute building. Years later the room became a museum where visitors could still see the desk and chair where Lenin worked for some weeks after the seizure of power, and the small iron bedstead behind the partition where he slept, with an identical bedstead for his wife, all starkly simple and without decor of any kind. That night, in accordance with the plans elaborated by Antonov-Ovseenko, Podvoisky and Chudnovsky,

the troops of the MRC occupied two of the railway stations, the Nikolai Bridge, the State Bank and the Central Telephone Exchange. There was no resistance and no disorder. The MRC overestimated the resources of the Government and deferred the attempt to occupy the Winter Palace, awesome citadel of the vanished power of the Tsardom, until the belated arrival of the sailors from Kronstadt.

The morning of November 7 cured Kerensky of his last illusions. At 10 o'clock the MRC proclaimed the overthrow of his Government. At about the same hour he departed for the front in his touring car, followed (as an added assurance of safe passage) by a car from the United States Embassy flying the American flag and placed at his disposal by Ambassador Francis. Konovalov became Acting Premier—for a few more hours. Shortly after noon troops of the MRC surrounded the Marinsky Palace and told the members of the Council of the Republic to go home. They obeyed under protest. That afternoon Lenin made his first public appearance since July. He addressed the Petrograd Soviet at Smolny: "Comrades, the workers' and peasants' revolution, which the Bolsheviks always said must come, has been achieved. . . ." Peace would be made and land would be granted to the peasants. "Long live the world socialist revolution!"

Not until early evening was a demand presented for the surrender of the Winter Palace. No reply was forthcoming from the huge and somber red-painted building. At 9 p.m. the cruiser *Aurora* fired a blank shell. Soldiers and workers in the great square opened fire with rifles and machine guns. Artillery in the Fortress of Peter and Paul lobbed shells across the river, but most of them went wild. A few windows of the Palace were broken. The "defenders" consisted of a handful of yunkers and the Women's Battalion. When some of the girl soldiers made a sortie to "rescue" General Alexiev, who was falsely rumored to be in the Staff HQ, they were captured. Wild tales of wholesale atrocities against them proved unfounded. One committed suicide, after confessing "disappointment in her ideals." Three were said to have been raped. None of the defenders was killed. Among the assailants a few were wounded; one soldier and five sailors lost their lives. The Red guards gradually filtered into the Palace and induced the inmates to yield—more by persuasion than by force. Antonov-Ovseenko, wearing a pince-nez and floppy, broad-rimmed hat,

arrested the Ministers and safely escorted them to the Fortress of Peter and Paul where they were soon released.

Bloodshed, arson and terror were all conspicuous by their absence. Soviet Russia was born and the Provisional Government died with a calm casualness that was anti-climactic. There was no struggle because the Government had almost literally no supporters. Almost everybody hailed the new revolution. Those who did not had no program, no hope, no confidence and no desire whatever to risk their skins on behalf of a political vacuum.

Meanwhile the Second Congress of Soviets met in the great hall on the lower floor of Smolny at 10:45 in the evening of November 7. Kamenev was President. The Mensheviks and Right SR's protested at the day's events. Abramovich, leader of the Bund, angrily declared that his group would leave the Congress. Trotsky shouted that they were "so much refuse that will be swept into the garbage-can of history." The protestants withdrew to the city Duma and helped to form an anti-Soviet "Committee for the Salvation of the Country and the Revolution"—which accomplished nothing. The Congress adjourned at 6 a.m. It reassembled on the evening of November 8. For the first time Lenin appeared. He was, in John Reed's words, "a short, stocky figure, with a big head set down in his shoulders, bald and bulging. Little eyes, a snubbish nose, wide, generous mouth, and heavy chin: clean-shaven now, but already beginning to bristle with the well-known beard of his past and future. Dressed in shabby clothes, his trousers much too long for him. Unimpressive, to be the idol of a mob, loved and revered as perhaps few leaders in history have been . . ."

Some moments of confusion, occasioned by the goings and comings of a few Bundists and Menshevik Internationalists who could not decide whether to depart or remain, were followed by an ovation to Lenin. When it ceased, he spoke in a hoarse voice, simply and with no gestures: "We shall now proceed to construct the Socialist order. . . . The first thing is the adoption of practical measures to realize peace . . ." He read a "Proclamation to the Peoples of All the Belligerent Countries," proposing immediate negotiations for a "just and democratic peace," without annexations or indemnities, to be preceded by a three months' general armistice. "This proposal," said Lenin, "will meet with resistance on the part of the imperialist governments—we don't fool our-

selves on that score. But we hope that revolution will soon break out in all the belligerent countries . . ." All spokesmen of all groups expressed approval. The vote was unanimous. Delegates rose to their feet. "The war is ended! The war is ended!" exclaimed a workman to John Reed. A thousand voices chanted the "International":

Arise, ye prisoners of starvation! Arise, ye wretched of the earth! For justice thunders condemnation, a better world's in birth. No more tradition's chain shall bind you. Arise, ye slaves! No more in thrall. The world shall rise on new foundations. You have been naught: you shall be all . . .

After the singing of the Funeral March for the revolutionary dead, Lenin, with a sure political instinct, read a Decree on Land, abolishing without compensation all private ownership of land and transferring all estates and all Crown and Church holdings to the Land Committees and peasant Soviets "until the Constituent Assembly meets." After a confused discussion and a long recess, the Decree was put to a vote. Only one member voted against it. At 2:30 a.m. Kamenev read a "Decree on the Constitution of Power." Lenin had discussed with Trotsky what the new Cabinet should be called. "From persecution and a life underground, to come so suddenly into power. . . . It makes the head swim! . . . What shall we call them? Anything but Ministers . . ." Trotsky had suggested Commissars and then Peoples' Commissars and finally a Soviet of Peoples' Commissars. "The Soviet of Peoples' Commissars?" commented Lenin. "Splendid! Smells terribly of revolution!"³⁶ The Decree listed the new Soviet of Peoples' Commissars or Sovnarkom. Since the Left SR's were as yet unwilling to take posts, all the members were Bolsheviks:

President of the Council: Lenin	Commerce and Industry: V. P. Nogin
Foreign Affairs: Trotsky	Popular Education: A. V. Lunacharsky
Nationalities: Stalin	Finance: E. E. Skvortsov (Stepanov)
Interior: A. E. Rykov	Justice: G. E. Oppokov (Lomov)
Agriculture: V. P. Miliutin	Supplies: E. A. Teodorovitch
Labor: A. G. Schliapnikov	Post and Telegraph: N. P. Avilov (Glibov)
Military and Naval Affairs—a committee composed of V. A. Antonov-Avseenko, N. V. Krylenko, and F. M. Dybenko	Railroads: To be filled later

The debate which followed gave rise to protests and expressions of anxiety. Voices were raised for a coalition of all Socialist groups. Warnings were issued that a general peace would prove impossible, that the outcome would be an Entente-German peace against Russia or a separate German-Russian peace. Trotsky was defiant: "Coalition doesn't always add to strength. . . . There are only two alternatives: either the Russian Revolution will create a revolutionary movement in Europe, or the European Powers will destroy the Russian Revolution!" The Decree was carried by a large majority. The delegates adjourned *sine die* and departed shortly before dawn to carry the tidings all over the land.

A brief and half-hearted clash between Kerensky's troops and the Red Guards southwest of the capital (November 12-14) clinched the Bolshevik victory and sent the former Premier into flight and exile. A yunker revolt in the capital was bloodily suppressed at the same time with some 200 dead. In Moscow severe street fighting for control of the Kremlin took 500 lives and ended in Red triumph. Throughout the length and breadth of the realm the transition to Soviet rule was effected swiftly and with little disorder. The ease with which the Provisional Government vanished and the new rulers secured themselves in power was as surprising to the Party as to Kerensky's demoralized supporters and to the outside world.

* * * * *

After months of struggle and years and decades of dreaming and toiling, the vision of Lenin and the revelation of Marx and Engels had for the first time in history become reality. The broader objectives and the larger pattern of the new dispensation had been fashioned long ago by the slowly germinating loves, hatreds and anticipations which had culminated in the hour of victory. The specific form of the new Soviet State would be determined by the new balance of forces immediately after October. Its capacity to survive would be decided by the later verdicts of diplomacy and war in its relations with the other Great Powers.

The Revolution itself was the triumphant sequel to Lenin's arrival at the Finland Station. It was also the fulfillment of all the plans and plots of the RSDLP since the nine forgotten men had met in Minsk in March of 1898. It was likewise a watershed between the past and the future for much of Western mankind. For it represented the realization, albeit in a strange and unexpected

context, of the apocalyptic prophecies of seventy years before written into the *Communist Manifesto*. Conservatives everywhere were haunted by a new spectre and moved to panic-fear and grim determination that the new régime must die. Radicals everywhere were stirred to hot excitement and wild hopes. In the sad and sobering years ahead many of the fears and hopes would alike prove vain. A new and dynamic way of life would nevertheless emerge to challenge the attention of all peoples and to affect their own lives in many unsuspected ways. But the ordeals and the promises of times to come, reserved for the following pages, cannot be wisely evaluated without a backward glance at the tyranny of times past, looming dimly through a half-remembered millenium and inexorably shaping Russian destinies for all the future. For out of the toil and struggle of unending generations, from ancient days to the end of the Tsardom, was knit the tough but flexible fabric of community life which the new rulers were to try to weave into the design of a new heaven and a new earth.

BEFORE OCTOBER

I. RIVER AND STEPPE

THE "SIXTH OF THE WORLD" which the Bolsheviks conquered in the October Revolution comprises the largest contiguous land mass on the globe united in a single polity. The Communist Commissars, like the later Tsars, inherited a realm incomparably vaster in extent than any other now on the planet, save only the widely scattered territories of the British Commonwealth. The Muscovite lands are likewise broader than any of the earlier empires of recorded time, with the single exception of the World State of the Mongols. In the summer season of white nights the sun never sets on the Soviet Republics. When it is 7 p.m. in Leningrad it is 5 a.m. the next morning in Kamchatka.

Within the Soviet frontiers of 1941 lived some 200,000,000 people spread over more than 8,300,000 square miles. The Republic of China, second largest unit of the contemporary State System, claims some 4,000,000 square miles. Continental United States and Brazil each embrace about 3,000,000 square miles. The sub-continent of India occupies considerably less than 2,000,000 square miles. The Soviet Union is almost as large as China, India and the United States together. It is appreciably larger than the Continent of South America and is very near the size of all of North America.

The politics of the USSR is inevitably conditioned by the interaction of its peoples with other communities, with one another, with their common past and with the natural environment in which they live. Like all the human denizens of the turning earth, they are born, they grow, work, love and die in a homeland

shaped less by their own labors than by those of their ancestors through many centuries. And the land which is home has been molded less by human acts than by the age-long impact of winds and waves, ice-sheets and floods, flora and fauna on the rocks and soils and waterways of their gigantic imperium.¹

By far the larger part of the Soviet land is a flat plain, as endless and eternal as the sea, spreading from the frozen Arctic to the highlands of Central Asia. On the west the plain flows smoothly into the lowlands of Poland and northern Germany. To the southwest, south and east it extends to the mountain chains which loom up like the broken coastline of a huge ocean. The larger ranges, from west to east, include the Carpathians, beyond which live in a small enclave the Russian-speaking people of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine); the Caucasus, with their great peaks of Mt. Elbruz (18,465 ft.) and Mt. Kazbek (16,346 ft.), the highest in Europe and higher than any mountains in the United States; then to the east the lofty Pamirs with many peaks over 20,000 feet, merging into the jumbled mass of steep and rocky highlands called the Hindu Kush, the Tien Shan, the Altai range and the Sayan chain stretching toward Lake Baikal; and finally, beyond the Lake, the ranges of the Yablonoi, the Stanovoi, the Kolyma and the Anadyr, extending in stately procession to Bering Straits. The great plain is rimmed on the northeast by the Verkhoyansk and other transverse ranges beyond the Lena in the land of the Yakuts. The lands ruled from Moscow extend beyond the mountain rim in two other places: in the south they include Transcaucasia, and in the Far East they embrace the Maritime Provinces, the long coastal plain and the Kamchatka peninsula with their mountainous hinterlands set back from the Pacific.

The surface of the platter within the semi-circular edge of highlands is broken by only one major elevation—the Urals, stretching some 1,500 miles down from the Arctic Circle to a point about 500 miles north of the Caspian. These mountains, nowhere much over 5,000 feet, are no barrier between “Europe” and “Asia.” The rains and snows which fall on the great Eurasian plain drain into a dozen seas, of which five (White, Barents, Kara, Laptevkh and East Siberian) are arms of the Arctic Ocean. Three more (Bering, Okhotsk and Japan) are arms of the Pacific. The Aral and the Caspian have no ocean outlets. The Black and Baltic Seas both empty into the Atlantic by way of intermediate waters. Of

the innumerable inland lakes, the most notable are Baikal, about a third again as large as Lake Erie; Balkash and Ladoga, each the size of Lake Ontario; Onega, Peipus and Ilmen.

Into the lakes and seas flow more than half a million rivers. The longest are the Amur (2,900 miles), the Lena (2,860), the Yenisei (2,800) and the Ob-and-Irtish (3,200) which, after the Amazon, the Nile and the Mississippi, is the fourth longest river of the world. Into the Aral Sea between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan flow the Syr Daria (1,700) and the Amu Daria or Oxus (1,500). Into the Caspian empty the Ural (1,400) and the Volga (2,300), longest river in Europe, rising in the Valdai Hills northeast of Moscow. The capital city (before Peter and since Lenin) is located on the Moskva which flows into the Volga by way of the Oka. The Black Sea receives the waters of the Don (1,100), the Dnieper (1,400), the Dniester and the Danube. The Western Dvina empties into the Baltic, the Northern Dvina into the White Sea. The early history of the Russian people was in no small degree shaped by the fact that the Volga, the Western Dvina and the Dnieper all rise within 100 miles of one another in the hills 150 miles west of the site of Moscow, with the Don rising about 100 miles south of the city.

In terms of vegetation the great plain is divided into three zones of forest, steppe and desert. North of the forest is the almost treeless Arctic tundra. In the far south is a narrow fringe of semi-tropical vegetation along the Black Sea coast or "Russian Riviera." The plain as a whole has hot summers and severe winters. In Verkhoyansk, east of the lower Lena, summer temperatures often rise to 80° or 90° but winter temperatures of 93°F. below zero have been recorded, the lowest registered anywhere on earth. Only the Black Sea coast south of the Caucasus has no frosts and abundant rainfall all year. The rest of the land is colder and drier than most of the United States, making agriculture less productive despite much rich soil. The Gulf of Finland is on the same parallel as the southern tip of Greenland and the south coast of Alaska. Moscow is on a line with Labrador. Warm Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan in the Soviet south are as far north of the equator as Washington, St. Louis, Kansas City and San Francisco.

The forest zone, containing one quarter of the world's lumber reserves, is roughly 5,000 miles long and 1,200 miles wide. Kiev is on its edge. Moscow is well within its southern fringe of mixed

woods and meadows. Much of the forest contains both coniferous and deciduous trees, though the northernmost strip is exclusively evergreen. The steppe zone is approximately 2,600 miles long and 600 miles wide, stretching from Bessarabia to the Mongolian frontier. The heart of it is the broad belt of *Chernozom* or black earth, phenomenally rich in humus and perhaps the best of all soils for cereal crops. The steppes, treeless save in the river valleys, are endless prairies originally covered by feather-grass or *stipa*, similar to the feather-sedge of the American southwest. The desert zone is some 1,800 miles long and 600 miles wide. It comprises the dry steppes (below sea level) north and northwest of the Caspian, the comparable strip across Central Asia to Lake Balkash, and the sandy and salt wastes of southern Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The first recorded movements of peoples through the forests and between the wide horizons of the grasslands followed two long highways. At the point where they cross the old Russian State came into being. One is the broad road of the steppe zone which begins below the mountains of Mongolia, southwest of Lake Baikal, where the Yenisei and the Ob-Irtish first flow out of the snows of the high plateaus. From here the prairies stretch westward, skirting the Urals and the woodlands to the north and flanking the semi-desert plains to the south. Their majestic monotony, sweeping all across the Ukraine to the Carpathians, is broken only by the Volga, the Don, the Dnieper and lesser streams. The other road, intercepting the steppe road at a right angle, is a thin ribbon of waterways between the Baltic and Black Seas. It comprises, from north to south, the Gulf of Finland, the Neva, Lake Ladoga, the Volkhov River, little Lake Ilmen, the Lovat River and a short and easy portage across the site of Smolensk to the upper waters of the Dnieper, whose course constitutes the remainder of the ancient "water road."

2. THE VIKINGS AT KIEV

Everything of enduring import in the early development of Russia is encompassed in the migration of Asiatic tribes westward toward Europe along the steppe road and in the flow of Scandinavian and Slavic peoples southward toward Byzantium along the water road. During the long millennia of pre-history the steppe road was quite

possibly the common highway along which, in successive waves, came the remote ancestors of all the peoples of Europe and the Americas, save only the groups of African origin and the Americans, who settled the Western Hemisphere from eastern Asia by way of Bering Straits, the Aleutians and Alaska. It appears probable that Mongolia and its adjacent areas were the original "Garden of Eden" of all the progenitors of all the species and races of mankind. One stream of wanderers moved southward into China and the Indies, with some drifting into Polynesia and others into India and Africa. Another stream moved northeastward and then southward through both the American Continents. A third stream moved westward along the belt of black soil from the plateaus into the grassy plains. This third tide of nomads, pushing onward through thousands of years, peopled the Middle and Near East, North Africa and Europe.

The first Slavs, like the earliest Celtic and Germanic peoples and the ancestors of Greeks and Romans, doubtless came out of Asia by way of the steppes. They seem to have settled in ancient times not on the steppes, which were ever being overrun by new invaders, but in the area between the Carpathians, the Baltic, the Vistula and the upper Dnieper. They were called by Pliny "Venedi," by Ptolemy "Venedae" and, much later, by the Germans "Wends." From this center some moved southward to become the modern Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and to mingle with the forebears of the Rumanians, Bulgars and Greeks. Others moved westward to become the Slovaks, Czechs, Poles and the original Slavic Prussians. In the so-called "Dark Ages" Western Slavs occupied all of Germany east of the Elbe until, in medieval times, they were slowly pushed back to the Oder and the Vistula by Germanic colonizers and conquerors. Still other Slavs moved eastward to become at last the Great Russians, the White or Byelo-Russians and the Little Russians or Ukrainians.

Meanwhile the steppe road was traversed by a bewildering cavalcade. A thousand years before Christ it was travelled and settled by the "Cimmerians." In the 8th and 7th Centuries B.C. the grasslands north of the Black Sea were inhabited by a people called "Scythians" by the Greeks, who themselves had settlements in the Crimea and along the nearby coasts. The Scythians had evidently been pushed westward out of Asia by the pressure of other barbarians called "Huns" by the Chinese, who defeated

them and drove them to the west in quest of plunder and grazing lands. In alliance with Assyria, the hard-riding Scythian horsemen dispossessed the Cimmerians. Sometime after Alexander the Great (d. 323 B.C.), the Scythians were set upon and gradually ousted or conquered by eastern tribes variously called the Sarmatians, Alans or Antes who mingled with the southeasternmost Slavs. These communities in turn were assailed and partially conquered by the Goths, a Germanic tribe originally living on the south shore of the Baltic.

The Goths were the first of the early peoples to move from north to south along the water road (c. 150–200 A.D.). Between 250 and 400 A.D. both Visigoths and Ostrogoths periodically raided the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire by land and by sea. Under pressure from the Huns, now moving toward the western reaches of the steppe road, the Visigoths invaded Thrace, slew the Emperor Valens at Adrianople in 378 and, under Alaric, sacked Rome in 410. They then drove the Alans and Vandals out of Spain (into which these migrants had come from Gaul) into North Africa. Rome was sacked by the Vandals in 455. Twenty-one years later the last of the Western Emperors lost his throne.

The end of the Western Roman Empire amid the great *Völkerwanderung* of the 4th and 5th Centuries was thus a result of events in Russia long before there was a "Russia" or "Russians."² Still farther east the Chinese had built their "Great Wall" in the 2nd Century B.C., a barrier which contributed toward the westward movement of the Huns along the black soil highway. These terrifying invaders pushed the Goths and other Germans into the Roman Empire. Under Attila, the "Scourge of God," the Hunnish horde swept over all of Central Europe until it was beaten at Châlons-sur-Marne in 451. Behind the Huns, whose vast realm soon disintegrated, came the Bulgars (c. 400–500), and behind the Bulgars the Avars (c. 550–650), and behind the Avars the Khazars (c. 650–750), a people of mixed Hunnish, Bulgar, Turkish, Sarmatian and Caucasian origin. In the 7th Century the Khazars founded an empire under their Kagans or Kakhans (Great Khans) all along the northern shores of the Black Sea. After debating whether to accept Islam from the Arabs or Christianity from the Byzantines, the Khazars embraced Judaism. This prosperous and tolerant kingdom of Jewish converts protected its Alanic subjects, some of whom were Slavs and others Iranians.

But the weakening of the Khazar power under the attacks of the Arabs, coupled with the advent of new invaders out of Asia in the form of the Magyars (c. 750–850), caused the Kagan's dependent peoples to look elsewhere for guardians.

The first Russian State was the outcome of this quest. The name *Rus* is attributed by the "Normanists" among Russian historians to a corruption of the Finnish term *Ruotsi* or Rowers, applied to the Norsemen from Sweden who early pushed eastward to Murmansk (Normansk) and beyond. But the "anti-Normanists" note that the name *Rus*, *Ros* or *Hros* was used as early as the 5th Century to refer to the *Rukhs-As* ("light clan") of Alans living around the Sea of Azov. Toward the middle of the 8th Century the tribes of Scandinavia, composed of daring mariners, explorers, pirates and warriors who came to be known as Vikings, began the series of far-flung raids and conquests which were to make them ultimate masters of Sicily, Normandy and England. By the Eastern Slavs they were called "Varangians." Between 700 and 750 they were sailing up the Western Dvina in their high-prowed, dragon-headed boats, equipped with oars and colored sails and girded with shields. They went overland to the upper Oka and Volga and down the Donets and the Don. They fought the Magyars, reached the Azov area and apparently came in contact with the *Rukhs-As*, who welcomed them as fighters against Magyars and Arabs. Vernadsky suggests that the first "calling of the Varangians from over the sea" to help the Slavs may thus have taken place about 740 rather than 862, the conventional date.³ The Swedish Vikings of Azov took the name *Rus* and established a State on the Black Sea later known as the Russian Kaganate.

In describing the campaign of the Byzantine Caesar, Constantine V, against the Bulgars in 773, the chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor tells of the Emperor putting to sea in his special flotilla of "*rousia chelandia*," presumably meaning "Russian ships." but translated more than a century later by the Pope's librarian as "red ships." But red was the usual color of early Russian war vessels, and *Russus* is Latin for red (cf. the English "russet"), though the librarian changed it into *rubea*. That there were "Russians" around the Black Sea in the 8th Century is highly probable. They were the Swedish Vikings of Azov. In 833 the Khazar Kagan asked the Emperor to aid him in building a fortress on the Don. It was called the "White House," "White Tower,"

or in Ugric, "Sarkel." It was evidently designed as a defense against the "Russians." The Swedish Vikings of the Russian Kaganate disputed Khazar-Magyar control of the whole area north of the Black Sea, including the lower valley of the Dnieper.

Their Varangian kinsmen in the north were settled around Novgorod and Staraya Rusa on Lake Ilmen and were keenly interested in trade with the Russian Kaganate of the south, now closed by the Khazars. Under circumstances which can only be guessed at, the authorities of Novgorod invited a famous Viking raider, Roric (Rurik) of Jutland, to come to rule over them, perhaps with a view toward enlisting his aid in reopening contacts with the south. Rurik came and established himself in Novgorod c. 862 (more probably 858), whence he sent two Barons or Boyars, Askold and Dir, southward by the water road to Kiev which they liberated from Khazar suzerainty. In 860 a "Russian" fleet, perhaps including Askold and Dir, raided Byzantium but was driven off.

Vast consequences for ages to come were to stem from these semi-legendary events. Kiev, "mother of Russian cities" and allegedly founded in a forgotten past by three brothers, Kiy, Shchok and Khoriv, stands at the northernmost point of the intersection of the water road and the steppe road. In 860-61 the head of the Byzantine Church, the Patriarch Photius, dispatched his able pupil Constantine (later called St. Cyril), along with Cyril's brother, Methodius, on a mission to Khazaria to convert the Khazars and Russians to Christianity. The Khazar Kagan declined to be converted. The Russians—i.e., Varangians—were hostile. In 862 Cyril and Methodius, both of whom knew Slavic, were sent to Moravia to convert the Western Slavs. They were received in the following year at the court of Prince Rostislav. They allegedly invented on Greek models the "Cyrillic alphabet" for putting the liturgy and scriptures into a written Slavic language. This alphabet became the medium of "Church Slavonic" all over the Slavic world and is the basis of modern Russian. Cyril died in Rome in 869. His work in Moravia was partially undone by German priests and princes but had permanent results elsewhere. Meanwhile Rurik went to Nimwegen in 870 to confer with King Charles the Bald, from whom he received his Friesland fief in 873—after which he soon died. He left in Novgorod an infant son, Igor (Ingvar) in whose name his Norwegian kinsmen, Helgi or Oleg, ruled. Oleg at once

moved down the water road to occupy Kiev (c. 878) where his warriors slew Askold and Dir. Oleg therewith became "Prince of Kiev" and founder of a mighty realm.

After Oleg ruled Igor, and after Igor his widow Olga, who was baptized in Byzantium in 957. Olga's son was Svyatoslav I who conquered the Khazars, seized their towns of Sarkel and Itil (on the Volga), and defeated the Bulgars on the Danube, thus establishing a great kingdom which stretched from the western shores of the Black Sea to the north end of the Caspian. Svyatoslav preferred his western provinces: "I desire to live on the Danube. Here is the center of my land. Here are to be had all good things: gold, cloth, wines and fruits of the Greeks, silver and horses of the Czechs and Hungarians, and furs, wax, honey and slaves from Russia." But Kiev was his citadel. He soon lost the deltas of the Danube and the Volga, the former to the Byzantines and the latter to new barbarians from Asia.

The Kiev Principality (882-1240) is the first Russian State. Like its western counterparts of the feudal epoch, it was essentially an organization of power by landowners, many of whom were also pirates and merchants, to protect their interests against invaders and to exact obedience and tribute from the tillers of the soil. Under the rule of the Norsemen this form of polity became general among the Eastern Slavs along the water road. The lowest class was composed of serfs or slaves. The elite was a nobility of boyars who were originally the counsellors of the princes, members of their bodyguards (*druzhina*) or courtiers (*dvoryane*). Ultimately they were the "best people" (*luchshie lyudi*) who alone were entitled to bear arms and to own land and serfs. In the trading towns of the north there existed, along with princes and nobles, a popular assembly (*veche*) of all adult males. Government in primitive Russia thus combined elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.

The permanent legacy of the Kiev State was the product of its intimate relations with Byzantium, glamorous capital of the Eastern Roman Empire which outlived the Western by almost a thousand years. From Byzantium the early Russians acquired their written language, via Church Slavonic, and their models of architecture, art and literature. From Byzantium they likewise acquired Christianity. The chronicles depict Vladimir the Saint, Prince of Kiev and son of Svyatoslav, debating with his advisers the merits

of various faiths: the Judaism of the Khazars is discarded on the ground that the God of the Jews has scattered his worshippers all over the earth as punishment for their sins; Islam is rejected on the ground that strong drink is essential to happiness in Russia; Roman Christianity, which Polish King Mieszko I had embraced in 966, is repudiated as alien and as subordinating secular to ecclesiastical authority. Envoys back from Byzantium remind Vladimir of the conversion of his grandmother, Olga, and report their exaltation in the great Basilica of Saint Sofia: "We do not know whether we were in heaven or upon earth, for there is not upon earth such sight or beauty. . . . There God lives among men."

Vladimir became a Greek Orthodox Christian in 989 and married Princess Anne, sister of the Byzantine Emperor. All their subjects along the water road were baptized. The Lavra (Monastery) of the Caves in Kiev became the first Russian Orthodox Church. Not until 1054 did the breach between the Roman and Greek Churches become final and irreparable. Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes and Croats remained Catholic. Bulgars, Serbs, Rumanians and Greeks became Orthodox. The decisions of the Norman Prince of Kiev made Holy Russia the great citadel of Orthodoxy for all time thereafter.

These events suggest why the modern Russian Empire and the Soviet Union include an amazing variety of peoples of the most diverse tongues and cultures. Events to come added to the multiplicity of nations coming out of Asia by the steppe road. The crossroads of the Heartland was scarcely a secure location for the Norman State on the Dnieper. Almost a century before the conversion of Vladimir, Kiev was assailed by the vanguards of a new wave of migrants, the Pechenegs or Patzinaks, called by Matthew of Edessa "The carrion-eaters, the godless, unclean folk, the wicked, blood-drinking beasts." They reached the river of the Vikings in 895, drove the Magyars under Arpad into Hungary, and harassed the trade route to Byzantium. In 972 they defeated and slew Svyatoslav I, whose skull became a drinking cup for a Pecheneg prince. But in 1036 the invaders were beaten by Prince Yaroslav. They moved into the Balkans and vanished by the end of the century.

Next came the Polovtsi, also called Kipchaks, Cumans and Falven, who destroyed the vestiges of the Khazars and reached the Dnieper in 1055. They warred against Kiev, invaded Hungary

and the Byzantine Empire and slowly disappeared in the aftermath, with the last speaker of Cuman as a living language dying in Hungary in 1770. Against the Polovtsi in 1185 a certain Prince Igor suffered disaster, heroically celebrated in the legendary "Tale of the Host of Igor" and in Borodin's modern opera. "Igor leads his soldiers to the Don. . . . The eagles screech and call the beasts to a feast of bones. . . . The Russians bar the long fields with their crimson shields, seeking honor for themselves and glory for the Prince." For three and a half centuries the Kiev State lived through these barbarian assaults and survived intermittent dynastic rivalries and civil conflicts among its far-flung centers of power. Its final fall was consummated by the most formidable conquerors of all time, against whom none could stand.

3. THE GHOST OF JENGHIS KHAN

Sometime in the year of the Christians 1162 a baby boy was born in a felt tent or Yurt on the high prairies of Mongolia north of the Gobi Desert. His birthplace was a makeshift home of nomads who readily moved their tents on ox-carts when they struck camp to seek new pastures or to raid enemy tribes. These herdsmen and hunters lived on mares' milk and millet, mutton and game, ox-meat and horse-blood. They had good weapons and swift horses but were still barbarians with little literature and less art, save what they might plunder from more civilized peoples. The boy's father was Yesukai the Valiant, Khan of the Yakka or Great Mongols, descendant of the blue wolf and the clan of the Grey-eyed Men, son of Kabul Khan and chieftain of 40,000 tents. On the birthday the father was away on a tribal raid against one Temujin who was beaten and captured. In honor of the occasion Yesukai named the baby Temujin.

No one knew of these half-wild people save nearby tribes and some of the northern Chinese. They were perhaps akin to the ancient Scythians. Their language was one which Western linguists would later classify, along with Turki-Tartar and Tungus-Manchu, as Ural-Altaic. They were but one of many groups of wanderers among the Asiatic highlands. In remote Russia, where the fabled Prince Igor was preparing to do battle with the Polovtsi, they were as unheard of as in England, where Henry II, son of Geoffrey Plantagenet, was quarrelling with Thomas à Becket.

Within half a century, however, all Asia and all Europe would know with tears and terror of the strange people from the Gobi. Their horsemen were destined to conquer half the world. Their leader was Temujin, son of Yesukai, renamed in due course, by a council of Khans, Jenghis Kha Khan, Heavenly Ruler. He became the founder of the most extensive of all empires. His ultimate titles, "Master of Thrones and Crowns" and "Emperor of all Men," were less flights of rhetoric than acknowledgments of sober reality.⁴

This incredible transformation of an obscure tribal chieftain into the most widely obeyed ruler of the ages was as decisive for the fortunes of Russia as the earlier coming of the Vikings and the later emergence of Muscovy. The warriors of Jenghis Khan were the last of the nomad peoples to pour out of "Tartary" along the steppes. They were also the most formidable and the most indelible in their impact upon the peoples they conquered. Their advent was like a volcanic eruption, burying all in its path in lava and ashes.

Mongol invincibility, like that of all irresistible war hosts, was the result of superiority over their foes in mobility, fire-power and strategy. They lived on horseback and moved at greater speed over vaster distances than any armed force in history prior to the invention of the internal combustion engine. They launched clouds of arrows and lances from the saddle with uncanny accuracy and employed a primitive but effective artillery for siege operations. Their soldiers, grouped into light and heavy cavalry, were organized into troops of 10, squadrons of 100, regiments of 1,000 and divisions or tumans of 10,000, with each self-sufficient army consisting of three divisions. They developed excellent espionage and communications services and were adept at political and psychological warfare. They likewise bred a series of great commanders who seldom failed to outflank, encircle and destroy all armies sent against them.

Once master of the local tribes, Jenghis Khan established his capital at Karakorum, desert city of the Black Sands. In an eight-year campaign his warriors subdued Cathay, the kingdom of North China, then ruled by the Chin or Golden dynasty. Peking fell in 1215. Here the Chinese scholar, poet and astronomer, Yeliu Chutsai, entered the Khan's service and became a statesman and administrator of remarkable genius. When the Shah of the

huge Moslem Kingdom of Khorezm, embracing Turkestan, Afghanistan and Iran, rejected Jenghis' peace overtures and ordered the Mongol merchants and envoys put to death, the Khan in 1219 led a quarter of a million horsemen over the bleak solitudes of the Roof of the World on a ride of 2,000 miles from Lake Baikal to Iran. Bokhara and Samarkand were taken. The hosts of Islam were everywhere broken and slaughtered by the warriors of the ever-victorious commanders, Chepé and Subotai. By the end of his reign Jenghis Khan ruled all the lands from the valley of the Amur to the Caspian and the Persian Gulf.

The son of Jenghis, Ogdai Khan (1227-1242), extended the Mongol conquests in Asia and sent his armies all across the Heartland to invade Europe. Unlike the Huns and Saracens before them and the Turks thereafter, the Mongols in their first rush toward world dominion were never beaten by Christian arms. Only the death of Ogdai caused their withdrawal from the Oder, the Vistula and the middle Danube.

The grandson of Jenghis was Kubla Khan (1260-1294), visited by Marco Polo and celebrated in Coleridge's memorable lines as the builder of the "stately pleasure dome" in Xanadu, "where Alph the sacred river ran in caverns measureless to man down to a sunless sea . . ." Kubla subdued all of China and moved his capital to Peking where he founded the Mongol dynasty. He also conquered Burma, Indo-China and part of India. He attacked Cipangu (Japan) but abandoned the venture when his fleet was scattered by the "Kamikaze" or Divine Wind. After Kubla, the Eastern Mongols became more and more Chinese while their western kinsmen embraced Islam. The Empire became a loose union of great Khanates. One of these in Turkestan came to be ruled by Timur the Lame or Tamerlane (1369-1405) who defeated the Seljuk Turks and left mountains of skulls all over south-western Asia. More than a century later other Mongols under Baber conquered India and founded the Mogul dynasty whose most brilliant ruler was Akbar (1556-1605). The conquerors from the Gobi were thus no fly-by-night raiders but founders of realms which endured in various forms for almost half a millennium.

In the time of Jenghis, the Kiev Russians were united under the descendants of Vladimir Monomach (1113-1125), though chronically torn by dynastic struggles and sectional feuds. They

first encountered the Mongols in the aftermath of the fall of Khorezm, whose Shah fled Bokhara in 1220 and was pursued through northern Iran. From here the dreaded horsemen invaded Georgia, decimating the local knights, and then crossed the Caucasus and entered the steppes of the Don. The fleeing Polovtsi sought the aid of their erstwhile Russian enemies: "Today they have taken our land; tomorrow they will take yours." In Kiev Prince Mstislav the Daring gathered his fellow princes and vassals. They rashly killed the Mongol envoys and went out with 80,000 men to meet the foe. On the Kalka River, north of the Sea of Azov, the battle was joined on a June day of 1223. Polovtsi and Russian warriors alike were overwhelmed. The Prince of Kiev and his vassals were captured and crushed to death under planks. The host of Chepé and Subotai raided the Crimea but were soon recalled by orders from Karakorum. They returned by way of the steppe road north of the Caspian. The origin and destination of the "evil Tartars" were alike unknown to their victims. Wrote the Russian chronicler: "Only God knows whence they came and whither they went."

The clash on the Kalka heralded a raging tempest which, thirteen years later, was to sweep relentlessly along the steppes and plunge all the Russian lands into vain grief and long darkness. Ogdai Khan granted to his nephew, Batu the Splendid, the whole territory from the Urals to the Dnieper. In 1236 Batu, with 300,000 warriors, including Turks, Kipchaks and other allied peoples, crushed the Volga Bulgars. Instead of aiming directly at Kiev, he went north up the Volga in 1237 and struck at Vladimir, north of modern Moscow. The city was besieged, taken and all but razed. The victors pursued Grand Prince Yury and destroyed him and his army in March, 1238. After coming within 70 miles of Novgorod, which was protected by marshes, the invaders turned south, scattering the Polovtsi like leaves in a storm. In December, 1240, they took Kiev in the face of heroic resistance and put most of its people to the sword. Years later travellers found only a few dispirited survivors in the 200 houses which remained amid the ruins and bleaching bones.

The fall of Holy Kiev left Novgorod as the only center of independent Russian life. Its Prince, Alexander, was surnamed Nevsky after beating back Swedish raiders on the Neva in 1236. When the Teutonic Knights of the Baltic besieged Pskov and attacked

the lands of Novgorod, Alexander organized a stout defense and struck down the invaders at Lake Peipus in April, 1242. Seven centuries later the memory of this canonized Prince became a bulwark of anti-German Pan-Slavism. The greatest cathedral in the Balkans, a gift from the Russian Tsar to Bulgaria, is the Church of Alexander Nevsky in Sofia. In the 1930's he became a Soviet hero as a symbol of Russian defiance to the German menace. But this doughty warrior, who also crushed Lithuanian invaders three years after his victory at Peipus, recognized that the Mongols were invincible. He visited Batu in 1242 and repeatedly persuaded his people that they must pay tribute and acknowledge Mongol supremacy or face complete destruction. On his death in 1253 the Metropolitan Cyril in the cathedral of Vladimir declared "My children, know that the sun of Russia has set."

The Mongols had meanwhile cast covetous eyes on Central Europe. The spring of 1241 found Batu and Subotai in Galicia, facing the gathering armies of Boleslas of Poland, Henry the Pious of Silesia (with 30,000 Poles, Bavarians, Teutonic Knights and French Knights Templar), King Wenceslas of Bohemia, Mieceslas of Galicia and King Bela IV of Hungary, who alone had 100,000 fighters. Under two grandsons of Jenghis Khan, Kaidu and Bai-bars, a part of Batu's forces crushed Boleslas, burned Cracow and then at Liegnitz (April 9, 1241) annihilated the knights of Henry who perished with all his barons and allies on the field. While Wenceslas was outflanked and tricked, Batu and Subotai invaded Hungary, where early in April they met the great host of Bela at Mohi on a field flanked by the River Sayo and the dark hills of Tokay. Under the Mongol war standard with its nine yak tails, the terrible Asiatic horsemen slew 40,000 of the enemy and sent King Bela into flight. They then stormed Pest, invaded Austria and, except for Dubrovnik (Ragusa), ravaged all the towns of the Dalmatian coast. From the Oder to the Adriatic all of Eastern Europe was in Mongol hands. Fortunately for a Christendom with no power to resist these foes, word came from Karakorum in 1242 that Ogdai was dead. His commanders returned to Mongolia. Hungary, Germany and Poland were abandoned.

Russia had no share in this fortuitous blessing. Elsewhere the world conquerors rode onward. Hulagu, the great general of Mangu Khan, took Bagdad in 1258 and would have taken Jerusalem but for the death of his master. The Mongols remained rulers

of the Russian land, sometimes making raids into Poland, as in 1259 and 1287, but for the most part losing interest in Western Europe and governing all of Russia through vassal princes. Only the trading city of Novgorod had semi-independence. It claimed all the empty northern lands to the White Sea and the Urals and enjoyed the rule of wise princes in conjunction with the Council of Masters (*Soviet Gospod*) and the *Veche* or town meeting. Russian people elsewhere lived a servile, parochial life under the agents of the Khan. Batu's successors acknowledged only a nominal allegiance to the Great Khan in Peking. Their vast Eurasian realm, called the Khanate of the Golden Horde (from Batu's gold pavilion), had its capital on the lower Volga at Sarai near the site of modern Tsaritsyn or Stalingrad where the steppe zone begins to give way to the desert. With the reign of Uzbek Khan (1314-1341), the Mongols of the Golden Horde became Moslems, but they continued to tolerate and even encourage all faiths. The Russian Church was not persecuted but patronized. The secular princes, however, had to go to Sarai, and at first even to Karakorum, to receive permission to be crowned.

The children of the lost generations which lived under the Mongol yoke tended to regard it as an unmitigated curse. Yet the dominion of the Khans unified most of Asia for the first time and, thus far, for the last. It brought the Middle East and later Europe into new contacts with China. The men from the Gobi were neither racial nor religious fanatics nor yet blood-thirsty monsters. They seldom killed or burned save to crush resistance. Those who yielded were usually spared, protected and well governed. By cutting off many of their Slavic subjects from fruitful contacts with Byzantium and Western Europe, they undoubtedly retarded the economic and intellectual development of Russia. Cultural activities were largely confined to the churches and to the increasing number of monasteries. As in Spain during the struggle for liberation from the Moors, Christian priests and princes were drawn together against the pagans. Autocracy and Orthodoxy became twin pillars of resistance in an intimate union of Church and State.

In addition to introducing to the Russians new methods of administration, tax collection, coinage, customs dues, census-taking, military conscription and postal communication, the Mongols convinced their subjects of the uses of political absolutism. In

Mongol practice all individuals were strictly subordinate to the needs of the community and owed universal service and unanimous, unquestioning obedience to potentates possessed of theoretically unlimited authority. The Russians had been conquered because of their political disunity and communal cleavages. Many were disposed to attribute their woes to the wrath of God and to the quarrels of the princes. Duty therefore called the princes to united leadership and their subjects to obedience and repentance. The price of liberation from the Mongols was the adoption from the Mongols of the principle of all for one and one for all. Only in this way was the Grand Duchy of Muscovy finally able to cast off the yoke. Tsarist Absolutism and Soviet Socialism both owe much to the lessons learned by their forebears from the heirs of Jenghis Khan.

Russia began to live again with the slow disintegration of the Empire of the Golden Horde. The first hundred years were the hardest. By the middle of the 14th Century the symbols of Mongol power at Sarai were often disputed among various contenders, with the realm splitting into the "Eastern Kipchaks" or the "White Horde" and the "Western Kipchaks." Toktamish, who overthrew Mamai in 1381, temporarily reunited them and wrought fearful destruction on rebellious Russian cities. But he quarrelled over control of Khorezm with his patron, Tamerlane, whose hosts in turn devastated Turkestan, all of southeastern Russia and the Caucasus, virtually destroying the Golden Horde which went completely to pieces after Tamerlane's death. Separate Mongol principalities remained in the Crimea, at Astrakhan and at Kazan on the Volga.

The most enduring heritage of Jenghis Khan to the Soviet Union was the diffusion over Eurasia, in the wake of the trails of devastation and pregnancy left by his warriors, of various Oriental languages, cultures and creeds which still persist today among many of the Soviet peoples. These survivals comprise not only such Tartar areas as the Crimea, the Nogai and Kirghiz steppes, the Kazan region and scattered settlements in Soviet Asia but the larger communities where Tartar and Turkish tongues and customs are mingled. Peoples speaking languages of the Turkish family, which is related to Finnish and Magyar, followed the Avars along the steppe road in the 6th Century and came into the Middle and Near East long before the Mongols. The Seljuk

Turks, who defeated the Persians in 1040, took Bagdad in 1055 and succeeded to the Arabian Caliphate, came from Turkestan. Under Alp Arslan they drove the Byzantines out of Asia Minor and laid the foundations of the Turkish Empire. After the Seljuks were smitten by the Mongols, they were succeeded by the Osmanli or Ottoman Turks under Osman (1288-1326) and Orkhan (1326-1359). Tamerlane was of Turkish origin. The mixed peoples speaking Turkish dialects embrace the so-called Iranian Turks, including the Turkomens, the Sarts, the Taranchi, the Uzbeks, the Kazaks and the Kara Kalpaks, and the Turanians, including the Kirgiz, the Yakuts and the Siberian Tartars.

The great Kazak Soviet Republic, a third the size of the United States and rich in copper, oil and rubber-bearing plants, is inhabited chiefly by a Mongol people of Turkish language and Moslem faith and culture. Cotton-growing Uzbekistan to the southwest is the setting of jewelled Bokhara, once the "heart of Islam," and of storied Samarkand, capital of Tamerlane and site of his tomb. Beyond, along the frontiers of Iran and Afghanistan, lies Turkmenistan and, to the east, Tadjakistan and Kirgizia. These five of the sixteen Soviet Republics, in addition to various regions of the RSFSR, are all peopled by Tartar-Turkish communities.

Some of their ancestors lived in these lands before the Mongols. A few came after. But many came as members, allies or camp followers of the invincible cavalry of Chepé, Subotai and Batu. Sarai is long since gone. Karakorum is lost in the black sands. But the winds over the steppes and desert still echo with the muted thunder of hoofs and the faint whistle of arrows as spectral horsemen in lacquered armor ride with round shields after the yak-tail battle flag of the Emperor of all Men. Under Soviet rule the descendants of his subjects have once more emerged from the long centuries of degradation which followed the waning of the Mongol power and again cultivate their ancient tongues and arts along with the new skills of the age of machines.

4. GREAT MUSCOVY

A thousand years and thirty-nine passed between the coming of Oleg to Kiev and the October Revolution. Three centuries three score and two were the bright years of Holy Kiev. Two centuries

and two score were the dark years of Mongol rule. Three centuries and four years was the time of the Romanov Tsardom. The Kiev epoch gave Russia its Church, its State, its first letters, law and art and its debt to the Byzantines. The Mongol epoch saw the rise of absolutism and the slow fashioning of the social order of the modern empire. The fulfillment and decay of that order and the expansion of the empire to its farthest limits transpired under the Romanovs. Their history and that of their predecessors in the Tsardom is better known in the West than that of earlier ages, for they made it their task to bring Europe to Russia and Russia to Europe.⁵ A sketch will suffice to show the design for community life which took shape in Muscovy after the lands of the Golden Horde began to pass to the Dukes and Tsars of Moscow.

The little wooden town on the Moskva, mentioned in the chronicles as early as 1147, was of no importance until Daniel, son of Alexander Nevsky, became its Duke toward the end of the next century. After Daniel, from 1328 to 1462, was Ivan Kalita (John Moneybags), Ivan II, Dmitry, Basil I, Basil the Blind, and Ivan III, called "the Great." All went to Sarai to humble themselves before the Khan and to receive their *yarlik* or investiture. In return they became the chief collectors of tribute to the Mongols in Central Russia and thereby acquired power over neighboring dukes. Each added new lands to his domain with the blessing of the Metropolitans of the Russian Church who settled in Moscow and served the faithful under the *yarliki* granted by the Khan. The Duchy of Muscovy became an ever larger realm, earmarked by fate and the ambitions of its rulers to expand ultimately over a sixth of the world. Dmitry, with the support of St. Sergius of Radonezh, founder of the Trinity Monastery, inflicted the first defeat on the Mongols at Kulikovo near the Don in 1380, a victory which earned him the name of Dmitry Donskoi. The vanquished host of Mamai, however, had slain most of the Russian fighters. Two years later Moscow was sacked and burned by Toktamish. Liberation was not yet possible. But the identity of the liberators was no longer in doubt.

Ivan the Great (1462-1505) annexed Novgorod and Tver and gave substance to the title of "Grand Duke of All Russia." In alliance with the Khan of the Crimea, he succeeded in 1480 in discontinuing tribute to the Golden Horde. He likewise ordered the building of the walls and towers of the Kremlin with the aid

of Italian architects. Meanwhile the Osmanli Turks in 1453 had at long last broken through the ancient walls of Byzantium and put an end to the Second Rome. From this event Ivan acquired a wife and a new title. Almost five hundred years earlier St. Vladimir, Prince of Kiev, had married a sister of a Byzantine Emperor and given Christianity to Russia. In 1472 Ivan married Zoe (Sofia), niece of the last Byzantine Caesar, Constantine Paleologus, who had fallen under the sword of Islam in the last vain defense of the city on the Bosphorus. Ivan now took the Byzantine title of "Autocrat" and adopted the Byzantine double-headed eagle as the symbol of his State. With the approval of the Church, he assumed the role of successor of the Emperors and defender of the Orthodox. Muscovy therewith became the "Third Rome." The living Church of the Greeks and the dead State of the Caesars were thus fused into a Muscovite synthesis upon which, for some centuries, favor was cast by whatever gods preside over the destiny of nations.

Under Basil III (1505-1533), son of Sofia, Muscovy acquired Pskov, Ryazan and Smolensk. The Church was the ally of the Autocrat, though the reformer, Nil Sorsky, complained bitterly of its quest for wealth: "We look into the hands of the rich, fawn slavishly, flatter them to get some little village. . . . We wrong and rob and sell Christians, our brothers. We torture them with scourges, like wild beasts." The son of Basil was Ivan IV (1533-1584), only three years old when Basil died and later known as Ivan the Terrible (John the Dread). His name recalled his wrath against foreign enemies and the half-mad rages of his declining years which drove him to commit hideous atrocities against friend and foe alike, ranging from the execution of the Metropolitan and the murder of his own son to the savage suppression of the people of Novgorod for negotiating with the Poles.

The reign of the Terrible Ivan, who first took the title of Tsar (Caesar), marks the beginning of the foreign policy of modern Russia. One result of the Mongol conquest, persisting in its effects down to the present day, was to enable the border States to the west to annex huge areas of formerly Russian territory. Except for sporadic counter-measures, as when the Mongols crushed a Lithuanian invasion in 1399, the Khans had little interest in the western lands. The Lithuanians had already made themselves masters of the old water road and had taken Kiev in 1321. Casimir

the Great, King of Poland (1333-1370), had taken Galicia and part of Volhynia, introducing Catholic bishops and Polish landowners and thus laying the basis for the long quarrel between Russia and Poland over control of the western Ukraine. In 1386 Queen Jadwiga of Poland contracted a political marriage with Jagiello, Grand Prince of Lithuania, with the Polish Crown thereby acquiring claims to the whole of the water road. To the north the Swedes ruled Finland and all the Baltic coast, whence they pressed in upon the Russian holdings beyond Lakes Peipus and Ladoga. In the south the Crimean Tartars, whose Khan became a vassal of the Turks in 1475, continued to raid Russia as far north as Moscow and to drag off hundreds of thousands of Russians as slaves.

Ivan's realm was obliged to fight for its very life against formidable enemies on all sides. For all his evil-tempered cruelty, the first Tsar was as shrewd and able a statesman as his contemporaries, England's Elizabeth, France's Catherine de Medici and India's Akbar. The direction in which the enemies of Muscovy proved to be weakest was east. Ivan, carrying the cross of Dmitry Donskoi, led 100,000 men against the Tartars of Kazan in 1552, took the city and broke the Mongol power on the Volga after a fierce struggle. Astrakhan, at the delta of the great river, was annexed in 1556. The road to the Urals was now open. Beyond them was no organized resistance save for the Buryat Mongols near Lake Baikal. Here as elsewhere the freebooters and pioneer adventurers of the frontier, known as Cossacks, played a major role. In 1581-82 the Cossack Yermak, with a mere handful of followers, reached the Ob-Irtish and presented central Siberia as a gift to the Tsar. Fifty years later Russian explorers were in sight of the Pacific. Only the Chinese under the Manchus were able to halt the Russian march. The first Sino-Russian treaty, 1689, left the Amur basin in Chinese hands and limited the Slav advance to the Stanovoi mountains. Siberia was long a fur colony but later became the scene of a vast reverse migration toward the east along the steppe road and through the northern forest.

The only parallel in modern times to this occupation of a Continent by pioneers is the American westward movement of the 19th Century. The two peoples, both pushing toward the Pacific, met in Alaska and along the coasts to the south which the Russian explorer, Captain Bering, had reached in 1741. President

Monroe's Doctrine of 1823, forbidding further European colonization in the Americas, was followed by an abandonment of Russian claims south of $54^{\circ} 40'$ and by the first formal Russian-American agreement, signed in 1824 and providing for reciprocal freedom of navigation, fishing and trading with the natives in the North Pacific. The sale of the Alaska Territory to the United States in 1867 made Bering Strait the eastward limit of Russian expansion.

To return to the 16th Century, the ventures of Ivan IV in defense and aggrandizement were less successful in other directions. In 1555 he granted trading privileges to English merchants at the request of Chancellor, Arctic explorer and Ambassador of Queen Mary. The Tsar wished to keep open a northern road to the west, via Archangel. He imported medical and mining experts from England. In 1569 he proposed to Queen Elizabeth an alliance against Poland, but in this he was disappointed as he was in his later proposal of marriage to Lady Mary Hastings. War with the German Knights of the Baltic led to war with Poland, now fully united with Lithuania by the Union of Lublin (1569). Ivan was cheated of victory by the Tartars and Turks of the Crimea, who sacked and burned Moscow in 1571. Efforts to secure Estonia led to war with Sweden. The peace accords of 1582-83 registered the failure of the first Russian attempt to reach the Baltic and to recover the lands of the water road. But they posed problems of power for Russian policy for succeeding centuries. The issues at stake have reappeared in the present generation, thanks to Russian weakness after 1917, which led to the loss anew of the western border lands, and to Russian strength after 1939 which led to their partial recovery.

The internal pattern of political and social organization was also set in the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Its form was largely due to the exigencies of the struggle with foreign foes. In the words of Sir Bernard Pares: "The Great Russian people was hammered out of peaceful, silent, pacific elements by constant and cruel blows from enemies on all sides, which implanted in the least intelligent Russian an instinct of national defense and of the value of a national dictatorship."⁶ Ivan resented as a source of weakness the disorderly rule of the great dukes and boyars or landed magnates. Their counterparts in Poland were ultimately to reduce the Polish monarchy to an impotent mockery. Ivan

curbed the boyars and put many of their unruly members to death. He hired mercenaries and recruited picked musketeers or *streltsi*. He encouraged Cossack adventurers to seek land and freedom on the Don and the Dnieper in return for fighting the Tartars and Turks in the wild southern borderland—i.e., "Ukraine." He fostered a new nobility of *dvoryane* or courtiers and *pomeshchiks*, consisting of anyone willing to fight in return for an estate. These warrior castes could be paid only in land, and land was useless without peasants to till it. The peasants were accordingly forbidden to leave their estates. A new serfdom thus came into being. The new aristocracy held its properties and privileges only in return for service to the Tsar. Russian feudalism was a product of war and a bulwark of the centralized despotism necessary for effective war. In these developments the whole design of the Muscovite Tsardom assumed a shape which was to persist with few changes to the end.

The larger problems of Ivan remained to be solved or left unsolved by his successors. The Muscovy of the 16th Century was not yet equal to its tasks. Ivan's simple-minded son, Fedor, whom his father said was more fit to be a convent bell-ringer than a Tsar, came to the throne in 1584. Power passed to his able father-in-law, Boris Godunov. When Fedor died in 1598, Boris had himself elected Tsar by the *Zemsky Sobor* or Assembly of the Land. But the boyars championed a "false Dmitri." The real Dmitri, Fedor's brother, had been killed in 1591. With the death of Boris Godunov in 1605, Poles and Cossacks brought the false Dmitri to Moscow, but he was slain in the following year. Basil Shuisky became Tsar with the support of the boyars. But there now broke out in the south the first of the great peasant uprisings. A former serf, Bolotnikov, led the serfs in revolt while a second false Dmitri marched on Moscow. Basil sought Swedish aid but was dethroned by the boyars who offered the crown to Wladyslaw, son of King Sigismund of Poland. Then, as always, Russia's western neighbors lost no time in taking advantage of Muscovite weakness. The Swedes took Narva and Novgorod and the Poles Smolensk. In 1610 Polish troops occupied Moscow. Amid complete confusion, the second Dmitri was killed and a popular upsurge, led by Prince Pozharsky and Cosmo Minin, a butcher of Nijni Novgorod, ousted the Poles from Moscow in 1612. This chaotic "Time of Troubles" was ended by the elevation to

the Tsardom of seventeen-year-old Michael Romanov, son of the Metropolitan Philarete. He was unanimously elected by the *Zemsky Sobor* on February 21, 1613, and became founder of the dynasty which was to endure until 1917.

The development of Romanov Russia was largely an unfolding of purposes and interests already predetermined by the past. Politics at home was a problem for successive power-holders of consolidating the Autocracy, supporting the Church as a bulwark of the *status quo*, strengthening the landed gentry, suppressing or appeasing the peasants, and resisting such tendencies as the slowly rising business class and working class might display toward Western liberalism or radicalism. Politics abroad was a problem of thwarting the ambitions of powerful neighbors through defense and alliances; pushing to the Baltic and Black Seas against Swedes, Poles, Tartars and Turks; coping with British and later with German opposition to Russian pressures against Iran, Turkey and the Balkans; and confronting ultimate Japanese resistance to Russian pressure upon China. The problem at home proved beyond solution in the end, when economic and social changes had disrupted beyond repair the fabric of the old order. The problem abroad led ultimately to defeat and disaster. But the Tsardom nevertheless expanded its lands at the rate of 60 square miles a day for 300 years. Thus was built a realm destined to endure as a community and as a polity, if not as an economy and a social hierarchy, far beyond the life of the dynasts and the aristocrats who were its creators.

The major steps of this progression are inseparably identified with the names of the more able and far seeing Autocrats. Under Alexis (1645-1676) the bloody combat in the Ukraine between Polish overlords and revolting Cossacks under Hetman Bogdan Hmel'nitsky led to war with Poland, at the close of which (1667) Russia recovered Smolensk, most of the eastern bank of the Dnieper and the city of Kiev. Another Cossack rebel, Stenka Razin, preaching a class war of serfs against boyars, organized a peasant rebellion which swept over the whole Volga valley, 1667-71, before its leader was defeated, captured and executed.

Peter the Great (1682-1725) sought social stability through westernization and territorial aggrandizement. He broke wide open the "window to the west" which Ivan IV had vainly sought to unlock. Impressed with Russian backwardness in his campaigns

against Azov, he spent the years 1697-98 in Germany, Holland and England, working *incognito* in shipyards, meeting men of learning, and collecting books, specimens and models of machines. On his return he put down a revolt of the *streltsi* and set himself with demonic energy to end the dark Russian ways by shaving off beards, compelling the adoption of European dress, and otherwise rendering his subjects capable of dealing with the West on more equal terms. The *dvoryanstvo* became a unified aristocratic hierarchy, all of whose members owed service to the State. Farm workers became a uniform class of serfs. In the course of the "Great Northern War," 1699-1721, Peter first suffered defeat at Narva in 1700 at the hands of Charles XII of Sweden. Three years later he began building St. Petersburg which he made his capital. Here he founded the Russian Navy and adopted the new title of "Emperor." After defeating Peter's allies in Denmark and Poland, Charles advanced into the Ukraine. Like all the Western invaders of Russia, he sought to use Cossack and Ukrainian rebels against the Muscovites. But the Hetman Mazepa, who made common cause with Charles, brought him little aid. Peter's forces crushed the foe at Poltava in 1709 and sent the Swedish king fleeing to Turkey. Following a Russian invasion of Sweden, the Peace of Nystadt (1721) transferred to Russia Livonia, Estonia, the whole south coast of the Gulf of Finland, and most of Karelia and southeastern Finland.

Under Peter's daughter Elizabeth (1741-1761) Russia joined the coalition against Frederick the Great of Prussia in the Seven Years' War. In 1760 Russian troops occupied Berlin. But the victory was thrown away by Elizabeth's successor, the mad Paul III, who made peace on Frederick's terms. In the brilliant reign of the Great Catherine (1762-1796), letter-writer, liberal and libertine, public policy was shaped by the more influential of her lovers: Orlov, Potemkin and Zubov, in succession. She was the first of the Romanovs to make Constantinople (Byzantium) the goal of her wars against the Turks. In the first clash, 1768-74, she had Prussia as an ally and Austria as an enemy. By the Peace of Kuchuk-Kainardji, 1774, Catherine won Azov, Kuban, Terek, a protectorate over Moldavia, Turkish recognition of the "independence" of the Crimea, and what was later interpreted as a protectorate over all Christians in Turkey. In the second war, 1787-91, Austria was Russia's ally while Sweden vainly attacked

St. Petersburg and Prussia threatened to join the enemy. The Turks were again beaten by the military genius of General Alexander Suvorov. The peace of 1791 gave Russia the Crimea and the area between the Bug and the Dniester, including Odessa.

Catherine the Great also acquired Courland (Latvia) and joined Frederick in the first partition of Poland in 1772. To Prussia went the Corridor, to Austria Galicia, and to Russia the lands east and north of the Dnieper and the Dvina. In resistance to new Russian demands, Polish forces rallied under Kosciuszko in 1794, but were defeated by Suvorov who took Warsaw. A second partition followed in 1795. Russia took the area around Minsk and most of Volhynia and Podolia west and southwest of Kiev, while Prussia annexed western Poland. By the third partition of 1796, which put an end to the old Polish State, Austria received the region of Cracow, Lublin and Kholm, north to the Bug; Prussia took Warsaw and the lands between the Bug and the Niemen; and all the rest, including Lithuania, became Russian.

In her last years Catherine was horrified by the French Revolution. She had looked with some sympathy upon the American Revolution, since it promised to weaken British power, but had refused to recognize the United States, from which Francis Dana came to St. Petersburg vainly seeking diplomatic relations. In 1773-74 another furious peasant revolt, led by the Don Cossack, Emilian Pugachev, had swept the valley of the Volga and terrified the gentry before the hordes of rebels were crushed and Pugachev executed in Moscow. Catherine, who called the Republican followers of Kosciuszko the "Jacobins of the East," never permitted her "liberalism" to encourage social reform opposed by the landed aristocracy. Serfdom was greatly expanded during her reign. When she died a new commander, thrown up by a successful revolt of serfs and burghers against another aristocracy, was winning battles in Italy. His name was Napoleon Bonaparte.

If the Muscovite Tsardom had become in more than a figurative sense an executive committee of the landholding and serf-owning nobles, the Russian Church had become the spiritual bulwark of the State, inculcating obedience to Autocrat and landlord alike among dark multitudes steeped in poverty and ignorance. The attempted reunion of the Greek and Roman Churches at the Council of Florence, 1439, had been repudiated by the Russian clergy. Catholic attempts at reconversion failed, although in 1596, at the

Union of Brest-Litovsk, the Jesuits had succeeded in attaching to Rome a large group of the Orthodox in the eastern provinces of Poland. The price paid by the Papacy for this victory was to permit the new "Uniat" church to retain its Greek rites and liturgy. The Russian Church became increasingly a national Church and an arm of the State. For a time the Patriarch Philarete, father of Michael Romanov, was, in fact if not in form, head of State as well as Church. But his successors were subordinated to the secular power, particularly after the resistance of the "Old Believers" to the corrections of ritual by the Patriarch Nikon (1653-66) led to a schism (*Raskol*) and to a later multiplication of dissident minority sects.

Peter abolished the Patriarchate (which was not restored until 1917) and substituted at the head of the Church a Holy Synod, the members of which were appointed by the Tsar. Said an Old Believer of the 19th Century: "The so-called orthodox faith is an appurtenance of the Crown and Treasury, an official badge. It rests on no basis of real life or sincere conviction, but merely does its duty as a government weapon for the defense of order."⁷ There was enough truth in this judgment to involve the Church in the ultimate ruin of the Autocracy.

5. THE TWILIGHT OF THE TSARDOM

The feudal elite of nobles and priests which ruled Romanov Russia never attained that flexibility and skill in adaptation which enabled its counterpart in England to preserve monarchy, aristocracy and an established church in the new age of capitalism and democracy. Fear of the peasantry, and later of the proletariat, on the part of the Russian landlords, coupled with the requirements of diplomacy and war in a realm lacking insular security from invasion, led to a perpetuation of serfdom and absolutism long after both had outlived their time. Victory in foreign war encouraged the ruling class to set its face against all social or political reform. Defeat in war stimulated popular demands for change which evoked grudging concessions from those with power and wealth. But victories were few and the concessions born of defeat proved in the end too little and too late. In these relationships can be found the clue to the decay of the Tsardom in the 19th Century and beyond.

Alexander I (1801-1825), like Catherine, began his reign as a liberal and ended it as a reactionary. At first he played with ideas of limiting the Autocracy and liberating the serfs. But nothing came of these proposals, nor of the later plans of his far-seeing adviser, Michael Speransky, who urged a scheme of self-government based on elected local dumas which would choose delegates to district and provincial dumas which in turn would pick the members of a national duma or parliament. Alexander was more interested in war and diplomacy and in his ultimate mission as savior of Europe. He joined Austria, Prussia and England in fighting Napoleon, but after the military disasters of 1805-06, he met the French Emperor at Tilsit (1807) and signed a peace pact. He was then free to pursue his wars with Sweden and Turkey, concluded respectively with Russian annexation of Finland in 1809 and of Bessarabia in 1812.

On June 23, 1812, Bonaparte invaded Russia with the largest land army thus far assembled for a single campaign. Exactly 129 years later, less one day, Hitler invaded Russia with the largest land army thus far assembled. In each case the conqueror of the Continent, having failed to crush England, struck at Russia in order to protect his rear and at the same time gain a speedy victory which would make him undisputed master of Europe and the world. In both cases the hope was drowned in blood, thanks to the vastness of Muscovy and the heroic rallying of all its peoples to the common defense. Alexander's Marshal Michael Kutuzov, unlike Stalin's marshals of 1941, was unable to defend Moscow, but he fought skillful delaying actions and took full advantage of the onset of winter, the burning of the city, and the services of peasant partisans to bring about the destruction of the "Grand Army."

After spending five weeks amid the ashes around the Kremlin, waiting in vain for peace overtures, the Corsican retired and recrossed the Niemen in November with 50,000 of his original force of 600,000. Alexander rallied the armies of the coalition which defeated the French near Leipzig at the "Battle of the Nations" in October, 1813. The Tsar, now a hero to all Europe, entered Paris in triumph at the end of the following March and subsequently dominated the Congress of Vienna and founded the "Holy Alliance." From the West his officers brought back ideas of constitutionalism and social reform, but his own course was one of restoring the past. Within a month after his death those who were

later called the "Decembrists" launched an unsuccessful uprising. It was the last palace *coup d'état*. It was also the first Russian revolutionary movement directly inspired by Western liberalism.

Nicholas I (1825-1855) sought safety simply by the suppression of all critics. His early decision to establish a secret police—the "third section" of his personal chancery and predecessor of the dreaded *Okhrana*—typified the spirit of his regime, as did his crushing of the Polish insurrection of 1830-31 and his participation in the destruction of the Hungarian revolution of 1848. Although his war with Turkey (1827-29) led to the liberation of the Greeks, he aspired to be the policeman of Europe and the champion of legitimacy against subversive forces. His ambitions in the Near East led to war once more with Turkey in 1853. In order to halt the Russian drive to the Straits, Britain, France and Sardinia declared war the following spring. Defeat in the Crimea hastened Nicholas' death.

His son Alexander II (1855-1881) made the humiliating Peace of Paris and became the great "reforming Tsar" in recognition of the need for change and for concessions to popular demand. Serfdom, "better abolished from above than from below," said the Tsar, was at last ended by the law of March 3, 1861, with State compensation to the landlords for the small plots granted to the peasants and with heavy redemption dues owed to the State by the beneficiaries of emancipation. In 1864 elected county councils or *zemstvos* were established as agencies of local self-government, but on a basis which gave the landlords effective control. Public trial by jury in independent courts was likewise introduced (1864) as well as a measure of municipal self-government (1870) and a reform of the military service (1874).

In foreign affairs Alexander befriended the United States in the American Civil War, partly out of fear of Anglo-French intervention in favor of the Polish rebellion of 1863; took advantage of the Franco-Prussian War to repudiate the provisions of the Treaty of Paris forbidding Russia to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea; balanced vanquished France against the newly united Reich; liberated Bulgaria through a new war with Turkey (1877); reacquired Bessarabia, annexed most of Transcaucasia, added Turkestan (1867) and Transcaspia (1874) to the Empire; acquired Sakhalin from Japan (1875); and obliged China (1858) to cede the Maritime Provinces, at the southern extremity of which Vladivostok

was founded. But diplomatic successes abroad and reforms at home did not stem the tide of revolutionary Populism sweeping through the intelligentsia. On March 13, 1881, on the very day when he signed Loris-Melikov's project for a quasi-constitution, Alexander was killed by a terrorist bomb.

His dour son was the last Tsar but one. Alexander III (1881-94) proclaimed his devotion to absolutism and sought to restore the dwindling wealth and influence of the nobility. The press was muzzled, criticism stifled, and national and religious minorities persecuted. The alliance with France of 1892 was accompanied by an inflow of French capital but by no relaxation in the suppression of Republican ideas. After living unhappily as a virtual prisoner, fearful of assassins and surrounded by policemen, the Tsar died unhappily at Livadia. His son, Nicholas II, inherited the whirlwind and lacked all talent for coping with it. He was weak and shy and therefore resolved to preserve the Autocracy intact. He dismissed plans for representative government as "senseless dreams." He was dominated by his wife, Princess Alix of Hesse, a superstitious woman who sought to save their only son, the haemophiliac Alexis, by recourse to quacks, beginning with French spiritualists and ending with the degenerate and drunken monk Rasputin. Unsuccessful war with Japan (1904-05) led to the loss of southern Sakhalin and of Russian rights in Manchuria in the Treaty of Portsmouth. Defeat brought revolution. A decade later defeat at the hands of the Central Powers brought catastrophe to the dynasty.

The Muscovite Autocracy which passed into the shades in March of 1917 was a divine right absolutism whose subjects found it neither absolute, right nor divine. Prior to 1905 its government was an arbitrary despotism, with no constitution, no parliament and virtually no public participation beyond the village *mir* and the provincial *zemstvos*. According to the Fundamental Laws, the Tsar was an "unlimited autocrat" to whom obedience was "ordained by God himself." The Sovereign administered his scores of provinces (*guberni* and *oblasti*) through Governors appointed on the nomination of the Minister of the Interior. In St. Petersburg sat the Council of Ministers, composed of department heads; the Imperial Council of a hundred appointed members, to whom were added in 1906 elected members in almost equal number, with both groups consisting chiefly of wealthy landowners; a Senate (estab-

lished by Peter the Great), composed of Privy Counsellors and functioning as the highest judicial and administrative body; and the Holy Synod, dominated by its Procurator who acted as a Minister for Church affairs. All these appointed officials were named by, answerable to, and removable by the Tsar alone. Legislation was prepared by the Imperial Council, but its members could merely advise and never control the Emperor and his Ministers. Earlier representative institutions, such as the *Duma* of the Boyars and the *Zemsky Sobor*, first called by Ivan the Terrible in 1550, had long since passed away.

This archaic political structure, like the feudal social hierarchy on which it rested, was placed in grave jeopardy when commerce and industry fostered the growth of cities. Urban capitalism, arriving belatedly in Russia, had social consequences similar to those it had produced in western Europe a century earlier. A middle class of burghers, intermediate between nobles and peasants, grew in numbers and wealth and shortly divided itself into an upper stratum of businessmen and a lower order of factory-workers or proletarians. As in the West, merchants and employers tended to embrace the ideals of liberalism and nationalism and to demand participation in government under a constitution. Workers lent willing ears to the agitators of radical internationalism, including various schools of revolutionary anarchism and socialism. Both new classes became the enemies of Tsarism and of the aristocracy.

The first opportunity for revolutionary mass action was provided by the results of the war with Japan. An eleven-point petition, drawn up at a conference of *zemstvos* representatives in November, 1904, demanded civil liberties and constitutional government. On "Bloody Sunday," early in January, 1905, a peaceful demonstration of workers, carrying ikons and singing hymns under the leadership of Father Gapon, was fired upon by troops before the Winter Palace with the loss of several hundred lives. Numerous strikes, peasant disorders, mutinies and acts of political terrorism ensued. By autumn a political general strike was under way in many centers under the direction of Councils or Soviets of Workers' Deputies. The Tsar's Ministers sought to appease the liberals and to suppress the revolutionary radicals. A black epoch of reprisals and punishments began in 1906 under the direction of Prime Minister Peter Stolypin. His assassination in 1911 did not alter the fact that the revolution had failed.

In the face of danger, however, the Tsar had issued the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, promising civil liberties and popular elections for a parliament which would have control over the Ministers and effective power over law-making and the purse-strings. But in the final arrangement the new assembly or Imperial Duma was weakened by a second chamber in the form of a revamped Imperial Council. The franchise, moreover, was restricted in 1907 through a complex scheme of indirect class elections, with the result that the Third and Fourth Dumas were filled with conservatives and reactionaries. In practice the Duma was given no genuine authority over appropriations or legislation and none at all over the Ministry. The Tsar could veto all laws, could adjourn or dissolve the Duma at will, and could issue executive decrees (*ukaze*), having the force of law, without consulting the Duma. The Autocracy was no longer unlimited, but it was still an autocracy.

Its final disintegration and collapse was a direct result of the war with the Second Reich which the Tsar's Ministers had done much to prepare and unleash. The military defeats of 1915-16 gave rise to "dark forces" at the Imperial Court, headed by the Tsaritsa and Rasputin, which sought to save the Autocracy through treasonable intrigues with the enemy. Toward the end the Tsaritsa told her husband: "Never forget that you are sovereign in your own right. Thank God, Russia is not a constitutional State. . . . You must not give way. It must be your war and your peace, your and your country's honor, but on no account the Duma's. . . . Don't yield. Be the boss. Obey your firm little wife and our Friend"—i.e., Rasputin. The mood of the last Tsar, always trivial, melancholy and indifferent, was much the same as it had been after 1905 when he wrote in his diary, amid national upheavals shaking his throne: "Pretty doings! . . . Was quietly busy until dinner and all evening. Went paddling in a canoe. . . . Got dressed and rode a bicycle to the bathing beach and bathed enjoyably in the sea. . . . The weather was wonderful. Bathed in the sea. . . ." ⁸

The assassination of Rasputin in December, 1916, produced no change in the blindness of the Tsar and his advisers in the face of mass misery and popular clamor for reform or revolution. In the midst of strikes, riots and mutinies, Nicholas II suddenly discovered that no one would any longer obey him. On March 15,

1917, he abdicated in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael, who decided not to accept the throne unless the proposed Constituent Assembly should request him to. Thus was terminated the dynasty of despots who had ruled or misruled all the Russias during the three centuries since the accession of Michael Romanov. The end came not with a bang but a whimper.

II

SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES

A Book of Peace and War

"Those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! . . . Old Russia was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—for her backwardness, for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because it was profitable and could be done with impunity. Do you remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: 'You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia.' These words of the old poet were well learned by those gentlemen. They beat her. . . . Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. . . . That is why we must no longer lag behind. . . . You must put an end to backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up the socialist system of economy. There is no other way. . . . Either we do it, or they crush us."

—JOSEPH STALIN, *Address to First All-Union Conference of Managers of Socialist Industry, February 4, 1931.*

STALINGRAD

Bury the dead apart—
The granite-backed ones with their
Heads to the uncrossed river,
In unassailable parapets
Under the good steppe grass.

Leave the others, leave their inadequate bones
To the gaunt women to spade,
To level with the rubble,
To make the site clean and hard
And fit to be built on.

Let there be no symbols,
No markings, no stony words
For the wind to eat,
Nothing to be forgotten.

Let the city be new,
Let it be avenued
In great spokes arrowed
At the world.

Let this be a holy place,
The prime longitude of courage
From which our hope is measured.

—MAJOR GEORGE D. BRODSKY 1

1. Reprinted by permission of *The New Republic*, where this poem was first published, December 21, 1942.

THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

1. PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

PARADOX IS KING in the reign of rebellion. This strange Sovereign is robbed in a crazy-quilt of contradictions. Under his rule the last become first and the first are put last. The lowly are elevated while the lofty are cast down. Left is right and Right is wrong. All things are turned inside out. Foreign policy passes through the looking glass no less than domestic affairs. In the Russia of 1917-18 war became peace, peace became war, insurrection led to order, order begot anarchy, and anarchy spawned tyranny until in the end democrats were damning dictators as sponsors of mob-rule while dictators damned democrats as despots. Those who made peace in order to get out of war were fought by those who made war in order to win peace. Fighting without a war, moreover, went on long after the war had ended and peace had been made.

The Bolshevik seizure of power in the October Revolution was a direct result of the inability of the Provisional Government to win or end the war begun and lost by the Tsardom. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was a direct result of the inability of the Soviet Government either to bring about general peace negotiations or to enlist Allied help for continuing a war which Russia was too exhausted to carry on unaided. The Peace, in turn, was the direct occasion for the unleashing of new hostilities, conceived in the womb of the old but destined to go on for years after the mother-war had died and been decently buried. The new battle was waged against the Soviets by its enemies at home and abroad in the form

of the Russian forces of anti-Bolshevism and the Allied and Associated Powers. Its course and consequences were no less fateful for world politics than the greater war of the coalitions out of which it was born.

What is less obvious is that the whole structure and spirit of the Soviet State were imposed upon its rulers, as the price of survival, by the armed struggle which its foes commenced against it. In the absence of attack from without, supported by counter-revolution from within, the Marxist gospel, superimposed by its Russian apostles on the wreckage of the Muscovite autocracy, might have found concrete expression in any one of a number of possible shapes so long as State power could be said to rest on the Soviets and could be somehow described as a dictatorship of the proletariat and poorest peasants, dedicated to socialism. It did, in fact, assume at the outset a political form having little in common with its ultimate configuration. In the sequel the Soviet State would doubtless have become something wholly different from what it actually became, both in its program at home and its policies abroad, had it not been made the target of those resolved upon its destruction.

Once woven, warp and woof are inseparable parts of a single fabric. But careful inspection of the cloth reveals how the weaving was done. The decisive impact of foreign relations in fixing political folkways and mores within the nation is noteworthy in all the modern Great Powers. In Russia the line between internal and foreign affairs has always been even more shadowy than in other major communities. Ancient Kiev was the product of the dealings of its Norse-Slav ruling class with Byzantines, Khazars, Pechenegs and Polovtsi. Muscovy was fashioned on the loom of the Mongols. The early nobles and priests of Romanov Russia built serfdom and absolutism into the texture of Russian life by virtue of their incessant struggles with Poles, Swedes, Turks and other foreign enemies. The Bolshevik elite of the workers' and peasants' revolution molded the Soviet power into its historic shape as a means of beating back the deadly assault organized against it in London, Paris, Tokyo, Washington and Warsaw.

The war of the revolution against intervention and counter-revolution converted a quasi-coalition regime into a one-party despotism. It transformed cooperation and compromise into force and terrorism. It changed tolerance into intolerance, democracy

into dictatorship, socialist gradualism into "war communism." It produced the first of the "totalitarian" States of the 20th Century, whose unique devices of persecution, persuasion and perquisites were later copied, for wholly different purposes, by the demagogue-despots of Fascism. These devices are everywhere abhorred by democrats. They constitute the chief counts in the indictment of Soviet "totalitarianism" by the democracies. What is commonly forgotten in the West is that Soviet "totalitarianism" was not inevitable nor necessarily implicit in the Bolshevism of 1917-18 but was forced upon it, with death as the alternative, by the decisions of Russian democrats and of the Western Democracies.

Lenin's new government during the first phase of the Soviet regime was a blend of expediency with the somewhat vague directives supplied by Marx, Engels, the Paris Commune, the earlier Soviets, and the precepts of *The State and Revolution*. The Bolsheviks claimed no monopoly of legality and did not suppress critics and opponents. The first Sovnarkom consisted exclusively of Bolsheviks. But the new Central Executive Committee chosen by the Second Congress of Soviet on the night of November 8-9 consisted of 61 Bolsheviks, 29 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 6 Menshevik Internationalists, 3 Ukrainian Socialists, 5 peasant representatives, 2 Navy men, 1 trade union spokesman and 3 unaffiliated members. This CEC, like the Sovnarkom, was tentative, since the question of an All-Socialist coalition was unsettled. This became the burning political issue of the following weeks.

Amid much wrangling among Bolshevik leaders, there were almost no supporters for the idea of a one-party government with all other parties suppressed. On November 14 (cf. *Izvestia*, November 15, 1917) the Bolsheviks asked an accord with the other Socialist groups on the basis of common acceptance of the decrees on peace, land and workers' control, and responsibility of the Sovnarkom to the CEC and of an enlarged CEC to the Soviet Congress. The Right SR's repudiated the *coup d'état* of November 7 and broke off negotiations. The Mensheviks held that agreement with the Bolsheviks was impossible but offered to resume discussion on condition of the release of political prisoners and the full restoration of civil liberties. Many Bolsheviks shared these views. Lenin's opposition to them was resisted by Rykov, Miliutin, Schliapnikov, Nogin, Teodorovich (Food), Riazanov (Railways), Derbyshev (Press), Arbuzov, Federov and Larin, all

of whom resigned in protest from the Sovnarkom and demanded a coalition of all parties in the Soviet on the ground that "a purely Bolshevik government can maintain itself only by political terror." On November 17 Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Nogin and Miliutin took the extreme step of resigning from the Bolshevik Central Committee. A. Lozovsky denounced the majority of the Committee for trying to establish an arbitrary and undemocratic regime. Lenin threatened the dissenters with expulsion from the Party. The always vacillating Zinoviev at once recanted, with the others later following suit. Lozovsky continued to protest and was expelled from the Party in January, 1918, but readmitted in the following year.¹

This intra-Party crisis was resolved only with the creation of a quasi-coalition regime. Inconclusive negotiations in Petrograd were paralleled by secret but futile efforts on the part of Victor Chernov, one of the founders of the SR's, to form a rival government at Moghilev, HQ of the *Stavka* or Army General Staff, in collaboration with military groups and the railwaymen's union. On the summons of the Left SR's, a special Congress of Peasant Soviets met in Petrograd, November 23–December 8. Maria Spiridonova was elected chairman. The members included 195 Left SR's, 65 Right SR's and 37 Bolsheviks. Almost all favored an All-Socialist coalition. But quarrels among the SR factions precluded this solution. On November 28 the Left SR's reached an agreement with the Bolsheviks, as did the railwaymen's union. The land decree of November 8 was approved by the Congress. The Peasant Soviets were united with the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets. Four leaders of the Left SR's—Spiridonova, A. L. Kolegayev, A. Proshyan and I. Z. Steinburg—became members of the Sovnarkom. The new Cabinet or Council of Peoples' Commissars thus remained an all-Bolshevik body for only three weeks. That the coalition was not broader was due to the refusal of the Right SR's and the Mensheviks to participate.

This regime was a species of non-dictatorial dictatorship. The elected Soviet deputies continued to meet in regular session, with the Third Congress convening in January, 1918, the Fourth in March, and the Fifth in July. Neither the Sovnarkom nor the CEC "dictated" to local authorities. All over the vast expanse of Russia, power was exercised by local Soviets. There was very little lawlessness, disorder or crime. As late as May, 1918, Colonel Raymond

Robins travelled from Moscow to Vladivostok and found everywhere complete peace and respect for Soviet rule. Although the "bourgeois" press was partly suppressed and non-Bolshevik papers were hampered in various ways, there was no general silencing of criticism nor abrogation of civil rights. Neither was there any "terrorization" of dissidents or members of the propertied classes. On December 20, 1917, the Cheka (*Chrezvychainaya Komissiya*) or "Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation" was brought into being by a decree of the Sovnarkom and organized by Felix Dzerzhinsky as a new political police. During the next six months it arrested a few thousand persons and executed an uncertain number, estimated at 884 by the bitterly anti-Bolshevik S. P. Melgunov in his book *The Red Terror in Russia* (London, 1926) and at 22 by Martin Latsis, himself a member of the Cheka. In any case, contrary to the impression which soon became current in the West, the Soviet Government between November and June, 1917-18, established itself and pursued its program with less violence and with far fewer victims than any other social revolutionary régime in human annals.

During this period the practical meaning of the time-honored Marxist slogan of a "dictatorship of the proletariat," as defined and implemented by the Bolsheviks, was not that the Party alone should rule. All parties were welcome to participate, provided that they accepted the goal of socialism, represented workers and peasants, and acknowledged the Soviet as the basis of the new State. Those opposed to socialism—i.e., all "bourgeois" parties—were regarded as enemies against whom vigilance was called for. All political factions of any numerical importance, however, championed "socialism" in one form or another at this time. The new "freedom" was a class freedom and the "proletarian dictatorship" was envisaged as a class weapon against the bourgeoisie. At the Seventh Congress of the Party, held in March, 1918, this conception was clarified. Here the Party name was changed from "RSDLP (B)" to "Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)," and it was decided to move the capital to Moscow. Here also further steps were taken toward a new Party program. The draft resolution asserted that "there can be no question of freedom for the bourgeoisie. . . . The Party must mercilessly suppress all attempts of the bourgeoisie to return to power. And this is what is meant by a dictatorship of the proletariat."

In practice most "bourgeois" newspapers were suppressed and most "bourgeois" meetings were forbidden while all Socialist groups, so long as they were not anti-Soviet, carried on their activities with the minimum of interference. Although determined to socialize all means of production, Lenin had no desire to deprive the propertied classes of their liberty or their lives so long as there was hope of enlisting their cooperation. The Party sought to persuade bankers, manufacturers, bureaucrats, engineers and even landlords—i.e., all who exercised managerial functions in the old society—to become salaried officials in the new order. Land was "nationalized" as a means of meeting peasant demands. In most factories and stores a loose and chaotic form of "workers' control" was instituted. But there was no sweeping nationalization of business property. By mid-May of 1918 only 304 plants had been nationalized, mainly in mining and heavy industry. Even foreign trade remained in private hands until April 22, 1918, when it was made a State monopoly. Lenin moved slowly toward socialism, hoping to lessen the cost in the initial disruption of production and distribution and to "liquidate the bourgeoisie as a class" by absorbing its members peaceably into the new bureaucracy. That he failed does not change the fact that the Soviet régime, within the limits of its ultimate goals, was at first characterized more by patience, moderation and muddling than by the intolerance and ruthlessness associated with totalitarian tyranny.

The one action of the Soviet power during these months which could be deemed arbitrary and dictatorial was the suppression of the Constituent Assembly. The great expectations of many decades seemed near to realization when delegates were finally elected on November 25, 1917, under a decree of the Sovnarkom signed by Lenin on November 9. Bolshevik candidates won a majority of the ballots cast in Petrograd, Moscow and other urban centers. But in the country as a whole the Party elected only 175 representatives out of a total of some 700, while the Left SR's elected 40. The Cadets secured 17 members, the Mensheviks 16 and the Right SR's 370. The election was thus an overwhelming popular endorsement of socialism but a heavy defeat for the Bolsheviks and Left SR's at the hands of those who were unreconciled to the October Revolution and the Soviet régime. The Party leaders showed no enthusiasm for permitting the Assembly to convene on the day originally set: December 11. When the day

brought street demonstrations, the Sovnarkom accused the Cadets of plotting a *coup*, declared them "enemies of the people," and ordered the arrest of their leaders. Bolshevik plans to delay or dissolve the Assembly led some of the SR's to concoct feeble plots against the Sovnarkom, which, in turn, strengthened Bolshevik determination to insist that the Assembly must recognize the Soviets as the basis of the new State.

The deputies at length assembled in Taurida Palace on January 18, 1918. Victor Chernov, leader of the Right SR's, was chosen chairman. Various resolutions approved the land decree, the demand for an immediate democratic peace, and certain other acts of the Sovnarkom. While Lenin sat in the gallery, telling Albert Rhys Williams how he should study Russian, the deputies rejected, 237 to 136, the proposition that the new constitution should accept the Soviets as the basis of government. At 1 a.m. the Bolshevik and Left SR deputies withdrew. At 5 a.m. a sailor in charge of the Red Guards policing the Palace asked the chairman to close the meeting on the ground that the Guards were sleepy. Adjournment was voted to the evening of January 19.

In the morning, however, the Sovnarkom proposed dissolution. The Left SR's proposed new elections or the establishment of a revolutionary convention. The issue was referred to the CEC which voted simple dissolution after hearing a two hour speech by Lenin:

The transition from a capitalistic to a socialistic structure of society must necessarily be accompanied by a long and stubborn struggle. . . . There will be all sorts of errors and blunders . . . (but) the Soviets have started us on a road which is leading the people to the building of a new life. . . . The transfer of all power to the Constituent Assembly is nothing but the old policy of "conciliation" with the malevolent bourgeoisie. . . . As long as the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly" is used to cloak the slogan "Down with the Soviet Power," so long will there be no escape from civil war, for we will not give up the Soviet power for anything in the world! . . . The Constituent Assembly, which failed to recognize the power of the people, is now dispersed by the will of the Soviet power. . . . The Soviet Republic will triumph, no matter what happens.²

The deputies were not molested but allowed to return to their homes. N. D. Avksentiev, Right SR deputy, was already under arrest, however, along with several of his colleagues and most of

the Cadet delegation. The dissolution was not wholly non-violent. Two Cadet deputies, Shingarev and Kokoshin, were murdered in their beds by a mob of sailors in the Marinsky Hospital—a deed strongly condemned by *Izvestia* as “a blot on the honor of the Revolution.” Several more lives were lost when a crowd, bearing banners inscribed “All Power to the Constituent Assembly,” was fired upon by Red Guards as it tried to reach Taurida Palace. Maxim Gorky compared the incident to “Bloody Sunday” and bitterly denounced the “Peoples’ Commissars” for “crushing Russian democracy, destroying the conquests of the revolution.”

These events were followed by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets which adopted the first Soviet Constitution and formally made the Soviets the permanent political basis of the revolutionary State. No popular support of the Constituent Assembly materialized. Had the Right SR’s accepted the Soviets and offered to enter the Sovnarkom, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” might well have become a broad-based coalition. It now remained a Bolshevik-Left SR coalition. When this liaison was later dissolved, all the foes of the Bolsheviks, Socialists and anti-Socialists alike, took up arms against the Soviet power and thereby transformed it into the dictatorship of the Communist Party. This transition was less a consequence of irreconcilable differences over domestic questions than of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk.

2. PRUSSIAN DIKTAT

The original Soviet proposal of November 8, 1917, for a three months’ armistice and the negotiation of a general peace received no reply from the Central Powers or from the Allies. On November 21 Lenin, Trotsky and Nikolai Krylenko, Commissar for War, acting in the name of the Sovnarkom, ordered General Nikolai Dukhonin, Commander-in-Chief with the *Stavka* at Moghilev, to open armistice negotiations with the enemy commanders. Dukhonin refused. He was killed by a mob on December 3, a few hours after Krylenko’s arrival to take over the *Stavka* and assume supreme command. On the same day discussions were opened at Brest-Litovsk between the Soviet delegation, headed by Adolf A. Joffe and including Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Leo Karakhan, and a delegation of the Central Powers headed by General Max von Hoffmann. On December 15 an armistice was signed. A week

later negotiations began for a treaty. Joffe proposed peace on the basis of no annexations or indemnities, evacuation of occupied territories, self-determination of peoples, respect for the rights of small nations, and a general renunciation of international economic warfare. The heads of the German and Austro-Hungarian delegations, Richard von Kühlmann and Count Ottokar von Czernin, accepted these principles in form, with the support of their Bulgarian and Turkish colleagues, and rejected them in substance by contending that the separation of Poland and the Baltic area from Russia would not be "annexation" but merely an expression of "self-determination." Trotsky arrived early in January to resist German demands and delay the talks as long as possible.

A deadlock was soon reached, with Hoffmann thumping the table and Trotsky offering passive resistance with no effective bargaining power at his disposal. On February 8 the Central Powers signed a "peace treaty" with representatives of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian Rada. Two days later Trotsky broke off the negotiations, declaring that his Government would refuse to sign a treaty but regarded the war as ended. This formula of "no peace, no war" failed of its purpose. Hoffmann gave notice that the armistice was terminated and hostilities would be resumed on February 18. German forces occupied Dvinsk, moved toward Petrograd, and began occupying the Ukraine. Lenin insisted that peace must be signed. But when a message from the Sovnarkom (February 18) expressing willingness to sign brought no response from Berlin, he reconsidered the possibility of a revolutionary war of resistance. A decree of January 28 had provided for voluntary recruitment of a Red Army. On February 21 the Sovnarkom issued an appeal, drafted by Lenin: "The Socialist Fatherland is in danger! . . . The sacred duty of the workers and peasants of Russia is devotedly to defend the Republic of Soviets against the hordes of bourgeois-imperialist Germany."³ On February 23, 1918,—later designated as the official birthday of the Red Army—Soviet detachments halted German forces at Pskov and Narva. But there was as yet no army. On the same morning new and more drastic German peace terms reached Petrograd. Lenin threatened to resign if they were not accepted: "To carry on a revolutionary war, we need an army which we do not have."

The Soviet delegates returned to Brest-Litovsk. On March 3, 1918, the treaty was signed and hostilities ended. The terms re-

quired Soviet evacuation of Erivan, Kars, Batum, the Ukraine, the western provinces, Finland and the Baltic region. Russia lost 1,267,000 square miles of territory inhabited by 62,000,000 people, a third of her crop area, three quarters of her coal and iron, and over half of her industrial plants. Party Congress VII, meeting in Petrograd March 6-8, approved Lenin's motions to accept the treaty which was accordingly ratified March 16 by the Fourth Congress of Soviets, meeting in Moscow, after it had become clear that no aid for resuming the war could be expected from the Allies. Soviet Russia was at peace. Despite the heavy sacrifices exacted by the foe, both leaders and people expected to enjoy a "breathing spell."⁴

This boon was bought at the price of a new and dangerous crisis within the Party, a rupture between the Communists and the Left SR's, and a swiftly accelerated drift toward conflict with the Allied and Associated Powers. In retrospect Lenin's view of the possibilities and necessities confronting the country appears incontrovertibly right. At the time many of his colleagues and most of his opponents deemed it akin to madness or treason. On January 20 he posed the issue to a Party conference:

Either to accept the annexationist peace or to start at once a revolutionary war. No other solution is in fact possible. . . . (The second policy) is capable of giving satisfaction to those who crave the romantic and the beautiful but who fail completely to take into consideration the objective correlation of class forces. . . . Our army is in no condition to stop a German offensive. It is very tired and very hungry. . . . In concluding a separate peace now we rid ourselves, as far as present circumstances permit, of both imperialistic groups fighting each other. We can take advantage of their strife . . . to develop and strengthen the Socialist Revolution. . . . We can reorganize Russia on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . and make socialism unconquerable in Russia and in the whole world . . . (*Pravda*, February 24, 1918)

The leading comrades were not convinced. The vote was 15 in favor of Lenin's proposal, 16 in favor of Trotsky's idea of "no war, no peace," and 32 in favor of revolutionary resistance. But on January 22 the Bolshevik Central Committee voted 11 to 2 against a revolutionary war, 12 to 1 in favor of continuing negotiations and 9 to 7 in favor of Trotsky's formula. On February 17 the Central Committee, 6 to 5, rejected Lenin's motion to accept the

terms. On the 18th he introduced a similar motion which was again lost, 7 to 6, with Trotsky voting in the negative. Lenin persisted: "We cannot joke with war. . . . To delay is to betray the Revolution." His motion was now carried, 7 to 6, with Trotsky (who had changed his mind), Stalin, Smilga, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Zinoviev and Lenin for it and Joffe, Bukharin, Krestinsky, Djerzhinsky, Uritsky and Lomov opposed. In the crucial vote of February 23 in the Central Committee, 7 favored acceptance of the German terms (Lenin, Stasova, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Smilga and Stalin), 4 were opposed (Bukharin, Uritsky, Lomov and Bubnov), while Trotsky, Joffe, Krestinsky and Djerzhinsky refrained from voting. The Central Committee thus reached its decision not by a majority but only by a plurality. That night the CEC voted to accept, 116 to 85, with 26 not voting.

The Party members who denounced capitulation and urged a revolutionary war coagulated into the opposition bloc of "Left Communists." Bukharin, Uritsky, Lomov and Bubnov submitted their resignations to the Central Committee on February 23. The Moscow Regional Bureau of the Party adopted a motion of non-confidence in the Central Committee. On March 5, the day before the meeting of Congress VII, a new paper, *The Communist*, edited by Bukharin, Uritsky and other Leftists, made its first appearance with an attack on Lenin and his supporters. Lenin in *Pravda* told his critics to study the Napoleonic Wars: "We have concluded a Tilsit peace, just as the Germans did . . . and just as the Germans freed themselves from Napoleon, so will we get our freedom." This Party Congress was the first held since the October Revolution. It was attended by only 46 voting delegates, representing 145,000 members, although total Party membership was now 270,000. The debate was stormy. The Left Communists were voted down and Lenin's motion for peace was approved, 30 to 12, with 4 not voting. Bukharin, Uritsky and Lomov refused to serve on the new Central Committee. The final vote for ratification in the Fourth Congress of Soviets was 784 to 261, with the Left Communists not voting.

Since the treason trial of March, 1938, in which Bukharin, Krestinsky, Rykov and others were sentenced to death, it has become a part of the orthodox doctrine of the Party, reiterated in all subsequent official histories and commentaries, that "in 1918 Bukharin, and the group of 'Left Communists' headed by him, in

conjunction with Trotsky and the Left SR's, hatched a plot against the Soviet Government. The aim of Bukharin and his fellow-conspirators was to thwart the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to overthrow the Soviet Government, to arrest and assassinate V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and J. M. Sverdlov and to form a new government consisting of Bukharinites, Trotskyites and Left SR's . . ." ⁵ The accused confessed to having entertained such purposes twenty years previously. Trotsky had written earlier that the struggle of 1918 was "not between Lenin and me, but between Lenin and the overwhelming majority of the chief organizations of the Party." He described his "no peace, no war" solution as a bridge between Lenin and the Left Communists. Having promised Lenin not to support the advocates of a revolutionary war, he rejected (so he wrote) the overtures of Uritsky, Radek and Ossinsky for a common front. He had worked with Bukharin in New York. On February 23, according to Trotsky, "Bukharin overtook me in the long corridor of Smolny, threw his arms about me, and began to weep. 'What are we doing?' he exclaimed. 'We are turning the Party into a dungheap.'" ⁶ During the treason trial, Trotsky in his Mexican exile indignantly repudiated the allegations which Bukharin, Rykov and others had made against him.

The whole truth of the matter cannot at present be ascertained and perhaps will never be fixed beyond all debate. The official Soviet version is colored by an obvious intent to link later sins with earlier sins, to tar all sinners with the same brush, and to convince the virtuous that all sinners are vicious and that sinners once are always sinners. Trotsky's denials and counter-accusations were colored by his almost paranoiac rage against the leadership of Stalin. It is clear that Trotsky's errors of judgment at Brest-Litovsk and his unworkable formula cost Russia dearly, since peace could have been had in January at a lower price than was exacted in March. "For the sake of a good peace with Trotsky," said Lenin with bitter humor, "Latvia and Estonia are worth losing!" ⁷ It is also clear that the Left Communists were hotly indignant against the policy favored by Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov and were more than half prepared not only to split the Party but to make common cause with others against its leaders. Trotsky, as was the case for years before 1917, presented the appearance of standing between the two extremes. But the costly fiasco of his own program, and the melancholy vindication of the position

taken by Lenin from the beginning, may have disposed him to contemplate ways and means of removing those who had condemned his views. Aside from his own denials and the statements of the accused, there is no means of knowing how far, if at all, he joined with the Left Communists in conspiring against those whose policies finally prevailed.

Grave as was the Party schism over Brest-Litovsk, the rupture between the Party and the Left SR's was graver in its immediate results. The peace had been bitterly opposed by the faction of Maria Spiridonova, a tragically chaotic personality who had once assassinated a Governor and suffered violation at the hands of the Tsarist police. On the day of the ratification of the treaty, the Left SR's issued a statement denouncing it as "a betrayal of the international proletariat and of the Socialist Revolution begun in Russia. . . . The party declares that it is not bound by the terms of this treaty . . . and that it is its duty to organize the toiling masses to fight this encroaching international imperialism with all their might."⁸ All the Left SR's now resigned from the Sovnarkom, though not yet from the CEC and the Congress of Soviets. Some spoke of organizing an uprising. The quasi-coalition was ended. The Right SR's, the Mensheviks and the Cadets were, with few exceptions, equally opposed to the peace and determined, from the loftiest of "patriotic" or "revolutionary" motives, to oppose the now completely Bolshevized Soviet power. In a land whose people were profoundly thankful for peace on any terms consistent with the preservation of the gains and promises of the Revolution, these dissenters found few followers and no immediate opportunity to translate their wishes into acts. By summer, however, the opportunity would come—with tragic consequences for all.

Meanwhile Allied and American policy toward the Soviets moved from an initial mood of shocked incredulity to non-recognition, indignation, fear, rage, half-hearted hopes of somehow preserving the Eastern Front with Soviet aid, and half-hearted resolves to destroy the Soviet as a means of restoring the Eastern Front and bringing Russia back to "sanity." Trotsky's execrations and excoriations, spiced with frequent appeals to the world proletariat to overthrow all "capitalistic" and "imperialistic" governments, were not calculated to promote relations of mutual confidence between the new régime and the Western Powers.

American Ambassador David R. Francis, a former St. Louis businessman, was from Missouri but declined to be shown the facts of life of the Revolution. His first reaction to the events of November 7 was: "Disgusting!—But the more ridiculous the situation, the sooner the remedy."

Francis and his fellow-diplomats were agreed that any recognition of the Soviets was unthinkable. As early as November 20 it was reported from Washington that the United States would permit no more supplies to be sent to Russia until a "stable government" should emerge. The State Department denied that any embargo was contemplated. But the Kerensky officials in America, headed by Ambassador Boris Bakhmetev (who continued to be dealt with as representative of Russia until June 20, 1922, when he retired), halted all shipments until they were able to resume deliveries safely to anti-Soviet forces. The Allied Military Attachés warned the ill-fated General Dukhonin on November 23 of "most serious consequences" if he sanctioned "criminal negotiations" for peace. Trotsky raged against this threat.

Only one of the top Allied diplomats perceived that Russia, regardless of the purposes of its rulers, was physically unable to continue the war. British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan condemned the warning to Dukhonin as "an ill-advised step" and cabled Downing Street on November 27:

I share the view, already expressed by General Knox, that the situation here has become desperate, that we must reconsider our attitude. In my opinion the only safe course left to us is to give Russia back her word and tell her people that, realizing how worn out they are by the war and the disorganization inseparable from a great revolution, we leave it to them to decide whether they will purchase peace on Germany's terms or fight on with the Allies, who are determined not to lay down their arms till binding guarantees for the world's peace have been secured. For us to hold to our pound of flesh and to insist on Russia's fulfilling her obligations, under the 1914 agreement, is to play Germany's game. Every day we keep Russia in the war against her will does but embitter her people against us.⁹

This sensible advice was rejected. Clemenceau and Sonnino would hear nothing of it. The British Cabinet was also hostile. Colonel House suggested that the Allies restate their war aims. On December 1 the Allied Supreme War Council reached no agreement on the issue aside from authorizing each Government to

instruct its spokesman in Petrograd to declare that "the Allies were willing to reconsider their war aims in conjunction with Russia as soon as she had a stable Government with whom they could act." General William V. Judson, United States Military Attaché, called on Trotsky on the same day and told him that while the Allies could not take part in peace negotiations "the time for protests and threats to the Soviet Government has passed." But he was recalled to Washington a month later. The Allied leaders were already lost in a fog of incomprehension.

Woodrow Wilson was not insensitive to the need for meeting the Soviet challenge by means other than sweeping condemnation. On December 4 he told Congress that the Russian cry of "no annexation, no indemnities, self-determination" was a "just idea" of which a "right use" should be made. On January 8, 1918, in response to pleas from Foreign Secretary Balfour and from Edgar Sisson in Petrograd, the President delivered his memorable Fourteen Points address which he described as a response to "the voice of the Russian people." Point No. 6 called for:

The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

Words without works could not keep Russia in the war. Wilson was generous with words but unwilling and perhaps unable to make use of the opportunity afforded by the German demands at Brest-Litovsk to pledge material aid to Lenin's regime against the Central Powers. Trotsky's publication in November of the inter-Allied secret treaties found in the Tsarist archives did not promote collaboration, nor did the Soviet decree of February 8, 1918, repudiating Russia's State debts. On March 11 Wilson sent a message to the Fourth Congress of Soviets, meeting in Moscow to consider ratification of the peace treaty with the Reich. He ex-

pressed "sincere sympathy for the Russian people" and regretted the inability of the United States "to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render." America, however, would "avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world." The resolution of reply adopted by the Soviet deputies was exultingly described by Zinoviev as "a slap in the face" of the American President. It expressed gratitude but appealed to the workers of the world to attain peace by overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism.

Meanwhile Trotsky had refused to permit British subjects to leave Russia and threatened to have Ambassador Buchanan arrested for aiding counter-revolution unless London should release from Brixton Gaol a certain George V. Ornatsky *alias* Chicherin. This erudite Tsarist diplomat had resigned his post and joined the RSDLP during the revolution of 1905. He became a Menshevik but veered toward the Bolsheviks in 1915 and contributed to Trotsky's Paris paper, *Nashe Slovo*. He was arrested by the Scotland Yard Alien Squad after he had delivered a defeatist speech in Hyde Park.

Litvinov, then acting in London as agent of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel), was surprised at Trotsky's wanting Chicherin as an assistant. This gifted but neurotic son of the aristocracy was an esthete, a genius and "a shy, little, serious man," as Lincoln Steffens described him. He was released and reached Russia in time to become a member of the delegation which returned to Brest-Litovsk to sign the treaty. On March 13, 1918, Trotsky, who had already suggested his resignation to Lenin during the sharp controversy over the peace, gave up his post in the Narkomindel and became Commissar for War. Chicherin was the new Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He was destined to retain this post for the next twelve years until illness obliged him to retire in 1930 in favor of Litvinov.

In the absence of Allied recognition, this change of personalities in the Narkomindel produced no change in Allied-Soviet relations. In January the State Department demurred to a suggestion of recognition advanced by Ambassador Francis in a moment of weakness when, as he wrote later, he was filled with "disgust with all political parties and all capitalistic interests in Russia for not

organizing and deposing the Bolshevik Government whose principles were so reprehensible." Francis's only link with Trotsky and later with Chicherin was Colonel Raymond Robins, Chicago businessman and social worker who had become head of the American Red Cross mission to Russia at the end of November. Like Bruce Lockhart, Robins saw that the opposition of Trotsky and the "Left Communists" to Lenin's views offered a possibility of thwarting the peace if some assurance of Allied recognition and aid could be extended. But most of the Allied diplomatic and military officials, as well as their superiors abroad, had no such insight and preferred to believe that the Soviets would soon be overthrown. Robins was helpless. Trotsky finally told him: "Colonel Robins, your Embassy sends you here with a big bag marked 'American help.' You arrive every day, and you bring the bag into my room, and you set it down beside your chair, and you keep reaching into it as you talk, and it is a powerful bag. But nothing comes out."¹⁰

On March 5, two days after the signing of the treaty and a week before his own resignation, Trotsky asked Robins in Lenin's presence to inquire of Washington as to the nature and extent of possible aid in the event of a rejection of the peace. Trotsky also saw Lockhart who cabled Lloyd George that the proposal represented "our last chance" to keep Russia in the war. Robins and Francis sought to send the proposal to Washington at once, but it was not cabled from Vologda, where Francis had established HQ, until March 12. Wilson's message to the Soviet Congress had been sent on the preceding day. The State Department made no reply to the offer. The dispatches it received from Francis continued to describe Lenin and Trotsky as "German agents." Robins saw Lenin in Moscow on the 13th, but had nothing to report. The opportunity was lost. Lenin spoke last at the Congress of Soviets on the evening of March 16:

At 11:20 he was sitting in a chair on the platform. Robins was sitting on the steps of the platform. Lenin waved to Robins to come to speak to him. Robins came. Lenin said: "What have you heard from your Government?" Robins said: "Nothing. . . . What has Lockhart heard from London?" Lenin said: "Nothing." Then Lenin said: "I shall now speak for the peace. It will be ratified . . ." He spoke for a necessary peace, a preparatory peace, a peace of respite and return. Red cards rose up in hands all over the house to approve. Red cards

rose up to disapprove. The count was held. Not voting, 204. Voting against ratification, 276. Voting in favor of ratification, 724.¹¹

3. WHITE ATTACK

During the summer of 1918 the Soviet Government became a one-party dictatorship, ruthlessly suppressing all opposition by terror. Its transformation was occasioned by armed attacks launched against it from all points of the compass by its domestic and foreign foes, employing all possible weapons from conspiracy and blockade to invasion and assassination. Its internal enemies, if unaided from abroad, could not have placed it in mortal danger, nor could its external foes have brought about this result if unaided by allies within Russia. The combination of the two was almost fatal. Both camps took up arms in the name of nullifying the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and leading Russia back into war with the Central Powers.

As always in affairs of such magnitude and complexity, the motives of the actors were neither simple nor pure. To restore somehow the Eastern Front was a natural objective of the Allied and Associated Powers. Five days after Soviet ratification of the pact of Brest-Litovsk, Ludendorff launched the first of the spring offensives on the Western Front which almost won World War I for the Second Reich. Even after the tide had turned in July, Allied leaders were contemplating war throughout 1919. Those who shaped policy in Tokyo had other fish to fry. Having imposed the "Twenty-one Demands" of 1915 on a helpless China, the Japanese Government blackmailed the United States into signing the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917. By its terms Washington, in exchange for a Japanese reiteration of the Open Door Doctrine, recognized "that territorial propinquity creates special relations" and "that Japan has special interests in China."

No sooner was Kerensky overthrown than Tokyo, with the support of Clemenceau, began proposing military intervention in Siberia, with suggestions of exclusive economic concessions for Japanese corporations. London and Paris were favorable. But early in March, 1918, despite repeated pressures from the Allies, Washington strongly opposed such action on the ground that it would be of no aid in winning the war, would be incompatible

with Allied war aims, and would antagonize all Russia.¹² Japanese troops, soon followed by British, nevertheless landed at Vladivostok early in April. Said *Izvestia* on April 6, prematurely but not inaccurately: "The Imperialists of Japan wish to strangle the Soviet revolution, wish to cut off Russia from the Pacific ocean, wish to seize the rich territories of Siberia and to enslave Siberian workers and peasants. . . . The American Government, it seemed, was against the Japanese invasion. But . . . England intends to go hand in hand with Japan in working Russia's ruin. . . . A merciless struggle with Japan's agents and assistants within the country is a matter of life and death for the Soviet Republic."

Such suspicions were justified by acts of Allied agents in other areas. With only a single significant exception, there was no organized opposition to Soviet authority throughout the Muscovite empire during the winter and spring of 1918, save in territories dominated by Germans. In April Soviet rule in the Ukraine, easily established in December, was overthrown by the Germans who used General Skoropadsky as their puppet. At the same time Soviet rule in Finland was destroyed by German forces, supporting the White Guards of Baron Mannerheim. The one point in Russia beyond the reach of Berlin where anti-Soviet elements took control was Rostov. Here Gens. Kornilov, Kaledin and Alexiev, with the support of some of the Don Cossacks, organized a rebellion in December and established a "United Government" with a "Volunteer Army." The adventure lasted only a few weeks. By mid-February it was ended. Kornilov was killed by a Bolshevik shell. Kaledin committed suicide. Alexiev fled after naming General Anton Denikin as his successor.

While this revolt was of no consequence as a challenge to Soviet power, Allied policy toward its leaders was vastly revealing of things to come. Alexiev, Kaledin and Kornilov were at once offered £20,000,000 by the British Government and 100,000,000 rubles by the French to resist the Soviet. Although they were monarchist reactionaries, they yielded to Allied pressure to the extent of admitting to their movement various Cadets, including Paul Miliukov, various Right SR's, including Boris Savinkov, and even some Left SR's and Mensheviks. Negotiations were begun to admit the aged George Plekhanov. Dewitt C. Poole, American Consul General in Moscow, went to Rostov and Novocherkassk in December and reported to Francis on January 26 that the United

States should support the anti-Soviet cause: "You are aware that France and Great Britain are already committed to the movement. According to the information given by the French representatives at Novoherkassk, France had taken under its particular care the Ukraine, the Crimea, Bessarabia and Rumania; Great Britain had taken the Caucasus and the Cossack country. . . . (The movement) is not such a sectional movement as the Department has very naturally instructed us not to support."¹³ The "movement" swiftly collapsed but it showed who was prepared to cooperate with whom against the Soviets. All these developments on the Don, it should be noted, occurred long before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed.

In the tragedy to come the Russian ultra-reactionaries, whose orientation was not dissimilar to that of the later "Fascist" movements of Central and Eastern Europe, were quite unable by themselves to challenge the Soviet power. They found the opportunity in the anti-Soviet strategy of liberal democrats who, in turn, were enabled to pose a serious threat to Soviet Moscow by virtue of the anti-Soviet strategy of the non-Bolshevik Socialists. The latter groups were the first to resort to arms. The liberals, representing the lower middle class, followed suit. The "White" reactionaries, led for the most part by those who identified themselves with the old aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie, became the residuary legatees of the enterprise and the beneficiaries of Allied and American support.

If the question be asked as to why anti-Communist Socialists were the first to throw down the gage of battle, the answer lies in the familiar proposition that in all theologies heretics are hated more than infidels. Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks declared that they were unable to stomach the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. But these were pretexts rather than causes. In the eyes of these rival apostles of socialism, the Communists were heretics and foul betrayers of true socialism. Both sides, like all fervent religionists, acted on the principle that "orthodoxy is my doxy and heterodoxy is your doxy."

The motives of the propertied classes in fostering revolt against the Soviets were less complex. In the words of Machiavelli, "men sooner forget the death of their relations than the loss of their patrimony." To rebel against the Soviets, once the anti-Bolshevik

Socialists had paved the way, was to create the possibility of overthrowing a régime committed to the socialization—i.e., confiscation—of most private property. Not to rebel was to acquiesce in the inevitable loss of the privilege and influence which go with property and to accept the degraded role of pariahs in the new society. Neither threats of punishment nor promises of reward nor appeals to altruism could prevail against the call of obvious self-interest, however that interest might be rationalized in terms of abstract principles and ideals.

As so often in Russian history, the impact of aliens furnished the means whereby domestic rebels found it possible to challenge the central power. Here the incidents which set off a series of revolts were quite fortuitous and wholly disproportionate to the world-shaking consequences to which they led. Some 45,000 Czechoslovak deserters from the Austro-Hungarian armies had fought with the Imperial Russian forces against the hated Hapsburgs. These legionnaires were left stranded in the Ukraine by Brest-Litovsk. Early in 1918 the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris declared them part of the Czechoslovak Army in France and made plans to bring them to the Western Front. Climatic considerations and the disposition of enemy divisions led to a decision to evacuate these troops by the way of Siberia, the Pacific, America and the Atlantic. This astonishing Odyssey was finally completed, but only after a long delay. Out of the delay and the attendant misunderstandings grew the civil war and the Allied intervention in Russia.

The Czechoslovak legionnaires began their long trek eastward in March, 1918, with the full cooperation of the Soviet authorities. The first contingent reached Vladivostok without mishap. But other contingents in western Siberia suspected that the local Soviets were bent upon disarming them and impeding their passage. The Soviets were suspicious in turn that the Czechs might endeavor to aid the counter-revolutionary bands of émigrés gathered around Ataman Gregory Semenov in Harbin, Manchuria, and around General Horvath in Outer Mongolia. Friction was increased by rumors that the Soviets were arming German, Austrian and Turkish war prisoners in Siberia. At Trotsky's suggestion, Robins and Lockhart sent Capts. William B. Webster and W. L. Hicks to investigate in mid-March. They reported quite accurately that at Omsk 434 Hungarians, 300 Czechs and

197 Yugoslavs had renounced their old allegiance, assumed Soviet citizenship, and been incorporated into Soviet forces to help guard the Manchurian frontier. Elsewhere only a few score prisoners had been released. Rumors in Paris, London and Washington that Lenin was turning over Siberia to the enemy through the use of war prisoners were nonsensical inventions—not the first and by no means the last malicious fantasies which were to plague Allied-Soviet relations. Ambassador Francis believed the rumors, as did the State Department. Robins was called home in mid-May. The rumors were also believed by some of the Czech legionnaires.

On May 14, 1918, at Chelyabinsk a group of Czech soldiers passed several trains full of German and Austrian prisoners moving westward on their way home. One of the prisoners hurled a missile at the Czechs who promptly lynched him. When Soviet authorities arrested the lynchers, their comrades forcibly intervened and released the offenders. Trotsky now ordered the disarming of all Czech soldiers, in violation of the original agreement, and rashly ordered all armed Czechoslovaks to be shot on sight. The National Council ordered all the Czech troops to give up their weapons to the local Soviets. But the legionnaires, full of vague fears of designs against them, refused and began defying and then overturning Soviet authority in western Siberia. Moscow had no troops available to resist this "revolt." By June much of the trans-Siberian railway and the Ural region were in the hands of the Czechs. British, French and American agents encouraged them. Behind the protection of their arms a group of Socialist Revolutionaries proclaimed a "West Siberian Commissariat" on June 1, only to be superseded at the end of the month by a new "Siberian Government" of liberals, bent upon suppressing all Soviets and restoring property rights. In the same month five SR members of the Constituent Assembly set up a "government" at Samara on the Volga and, with Czech aid, organized anti-Soviet forces which took Ufa, Volsk and Kazan by early August.

A dark detail of this tragedy of errors was the end of the Royal Family. The former Tsar, with his wife and children, had been transferred from Tsarkoe Selo near Petrograd to Tobolsk in mid-Siberia and then to Ekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk) north of Chelyabinsk. When Czech and anti-Soviet forces approached the city, the Ural Territorial Soviet decided to execute the Romanovs

rather than permit them to fall into hostile hands. On the night of July 16-17, 1918, the Tsar, the Tsarina, their ailing son, the Princesses, the family physician and three servants were all taken by Red Guards to the basement of the house where they were confined and there shot to death. The bodies were burned in an abandoned mine near by and the remains scattered in a swamp.

Meanwhile some of the more ardent Left SR's, soon abetted by the Rights and the Mensheviks, had translated words into deeds in European Russia. Aside from efforts to instigate local revolts, all of which failed or were easily put down, their favorite weapon was assassination. V. Volodarsky, Commissar for Press and Propaganda, was killed on June 20. Count von Mirbach, the German Ambassador, was the next victim, July 6, and then General Eichhorn, German commander in the Ukraine, on July 30. Mirbach's murder, ordered by Maria Spiridonova, coincided with the final break between the Left SR's and the Communists, following the rejection by the Fifth Congress of Soviets of new appeals for war with Germany. In Moscow and Petrograd attempts of the Left SR's to seize power by a *coup* on July 6 were quickly put down. The German Government, which had already violated Brest-Litovsk by extending its area of military occupation in the south, took advantage of the situation to wrest further concessions from Moscow, particularly in the amounts of gold, goods and securities to be paid in compensation for the nationalization of German property in Russia.¹⁴

On August 30 Michael Uritsky, then President of the Petrograd Cheka, was slain by an SR assassin. That same evening Lenin was fired upon as he left the Michelson factory in Moscow after delivering a speech. His assailant was Fania Kaplan-Roid, a former anarchist and later a Right SR. Trotsky, Bukharin and the Left Communists were alleged subsequently to have known of the plot and to have approved.¹⁵ Lenin was hit in the neck and shoulder by two bullets and was incapacitated for a fortnight. The would-be assassin was arrested and reported executed a few days later.

Lenin's words of July 29, a month before the attempt on his life, expressed the realities of the new situation which his régime now faced:

War, military events, have again appeared on the stage as the fundamental question of the revolution. . . . The whole question of the existence of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the

whole question of the Russian Revolution now boils down to the question of war. . . . We are at war, and the fate of the revolution will be determined by its outcome. This must be our first and last word in our work of agitation, in all our political, revolutionary and reforming activities. . . . We must exert all our efforts, and call everybody to arms.¹⁶

The wheels of Allied diplomacy meanwhile revolved slowly but inexorably toward the decision to destroy the Soviets by force. Ambassador Francis, who had been urging military intervention since early May, joined his Allied colleagues on June 4 in telling Chicherin that the disarming of the Czechoslovaks would be deemed a hostile act. In response to Chicherin's pleas to come to Moscow, Francis and the other Ambassadors left Vologda for Archangel on July 25. Chicherin in a farewell message expressed regrets, thanks and regards "to the great people of pioneers on the new continent and to the posterity of Cromwell's revolutionaries and of Washington's brothers in arms." Francis, fearing that the message "would be given to the American people by the Department of State" and that it would comfort American pacifists, failed to transmit it. In the interim President Wilson had yielded to Allied demands and to increasing pressures at home. On July 2 the Allied Supreme War Council decided on military intervention.¹⁷ On July 17 the United States proposed to the Allies a slightly more qualified and limited intervention, though expressly leaving them free to intervene on their own initiative as extensively and for such purposes as they might desire.¹⁸

Following further exchanges of notes, Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk issued an ambiguous announcement on August 3, similar to a simultaneous Japanese statement. It began by denouncing intervention on the ground that it "would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion than to cure it and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distress." Intervention, moreover, would not aid the war against Germany. Nevertheless, military action is admissible "to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czechoslovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government and self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance." American troops from Vladivostok and from Archangel and Murmansk would guard military stores and "render

such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians." The United States would therefore cooperate with Britain and France at Archangel and had proposed to Tokyo a joint American-Japanese occupation of Vladivostok. All of this "contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs . . . and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter." The United States, after giving military assistance to the Czechoslovaks, would "send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Y.M.C.A., accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind . . . to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people . . ." ¹⁹

In diplomacy, hypocrisy is sometimes necessary, although never edifying, and may even be useful in securing approval of a well-conceived policy whose actual purposes cannot be publicly acknowledged. Its utility is doubtful, however, when it disguises a muddled program of meddling based not on any rational calculation of interests and possibilities but only on ignorance, fear and hatred. The premises of the Allied and American intervention in Russia were false. Its logic was fallacious. Its results were tragic. No more fatal decision has ever been reached at Washington, London and Paris, for its enduring effects so poisoned the atmosphere of Soviet-Allied relations as to pave the way a generation later for World War II and even to jeopardize unity among the United Nations in the wake of a costly common victory. Deep wounds leave ugly scars. The injuries inflicted upon Russia by the Western democracies between 1918 and 1921 not only exposed innocent millions to hideous suffering but disfigured the whole face of world politics for decades to come.

At the outset of this undeclared war the most immediate military threat to the Soviet power came from the southeast. The Czechoslovaks were soon disillusioned by Allied policy and by the increasing ascendancy behind their lines of counter-revolutionary reactionaries. The Red Army retook Kazan on September 10 and Samara on October 8. To the south the Don Cossack General, P. N. Krasnov, who had damned the Bolsheviks as German agents, now asked the Kaiser for aid against them. The rebel forces which he led attacked Tsaritsin (now Stalingrad) on the lower Volga. In the autumn of 1918 the city became known as the "Red

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Verdun"—twenty-four years before its heroic defense at the turning point of World War II—by virtue of the stubborn and successful resistance directed by Stalin and Voroshilov. Krasnov was beaten back and all the Volga cleared of "White" forces. These campaigns, however, were but the prelude to a formidable massing of anti-Soviet armies in north, south, east and west.

British forces had landed at Murmansk early in March when German troops began to enter Finland. French and American marines had followed. Moscow had acquiesced. Berlin had protested. On June 7 Lenin asked the Murmansk Soviet to oppose Allied occupation but this body defiantly concluded an agreement with Allied commanders on July 6 and was outlawed as "an enemy of the people" by the Sovnarkom. On August 2, in the face of repeated Soviet protests, British forces landed at Archangel. Immediately after the attacks upon Uritsky and Lenin, the British Embassy in Petrograd was raided by the Cheka. The Naval Attaché, Captain Cromie, was killed in the scuffle, after killing several of the assailants. Lockhart was arrested in Moscow for subsidizing counter-revolution. In reprisal the British authorities in London arrested Litvinov. Lockhart and Capt. Sidney George Reilly of the British Intelligence Service were in fact deeply involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet power.^{19a} Lockhart and Litvinov were exchanged in October, however, with the latter becoming Chicherin's chief assistant at the Narkomindel upon his return to Russia.

Meanwhile anti-Bolshevik Socialists at Archangel had overthrown the Archangel Soviet, at Allied instigation, and established the "Supreme Administration of the North," headed by Nicholas V. Tchaikovsky and other members of the Constituent Assembly. These leaders welcomed the 2,000 Allied troops under British General Poole who landed on August 2. Some 4,500 American troops arrived on September 4. On the very next day Tchaikovsky and his fellow Socialists were deposed, kidnapped and shipped off to the Solovetsky Islands by a group of reactionary Russian officers led by a Captain Chaplin. Ambassador Francis was busy reviewing the American contingent. What followed is best told in his own words:

I had just finished reviewing a battalion when General Poole, who was with me on the Government steps, turned to me and said: "There was a revolution here last night." I said: "The hell you say! Who

pulled it off?" He replied: "Chaplin." . . . I motioned for him to come over. . . . I said: "Chaplin, who pulled off this revolution here last night?" He said: "I did." Chaplin had done very good work against the Bolsheviks, getting them deposed and out of Archangel. He went on to say: . . . "I see no use for any government here anyway." I replied: "I think this is the most flagrant usurpation of power I ever knew . . ." ²⁰

The news threw the populace into an uproar. Chaplin was denounced as a monarchist. Labor leaders called a general strike. Francis insisted on the restoration of the kidnapped ministers. But Chaplin was protected from punishment by the Allied Ambassadors while the Ministers were treated as a nuisance by Anglo-French officers. The heartbroken Tchaikovsky, along with his colleagues, insisted on resigning. Not until early October were they induced by Francis to remain as members of a Socialist-bourgeois coalition called the "Provisional Government of the North." Poole was succeeded by General Ironsides. Francis left in November, deploring the fact that only 15,000 Allied troops had come, since he felt certain that a larger number could have taken Vologda and overthrown the Soviet regime. The Archangel "Government" was a shadow. Many officers of the local White troops were monarchists and had the blessing of Allied commanders. Intervention thus meant a rapid transition from non-Bolshevik Soviets to an anti-Soviet Socialist régime to a Socialist-Liberal coalition to the final assumption of power by the most benighted forces of counter-revolution and Tsarist restoration.

A similar transition took place, with local variations, everywhere that Allied forces destroyed Soviet authority. Behind the Czechoslovaks a "Provisional Government" emerged at Ufa in late September, headed by the SR leader, Avksentiev, and set up HQ as an "All Russian Directorate" in Omsk. Amid much wrangling this group finally coalesced with a rival group of Socialists and liberals at Tomsk. At British insistence the post of Minister of War was given to Admiral Alexander Kolchak, former commander of the Black Sea fleet. On November 18 this régime experienced its "Chaplin kidnapping." Reactionary officers abducted and arrested the Socialist members of the Directorate in Omsk. The Council of Ministers assumed power and delivered it at once to Kolchak as dictator and "Supreme Ruler." British troops preserved "law and order." Official London and Paris were delighted.

Official Washington was puzzled, but Prince Lvov and Ambassador Bakhmetev expressed their satisfaction to President Wilson and urged that Kolchak be granted diplomatic recognition. When the people of Omsk revolted against the White dictatorship in December, they were shot down by British troops, aided by Czech soldiers who were tricked into believing that the rebels were Tsarist sympathizers. When the Czechs perceived that the end of Soviet rule meant neither socialism nor democracy but unmitigated reaction, backed by Allied bayonets, most of them refused all support to the new White Army which Kolchak proceeded to organize with Allied aid and advice.

General William S. Graves also looked realities in the face and found them ugly. He was commander of the American Expeditionary Force of 7,000 men sent to Vladivostok. Here the Czechs had dissolved the local Soviet and arrested all Bolsheviks at the end of June. Allied consuls and officers, including Admiral Austin M. Knight, CINCUS Asiatic Fleet, proclaimed a "protectorate" over the city in July. The SR "Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia," which took control with Allied support, was at once challenged by General D. L. Horvath, Tsarist manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, who proclaimed himself "Provisional Ruler" in the name of "law and order." General Graves reached Vladivostok on September 4, a fortnight after American troops had begun to land. His men at first joined British, French and Japanese forces in attacking Soviet troops and Red partisans along the Amur. But he soon decided to interpret strictly his orders to refrain from political intervention and to permit no hostilities save what might be necessary to guard the railways.

In violation of its pledge to Washington, Tokyo now poured 73,400 troops into Eastern Siberia, followed by salesmen and concession-hunters. A major crisis in Japanese-American relations early in November was averted only by the military collapse of Germany which led Tokyo to adopt a more moderate line. But by the end of the year Kolchak's dictatorship, warmly supported by the British Mission, was being defied in Eastern Siberia by the Japanese puppet, Ataman Gregory Semenov, whose host of bandits committed unspeakable atrocities, pillaged the countryside, and compelled the peasants in self-defense to join the Red partisans. The activities of these pro-Soviet guerrillas were viewed with a certain sympathy by General Graves, who accurately de-

scribed Semenov as "a murderer, robber and a most dissolute scoundrel"—much to the disgust of Anglo-French and Japanese officers and of some of his own subordinates and superiors, who were less fastidious in their choice of means to "save Siberia from Bolshevism." Graves was reprimanded by British General Knox, who told him that he "was getting the reputation of being a friend of the poor and didn't he know they were only swine."²¹ General Graves and his troops were obviously an obstacle, rather than an aid, to the success of intervention as defined in Tokyo, Paris and London. For this they got small thanks at the time. But in retrospect their conduct was the one creditable episode in an otherwise discreditable and disgraceful adventure.

In the south General Anton Denikin's "Volunteer Army" succeeded in wresting a large part of the North Caucasus from the Soviets in August of 1918, while Stalin and Voroshilov were preparing to defend the lower Volga against Krasnov's forces to the northeast. In Georgia anti-Soviet elements proclaimed "independence" and made their State a German protectorate, only to be attacked by Turkish troops and reactionary elements from Azerbaijan. At the end of July the local SR's and Mensheviks, with British encouragement, overthrew the Baku Soviet. The 26 Bolshevik Commissars of Baku who sought safety across the Caspian were arrested by counter-revolutionaries and shot at Krasnovodsk on September 20 at the suggestion of British agents. British troops in Baku failed to prevent the capture of the city by a force of Turks and Tartars who massacred 30,000 Armenians and perpetrated an orgy of murder, rape, arson and pillage in the best tradition of Tamerlane. On November 26 Anglo-French forces occupied Odessa, but in the following April the sailors of the French fleet, led by André Marty, mutinied, ran up the Red flag, sang the "International" and forced their officers to sail away. The Red Army reoccupied the city but was not yet able to cope with Denikin's White Army which soon overran Caucasia and the Ukraine, thanks to liberal supplies of Anglo-French money, tanks, guns, planes and munitions. Denikin's officers sang "God Save the Tsar" and excelled in torturing Communists to death, slaughtering Jews, and horse-whipping and bayoneting the simple-minded peasants who had dared to seize the estates of the landlords.

The Allied policy of destroying Bolshevism by blockade, invasion and subsidized support of counter-revolution was not changed

by the armistice of November 11, 1918, which ended the war with Germany and expressly nullified the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The objective was no longer to restore an Eastern Front but to annihilate the Soviet power. All pleas for peace from Moscow fell on deaf ears, as did all reports of the crimes of the White terrorists and all accounts of realities in the rear of the White Armies—moderately described by William Henry Chamberlin as “a veritable bacchanalia of drunkenness, corruption and speculation.”²² Kolchak and Denikin both named as their Foreign Minister in Paris S. D. Sazonov, the Tsarist Foreign Minister of 1914 who bore a large share of responsibility for unleashing World War I. Around Sazonov, on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, gathered Lvov, Miliukov, Bakhmetev, Tchaikovsky and an incongruous band of monarchists, Cadets, Mensheviks and SR's, all united in their detestation of the Soviets and in their desire to enlist all-out Allied aid for the White forces.

Their views were widely shared in the Western democracies. Senator McCumber urged the American Congress to fight Lenin and Trotsky for the sake of the “poor innocent Russian people who are in the grasp of these damnable beasts.” He also read into the *Record* the wholly fictitious “Decree of the Saratov Soviet,” proclaiming the “nationalization” of all women in Russia—a Bolshevik “atrocious” which millions of Americans, Britishers and Frenchmen swallowed as truth in 1919. Senator Thomas described Bolshevism as “one long agony of murder, pillage and destruction.” The Overman Committee held hearings at which Soviet Russia was depicted as a madhouse ruled by homicidal maniacs. *Current History*, then owned by the *New York Times*, countered the State Department's denial of the nationalization-of-women story with “photographs” and “eye-witness accounts.” The *Times* itself, November 1, 1919, described the Bolsheviks as “ravening beasts of prey, a large part of them actual criminals, all of them mad.” The American Association for International Conciliation described Lenin and Trotsky as “feeble-minded visionaries” and their followers as “degenerates, drunkards and sex-perverts.” Elihu Root deemed them a “horrid group of cutthroats and assassins.” The *New York Times*, not to be outdone, ran such headlines as “Russia a Gigantic Bedlam—Maniacs Stalk Raving Through Streets.” In the same paper, which even then was the most accurate and reliable in the Atlantic world, Lenin was con-

stantly resigning, dying, fleeing to Berlin or Barcelona, being murdered or arrested by Trotsky, etc., while his régime was perpetually disintegrating, dissolving, collapsing, falling or otherwise passing from the scene.²³

In this atmosphere the Allied statesmen met in Paris to mend the woes of the world. That there could be no durable peace without the full participation of Russia in its making and enforcement occurred to none of them. Chicherin asked the United States to "kindly name a place and time for opening of peace negotiations. . . . We wish normal relations and are ready to eliminate everything which may be an obstacle." Ambassador Francis told the American Peace Commission in Paris that Bolshevism was a disgrace to civilization which must be exterminated, not negotiated with. Lloyd George, however, thought that an effort should be made toward peace. Clemenceau, Sonnino and Orlando dissented, but Wilson concurred. On January 22 Wilson secured acceptance for a proposal that all Russian factions should agree to a truce and send delegates to the Prinkipo Islands in the Sea of Marmara to confer with Allied agents. Moscow accepted at once and offered territorial, financial and economic concessions. But Sazonov and Lvov declared they could not possibly sit at the same table with assassins. Wilson named William Allen White and George D. Herron as delegates to Prinkipo, but the conference never met because all the White leaders, sure of Allied support, refused to participate.

In March, 1919, Wilson sent William C. Bullitt, accompanied by Captain Walter Pettit and Lincoln Steffens, on a secret mission to Soviet Russia to explore the possibility of a settlement. Bullitt came back with terms and reported that "no government save a socialist government can be set up in Russia today save by foreign bayonets. . . . The proposal of the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace with the Revolution on a just and reasonable basis." Wilson told Colonel House, however, that he had a one-track mind and that House should pursue the matter. The Colonel dallied and quibbled until the opportunity was lost. Bullitt resigned in disgust. Wilson did nothing in the face of the determination of Clemenceau, now supported by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, to overthrow the Soviets by force. The Allied statesmen were unable to dispatch large armies to Russia and unwilling to grant formal diplomatic recognition to Kolchak.

But they were confident in the spring of 1919 that the hated Soviet régime would soon be destroyed.

This confidence appeared justified. Under Allied prodding, Kolchak agreed to acknowledge the debts of previous régimes and to convoke, ultimately, a constituent assembly. Lloyd George, Wilson, Clemenceau and Makino agreed in return to send more aid to the White armies. Kolchak's agents borrowed money and purchased arms on a large scale in the United States, with the encouragement of Ambassador Bakhmetev and the State Department and with the aid of funds originally loaned by the United States to the Kerensky Government. According to Churchill, 100,000 tons of British arms and supplies were sent to Kolchak in 1919 while Denikin received 250,000 rifles, 200 guns, 30 tanks, "large masses of munitions and equipment" and hundreds of British officers, advisers and aviators.²⁴ Kolchak's White Army took Perm in December, 1918, and Ufa on March 13, 1919. By April it was threatening Samara and Kazan. Early in May Red forces under General Michael Frunze began pushing the Whites back from the Volga toward the Urals. They retook Ufa on June 9. But in the south Denikin's White Army broke the Red front, took Kharkov on June 25 and Tsaritsin on the 30th, and aimed at Moscow. Other enemy forces were pressing in from the west and down from the north. That the Soviet State could survive this combined and concentric assault of all its enemies at home and abroad seemed utterly impossible as the Paris Peace Conference concluded its work a week after the summer solstice of 1919.

4. RED DEFENSE

An ancient aphorism holds that "war is the father of all things." The war of the Russian Revolution begot many of the enduring features of the young Soviet State. Its leaders, guided by Marxist dogma, groped blunderingly toward workable answers to the thousands of questions posed by the impact of stubborn facts and distressing events on their own purposes. Many pressing problems of politics, administration, production and distribution found no definitive answers during the first eight months of the régime. Answers emerged only out of the grim trial-and-error of battle.

Some of the solutions, to be sure, were abandoned in 1921 and not revived until 1928 and then in a new form. But the foundation

osts of the Soviet Constitution, of the one-party totalitarian state, of the Comintern, of the Red Army, the political police and the higher propaganda, of economic planning in socialized industry, of rural collectivization and "class war in the villages" were all forged in the flames of war which swirled around Red Muscovy in the ghastly and heroic years of civil strife and foreign intervention. The political and social structure reared on these pilings, driven deeply into the Russian earth by the hammers of Mars, appeared to most outsiders to be disintegrating after the abandonment of "War Communism" and the advent of the "New Economic Policy." The building, moreover, seemed to most Western liberals not a temple of freedom but a new prison-house ruled by benevolent despots whose despotism was more impressive than their benevolence. Yet the framework stood firmly enough to be built upon later. If it offered its inmates no bourgeois freedom of the Western variety, it ultimately gave them an abundance of opportunity for life and growth and for personal self-fulfillment in common social purposes. It was to prove adequate not only for meeting the needs of reconstruction and gigantic new construction in times of peace but also for producing the warriors and the weapons of victory in the far greater war to come.

The one-party State, wherein the dictatorship of the Communist Party became the final expression of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," was the outcome of the break between the Communists and the Left SR's who were presently joined by all other party groups in rebellion against the Soviets. On June 14, 1918, the Soviet Central Executive Committee resolved to expel all Right SR's and Mensheviks from membership and to ask all local Soviets to do likewise on the ground that these parties were in contact with counter-revolutionary forces. At the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which opened on July 4 at the Bolshoi Theater with swarthy, blackbearded Jacob Sverdlov in the chair, there were 678 Communists and 269 Left SR's. The latter denounced Ambassador Mirbach, who was sitting in a box, and threatened violent resistance to Lenin's agrarian policy. The murder of Mirbach and the abortive revolt of the Left SR's on the next day, followed by the desertion of the SR General Murviev to the enemy at Simbirsk, led to the suppression of the party. By the time the first Soviet Constitution was promulgated (July 9) all the SR's, Mensheviks and Cadets were at war with the

Communists and prepared to cooperate with the Allies and White reactionaries for the overthrow of the Soviet. In the atrocious combat of factions and classes which ensued, no quarter was given. The penalty of defeat was political extinction and often death for those unable to flee. History was written by the survivors, who outlawed the vanquished and claimed for themselves a monopoly of legality.

Terror was fought with terror. On July 11-12 ten officers belonging to terrorist Boris Savinkov's organization for the "Salvation of the Country and the Revolution" were shot in Moscow by order of the Cheka, following a rebellion in Yaroslavl. In Yaroslavl itself, 350 participants were executed (*Pravda*, July 26, 1918). Said Latsis: "The struggle is one of life and death. If you do not kill, you will be killed. Therefore kill, that you may not be killed" (*Izvestia*, August 23, 1918). On September 2, two days after the assassination of Uritsky and the wounding of Lenin, the always cowardly and therefore cruel Zinoviev ordered the execution of 500 hostages in Petrograd. Sverdlov, Chairman of the CEC, called upon the working class to "meet every attack on its leaders with merciless mass terror against the enemies of the Revolution." Y. A. Peters, Acting Chairman of the Cheka, proclaimed that anyone found in possession of arms without a permit "will immediately be shot and anyone daring to agitate against the Soviet Government will immediately be arrested and placed in a concentration camp." The Sovnarkom formally authorized mass terror on September 5. Local Soviets were ordered to arrest all SR's and to take hostages from the ranks of the bourgeoisie and Tsarist officers. All involved in White Guard activities were to be executed "without formality." The individual terrorism of the Whites, in the form of isolated killings, was followed by a mass White Terror in the form of wholesale executions of all Party members and Bolshevik sympathizers in areas under White and Allied control. The Communist Party repudiated individual terrorism but was quite prepared to resort to mass terrorism against its enemies.

The Red Terror evoked immediate protests from foreign representatives, none of whom had voiced any objection to the attempts of anti-Soviet elements to assassinate Communist leaders and instigate rebellion. Dewitt C. Poole protested to Chicherin on September 4 against "the barbarous oppression of the Russian

people." On September 5 the Allied Diplomatic Corps at Petrograd, joined by the German Consul General, expressed its "profound indignation." Chicherin replied that nothing would "deter the hands of those punishing those who raise arms against the workmen and poorest peasants of Russia."²⁵ The Patriarch Tikhon raised his voice against "murder, plunder and violence" and quoted Isaiah against the Commissars: "Their feet run to evil, and they make haste to shed innocent blood: their thoughts are thoughts of iniquity; wasting and destruction are in their paths." Said Lenin: "There is only one way to free the masses and that is to crush the exploiters. This is the task of the Cheka, and for this it deserves the gratitude of the proletariat." Djerzhinsky's dreaded organization was primarily a weapon against the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, though many anti-Bolshevik Socialists and rebellious peasants became its victims. Names and numbers of those executed were at first published as a means of intimidation. According to Latsis the number of those shot during the first three years of the Cheka was 12,733. The total may well have been larger. But later stories to the effect that the Red Terror had taken 1,700,000 lives were fables. How many thousands or scores of thousands were slaughtered by the White terrorists will never be known. They kept no accounts on the ledgers of death.

If the Red Terror was the chief weapon of the dictatorship against enemies within the lines of battle, the Red Army was its sword against the hosts of invasion and counter-revolution. In the summer of 1918 the system of volunteer recruiting, elected commanders, and soldiers' committees gave way to conscription and strict discipline, with Party members appointed as political commissars to watch over the many thousands of Tsarist officers who were persuaded or coerced into entering the service. Trotsky, as Commissar for War and head of the Revolutionary War Council, built up an effective fighting force, though his achievements were expunged from all official accounts after his fall and disgrace. Some 5,200,000 men passed through the ranks. But there were never more than 600,000 combatant troops available, nor more than 500,000 rifles, 2,800 machine guns and 700 artillery pieces. Over half the Red Army soldiers deserted at one time or another, and of the deserters almost half returned now and then to their units. Trotsky created loyalty by a combination of punishment and inspiration. "So long," he wrote later, "as those malicious tailless

apes that are so proud of their technical achievements—the animals that we call men—will build armies and wage wars, the command will always be obliged to place the soldiers between the possible death in the front and the inevitable one in the rear. And yet armies are not built on fear.”²⁶

The dynamic Commissar for War dashed from front to front in an armored train equipped with a printing press, a radio and telegraph station, a library, garage and bath. He exhorted, commanded and harangued in a fashion equalled by few of his colleagues save for the slyly simple President of the CEC, M. I. Kalinin, who told the peasants in the voice of a peasant: “Formerly the elect of the Lord were in the seats of Government. Now Kalinin is at the head of the Government—the grey, uncouth *muzhik*, with his dirty feet, has climbed up on the throne of the elect. The nobles will not pardon us for this. . . . Of course we make many mistakes. . . . Perhaps Kalinin is stupid, but the masses of workers and peasants pushed him to the fore.”²⁷

The needs of war forced the Party to abandon its tentative muddling in the field of economic organization and to inaugurate the planned utilization of all resources. All modern war involves mobilization of agriculture and industry, commerce and finance, by the State. Total war involves total mobilization. Despite its rag-tag-and-bobtail character, the Russian civil war, as fought and won by the Bolsheviks, was in a sense the first total war of the 20th Century. It was waged, albeit on a far smaller scale, with a more complete use of all reserves and weapons, military, economic, social, political and psychological, than the combat of the Powers of 1914–1918. Its product was the first total State. The Marxist creed may well have led ultimately to the same result. But the drastic measures adopted by the Soviets in 1918 for the control of production and distribution were dictated less by theoretical principles than by military and political necessity. In the face of the opposition of the Left Communists, Lenin in the spring of 1918 was urging various measures which, if adopted, might have led then instead of three years later to the “New Economic Policy,” with its admixture of socialized heavy industry, private agriculture and extensive production and distribution for private profit. The economic prostration of the country and the coming of intervention and civil war in the summer compelled the Party

aders to take a different course which came to be called "Military Communism" or "War Communism."

On June 28, 1918, the Sovnarkom finally decreed the nationalization of all large-scale industry, under the direction of the hitherto inactive Supreme Soviet of National Economy, headed by Rykov. The former owners and managers, however, were left in charge as salaried State employees. Labor discipline was demanded. Strikes were declared treasonable. The Supreme Soviet of National Economy and the trade unions clashed frequently over control of enterprises. Compulsory labor duty was introduced in October. Most distribution was entrusted to the Commissariat of Food on a ration system which favored workers and discriminated against intellectuals and non-toilers. Private trade was outlawed in November in favor of a projected plan of State and cooperative wholesale and retail stores. All private banks were nationalized. Moneyless transactions among State enterprises and a partial system of payment of wages in kind were introduced, while the printing presses rapidly reduced the purchasing power of money toward the vanishing point. In making a virtue of the necessity of currency depreciation, many Communist spokesmen argued that this was the best way to attain a moneyless communistic economy.

In agriculture the original Bolshevik adoption of the land program of the SR's gave way in the spring of 1918 to the requisitioning of foodstuffs to feed the half-famished cities. Bitter peasant opposition led to the introduction of "class war in the villages." In June the CEC decreed the formation of "Committees of the Village Poor" to assist in requisitioning grain from the kulaks ("fists") or richer peasants. "Food Armies" combed the countryside and seized grain by force for urban workers and the Red Army, to the frequent accompaniment of open violence between poor peasants and kulaks, and sometimes between the requisitioners and the whole peasant community. Private trading in grain was prohibited in favor of a State monopoly, the chief task of which was to appropriate "surpluses" from the producers. Propaganda and subsidies were used to persuade the peasants to pool their small holdings into cooperative "collective" farms. A number of State Farms were likewise established as models of large-scale agriculture. These measures led neither to collectivized agriculture, nor to a functioning socialist industry, nor to any stable system of ex-

change between town and country, nor to anything that could be regarded as the cooperative commonwealth of the Marxist vision. They were war measures to meet the economic and military crisis. As such they were effective, despite the blundering, cruelty and chaos to which they often led. They were also foreshadowings of the "Second Revolution" of a decade later which was to achieve the costly translation of dreams into realities.

The Party itself was fused into a new unity. Half the members fought on the fronts. "In our commissars, our leading Communist fighters," Trotsky once declared, "we obtained a new Communist order of Samurai who—without caste privileges—are able to die and to teach others to die in the cause of the working class."²⁸ Party Congress VIII met in March, 1919, with 301 delegates representing 313,766 members. After paying tribute to Sverdlov, who had recently died, Lenin secured the adoption of a new Party program, describing imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism and outlining the tasks of building socialism. He also put through new directives calling for the conciliation of the middle peasants and opposing the so-called "Military Opposition" which resisted iron discipline in the armed forces. By way of checking on the reliability of the large influx of new members, the Congress voted a re-registration of the membership and a *chistka* or purge (i.e., expulsion) of those found unworthy. Congress IX, met in March, 1920, was attended by 554 delegates representing 611,978 members. They were chiefly concerned with combating the views of the minority which opposed responsible, one-man administration of industry, and with furthering Lenin's ambitious program for electrification and for planned reconstruction.

Despite the harmony produced in the ranks by a general realization that all must shoot together or else be shot separately, the successive crises of the war gave rise to frictions which were to have far-reaching consequences in later years. In October, 1919, General Nicholas Yudenich's White Army, based on Estonia and aided by British naval units, was approaching the gates of Petrograd. Zinoviev was in a panic. Lenin considered the abandonment of the city. Trotsky, with Stalin's support, insisted that it could be held. He took over the defense. The cradle of the Revolution was saved. Denikin's forces in the south were meanwhile advancing toward Moscow. After the successful defense of Tsaritsin a year previously Trotsky, infuriated by what he regarded as in-

subordination, had brought about the removal of Stalin from the Volga stronghold and threatened Voroshilov with recall. Against Denikin, at one stage of the campaign, Trotsky favored a counter-drive from Tsaritsin toward the Black Sea. Stalin, Voroshilov, Ordjonikidze and Budenny favored an offensive from Kharkov to Rostov by way of the Donets Basin. The Central Committee accepted the latter plan and removed Trotsky from the direction of southern operations. These and other quarrels over military plans left a residue of suspicions and jealousies. Trotsky wrote later: "My military work created enemies for me (because) I elbowed away those who interfered with military success, or . . . trod on the toes of the unheeding and was too busy even to apologize." ²⁹ Trotsky soon began to feel that Stalin and others whom he had offended were plotting against him.

The war which gave rise to such heartburnings and to incredible misery, heroism and brutality was, more than most armed conflicts, a disorderly and fantastic chaos of ill-disciplined troops and romantic adventurers, some of whom changed sides frequently. In the tradition of Stenka Razin and Pugachev, the colorful peasant anarchist, Nestor Makhno, repudiated all "political charlatans" and led his Ukrainian partisans in guerrilla warfare first against Denikin, then against the Reds, later against Wrangel and finally against everybody until he was forced to flee over the Rumanian border in August, 1921. Other peasant "Green Guards" opposed all government. As late as 1922 Enver Pasha sought to establish an anti-Soviet Islamic Empire in Central Asia, in imitation of Tamerlane, until he was defeated and slain near the Afghan border in August. Outer Mongolia fell under the control of Baron Ungern-Sternberg early in 1921. This converted Buddhist traced his ancestry back to Jenghis Khan and was in the habit of inviting guests to sumptuous banquets and having them shot after the last course. He twice invaded Soviet territory and was finally captured and executed, protesting vehemently against the absurdity of judicial proceedings before the shooting.

In this far-flung mêlée, innumerable heroes, martyrs, bandits and saints emerged from the ranks of enraged peasants, desperate workers and embittered aristocrats, all convulsed in a combat spread over two continents. Fire and famine followed the armies. Kiev changed hands nineteen times in three years. Many villages fought Red requisitioners, welcomed White "rescuers," found

them to be landlords with knouts, and rose in rebellion in aid of the Soviets. The White officers were sometimes gentlemen and more often drunken sadists. Most of the Red commanders were dedicated men. Alien support and political blindness were the greatest liabilities of the White cause. "Our rear," wrote one of the White fighters, years later, "was a cesspool. We lost this war because we were a minority fighting with foreign help against the majority. The majority had a purpose: to build a new and better life. Our minority had no purpose, except bringing back the 'good old times,' which we thought were 'good' not only for us but for all concerned." ³⁰

The confused and fluctuating campaigns in this formless struggle of bedraggled hordes have been described elsewhere at length.³¹ Red victory came first amid the sub-arctic tundra and taiga south of the White Sea under circumstances typical of the conflict in other arenas. Allied troops, feebly supported by dispirited anti-Bolshevik Russians, pushed southward from Archangel along the Northern Dvina and the Vaga but never reached Kotlas nor Velsk. Others advanced down the railway line toward Vologda but made little progress toward their goal. Still others, with no better success, sought to approach Petrograd by way of the broad neck of land between Lakes Onega and Ladoga. When Red forces opened a counter-attack on January 25, 1919, American and Canadian detachments fled Shenkursk in a temperature of 30° below zero. By March the invaders were in full retreat. The demoralized Allied soldiers, having no idea of why they were fighting, were assured by their officers that Bolshevism meant anarchy and that all Bolsheviks were Jews who tortured their prisoners to death. One French company killed all its wounded before a sudden retirement. The few Americans taken prisoner were pampered and propagandized in Moscow and soon liberated. On March 30 Company I of the 339th U. S. Infantry indulged in a mild mutiny. General March, Chief of Staff, promised the withdrawal of all American troops by June.

By June 30, 1919, the last Americans in north Russia had been evacuated. This entirely futile expedition had cost \$3,000,000, 244 American dead and 305 wounded. British reinforcements sought to advance on Petrograd but were now faced with resistance by the Russian populace. Reprisals bred revolt. As one participant wrote: "When night after night the firing squad took out

its batches of victims . . . there were thousands of listening ears to hear the rat-tat-tat of machine guns. . . . Every victim had friends. These friends and their friends rapidly were made enemies of the Military Intervention. And this enmity naturally spelled Bolshevism, as far as the Military Intervention was concerned.”³² On July 27 a group of conscripted Russians murdered their English and Russian officers and joined the Red Army. Desertions and mutinies became common. Said General Ironsides: “The Russian soldiers are Bolsheviki who raise rebellions. . . . The situation is hopeless. . . . These mutinies in the regiments, and especially the sentiment of the population of Archangel and of the villages, have convinced me that the majority of the population is in sympathy with the Bolsheviki.”³³ Churchill acquiesced in what he called “the difficult and painful alternative” of withdrawal. By mid-October the last of the British troops had sailed away. Soviet forces, meanwhile preoccupied elsewhere, entered Archangel and Murmansk in February, 1920.

Kolchak’s White Army was beaten before Kazan in mid-May of 1919. Tsarist officers and reactionary nobles sought to salvage their hopes by wholesale atrocities against the Siberian peasantry. The result was widespread insurrection. General Graves remained “neutral.” His troops were constantly at odds with the Japanese and with the forces of the bandit-butchers, Kalmikov and Semenov. Kolchak characterized Graves’s men as “off-scourings of the American army, Jewish emigrants, with a corresponding staff,” denounced them as “a factor of disintegration and disorder” and demanded (in vain) their removal.

In November, 1919, the remaining Czechoslovaks, now in open revolt, told Allied agents at Vladivostok that the Kolchak régime was one of “absolute despotism and lawlessness,” featured by “criminal action that will stagger the entire world. The burning of villages, the murder of masses of peaceful inhabitants, and the shooting of hundreds of persons of democratic conviction and also those only suspected of political disloyalty occurs daily.” Under these circumstances almost the entire population hailed the Red troops as liberators. They took Omsk on November 15 and Tomsk on December 16. On Christmas Day Kolchak gave up his command to Semenov. In February the Czechs at Irkutsk surrendered the White Admiral and his Cadet Premier, M. Papelaiev, to Red partisans. They were both shot at sunrise on February 7, 1920.

On April 1 the last American troops left Vladivostok—which was at once seized by the Japanese.

Denikin's advance on Moscow was checked at Orel and Voronezh in October, 1919. By mid-November he had lost Kursk and by mid-December Kharkov and Kiev. The Red Army re-occupied Tsaritsin early in January and Rostov soon thereafter. On April 4, 1920, Denikin resigned his command in favor of Baron Peter Wrangel and fled to Constantinople and later to Malta and Western Europe. Yudenich's efforts in the Baltic region likewise came to grief. The White assault would have ended with Red victory in the spring of 1920 save for the Polish invasion. But another year of bloodshed and suffering—the sixth since 1914—was imposed on the devastated land before the Soviet people, cold, hungry and in rags, could celebrate final triumph amid their ruins.

5. SECURITY BY SUPREMACY

"Poor, solitary, nasty, brutish and short" were the words used by Thomas Hobbes to describe human life under anarchy. The anarchy of Russia in 1919 was the concomitant of a larger anarchy in the community of nations. In a State System composed of independent sovereignties, with no common government above the nations, relations among States are relations of anarchy. All politics under anarchy are "power politics," since fighting capacity is ultimately decisive in determining who gets what when and how. In this competitive quest for security each Great Power can survive only by preventing invincible combinations of superior power against it. This objective can be attained in any one of three ways: (1) by establishing a superiority of power over all other States or blocs of States; (2) by promoting a balance of power among rivals, so that one group checkmates another; or (3) by striving for a concert of power in which all act together for common purposes.

Those responsible for Soviet foreign policy during the years of ordeal by battle knew that Brest-Litovsk, if not the October Revolution itself, ended all possibility of a concert of power with the Allies. Such a concert could rest only on joint war against Germany. But continued hostilities, as was demonstrated by the German advance of February, 1918, would have meant complete defeat and the probable overthrow of the Soviet regime. The

Bolshevik leaders, having accepted the costs and risks of a separate peace, hoped for a balance of power among the belligerent coalitions, since each side in such a situation would court the favor of the Soviet State. What was most to be feared was a combination of all other Powers against Red Muscovy. The defeat of Germany disposed of this peril in its most dangerous form but at once recreated it in a shape scarcely less menacing. Ludendorff's failure on the Western Front in the summer of 1918 enabled the Allies to embark upon armed intervention in Russia. The armistice of November enabled them to expand and intensify their intervention. By 1919 Soviet Russia was fighting for its life against Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan—i.e., all the Great Powers still having great power at their disposal after the collapse of the Central Powers. This coalition, to be sure, was unable to bring all its power to bear against Bolshevism. Italy was the weakest and least active member. America and Japan were at odds. London and Paris did not always see eye to eye. But the coalition could not be split by Soviet diplomacy. The Kremlin therefore had no option but to attempt to defeat its foes by striving to establish its supremacy over them.

This enterprise inevitably took the form of the establishment of the Communist International and the promotion of world-wide proletarian revolution. Both the end and the means toward its achievement were products of the Marxist vision of the millennium. What is less obvious is that the status of Soviet Russia in power politics vis-à-vis the Allied and Associated Powers left Moscow with no alternative. Blockade, invasion and subsidized rebellion obliged those who ruled from the Kremlin to attempt the defeat of the aggressors, since inaction meant death. To seek security by coalition, through a concert of power, was impossible. To seek security by balance was equally impossible, since Allied victory in 1918 had temporarily put an end to any balance among foreign Powers. Security could be won only by a superiority of fighting capacity over the enemy. This goal could not be attained by purely military means. The military resources at the Kremlin's disposal were wholly inadequate to the task. Lenin perforce resorted to the weapons of political and psychological warfare. To menace the Allied Powers with social revolution in their own territories or in Central Europe was the most effective means of weakening and defeating their assault. This strategy would have been imposed

upon the Soviet leaders by the decisions of 1918-19 in Washington, London, Paris and Tokyo, regardless of the world revolutionary purposes implicit in the Bolshevik ideology.

The Soviet strategy of security during the years of desperate defense aimed in principle at the overthrow of all other governments and the establishment of a global dominion of the revolutionary proletariat. Those who seek to "conquer the world," whatever their symbols or weapons may be, are almost invariably frustrated by the disposition and ability of their victims to mobilize superior power against the aspirants to hegemony. In the memory of Western mankind only two Powers have come close to achieving this goal: ancient Rome and the Mongol Khánate of Tartary. All others have failed—the Huns, the Arabs, the Turks, the Spain of Philip II, the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, the Germany of Wilhelm and Hitler, and the Japan of Hirohito. The Marxist dream of world revolution and of a global commonwealth of toilers similarly failed of realization in the years following World War I. The effort and its failure, however, were crucial in the survival of the Soviet State and in its future relations with the Western Powers.

The grandiose enterprise of building a revolutionary World State of workers was both a cause and a consequence of the Western attack upon the Soviet power. Had the October Revolution not put Russia in the control of a group of international firebrands, those who shaped policy in the Western capitals might not have embarked upon their program of intervention. Had this program not been pursued the Russian Communists might not have sought so eagerly to effect the overthrow of all "bourgeois" régimes. Yet it can scarcely be contended that Russia was driven toward the world revolutionary adventure by Marxist extremists who led an unwilling people into a bid for universal dominion in order to save their own skins. It would be closer to truth to say that Marxist extremists came to power in Russia because the Russian masses were already permeated with a desire to save the world, and incidentally themselves, by summoning workers and peasants elsewhere to revolt against their ruling classes. The Soviets did not become organs of world revolution because the Bolsheviks became their leaders. The Bolsheviks became their leaders because the Soviet deputies were already world revolutionists.

Twelve days after the abdication of the Tsar, twenty days be-

fore the return of Lenin and more than half a year before the Bolshevik seizure of power, the Petrograd Soviet issued a "Proclamation to the Peoples of the World," appealing for universal revolution:

Comrade proletarians and all laboring peoples of all countries: . . . The time has come to start a decisive struggle against the intentions of conquest on the part of the governments of all countries. . . . We are appealing to our brother-proletarians of the Austro-German coalition and first of all to the German proletariat. . . . Throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic rule in the same way that the Russian people shook off the Tsar's autocracy; refuse to serve as an instrument of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners and bankers, and by coordinated effort we will stop the horrible butchery which is disgracing humanity and is beclouding the great days of the birth of Russian freedom. Laboring peoples of all countries: we are stretching out our hands to you in a brotherly fashion over the mountains of corpses of our brothers, across rivers of innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of cities and villages, over the wreckage of the treasures of culture. We appeal to you for the reestablishing and strengthening of international unity. That will be the security for our future victories and the complete liberation of humanity. Proletarians of all countries, unite! (*Izvestia*, March 28, 1917)

Menshevik Skobelev in all sincerity could tell the Petrograd Soviet in mid-May that "all the oppressed are looking up to us, waiting to be freed from the agony of war. But this liberation is impossible without revolutionary armies in the other countries." In convoking the futile Socialist conference in Stockholm, the Mensheviks and SR's then in control of the Soviets asserted: "The Russian Revolution . . . is not only a national revolution, it is the first stage of the world revolution on which will end the baseness of war and will bring peace to mankind. . . . A unanimous decision by the Proletarian International will be the first victory of the toilers over the International of the Imperialists. Proletarians of the world, unite!" (*Izvestia*, May 15, 1917)

Soon after the October Revolution, *Pravda* (November 19, 1917) wrote:

The army of the Russian Revolution derives its strength from countless reserves. The oppressed nations of Asia—China, India, Persia—are just as eager for the fall of the régime of capitalistic oppression as are the oppressed proletarian masses of Europe. To fuse these forces in a

world revolution against the imperialistic bourgeoisie is the historical mission of the Workers' and Peasants' Russia. The flame of the Petrograd revolution will inevitably grow into a fiery hurricane that will strike to the ground the sword of this piratic war and turn the dominion of capital to ashes.

Early in December, 1917, the Sovnarkom appropriated two million rubles "for the needs of the revolutionary internationalist movement, at the disposition of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs." The decree declared that "the Council of Peoples' Commissars considers it necessary to come forth with all aid, including financial aid, to the assistance of the Left, internationalist wing of the workers' movement of all countries, entirely regardless of whether these countries are at war with Russia, or in alliance, or retain their neutrality."³⁴ While the ultimate aim was "world" revolution, the immediate objective was inevitably Germany, both because of her proximity and because Berlin was insisting on a conqueror's peace. If the Kaiser's Government could not be overthrown, it might at least be induced to modify its demands by the threat of revolution from the rear. Here the interests of the Communists as world revolutionists coincided with their interests as rulers of Russia. With this double inspiration, they set eagerly to work to bring about a proletarian revolt in the Reich. One group of enemy nationals could be reached without difficulty. These were the war prisoners in Russia who would soon be returning home and who might serve as a revolutionary nucleus. Extensive attempts were made to convert them to the new creed, both by written appeals and by frequent harangues in their own language by skillful propagandists.

A new Moscow "Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda," headed by Boris Reinstein of Buffalo, New York, who was assisted by John Reid and Albert Rhys Williams, supervised the preparation and printing of huge quantities of propaganda literature in German which was speedily sent to the front. A propagandist paper, *Die Fackel*, was regularly printed for distribution behind the German lines. By a curious paradox, even the Allies could rejoice in this initial phase of the Communist program of world revolution. Through secret channels, considerable sums of money from the Treasury of the United States were apparently placed at the disposal of the Bolshevik propaganda agencies to assist them in their work.³⁵

Brest-Litovsk marked the failure of the first stage of this effort. The effort nevertheless continued. As Joffe, Soviet envoy in Berlin, later wrote: "Having accepted this forcibly imposed treaty, revolutionary Russia of course had to accept its second article which forbade 'any agitation against the State and the military institutions of Germany.' But both the Russian Government as a whole and its accredited representatives in Berlin never concealed the fact that they were not observing this article and did not intend to do so" (*Izvestia*, January 1, 1919). Lenin told the CEC on October 22, 1918:

We have never before stood so near to the international proletarian revolution as at present. On the other hand we have never found ourselves in a more dangerous situation than now. . . . Comrades, now in the fifth year of the World War the general collapse of imperialism is an evident fact; now it is clear that the revolution in all the belligerent countries is unavoidable. . . . Our principal work must be carrying on propaganda. . . . The success of the world revolution depends to the greatest degree upon Germany.

In the long preamble to the Soviet Constitution of 1918, a "Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring and Exploited Masses" asserted that the repudiation of past debts was only a first blow at "international financial capitalism," that "the Soviet Government will continue firmly in this direction until the international revolt of the workers against the yoke of capitalism shall have secured a complete victory," and that colonial imperialism—"the barbarous policy of capitalist civilization"—is completely repudiated in order that humanity may be delivered "from the grip of financial capital and imperialism." This remarkable document, moreover, extended to all foreign workers in Russia all the political rights of Russian citizens and placed upon the official arms of the Soviet Republic the old slogan of Marx and Engels: "Workers of All Countries, Unite!"

By 1919 the "world revolution" had assumed a new significance for the Soviet rulers. Threatened with military defeat and extinction, they now concluded that their only hope of survival and victory lay in the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois governments seeking their destruction. What had before been a mission of salvation for all mankind now became a *sine qua non* of sheer survival in Russia. In Bukharin's words: "The Communist

Revolution can triumph only as a world revolution. . . . The existence of the proletarian revolution is in constant danger if the workers of other countries do not rally to its support. . . . The Communist working class movement can win only as an international Communist movement.”³⁸ These hopes were not wholly fruitless. Even as Kolchak’s White Army was advancing toward the Volga, Bolshevism came to power on the Danube amid the post-war misery of defeat and starvation.

On March 21, 1919, the first Soviet Government outside of Russia was established in Hungary. Its leader, Béla Kun, formerly an obscure Jewish journalist, had entered Russia as a war prisoner. In a prison camp he met Radek and together they had won favor in Bolshevik circles. After serving as a propagandist among war prisoners, he had been sent to Budapest on the staff of a mission to negotiate the repatriation of his fellows. Now, when the Magyars had drunk the cup of defeat to its dregs and Count Karolyi had abandoned the impossible task before him, Béla Kun was swept into power as Premier and Foreign Minister of a Communist-Socialist coalition. He at once wired the glad news to Lenin. Zinoviev, President of the newly founded Third International, sent congratulations. Lenin, Kamenev and others dispatched greetings from the Party: “We are convinced that the time is not distant when Communism will conquer throughout the world. The working class of Russia will come to your aid in every way possible. The workers throughout the world will watch your further struggle with bated breath and will not permit the imperialists of any country whatever to make any attempts against the new Socialist Republic” (*Izvestia*, March 26, 1919).

The Hungarian Soviet, however, endured only a few months before it was crushed between the Rumanian invaders and the White terrorists who rallied around Admiral Nicholas Horthy. The Russian leaders had the wish but not the means to help. Soviet forces in the Ukraine were ordered to create a diversion in the Rumanian rear. But Hungary was far away and the Red Army was battling desperately for the life of the Russian Soviet. Béla Kun fled to Moscow at the end of July. His followers were beaten and butchered by the victors. What had seemed a promising beginning of world revolution ended in a tragic defeat reminiscent of the Paris Commune.

The German comrades had no greater success. The Kremlin had placed high hopes in the Spartacists and had worked energetically to provoke a proletarian revolution in the Reich. Under Ebert and Scheidemann the Social Democrats, who came to power with the flight of the Kaiser, called upon reactionary Defense Minister Gustav Noske and upon General Groener's Reichswehr to suppress the Spartacist attempt at social revolution. In January, 1919, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were murdered by the Berlin police. On April 7, however, a Bavarian Soviet was set up in Munich. Chicherin wired greetings: "Every blow aimed at you is aimed at us. In absolute unison we carry on our revolutionary struggle for the welfare of all workers and exploited peoples" (*Izvestia*, April 10, 1919). At the same time Chicherin protested that Berlin was issuing "distortions of the truth" regarding the pacific intentions of Moscow toward Germany. Direct aid to the Bavarian Communists was even more impossible than aid to Hungary. The Munich Soviet was suppressed at the end of April by the Reichswehr. It carried with it to the grave the Bolshevik dream of revolutionizing Central Europe.

Lenin had meanwhile brought to fruition his long-nurtured project of a Third or Communist International. On January 24, 1919, the Bolshevik leaders invited Left-wing Socialists in all countries to send delegates to Moscow. The First Congress of the Comintern met from the 2nd to the 6th of March, 1919. The attendance was small and unrepresentative. Thirty-two voting delegates were present from Russia, the Ukraine, Armenia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Estonia. Other Marxists, without voting rights, arrived from France, Britain, America and lesser communities of Europe and Asia. With Kolchak's White Army advancing rapidly toward the Volga, the delegates undertook to place the new International officially on its feet and to issue an appeal to the world proletariat for universal revolution. The summons, 25 pages in length, signed by the drafting committee (Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Rakovsky and Platten) and released on March 10, was a new Communist Manifesto:

To the Proletariat of All Countries! Seventy-two years have gone by since the Communist Party proclaimed its program in the form of the Manifesto written by the greatest teachers of the proletarian revo-

lution, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. . . . We consider ourselves followers and fulfillers of the program proclaimed seventy-two years ago. . . . Spurning the half-heartedness, hypocrisy and corruption of the decadent official Socialist parties, we, the Communists assembled in the Third International, feel ourselves to be the direct successors of the heroic effort and martyrdom of a long series of revolutionary generations from Babeuf to Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. As the First International foresaw the future development and pointed the way, as the Second International gathered together and organized millions of the proletarians, so the Third International is the International of open mass action, of the revolutionary realization, the INTERNATIONAL OF DEEDS. Socialist criticism has sufficiently stigmatized the bourgeois world order. The task of the International Communist Party is now to overthrow this order and to erect in its place the structure of the Socialist world order. . . . The proletarian State, like every State, is an organ of suppression, but it . . . is only a provisional institution. As the opposition of the bourgeoisie is broken, as it is expropriated and gradually absorbed into the working group, the proletarian dictatorship disappears, until finally the State dies and there are no more class distinctions. . . . Indescribable is the White Terror of the bourgeois cannibals. Incalculable are the sacrifices of the working class. Their best—Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg—they have lost. Against this the proletariat must defend itself, defend at any price. The Communist International calls the whole world proletariat to this final struggle. DOWN WITH THE IMPERIALIST CONSPIRACY OF CAPITAL! LONG LIVE THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLIC OF THE WORKERS' SOVIETS! ³⁷

In the ensuing twelvemonth, the world revolution failed to materialize, but the prospects of the Soviet State improved. Following the defeat of Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin, the Red Army accepted the new challenge of the Polish invasion and was pushing rapidly westward in pursuit of the fleeing enemy when the Second Congress of the Comintern opened in Petrograd on July 18, 1920. Wrote Kamenev: "The Third International is the general staff of the world army (of the revolutionary proletariat), which had started to move and is marching to victory. Yes, this is a conspiracy. But it is a conspiracy that cannot be crushed." After addresses by Zinoviev and Kalinin, Lenin made a lengthy comparison of the current situation with that of the previous year: "If the First Congress was only a Congress of Public Propaganda . . . now we have everywhere advanced detachments and proletarian armies, although poorly organized and requiring reorganization.

We are able to organize these into a single force. If you will help us to accomplish this, then nothing . . . will prevent us from accomplishing our task, and this task will be that of leading on to the victory of the world revolution and to the establishment of an international proletarian Soviet Republic.”³⁸

The Congress sent greetings to the Soviet forces advancing on Warsaw: “Know that you are no longer alone. The toilers of the whole world are on your side. The time is near when there will be created the International Red Army.” Budenny replied: “Our army feels and recognizes itself as one of the detachments of the great army of World Communism. . . . We shall be happy on the day when, together with the proletarians of the West, we shall give decisive battle to the world bourgeoisie, when our army will receive the order to operate from Red Paris, Berlin or London. . . . Long live the World Republic of Soviets!” The spirit of martial enthusiasm pervading the Congress contributed to the Kremlin’s decision to seek by military means the establishment of a Soviet Poland. The victories of the Red Army likewise caused the Congress to wax optimistic regarding the imminence of world revolution. Twenty-one conditions were laid down for admission of national parties into the Comintern. They were asked to purge all reformists from their ranks, create illegal organizations capable of waging civil war, struggle against the Second International, agitate among troops and transport workers, and accept as binding all resolutions of the Congresses and of the Comintern Executive Committee. The open conspiracy to achieve world dominion was thus well advanced by methods which combined the techniques of the Jesuits and the Jacobins with those of Jenghis Khan and Napoleon. But the Red conspirators were destined to achieve no such striking triumphs as had once been gained by their predecessors in the arts of subverting and unifying the world through propaganda and violence.

6. PEACE BY DEFEAT

The war of the Russian Revolution, regarded as an effort on the part of the Bolsheviks to expand the realm of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the globe in the face of a counter-effort on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers to confine it to Russia, eventuated in defeat for the Kremlin and victory for the

forces of capitalism. But as a struggle on the part of the Western democracies and their White allies to destroy the Soviet régime by force in the face of the grim resolve of its adherents to survive, its end was failure for the interventionists and triumph for the Red Armies. The contest was a synthesis of both of these aspects. Its result was a deadlock.

The fact of stalemate was indubitably established in the autumn of 1919 with the defeat and disintegration of the White Armies. In view of the suppressions of the Communists in Finland, the overthrow of the Bavarian and Hungarian Soviets and the crushing of the German Spartacists, the Allied leaders had little fear (and the Bolshevik leaders little hope) of any immediate extension of world revolution. In view of the military and political débâcle of the White cause, the Kremlin had little fear (and the Allies little hope) of any successful resumption of the armed assault on the Soviet citadel. The attack had achieved the negative objective of leaving Soviet Russia economically prostrate and militarily impotent to act effectively outside of its shrunken frontiers. Defense through the propaganda of world revolution had achieved the negative objective of helping to defeat the interventionists. Neither side could reasonably anticipate further gains through new sacrifices of blood and treasure. On December 5, 1919, the Seventh Congress of Soviets passed a resolution asserting its desire "to live at peace with all people, and to devote all its strength to internal constructive work, in order to perfect production, transport, and public administration on the basis of a Soviet régime, to the work which has hitherto been hindered by the pressure of German imperialism and subsequently by the Entente intervention and the starvation blockade." The resolution recalled the nine peace offers made since August 5, 1918, and expressed "an unchanging desire for peace by proposing once more to all the Entente Powers—to Great Britain, France, the United States of America, Italy, and Japan, to all together and to each separately—immediately to commence peace negotiations."

The Allied Supreme Council lifted the blockade in January, 1920, and rejected the project of Foch and Clemenceau for an international army to renew the struggle. On February 24 the Council informed the border States that the Allies could not assume responsibility for advising them to continue war or to adopt aggressive policies toward Soviet Russia. Downing Street

was prepared to open discussions with Leonid Krassin, chief of a Soviet trade mission in Copenhagen. But the State Department in Washington continued to refuse export licenses to Russia and viewed with alarm all suggestions of resuming relations, whether economic or political, with a régime whose early disappearance was still taken for granted. Herbert Hoover, Director of the American Relief Administration, favored lifting the blockade in order to demonstrate the "complete foolishness" of the Soviet industrial system.

The spirit in which official Washington approached the problem of American-Soviet relations during the last days of the Wilson administration found expression in the treatment of Mr. Ludwig C. A. K. Martens. This Russian-born German had arrived in the United States from England in 1916. Although not a Party member, he was fully trusted by Lenin and Chicherin. On March 19, 1919, he presented his diplomatic credentials (dated January 2) to the State Department. They were ignored. His efforts to take over the Russian Embassy having failed, he opened offices in New York, launched a magazine (*Soviet Russia*) and concluded \$30,000,000 worth of tentative contracts with American corporations, all of which came to nothing because the State Department would permit no trade. After the Union League Club charged that he was preaching Bolshevism, his offices were raided in June, 1919, by the State police, aided by private detectives, agents of the Lusk Committee and Archibald E. Stevenson, Secretary of the Club. Chicherin protested without result. Martens was interrogated by the Lusk Committee, held in contempt and ordered arrested.

"Martens Admits Lenin Sent Him To Overthrow U.S." declared a full page headline of the *New York Tribune*, November 18, 1919—with no basis in fact. Martens brought suit for libel but got nowhere. During the winter of 1919-20, amid the "Red raids" and the "deportations delirium" organized by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, Martens was saved from arrest only by virtue of being chief witness in inconclusive hearings before a Senate subcommittee. At the close of the hearings the Department of Labor formally "arrested" Martens as an undesirable alien in order to forestall a sensational public arrest by the Department of Justice. On December 15, 1920, Secretary of Labor W. B. Wilson ordered Martens deported on the ground that he was an agent of the

Soviet Government which "believes in, teaches and advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by the use of force and violence." Chicherin called him home. Martens was permitted to depart in January, 1921, without a technical deportation.³⁹

Meanwhile the rulers of resurrected Poland, who shared in an extreme form the chauvinistic attitudes and imperial ambitions often characteristic of suppressed nationalities at the time of their emancipation, had imposed a new war on the Soviet State. Both Moscow and the Allies had recognized Polish independence. The issue was one of the eastern frontiers. The 13th of Wilson's Fourteen Points called for an independent Polish State "which would include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations." Under Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles the Allied Supreme Council, with American approval, had drawn a tentative line based on ethnographic data. West of this frontier, announced on December 8, 1919, and later known as the "Curzon Line," Poles were a majority of the population. East of it they were in the minority. Josef Pilsudski and his Colonels in Warsaw rejected this solution. Their gaze was fixed on the glories of the past when Polish Catholic landlords had dominated and exploited the Byelo-Russian and Ukrainian peasantry along the "water road" of the Dneiper while Russia was too weak to recover what the Polish kings had seized. The dream of Pilsudski's Colonels, as William Henry Chamberlin accurately described it, was "more justified by historical and sentimental traditions than by ethnographical considerations" and aimed at "the permanent weakening of Russia" and its reduction to a second-class power, "cut off from the Baltic and Black Seas, deprived of the agricultural and mineral wealth of the South and the Southeast," through the restoration of the boundaries of the 16th Century.⁴⁰

So long as there was danger of a White victory in the Russian civil war, the aristocrats, militarists and super-nationalists who controlled Poland refrained from a military attack on the Soviet. The triumph of Kolchak or Denikin would have doomed the hopes of the Polish ruling class. Pilsudski and his close friend, Josef Beck, authorized negotiations with Moscow in the autumn of 1919 through Julian Markhlevsky, a Polish Communist accredited by Chicherin as a Soviet diplomat. Polish troops had occupied Vilna (April 19) and Minsk (August 8) but abstained

from aiding Denikin despite French prodding. Chicherin proposed peace parleys on December 22, 1919. The Sovnarkom repeated the plea on January 28, 1920, warning that Poland was being driven toward "an unwarranted, senseless and criminal war." On February 2 the CEC again asked for negotiations. Chicherin did likewise on March 6. Moscow was prepared to accept a frontier far to the east of the later line of 1921-39, despite the large sacrifice of unquestionably Byelo-Russian and Ukrainian territories and populations.

To all of these appeals Warsaw was silent or evasive. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Diet demanded on February 24 that Moscow give up all lands west of the 1772 boundary so that the inhabitants might "freely" choose their own future. The Allied Council of Ambassadors in Paris reminded Warsaw of the (Curzon) line of December 8, 1919. Pilsudski's reply reflected grandiose dreams of "federalism," meaning Polish control of the Baltic, Byelo-Russia, the Ukraine and the Black Sea. Warsaw asked Moscow at the end of March to renounce sovereignty over all territories west of the border of 1772, to recognize a Polish protectorate over the non-Polish lands, to pay Warsaw an indemnity and to permit Polish occupation of Smolensk as a guarantee of payment.

In the light of later events it is worth noting that the extravagant ambitions of the Polish leaders in 1920 were consistently opposed by the British and American Governments. The most ardent champions of aggrandizement at Russia's expense were the right-wing politicians of the Polish Socialist Party, including Pilsudski and Ignatius Dashinski, Vice-Premier in 1920. Herbert Asquith told Commons that the project of restoring the frontier of 1772 was "a purely aggressive adventure" and a "wanton enterprise." Hugh Gibson, Ambassador in Warsaw, reported that the demands left the Polish Government "open to the charge of imperialism." In August, 1920, Acting Secretary of State Norman H. Davis warned Poland to keep out of Vilna and to remain within the Curzon Line—so called now because Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, had proposed on July 12 that Polish and Soviet forces accept it as a frontier which neither would transgress. "It is of especial importance," declared Davis, "that a veiled excuse for further invasion of Russian territory be not found in a strategic consideration." "This Government," wrote Secretary of State

Bainbridge Colby to the Polish Foreign Minister, August 21, 1920, "could not approve the adoption of an offensive war program against Russia by the Polish Government. . . . The United States Government believes that the Polish Government might well . . . declare its intention to abstain from any aggressions against Russian territorial integrity . . . (and to) remain within the boundaries indicated by the Peace Conference."⁴¹

The Polish aristocrats and Colonels, although ruling a hungry and disease-ridden land living on Allied relief, had no intention of complying with such advice. In their romantic passion for Russian real estate, they wrecked the tentative Anglo-Soviet and French-Soviet negotiations of the early months of 1920 and almost wrecked the Soviet peace settlements with the Baltic States initiated by the treaty of February 2 with Estonia. On April 23, 1920, Pilsudski concluded a "treaty" with the Ukrainian Hetman, Simon Petlura, who had been driven into Poland by the Red Army. By its terms Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia was acknowledged in return for Polish aid in setting up an anti-Soviet régime in the Ukraine. On April 23 Pilsudski ordered Polish forces to invade the Ukraine. They occupied Kiev on May 8, thus passing beyond the line of 1772, and sought to take Odessa and bring all of Ukrainia under their control through Warsaw's puppet, Petlura. His agent at the Vatican had already obtained recognition of Ukrainian "independence" by Pope Benedict XV. The bandit-gangs of the Hetman, who was later assassinated by a Jewish student in Paris, were of little help against the enemy but were proficient in issuing "anti-pogrom" orders to impress Western sympathizers, even as they indulged in slaughtering Jews. Their captured banners, on display in the Kiev historical museum prior to World War II, bore a familiar emblem: the swastika or Nazi Hakenkreuz.

Pilsudski's adventure ended in disaster from which he and his State were rescued only by Allied aid and Soviet war weariness. The Ukrainian peasants displayed no enthusiasm for the rule of Polish landlords. Russian patriots of all political complexions, including General Brussilov, rallied to the Red cause. Budenny's famous Cavalry Army smote the Poles and forced them to quit Kiev on June 13. In the north 27-year-old General Tukhachevsky drove the invaders from Minsk on July 11 and from Vilna on the 14th. Grodno was taken on the 22nd and Brest-Litovsk on the

31st. By mid-August Red troops were at the gates of Warsaw. For a brief moment Lenin had visions of a Soviet Poland—"a false political reckoning," he said later—and of a Communist inundation of Germany. The attack was pressed in the name of class war and world revolution. But British munitions poured through Danzig and General Weygand arrived from France to direct the defense of the capital, while London and Washington advised the Polish Government to ask for peace. Budenny's cavalry failed to take Lvov and likewise failed to advance northward against the Polish forces defending the Vistula. Tukhachevsky, who was later denounced by the Kremlin, along with Trotsky, for treasonable conduct during the campaign, left his flank exposed in his eagerness to cut off the Polish Corridor. By the end of August the issue had been decided and Soviet forces were beating a hasty retreat from northeastern Poland.

Moscow was now willing to accept a peace which it had been in no haste to conclude during the summer. Discussions were transferred from Minsk to Riga. On October 11 an armistice and preliminary pact were signed. The final Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, established the 1921-39 frontier by which Poland secured much less Russian territory than Moscow had offered a year before but much more than the Allies thought proper. Ambassador Bakhmetev prophetically warned Norman Davis in Washington: "Restored Russia will never approve a treaty of dismemberment forcibly imposed in times of adversity; nor will the peasant population, predominantly Orthodox, of the western provinces of Russia acquiesce to the domination of Polish Catholic landlordism. The Riga treaty is thus a menace to future world peace." The European Allies refused to recognize the new boundary until March 14, 1923. The United States withheld recognition until March 26, 1923.

The Polish war, following as it did upon the withdrawal of all American troops from Russian soil and the refusal of the American Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, marked the breakdown of the united anti-Soviet front which the Allies had hitherto maintained. It likewise furnished the occasion for a formal pronouncement of the grounds upon which the United States was to refuse recognition to the Soviet Government until 1933. While Paris *sans doute* and London with many doubts were prepared in the summer of 1920 to defend Poland at all costs against the Red flood,

Rome was resolved to avoid war with Russia whatever Poland's fate might be. The Italian Ambassador in Washington, Baron Avezzano, asked Secretary Colby about the views of the United States. Colby replied in a long public statement of August 10, 1920, which reflected American fear of Bolshevism and the desire of official Washington, under the influence of Ambassador Bakhmetev, to prevent any dismemberment of Russia.⁴²

While championing a united and free Polish State, the American Government also championed Russian territorial integrity. Hence the United States refused to recognize the Baltic States and held that Russia's boundaries should include the whole of the former empire "with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland" and Armenia. Foreign troops should be withdrawn. But the Soviet regime could not be recognized since it was based on "force and cunning," "savage oppression" and "the negation of every principle of honor and good faith and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of international law." Said the Secretary of State: its support of the Third International made its diplomats "the agitators of dangerous revolt" and rendered it incapable of discharging its international obligations. This thesis was reiterated by successive Presidents and Secretaries for the next thirteen years. The non-recognition policy was explained in terms of the impossibility of maintaining normal relations with a regime which stood for repudiation, confiscation and revolutionary propaganda.

Paris was highly gratified by the anti-Soviet sentiments of the Colby note. On the same day, August 10, it took the extraordinary step of extending formal diplomatic recognition to the "government" of Baron Peter Wrangel, last of the White hopes. This successor of Denikin had found his chance in the Polish invasion to break out of the Crimea and invade the southern Ukraine in June. He asserted that his troops were fighting "for the right of the Russian people to choose for itself a Master." The wheel of revolution and counter-revolution turned full circle when the ex-Marxist, Peter B. Struve, who had drawn up the first manifesto of the RSDLP at its founding Congress in Minsk in 1898, accepted the post of Wrangel's Foreign Minister in Paris and London. Such bedfellows made strange politics. The Ukrainian peasants showed no interest in Wrangel's revision of Stolypin's agrarian policy. In August Wrangel's forces launched an invasion of the Kuban, from

which they were soon driven back into the Crimea by the Red Army. At the end of October powerful Soviet forces to the north crushed the White units, stormed the Isthmus of Perekop on November 7, overran the Crimea and took Sevastopol on the 14th. British, French and American vessels, including the U.S. cruiser *St. Louis*, aided the fragments of the last White Army, along with thousands of civilian sympathizers, to flee to Constantinople. Russia's civil war was ended.

THE DYNAMICS OF BOLSHEVISM

1. THE LEGACY OF LENIN

MAXIM GORKY and Lenin once listened together to Beethoven's *Appassionata*. "I know nothing greater," said Lenin. "It is marvelous, super-human music. I always think proudly—perhaps I am naïve—what marvelous things human beings can do! . . . But I can't listen to music too often. It affects your nerves, makes you want to say stupid nice things and stroke the heads of people who could create such beauty while living in this vile hell. And now you mustn't stroke anyone's head—you might get your hand bitten off. You have to hit them on the head, without any mercy, although our ideal is not to use force against anyone. Hm . . . Our duty is infernally hard . . ." ¹

Amid the hell of civil war, Lenin—pictured abroad as a blood-thirsty despot, exercising lawless and arbitrary power—once wrote a note to the librarian of the Rumyantsev Museum asking the loan of several philosophical works and two Greek dictionaries. He concluded: "If the regulations do not permit of reference books being borrowed for home use, will you not allow me to use them in the evening, at night, when the library is closed. I will return them in the morning." ²

These two episodes typify Lenin's character. Simplicity and modesty, combined with deep faith in human potentialities, were of the essence of the founder of the Soviet Union. Hard and bitter, almost beyond endurance, were the tasks he faced early in 1921. The land which his Party ruled was in ruins and its famished

people in rags. Almost seven years of war, coupled with social revolution, class conflict, blockade and intervention, and the disintegrating impact of War Communism on the faith and work of millions, had brought about an all but complete dissolution of the bonds of community life. When an unkind nature followed the example of man's inhumanity to man by withholding rain from the Volga valley throughout the growing season of 1921, the result was famine. Maxim Gorky's appeal to Herbert Hoover led to generous aid, both official and unofficial, from the United States through the American Relief Administration. More than 10,000,000 people were saved from death by American charity. But 2,000,000 died, owing to the lack of food reserves and transport facilities in a broken and exhausted Muscovy. Workers went on strike, farmers rioted, and all suffered in shivering misery from chronic hunger. Peasants in Tambov province, led by the guerrilla chief Antonov, rose in revolt against Soviet requisitions of grain. Early in March the sailors and garrison of Kronstadt rebelled, demanding freedom of speech, press and assembly for all workers and peasants, re-election of all Soviets by secret ballot, an end of requisitioning, a "Third Revolution" and "Soviets without Communists." Trotsky's troops crossed the ice, stormed the fortress and ruthlessly crushed the last of the rebels on March 18, 1921. The day was being celebrated as the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Paris Commune.

This grim paradox was the symbol of a larger tragedy. By the close of 1920 only half of the pre-war farming area was under cultivation. The peasants refused to sow and reap beyond their needs, since surpluses were confiscated and they could get no manufactured products in exchange for foodstuffs. Total industrial production had declined to 15% of its 1914 level. In the metal industries it was down to 7%. This economic débâcle was attributed by alien critics to War Communism and by Communists to the Allied blockade and intervention. Amid wreckage and waste, Lenin and his disciples still dreamed of abundance for all through socialist planning.

At Congress IX, held late in March, 1920, and attended by 554 delegates representing 612,000 Party members, Lenin preached electrification. After the Polish war part of the Red Army became a Labor army. A Council of Labor and Defense was established to direct restoration and construction. "Communism,"

Lenin told the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, "is the Soviet power plus electrification." He recruited some 200 scientists and technicians in a "State Commission for the Electrification of Russia" (*Goelro*) which was expanded on February 2, 1921, into a "State Planning Commission" (*Gosplan*) under the engineer Krshishanovsky, "to work out a unified economic plan for the whole of the State." Meanwhile most of the population was without adequate clothing, shelter and food, and wholly without comforts or luxuries, in a vast levelling of all to the limits of bare subsistence.

The Communist Party was dedicated to the Marxist vision of the cooperative commonwealth in which security and opportunity would be shared by all in a classless society. In the promised land, all goods and services of the machine age would be available, richly and equitably, because economic relations would no longer be determined by greed and chance and the competitive happenstances of the marketplace. For the first time in history all producing and buying and selling would be guided by organized social intelligence devoted to realizing the good life. But hunger and want could not be relieved by dreams nor by paper plans. Capital and personnel were lacking for building a socialist industry. Electrification promised future plenty, but the future was remote. Without abandoning the vision, Lenin moved to alleviate the immediate and desperate needs of the hour by executing a "strategic retreat" toward competitive private profit as an economic incentive. Any attempt to inspire or coerce an impoverished and weary populace into socialist miracles of work and wealth would only have aggravated demoralization and perhaps brought about an irreparable breakdown of the whole social and political fabric of the Soviet State. With cold realism and without bitterness, Lenin led the Party toward the ironical duty of postponing what he regarded as the highest forms of economic organization and returning to the most primitive.

Congress X, at which 733,000 members were represented by 694 delegates, opened on March 8, 1921, in the midst of the Kronstadt mutiny. Lenin appealed for unity and condemned the various opposition factions. Here he secured approval of a "New Economic Policy" (NEP), the basis of which was the abolition of requisitioning from the peasantry and the substitution of a fixed tax, first payable in produce and later in money. Having paid it,

the peasant was free to sell what he had left, beyond the needs of his household, either to the State or to private purchasers in private markets which now were legalized. Since the purchasers could sell to consumers or distributors, the result was a lively growth of private retail trade. Individual entrepreneurs were likewise permitted and even encouraged to undertake building construction and small scale manufacturing. Labor armies, favored by Trotsky, gave way to a more or less fluid market for wage-earners. A State Bank, established in 1921, was authorized in the next year to replace the old paper money, reduced to worthlessness by inflation, by the new and stable *chervonetz* currency, backed by a gold reserve. A system of taxation replaced expropriations and requisitions as a means of raising revenue. The net result was a simple but productive kind of capitalism, with the State retaining control of the "commanding heights" of heavy industry, transportation and foreign trade. "This capitalism," said Lenin, "is not dangerous to us because we will decide in what measure we shall grant concessions . . ." And again: "The extent of the ruin and the destitution caused by the War and the Civil War condemns us for a long time to come to the mere healing of our wounds."

The NEP took shape in successive measures to restore the profit motive and the competitive market. Late in March, 1921, the CEC abolished requisitions from the village communities and decreed the new tax in kind in a graduated form payable by individuals and featured by incentives for those who should increase farm production. "Every peasant must now know and remember," said an official appeal, "that the more land he plants, the greater will be the surplus of grain which remains in his complete possession." Competition in business, however, did not mean competition in politics. The Party's monopoly of legality remained unchanged. Such limited toleration of Menshevik and SR activities as had survived the civil war was now withdrawn. The ultimate goal was unaltered. The new means thereto was encouragement to kulaks and Nepmen to produce and sell consumers goods for personal gain. The restoration of productivity to pre-war levels was substantially achieved by 1927-28.³ By the end of the NEP, the Soviet peoples still enjoyed nothing comparable to Western middle-class standards of housing, clothing, nutrition, transport and mechanical conveniences. But in the major cities, all overcrowded and dilapidated, there were numerous private shops, bakeries and markets,

selling most of the necessities and a few of the luxuries of life. This recovery from the abject misery of 1921 became the point of departure for the resumption of the "Socialist Offensive."

The NEP was more than a distasteful device to restore a ruined economy or a mere concession to the hardheaded and hardfisted *muzhiks*. It was likewise a product of the victory of the Red Army which obviated the need of War Communism even as it destroyed the martial fervor without which the earlier policy could have produced no significant results. Economic concessions to the "enemy" on the home front could now be made without risking the destruction of the Soviet régime. Viewed in terms of the international scene, the NEP was also a result of the failure of the World Revolution.

The Comintern held its Third Congress in the summer of 1921 in a mood of hope deferred. The Fourth Congress (November, 1922) was followed by an interval of a year and a half before the Fifth convened in June, 1924. Four years then went by before the Sixth Congress met in Moscow in the summer of 1928. After the defeats of 1919-20, Red expectations of success lingered on only in China. Sun Yat Sen's Kuomintang allied itself with the Chinese Communist Party and gratefully accepted Soviet aid through General Bluecher (Galen) and Michael Borodin. But after Sun's death (1924) and the temporary unification of China by the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek aligned himself with the landlords and bankers and broke with the Communists in the spring of 1927. He expelled his Russian aides and directed the slaughter of thousands of Red workers and peasants. The bloody extinction of revolutionary hopes on the Yangtze convinced the Soviet leaders, except for Trotsky and his followers, that the overthrow of capitalism through global proletarian rebellion was not within the limits of the politically possible. In a kind of "interlocking directorate," Party leaders continued to occupy posts on the Executive Committee of the Comintern along with posts on the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party and on the CEC and Sovnarkom at the top of the hierarchy of Soviets.⁴ But the "stabilization of capitalism" was an admitted fact. Trade and security became Soviet objectives. Both required "normal" relations with the bourgeois States.

Chicherin, who successfully demanded of Lenin that the original intimate connection between the Narkomindel and the

Comintern be attenuated, said of the Colby note of August 10, 1920:

Seeing that in America and in many other countries the workers have not conquered the powers of Government and are not even convinced of the necessity of their conquest, the Russian Soviet Government deems it necessary to establish and faithfully to maintain peaceable and friendly relations with the existing Governments of those countries. That the elementary economic needs of the peoples of Russia and of other countries demand normal relations and an exchange of goods between them is quite clear to the Russian Government, and the first condition of such relations is mutual good faith and non-intervention on both parts. Mr. Colby is profoundly mistaken when he thinks that normal relations between Russia and the United States of America are possible only if capitalism prevails in Russia. On the contrary we deem it necessary in the interests of both nations and despite the differences of their political and social structure to establish proper, peaceful and friendly relations between them.

This conception first came to fruition in the signature in London on March 16, 1921, by Leonid Krassin and Sir Robert Horne, President of the Board of Trade, of an Anglo-Soviet agreement constituting *de facto* recognition of the Soviet Government by Great Britain. The negotiations which led to this result had opened on May 31, 1920, with a conference at No. 10 Downing Street between Krassin, Klishko, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, Sir Robert Horne and Mr. Harmsworth. Ironically, *The Manchester Guardian* commented: "The blow has fallen. A Bolshevik, a real live representative of Lenin, has spoken to the British Prime Minister face to face. . . . Lloyd George has seen him and still lives. . . . The British Empire still stands."⁵ But an agreement hung fire for ten months. As finally signed, the accord provided for an immediate resumption of trade, repatriation of war prisoners, mutual abstention from hostile acts and propaganda, and a postponement of a settlement of financial claims. On May 6, 1921, a German-Russian trade agreement was signed. Norway followed suit on September 2, Austria on December 7 and Italy on December 26.

Moscow was unrepresented at the Washington Conference of 1921-22, although the "observers" included Avksentiev and Miliukov as well as agents of the "Russian Supreme Monarchical Council." These were balanced by the presence of a "trade dele-

gation," headed by Boris Skvirsky, from the "Far Eastern Republic." This semi-Soviet buffer State against Japan had been proclaimed at Chita in October, 1920. It was never recognized by the United States, but Chita, Moscow and Washington had a common interest in getting the Japanese out of Eastern Siberia. Secretary Hughes elicited from Baron Shidehara a statement pledging evacuation, non-intervention and respect for Russian territorial integrity. By the end of October, 1922, the last Japanese troops left Vladivostok. On November 17 the Far Eastern Republic proclaimed its own dissolution and reunion with Soviet Russia. On May 1, 1925, Japanese forces withdrew from northern Sakhalin.

Chicherin had meanwhile gone to Genoa where delegates of 34 States met on April 10, 1922, in an economic and financial conference to further the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. The United States refused to take part. By the Treaty of Rapallo, signed on April 16 by Chicherin and Walter Rathenau, the Kremlin obtained *de jure* recognition from the German Republic, a mutual cancellation of all financial claims, and a regulation of German-Soviet trade on the basis of the most-favored-nation clause.⁶ Rapallo was not, as indignant British and French commentators insisted, a Soviet-German "alliance." But it was a *rapprochement* between outcasts, each of which thereby enhanced, however slightly, its bargaining power in dealing with London, Paris and Rome.

Efforts at Genoa to achieve a general settlement of financial claims were unsuccessful. Said Chicherin: "The British Premier tells me that if my neighbor has lent me money, I must pay him back. Well, I agree, in that particular case, in a desire for conciliation; but I must add that if this neighbor has broken into my house, killed my children, destroyed my furniture, and burnt my house, he must at least begin by restoring to me what he has destroyed." Against Allied claims of \$13,000,000,000 against Russia for Tsarist and Kerensky debts and confiscated properties, Chicherin posed Soviet counter-claims of \$60,000,000,000 for damages suffered from unlawful intervention. He offered to settle for a token payment plus new loans for reconstruction, but the Allied representatives refused to agree. The conference ended on May 19 in discord, mitigated by a temporary "peace pact" pledging abstention from aggression and subversive propaganda. A meeting of ex-

perts at The Hague ended in July with no better results. Litvinov declared that his Government would pay none of the war debts, would insist on a reduction and moratorium for the pre-war debts, and would pay compensation for nationalized property only in return for new loans.

At Lausanne, where another conference met late in 1922 to consider the status of the Straits in the light of the defeat of the Greeks by the Turks in the Anatolian war-after-the-war, Chicherin clashed with Lord Curzon over the question of whether Turkey should or should not have full sovereignty over the waterways, including the right to close them to foreign warships. On May 8, 1923, during these protracted negotiations, London delivered a virtual ultimatum to Moscow threatening to terminate the trade agreement unless the Narkomindel should, within ten days, release certain British fishing vessels, disown and recall its agents in India, Persia and Afghanistan for alleged anti-British propaganda, and meet certain other demands. Two days later Vaslav Vorovsky, Soviet delegate at Lausanne, was assassinated by Maurice Conradi, a Russian émigré of Swiss descent. The conference studiously ignored the murder while the Swiss courts acquitted the assassin, who was praised by part of the Swiss press. Krassin flew to London with a conciliatory but firm reply to the British demands, which were settled or lost track of in later discussions. The Straits Convention signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, demilitarized the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, but limited foreign naval forces permitted to enter the Black Sea. Moscow adhered and became a member of the Straits Commission.

These complex and often acrimonious parleys led to the *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government by many States during 1924: Britain, February 1; Italy, February 7; Norway, February 13; Austria, February 20; Greece, March 8; Sweden, March 15; China, May 31; Denmark, June 18; Mexico, August 1; France, October 28; and Japan, January 20, 1925. Among the Great Powers only the United States declined to enter into official relations with Moscow. The diplomatic and commercial boycott of the Soviet State was ended. The USSR was again a member of the family of nations.

During these developments abroad Lenin had devoted himself to maintaining unity among his quarrelling colleagues and strengthening the Party as the weapon of further struggle toward

the goal of socialism. He had foreseen the possibility of "Socialism in one country" as early as 1915. After Brest-Litovsk he had written:

We want no self-deception. We must have the courage to look the unvarnished bitter truth in the face. We must plumb to the very depths the abyss of defeat, dismemberment, bondage and humiliation into which we have now been plunged. The more clearly we understand this, the more firm, hardened and steeled will be our determination to achieve liberation, our striving to rise once again from bondage to independence, and our indomitable resolve at all costs to make Russia cease to be wretched and feeble and become mighty and abundant in the fullest sense of the word. And she can become such, because, after all, we have sufficient territory and sufficient natural wealth to provide everybody not with superfluities, perhaps, but at all events with adequate means of existence. In the shape of the natural wealth of our country, of our reserves of human strength, and of the magnificent scale on which our revolution has stimulated the creative genius of our people, we have the materials with which to create a really mighty and abundant Russia.⁷

At Congress XI in March, 1922, the last which Lenin attended, he reviewed the favorable results of the NEP and called a halt to the "retreat." In his speech of March 27, however, he insisted that the NEP must be applied "in earnest and for long" until the comrades should learn to become businessmen in the interests of socialism:

By our side a Capitalist is busy, he acts as a robber, he grabs profits, but he knows his job. And you—you are trying new methods: you make no profits. Communist principles, excellent ideals, are written large on you, you are holy men, fit to go alive to Paradise, but do you know your business? . . . We must understand this simple thing—that in a new and unusually difficult task we must learn to begin anew again and again. If one start has led you into a blind alley, begin again, redo the work ten times; but attain your end, don't be self-important, don't pride yourself on being a Communist and no such thing as that non-Party commercial clerk; he may be a White (there is probably no doubt he is a White), but he knows his job . . . and you do not. . . . When an army is retreating discipline must be a hundred times greater than during an offensive, for then all ranks compete in pushing forward. But if during a retreat everyone were to begin to compete in pushing backward, that would be ruin, inevitable and immediate. . . . In the masses of the people we are as a drop in the sea and we

can govern only if we adequately express what the people feels. . . . All the revolutionary parties that have hitherto fallen have fallen because they became proud and unable to see where their strength lay, and were afraid to speak of their weakness. We shall not fail, because we are not afraid to speak of our weakness and will learn to overcome our weakness.⁸

Lenin in his early fifties was still young. But the privations and herculean labors of his exile, his return and his triumph had left their marks upon him, no less than the bullets of Fania Kaplan-Roid. In May, 1922, a cerebral hemorrhage led to the temporary paralysis of his right arm and leg. After some months of convalescence at a country house in the village of Gorki, he returned to work in Moscow early in October. On November 20 he spoke to the Moscow Soviet in what was to be his last address: "We have dragged socialism into everyday life, and here we must be able to keep our bearings. This is the task of our day, this is the task of our epoch. . . . Difficult as this task may be . . . we shall all, not in one day, but in the course of several years, all of us together, fulfill it, come what may; and NEP Russia will be transformed into Socialist Russia."⁹

In March, 1923, Lenin suffered a second stroke which left him incapable of work, save for the writing of letters and articles. Like Woodrow Wilson, he spent his last days under the shadow of physical helplessness. To Stalin he wrote: "I have wound up my affairs and can leave with a quiet mind." Wilson had met defeat in his most cherished enterprise. Lenin had lived victoriously to see his people launched on a hard and heroic adventure which, he never doubted, was destined to change for good and not for evil the entire course of human events. "Our teaching," he once said, "is not dogma. Life will show us. . . . We know the direction. But only the experience of millions, as they move to the task, will discover the road."¹⁰ Shortly after the early winter sunset of January 21, 1924, while he was resting at Gorki, a new hemorrhage quietly brought his life to an end. Thirteen days later Woodrow Wilson joined him in death and immortality.

In a short quarter of a century, Lenin had left a larger imprint upon posterity than any other leader of his time. The student, lawyer, revolutionist and pamphleteer grew into a scholar of remarkable industry and erudition. The scholar was at the same time a political and social scientist, agitator, organizer and astute ad-

ministrator. His was a stable, well-balanced personality with few weaknesses and no vices. His uncanny sense of political strategy and tactics, combined with his profound devotion to the poor and lowly, inspired among millions the most passionate and self-sacrificing affection. On the day after his death the Central Committee declared: "Death has taken from us the man who founded our steeled Party, who built it up year in and year out, led it amidst the blows of Tsarism, trained and steeled it in the fierce struggle against the traitors to the working class and against the half-hearted, the waverers and deserters. . . . Lenin possessed all the truly great and heroic virtues of the proletariat—a fearless mind, an iron, inflexible and indomitable will which surmounts all obstacles, a holy and mortal hatred of slavery and tyranny, revolutionary ardor which moved mountains, boundless faith in the creative powers of the masses and vast organizing talents. His name has become the symbol of the new world from West to East and from South to North."¹¹ Said Stalin at the memorial session of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on January 26:

We Communists are people of a special mold. We are made of special material. We are those who comprise the army of the great proletarian strategist, the army of Comrade Lenin. There is nothing higher than the honor of belonging to this army. . . . In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of holding aloft and guarding the purity of the great title of member of the Party. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfill your bequest with honor. . . . In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of guarding the unity of our Party like the apple of our eye. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will also fulfill this bequest of yours with honor. . . . In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of guarding and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will spare no effort to fulfill also this bequest of yours with honor. . . .¹²

For years thereafter Lenin's body, perfectly embalmed, lay on a red couch guarded by soldiers in the famous marble tomb on Red Square below the Kremlin walls—in all respects the most holy shrine of all true believers in the faith which Lenin served. His brain was removed and became the nucleus of the Moscow Neurological Institute. No outward sign of this appears. He sleeps well with his sharp face, domed forehead and reddish beard still seeming alive with eager energy. The editors of *Life*, in their special

issue of 1943 devoted to the Soviet Union, placed under Lenin's picture a caption which most Russians and many non-Russians would regard as a sober estimate of his place in history: "This is perhaps the greatest man of the 20th Century."

The last judgment of his followers, and ultimately, it may well be, of much of mankind, on the credo and contributions of Lenin, recalls the confession of faith of Paul Korchagin, one of the characters of Nicholas Ostrovsky's novel, *The Making of a Hero*, published in 1937. These words, quoted in the diary of the partisan heroine, Zoya Kozmodemyanskaya, and attributed by some¹³ to Lenin himself, express well the intent of the work of the man from Simbirsk:

Man's dearest possession is life and it is given to him to live but once. He must live so as to feel no torturing regrets for years without purpose; so live as not to be seared by the shame of a cowardly and trivial past; so live that dying he can say "All my life and all my strength were given to the finest cause in all the world—the fight for the liberation of mankind."

2. THE LEADERSHIP OF STALIN

Viewed in the long perspective of man's devices for the management of men, the cause of liberty has sometimes been served by dictatorship—but only when dictators resist the temptation to become despots and unselfishly serve democratic purposes in times of trouble or of dynamic new departures in social engineering. In a one-party State, political differences assume the form of controversies inside the ranks of the ruling elite. The transition from War Communism to the NEP was accompanied by serious cleavages within the Party, exceeded in bitterness only by the later splits which followed the transition from the NEP to the epoch of the Five Year Plans. In the 1930's these controversies were to become so envenomed as to lead to bloodshed and a death struggle between the Party leadership and the Oppositionists.

Winners and losers, here as always, seek to identify one another in the public mind with the most negative symbols of the current political vocabulary. Among the great modern States only the United Kingdom, with its ancient and sacred hierarchy of classes and its long parliamentary tradition of illogical moderation and compromise, exhibits a stable pattern of folkways and mores which

lead to the labelling of dissenters as "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition" rather than as subversive scoundrels and traitors. The United States approaches, but does not always attain, this ideal. On the Continent its realization has been ephemeral. In revolutionary régimes, it is usually conspicuous by its absence, particularly when revolutionists and counter-revolutionists are converts to a political cult which prescribes hatred toward infidels and intolerance toward heretics.

In the Soviet Union the factional frictions within the CPSU (B), all having their counterparts in Marxist circles abroad, were ultimately polarized around "Trotskyism" and "Stalinism." In the libraries of Trotskyism, whose apostles regard themselves as the only true Marxists and Leninists, Stalin and his disciples are Thermidorians, Bureaucrats, Tyrants, Reactionaries, Betrayers of the Revolution, Terrorists and Assassins. In the libraries of Stalinism, whose apostles regard themselves as the only true Marxists and Leninists, Trotsky and his disciples, both currently and retrospectively, are Assassins, Terrorists, Betrayers of the Revolution, Reactionaries, Rebels, Renegades, Fascist Agents and Restorers of Capitalism. No outside observer who pretends to objectivity (which is itself the unpardonable sin in the eyes of all the contestants) can accept these stereotyped epithets as accurate descriptions of men and motives on either side. These vast piles of political polemics, which admit of no review or evaluation within the scope of these pages, are imposing temples of Marxist orthodoxy and heterodoxy. But only the most discerning visitor or the most devout worshipper can ascertain the inner meaning of the noisy and tumultuous ceremonies of word-hurling which go on before the altars. These rituals have few counterparts in bourgeois democracies. They recall the disputation of the Byzantine theologians and the pamphlet battles of the Wars of Religion. The subtle and all-pervasive corruption of uncompromising partisanship has long since spread so far beyond the Soviet frontiers that any narrative or evaluation of Soviet politics in the 1920's and 1930's is all but certain to be denounced in the most abusive language by this or that group of protagonists or by all together.

There can be no hope of avoiding this result in the present instance. Any effort to do so would merely plunge the uninitiated reader (assuming he did not turn away in boredom or bewilderment) into utter confusion without in any way altering the in-

flexible conviction, on the part of the devotees of the warring camps, of their own incontrovertible rectitude and of the unmitigated wickedness of their critics and foes. A cursory review of the record must suffice for present purposes. That record has led the present writer to a few general conclusions which are best stated at the outset.

1. Judged by material results, Stalin's policies after Lenin's death constituted the only practicable means of creating a highly industrialized and militarily powerful socialist society. The gradual abandonment of World Revolution and the ruthless resumption of the Marxist offensive in the name of "Socialism in One Country" represented not a "betrayal" of the Revolution but the only possible means of its fulfillment under prevailing circumstances abroad and at home.

2. The methods employed in carrying out this program, however, temporarily translated "democratic centralism" within the Party into a maximum of centralism and a minimum of democracy. They also entailed enormous sacrifice, suffering and waste, most of which was occasioned by the initial backwardness of the Soviet peoples and by the need of breakneck speed imposed by the danger of war—a danger which was correctly estimated by the Party leadership. They likewise involved measures of cruel repression, many of which were less a product of the objective nature of the social problems to be solved than of the Marxist principle that all social problems are to be dealt with in terms of class war.

3. Soviet politics, like all politics, never poses to its practitioners a choice between good and evil but always a choice between evils. On the whole Stalin's judgments, both at home and abroad, as to which evils were greater and which lesser were vindicated by the course of events.

4. The various intra-Party Oppositionists, both Left and Right, were almost invariably wrong in their estimates of the changing situation within the USSR and in the outside world. They would not have won the support of a majority of the membership even under a régime permitting complete freedom of speech, press, propaganda and political action. Many of them were guilty from the outset of gross infractions of Party discipline. None of them, however, had any original desire to "restore capitalism" or co-operate with foreign enemies of the Soviet Union. But after 1930,

when their failures and frustration begot irresistible aggressions against Stalin's leadership, some of them resorted to sabotage, assassination and conspiracy with foreign agents in the hope of disrupting the Soviet State and thereby creating an opportunity for their own return to power.

5. Prior to this tragic finale, Stalin and his colleagues displayed no bloodthirsty passion to exterminate opponents, but on the contrary acted with remarkable patience and toleration in an effort to conciliate and reconvert the dissenters.

6. Like all constructive achievements carried to completion in the face of mass inertia, the process of building socialism required the felling of trees and the breaking of stones on a gigantic scale. Tears for the victims who were cut down or crushed need not blind observers to the ultimate good attained. Liberal abhorrence of the doctrine that the end justifies the means has no relevance in crises where the final alternatives pose a question of national life or death.

7. Had the Party under Stalin not driven the Soviet people, by terrific pressure and incessant appeals, to prodigious and costly feats of construction and production, and had it not smashed ruthlessly the conspiracies of the 1930's, the Soviet Union and all the United Nations would have suffered irreparable defeat in World War II at the hands of insanely savage foes who in the end would have left the vanquished without eyes for weeping and without tongues for protest or lamentation.

The controversies engendered by the adoption of the NEP caused Congress X (March, 1921) to order the dissolution of all factional groups and the expulsion from membership, on the order of the Central Committee, of all deemed guilty of reviving factionalism, infringing the rules of discipline or violating Congress decisions. During 1921 some 170,000 members, about 25% of the total, were expelled in a mass purge which continued throughout 1922. So drastic was this cleansing that Congress XII (April, 1923) was attended by only 408 delegates representing 386,000 members, as compared with 694 and 732,000 in March, 1921. The Congress rejected proposals by Krassin and Radek for large scale concessions to foreign capital, by Bukharin and Sokolnikov for abandoning the State monopoly of foreign trade, and by Trotsky for reversing Lenin's policy of conciliating the peasantry. In the

autumn of 1923 Trotsky issued a "Declaration of the 46 Oppositionists," criticizing the NEP, predicting a grave economic crisis and demanding full freedom for dissenting groups and factions. Immediately after Congress XI (March, 1922) the Plenum of the Central Committee, on Lenin's motion, had chosen Stalin as General Secretary of the Committee. This post, which had hitherto been of minor importance, was continuously retained by Stalin thereafter and became the decisive strategic position from which he assumed direction of the entire Party apparatus.

The issues between the General Secretary and the Oppositionists were squarely joined in the discussions during the autumn and winter of 1923-24. Trotsky was a victim of influenza and had been ordered south for a rest by his physician. He was not present when the Thirteenth Party Conference, in mid-January, 1924, voted against the Oppositionists after hearing a report by Stalin summarizing the results of the discussion. When Lenin died, Trotsky was in Tiflis. He was at once informed by wire from Stalin. He had a week to get back to Moscow for the funeral and was not too ill to do so. Instead he went to Sukhum on the Black Sea coast. His absence at the last rites was the first of a long series of political blunders. Lenin's death was followed by the admission of 240,000 workers to the Party in the "Lenin Enrollment." At Congress XIII (May, 1924) there were 748 delegates representing 736,000 members. The Congress endorsed the decision of the January conference and condemned Trotskyism as a "petty bourgeois deviation from Marxism."

During his last illness Lenin worried about the relations between Stalin and Trotsky. On January 4, 1923, he had completed a confidential statement to the Party, later known as "Lenin's Testament." It perhaps reflected temporary resentment at Stalin's rudeness toward Krupskaya, arising out of Stalin's conviction that Georgia should be granted less autonomy than Lenin favored. The document did not become generally known until 1926, when Max Eastman published it abroad. Trotsky then denied its authenticity but later insisted on its genuineness—since conceded by all concerned. In this "Will," Lenin sought to evaluate six of his colleagues: the weakness of Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1917 was "not an accident," but they should not be condemned for past mistakes; Pyatakov is a good administrator but a bad politician; Bukharin is a scholastic rather than a true Marxist but is a sympa-

thetic soul; Trotsky is most able but suffers from vanity and overconfidence. (Trotsky wrote later that Lenin wished to designate him as Chairman of the Sovnarkom and was contemplating a public attack on Stalin when illness made him helpless. But there is nothing in the "Will," nor in any other reliable source, to substantiate this allegation.) In a postscript, Lenin added:

Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and to appoint another man who in all respects differs from Stalin except in superior ability—namely, more patient, more loyal, more polite, and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may seem an insignificant trifle, but I think that from the point of view of preventing a split and from the point of view of the relation between Stalin and Trotsky . . . it is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle as may acquire decisive significance.

In almost all Western theologies, disputants traditionally belabor one another with selected excerpts from Holy Writ. Marxism and Leninism are no exception. Marx denied that he was a "Marxist" and Lenin, though often quoting Marx to carry his argument, was not a dogmatist. But their successors of all schools invariably quote the equivalents of the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost and the Saints to prove themselves right and their critics wrong. Lenin's will therefore became a weapon.

The decline and fall of Leon Trotsky, however, are not at all explicable in terms of a selfishly ambitious scheme developed by Stalin to thwart Lenin's purposes. Neither can they be explained solely by reference to differences in doctrinal exegesis. The actual fire of controversy over principles was far too small to give rise to such tremendous clouds of smoke, surcharged with lightning, thunder and poisonous fumes. A crucial role was played by personality problems and by the varying capacity of different groups of revolutionists to adapt themselves to environmental change. "All through the discussion of Trotskyism in 1923," the brilliant War Commissar wrote later, "I was ill. One can foresee a revolution or a war, but it is impossible to foresee the consequences of an autumn shooting trip for wild ducks."¹⁴ His own account of his mood—bored, irritable, feverish, unsociable, contemptuous of colleagues—suggests that he felt himself a social outcast and was perhaps already developing the paranoid pattern which later

found expression in furious invective against his "persecutors." Trotsky's continued fever, for which his physicians could find no organic basis, may have been psychic, rather than somatic, in origin. Those who have an unconscious wish to fail in their task not only adopt means which often insure failure but sometimes become hypochondriacs. They then have an excuse for failure.

"From the days of my childhood I had many conflicts in life which sprang, as a jurist would say, out of the struggle against injustice."¹⁵ A psychoanalyst would say something else. Repressed insecurities and contradictions drove Trotsky to seek domination, to resent rivals, and at the same time to turn against whatever might have led him to his goal. In his response to Lenin as a father-image, love predominated over hatred in the later years of their relationship. In his response to Stalin, emerging as a new father-image, hatred predominated over love. As Lenin's health waned and Stalin's influence waxed, Trotsky suffered a spiritual and physical decline. He slowly withdrew from political realities into a fantasy world in which he was a great hero, vindicated by destiny. At Sukhum in January, 1924, he basked in the sun and daydreamed of his life with Lenin. Suddenly he perceived that he himself was the victim of a plot. "Individual episodes emerged with the vividness of a dream. Gradually all of it began to assume increasingly sharp outlines. . . . As I breathed the sea air in, I assimilated with my whole being the assurance of my historical rightness in opposition to the epigones"—i.e., Stalin and his supporters.¹⁶ Delusions of grandeur, even when indulged in by the greatest of leaders, make for political ineffectiveness and tragedy.

What followed was also a product of new needs calling for new talents. Neurotic intellectuals, while often spectacular as polemicists, are seldom good administrators. Agitators derive ego-gratification from impersonal mass reactions to the skillful manipulation of verbal symbols. Managers live and move and have their being in the more intimate contacts of interpersonal relations. Lenin, an intellectual without neurosis, was one of that small number of rare political geniuses (e.g., Napoleon Bonaparte, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt) who combine in almost equal measure the skills of the propagandist and of the expert in winning friends and managing people. Trotsky, like most of those who ultimately shared in his eclipse, was a talented orator and a spinner of impressive webs of words. Like Thomas Paine, William

Jennings Bryan or Léon Blum, he lacked skill in adroit political maneuvering on the interpersonal level. Stalin, neither an intellectual nor a neurotic, was above all an executive and a "machine politician," comparable to the American "political boss" who wields power less by public verbalizing than by private leadership of loyal and disciplined subordinates. The October Revolution and its immediate aftermath required the abilities of great agitators. The NEP and the subsequent building of socialism called for able administrators and managers.¹⁷

In his insatiable quest for mass approbation, Trotsky irritated and insulted his colleagues. He thereby lost his public, since his rivals were able and willing to deprive him of effective media of communication with the masses. No political leader is more pathetically impotent than an agitator without an audience. Trotsky's descent from the heights to the depths, through successive stages of invective, insubordination, exile and conspiracy abroad, represented a fierce effort, constantly renewed and always futile, to recapture what he had forever lost and to solve psychological problems which remained forever unsolved.

"The Lessons of October," published by Trotsky in the fall of 1924 as an introduction to a volume of his speeches of 1917-18, precipitated a storm. In his inexhaustible passion to demonstrate that he sat in the driver's seat of the locomotive of history, he gloated over the fact that on the eve of October he had supported Lenin's plea for an armed uprising while Zinoviev, Kamenev and (to a lesser extent) Stalin had opposed it. The denunciations which now descended on Trotsky's head left him in no doubt but that he was the target of a "plot." In January, 1925, he was obliged to give up his post as Commissar for War in favor of Mikhail Frunze. But he was at once made Chairman of the Concessions Committee, head of the electro-technical board and chairman of the scientific-technical board of industry. These administrative positions, however, were little to his liking. He felt sure that Stalin and Molotov were "sabotaging" his work.

Congress XIV, comprising 665 delegates representing 643,000 Party members, passed a memorable resolution in December, 1925, which foreshadowed the program to come and precipitated an acute intra-Party crisis. It asserted that "in the sphere of economic development, the Congress holds that in our land, the land

of the dictatorship of the proletariat, there is 'every requisite for the building of a complete socialist society' (Lenin). The Congress considers that the main task of our Party is to fight for the victory of socialist construction in the USSR." Zinoviev and Kamenev favored the expulsion of Trotsky from the Party. Stalin opposed them: "Today we cut off one, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third. But, by then, what will be left of the Party?" Zinoviev and Kamenev rejected the resolution for building "Socialism in One Country" and championed World Revolution. After the Congress adjourned, Zinoviev called a meeting of the Leningrad Provincial Committee of the Young Communist League (Komsomol) which passed a resolution refusing to abide by the decisions of the Congress. This flagrant breach of Party discipline brought Molotov, Kirov, Voroshilov, Kalinin and other leaders to Leningrad where they brought about the endorsement of the work of the Congress by the Party local and the condemnation of the "New Opposition."

In the sequel Trotsky, who spent the spring of 1926 doctoring in Berlin, formed a bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev and demanded a new Party discussion. They were supported by Radek, Rakovsky, Pyatakov, Evdokimov, Smilga, Sokolnikov and Smirnov in denying the possibility of socialism in a single country and insisting upon "permanent revolution," more intra-Party democracy, greater authority to the trade unions, and immediate steps to liquidate the kulaks who had been permitted in 1925 to lease land and hire labor. Against this Left wing, formed in June, 1926, a Right wing developed around Bukharin and Rykov, who then stood with Stalin against Trotsky but favored further concessions to the kulaks and an extension of the NEP. Trotsky's new colleagues were not towers of strength. Kamenev, who had married Trotsky's sister, was timid and vacillating. Both he and the loud-mouthed, faint-hearted Zinoviev "lacked that little thing called character," wrote Trotsky later. Stalin contended that collectivization and industrialization could build a socialist Russia, but only after production should be restored, by the methods of the NEP, to the pre-war level. After lively discussions at many party gatherings, in which Left spokesmen made few converts, the new anti-Stalinist trio pledged itself in October to avoid any activities which might engender a split.

The truce which followed came to an end with the international crises of 1926-27. In April, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek began his butchery of the Chinese Communists. On May 14, 1926, Pilsudski had overthrown the Polish Republic by a military *coup d'état*—originally favored by the Polish Communist Party and eventuating in a violently anti-Soviet and semi-Fascist regime. On June 7, 1927, Minister Voikov, Soviet Envoy to Poland, was assassinated by a Russian émigré in Warsaw. Meanwhile, the Conservative Cabinet in London, in the belated aftermath of the General Strike of May, 1926, had severed diplomatic relations with the USSR on May 26, 1927.* Trotsky's bloc at once accused Stalin of having betrayed the World Revolution. The leader of the Left, in his own words, at once embarked upon "an open struggle" through "secret meetings" and "illegal means."¹⁸

Trotsky and Kamenev were now removed from the Politburo and Zinoviev from the chairmanship of the Comintern. In September, in the so-called "Platform of the 83," they demanded of the Central Committee that the Opposition case be published and discussed in preparation for Congress XV. The demand was refused on the ground that under the Party rules such a discussion could be opened only two months before the next Congress. The Oppositionists then had their "Platform" secretly mimeographed and distributed. The GPU seized the press and arrested many of those responsible.

The Opposition came to grief late in 1927 less because of repression at the hands of the "Stalin machine" than because of its own incapacity to grasp reality. In October the Central Committee announced a general Party discussion. Trotsky held that it was a fraud. He later published the "Platform of the 83" under the title of "The Real Situation in Russia," in which he denounced kulaks, Nepmen and bureaucrats, urged World Revolution, and contended that the Party had been subordinated to the Politburo, which was at the mercy of the Secretariat, which was wholly dominated by the General Secretary. On November 7, anniversary of the Revolution, the bloc organized street demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad. Militiamen tore down placards. Trotsky's car was fired upon. Fatal rioting was narrowly averted. On November 14 the Central Committee and the Central Control Com-

*British interests in the USSR were entrusted to the Secretary of the Norwegian Legation in Moscow—i.e., Major Vidkun Quisling.

mission, meeting jointly, voted to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party. Two days later Adolf Joffe, recently Ambassador to Japan and now Trotsky's deputy in the Concessions Commission, committed suicide. His funeral was made the occasion for another street demonstration by the Opposition.

That the Leftists should appeal to the Party membership and the general public against Stalin, Bukharin and Rykov may seem quite legitimate to most Western liberals. But in terms of Lenin's conception (and Stalin's) of a disciplined, monolithic brotherhood, this was an intolerable offense. The Oppositionists justified their conduct with the contention that Stalin had suppressed all free discussion within the Party. The argument was contrary to fact. In any event the Leftists were less advocates of freedom of thought and talk than challengers of the Central Committee for the privilege of dictating thought and talk to the Party and the country.

Congress XV opened on December 2, 1927, with 898 delegates chosen by 887,000 members. In the voting, delegates representing 724,000 members supported the Central Committee. The Opposition received the vote of delegates speaking for only 4,000 members, with the balance abstaining. Stalin now urged collectivization and a Five Year Plan of industrialization. The Congress declared war on the kulaks, authorized the seizure of their grain surpluses, and offered the poorest peasants 25% of the confiscated crop. The Congress likewise expelled from the Party Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Rakovsky, Preobrazhensky, Smirnov, Serebryakov and several hundred lesser Oppositionists. It ruled that adherence to Trotsky's views was incompatible with Party membership. All the leading Oppositionists, save Trotsky, recanted and were readmitted on probation in June, 1928, on condition of denouncing Trotskyism and accepting unconditionally Party decisions. In January, 1928, Trotsky was exiled to Alma Ata in Turkestan.

Here he hunted, fished, lived comfortably, despite attacks of colitis, gout and malaria, and carried on an extensive correspondence with little interference. Between April and October, by his own account, he sent out 800 political letters, "among them quite a few large works," and 550 telegrams, and received 1,000 political letters and 700 telegrams. He also carried on "secret" correspondence by courier. On December 16, 1928, an agent of the GPU

arrived from Moscow with the demand that he cease his leadership of the Opposition. He refused in a long letter to the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Comintern. Stalin's supporters, he said, were "creatively impotent, false, contradictory, unreliable, blind, cowardly, inept" and were "executing the orders of the enemy classes. . . . The great historical strength of the Opposition, in spite of its apparent weakness, lies in the fact that it keeps its fingers on the pulse of the world historical process. . . . To abstain from political activity would mean to obtain from getting ready for tomorrow."¹⁹ On all points, Trotsky was wrong. Being wrong, he was never able to forgive Stalin for being right. On January 20, 1929, he received the decision of the GPU:

Considered: the case of Citizen Trotsky, Lev Davydovich, under Article 58/10 of the Criminal Code, on a charge of counter-revolutionary activity expressing itself in the organization of an illegal anti-Soviet Party, whose activity has later been directed toward provoking anti-Soviet actions and preparing for an armed struggle against the Soviet Power. *Resolved:* Citizen Trotsky, Lev Davydovich, to be deported from the territory of the USSR.²⁰

Trotsky with his wife and son were taken to his native Ukraine and sent by sea from Odessa to Istanbul where they arrived on February 12. He tried to go to Germany or England, but could get no visa. He finally went to France, then to Norway and ultimately to Mexico. His later role and that of his erstwhile followers belong to another chapter.

The son of the Georgian cobbler was now undisputed leader of the Party, which was undisputed master of the USSR. With no penchant for popular oratory and no inner craving to live in the limelight, he remained a sober and stolid figure, vigorously healthy, simple, secretive, subtle and blessed with vast patience and vaster determination. He was little known to most of his countrymen save as a name and a symbol, for he lived without ostentation and worked without display in the tradition of Lenin.

Public discussion of private business is as much anathema to all true Bolsheviks as is private discussion of public business. The personal lives of leaders are therefore not a proper subject of articles, monographs, books or gossip. In 1919 Stalin had married Nadya Alliluieva. They had two children, Vassily and Svetlana,

both of whom grew up in relative obscurity. Vassily became a colonel in the air force in World War II and has presented his father with two grandchildren. Svetlana became a Komsomol and entered the School of International Relations at the First Moscow University in 1944, putting down her father's vocation as "Professional Revolutionary." Nadya died of peritonitis on November 8, 1932, after a too-long-delayed appendectomy. Stalin's third wife is believed to be Rosa, sister of Lazar Kaganovich, able Jewish Commissar of Railways and builder of the Moscow subway. The fact that this marriage has never been mentioned in the Soviet press, and is pure hypothesis among those given to speculation about such matters, proves nothing except that in Soviet culture love is a private affair.

Public idolatry of Stalin was already well developed by 1928. In the intervening years it has become a cult, characterized by mass adulation which many foreign observers have misinterpreted as evidence of colossal conceit on the part of the Leader (*Vozhd*) and of universal sycophancy on the part of his followers. On Stalin's fiftieth birthday, December 21, 1929, the Soviet press was filled with headlines, portraits and eulogies. All virtues and all accomplishments were attributed to the Man of Steel. Messages of greeting were as the sands on the seashore. An official bust was distributed wholesale over one-sixth of the globe. Factories, streets, squares, towns and cities, as well as rivers, forests and mountains, have been named after him. Pictures and monuments of the hero are everywhere. Early in 1934 Sergei Kirov, Leningrad leader and Stalin's closest colleague, declared:

Comrades, it is not easy to grasp the figure of Stalin in all its gigantic proportions. In these latter years, ever since we have had to carry on our work without Lenin, there has been no major development in our labors, no innovation, slogan or trend of policy of any importance of which Comrade Stalin was not the author. All the major work—and this the Party should know—is guided by the instructions, the initiative and the leadership of Comrade Stalin. . . . The mighty will and organizational genius of this man insure our Party the timely accomplishment of the big historical turns involved in the victorious construction of Socialism. . . . All emanates from this man, and all that we have achieved in the period of the First Five Year Plan has been due to his direction.²¹

In similar vein are the comments in the closing pages of the short official biography issued by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of Moscow in 1943:

Stalin is the brilliant leader and teacher of the Party, the great strategist of the Socialist revolution. Implacable hostility to the enemies of Socialism, profound fidelity to principle, a combination of clear revolutionary perspective and clarity of purpose with extraordinary firmness and persistence in the pursuit of aims, wise and practical leadership, and intimate contact with the masses—such are the characteristic features of Stalin's style. . . . Stalin's whole career is an example of profound theoretical powers combined with an unusual breadth and versatility of practical experience in the revolutionary struggle. . . . Everybody is familiar with the cogent and invincible force of Stalin's logic, the crystal clarity of his mind, his iron will, his devotion to the Party, his ardent faith in the masses, and his love for the people. . . . Stalin is the Lenin of today. . . . Stalin's name is a symbol of the courage, of the renown of the Soviet people, and a call to fresh deeds in exaltation of the Soviet people. . . . Stalin's name is cherished by the boys and girls of the Socialist land, the Young Pioneers. Their dearest ambition is to be like Lenin and Stalin. . . . The name of Stalin is a symbol of the more than political unity of Soviet society. . . .

Such a relationship as this between ruler and ruled inevitably recalls to Western democrats the ancient myth of the divine right of kings, the modern cult of the charismatic despots, and every other image of arbitrary personal power, founded on unquestioning public adoration, which is historically associated with tyranny in all its most hateful forms. In no political system, including the Soviet system, can flexible and representative leadership or responsible popular participation in public affairs be promoted by uncritical adulation of the individual who occupies the highest position in the State. In the USSR this situation has come to prevail by virtue of the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the Party, with control of the Party transformed in turn into a close facsimile of a personal dictatorship. Many have concluded that this result flows from personal vanity, deviltry or ambition playing upon a mass of unthinking robots, with Stalin becoming Tsar, all Soviet citizens his slaves, and all his advisers obsequious "yes-men." But a mature judgment requires consideration of the times as well as the life of Josef Djughashvili and of the respects in which his personal

authority is unique and those in which it parallels a world-wide trend producing similar patterns of relationships between leaders and led in many diverse communities.

Stalin is an administrator, an executive and a strategist. He has never been a facile publicist nor an inspiring orator. His only important doctrinal works are *The Foundations of Leninism*, *Problems of Leninism*, *Marxism and the National Question* and various shorter essays, most of them glosses on words of the founder. He is not a Russian but a Georgian. His people comprise less than 2% of the Soviet population. Such a leader seldom evokes popular enthusiasm or devotion. His single-minded pursuit of objectives may inspire fear, respect and admiration. These are not enough in a time calling for self-sacrificing fervor on the part of millions, nor is it feasible in such a situation to apply Machiavelli's dictum that it is better for a Prince to be feared than loved. The impersonal abstractions of dialectical materialism, moreover, arouse ardor only among passionate converts.

Masses of men and women on the march have always required a highly personal symbol of leadership to inspire them on their way. The systematic heroization of Stalin has garbed an able manager and bureaucrat in the less prosaic vestments of a man of the people, an all-wise father, an intellectual giant and a vivid incarnation of all the values and purposes worth living by and dying for. Only those unfamiliar with the arts of leadership in other contexts will regard this as a deception or as an evidence of conceit or of contempt for the multitude. Neither does it appear that collective idolatry has isolated Stalin from his colleagues or caused him to suffer that atrophy of critical faculties which often afflicts leaders who are elevated to lonely grandeur. The public image of Stalin has been no less important in guiding the Soviet peoples to victory in the tasks of peace and war than the private talents of Stalin as an executive.

Stalin's epoch, moreover, has been rich in one-man rule (or the fiction thereof), even in countries with a long parliamentary tradition. If Stalin's name has been synonymous with that of his State for many years, the same can be said not only of Chiang Kai-shek, Pilsudski, Salazar, Vargas, Mussolini, Hitler and Franco but also of Roosevelt, Churchill, Beneš and De Gaulle—even though the span of years of personal power be less in the democracies while the tolerated limits of public criticism are vastly greater. This

advent of "Caesarism," predicted by Oswald Spengler thirty years ago, is a world-wide phenomenon of our time.

The three decades which have witnessed this development have been the bloodiest and most horrible in human memory, marked by the two most destructive and sanguinary wars of all time and by the disintegration of much of Western culture into a miasma of hunger, misery and sadism on a scale without precedent in any past epoch. The insecurities and anxieties flowing from these traumatic experiences have everywhere led to imperative demands for reassurance. To follow an exalted and omniscient leader into a "New Deal," a "New Order," or a new epoch reassures the fearful and restores a desperately needed sense of unity, purpose and progress. The peoples of the USSR have had far more than their share of the sufferings, doubts and despairs of our time. In making Stalin the object of uncritical worship, they have followed a leader whose works they regard, not without justification, as laying an enduring foundation of future assurance, hope and well-being.

3. THE SECOND REVOLUTION

Stalin's mission between 1929 and 1939 was to lead his Party and his people on the great crusade which converted the broken nation of Brest-Litovsk and the doubtful country of the NEP into the Socialist Fatherland which met the test of World War II and emerged from the ordeal as the mightiest industrial and military Power of Eurasia. This metamorphosis, often compared to the work of Peter the Great, was brought about through a new revolution—from above rather than from below. The irresistible dynamism of the renewed offensive, at once merciless and creative, transformed beyond recognition almost all aspects of life among the Soviet peoples. All were obliged to go to war against the past and to go to school to learn the ways of the future. In its impact on the peasantry, the new departure led not only to the most far-reaching rural revolution of all time, but to the emergence on a vast scale of a new mode of farming and a new type of country life which ultimately may come to be regarded as the most startling technical and social innovation in all the history of agriculture. In its impact on urbanites, the new revolution was a colossal process of industrialization without parallel elsewhere in the rapidity of

its tempo, and without precedent anywhere in its socialist structure and purpose.

The industrialization of a great community is by itself obviously not unique. It has been experienced by England, Germany and the United States and may in days to come be experienced by China and India. What is unique in the USSR is that a single decade saw developments which required half a century or more elsewhere. Industrialization was achieved, moreover, without private capital, without foreign investments (save in the form of engineering skills and technical advice), without private profit as a spur to individual initiative, without private ownership of any of the means of production, and with no unearned increment or private fortunes accruing to entrepreneurs or lucky investors. Resources were developed, labor was recruited, trained and allocated, capital was saved and invested not through the price mechanism of a competitive market but through a consciously devised and deliberately executed national economic plan, drawn up by quinquennia, by years, and by quarters for every segment of the economy, for every region, city, town and village, for every factory, farm, mine and mill, for every store, bank and school, and even for every hospital, theater and sports club. Politburo, Sovnarkom and Gosplan supplied direction and coordination to the effort. But almost all Soviet citizens participated in planning, contributed to fulfillment in proportion to their abilities, and shared in the results in accordance with their contribution. Nothing remotely comparable to this endeavor had ever been before attempted. Most outside observers were therefore certain that the effort would fail. Long after it was launched, many were equally certain that it had failed or was failing. But in all that was decisive for the future, Party and people carried through their self-imposed tasks to success.

This gigantic design for change can scarcely be depicted in mere words or statistics. It has tangible meaning only in terms of the experiences of millions, sharing in the excitement of achievement and in the deprivations required to translate fantastic blueprints into fabulous actualities. Language is inadequate to convey these experiences to those who have no equivalents of them in their own lives. A staggering human reality is mirrored but faintly in the obvious generalizations: the adventure led from illiteracy to

literacy, from the NEP to socialism, from archaic agriculture to collective cultivation, from a rural society to a predominantly urban community, from general ignorance of the machine to social mastery of modern technology.

Between the poverty-stricken year of 1924, when Lenin died, and the relatively abundant year of 1940, the cultivated area of the USSR expanded by 74%; grain crops increased 11%; coal production was multiplied by 10; steel output by 18; engineering and metal industries by 150; total national income by 10; industrial output by 24; annual capital investment (*c.* 40 billion rubles in 1940) by 57. During the First Five Year Plan, 51 billion rubles were invested; during the Second, 114; and during the Third, 192. Factory and office workers grew from 7,300,000 to 30,800,000, and school and college students from 7,900,000 to 36,600,000.²² Between 1913 (roughly comparable in most fields of production to the levels of 1927) and 1940, oil production increased from 9 to 35 million tons; coal from 29 to 164; pig-iron from 4 to 15; steel from 4 to 18; machine tools from 1,000 to 48,000 units, tractors from 0 to over 500,000; harvester combines from 0 to 153,500; electrical power output from 2 billion kilowatt hours to 50 billion; and value of industrial output from 11 billion rubles to more than 100 billions by 1938. If the estimated volume of total industrial production in 1913 be taken as 100, the corresponding indices for 1938 are 93.2 for France; 113.3 for England; 120 for the United States; 131.6 for Germany and 908.8 for the Soviet Union.

The rapidity and scope of the Second Revolution are most strikingly symbolized by the growth of cities. Of the 29 largest cities of the United States, only two (Los Angeles and Houston) more than doubled their populations between 1920 and 1930, a decade of prosperity and urban expansion. Of the 29 largest cities of the USSR, 17 approximately doubled their population between 1926 and 1939. Of these Moscow increased from 2 to 4 millions; Leningrad from 1½ to 3 millions; Kharkov from 417 thousands to 833; Baku from 453 to 809; Tashkent from 323 to 585; Dnepropetrovsk from 236 to 500; Kazan from 179 to 401; Kuibyshev (Samara) from 175 to 390; Minsk from 131 to 238; and Vladivostok from 107 to 206. Some cities tripled in size, *e.g.*, Voronezh, 121 thousands to 326; Novosibirsk, 120 to 405; Sverdlovsk, 140 to 425; Stalingrad, 155 to 445; and Gorky, 222 to 644. Two important centers quadrupled their populations; Archangel, 76 to 281, and Chelya-

binsk, 59 to 273. Stalinsk in the Western Siberian industrial area increased its inhabitants by 42 times, from 3,900 to 169,500. Apart from this phenomenal growth of old centers, many new cities and towns came into being. The largest was Magnitogorsk, named after the nearby mountain of iron ore in the southeastern Urals and constituting, with Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk, one of the three metropolises of the new Ural industrial area. Here on the empty prairie, around what is to be the largest metallurgical plant in the world, grew a city of more than 150,000 people, swelled by war evacuees after 1941 to a quarter of a million.

These and a thousand other transformations, viewed in terms of personal living, meant for scores of millions hope, heroism, opportunity, the realization of the promise of 1917, the collective inspiration of dynamic purposes shared in cooperative endeavor, and the triumph of new techniques of planning and management in guiding all to a more meaningful and abundant life than any of them had known before. They also meant bureaucracy, red-tape and costly fumbblings; overcrowding, wretched housing and meager food and clothing for the sake of heavy industry; and incredible quantum of backbreaking labor and heartbreaking tragedy; and appalling sacrifices, ruthless cruelty toward laggards, and the relentless driving of the entire population to the edge of physical and nervous exhaustion. In the perspective of recent years the question of whether the results were worth the price has found its answer in events. The ultimate alternatives were victory or death. The road to victory was watered with sweat, tears and blood long before the Nazi invaders burst into the Soviet land. Those who suffered en route and those who died by the wayside were as much casualties of war as those who fell in the later struggle between the armed hosts of Soviet Socialism and European Fascism. In both of these wars, as in all wars, needless waste and woe were mixed with miracles of courage and achievement. Those who survived and those to come, who will share in the fruits of past labors, have no doubts regarding the final balancing of the books in the building of socialism.

The social and psychological aspect of this agony of creation cannot here be discussed. Neither can its economic and administrative aspects be analyzed, though they are vastly portentous for all mankind.²³ The political driving force behind the great offensive was the Communist Party and the Komsomol or League

of Communist Youth. The battle was joined, albeit the full course of the campaign was not yet apparent, at Congress XV in December, 1927. Stalin's endorsement of a Five Year Plan of industrialization and of the collectivization of agriculture was less a product of orthodox doctrine or of a desire to "steal the thunder" of the Trotskyites than of economic need, political necessity and a lively apprehension of foreign attack.

The economic need arose from the fact that although the NEP had raised rural production to something approaching its 1914 level, the marketed grain surplus available for urban consumption or export was only a third of its pre-war volume. Without a larger food supply, progress toward industrialized socialism was unthinkable. The situation, moreover, promised to become worse and to reproduce on a disastrous scale the "scissors crisis" of 1923-24 when agricultural prices were declining and industrial prices rising so sharply as to deprive the peasant of incentives to produce beyond his own needs. Most of the marketed grain came from the farms of the *kulaki*, or relatively well-to-do and efficient peasants, rather than from the *seredniaki* (middle peasants) or *bedniaki* (poorest peasants). The easiest means of increasing the food supply would have been to encourage the middle and poor peasants to become kulaks and to foster larger production by the kulaks through higher prices for grain, subsidies for increased output, and tax differentials in favor of the larger producers.

The political necessity which dictated a policy diametrically (and dialectically) opposed to that suggested arose from the fact that any such policy would have established a large and growing class of prosperous "capitalist" farmers, producing for profit, owning their own farms in fact if not in form, and inevitably serving as the nucleus of a new bourgeoisie. To relieve the food shortage by fostering any such development would have destroyed the class basis of the Revolution, dissolved the *smychka* or alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, and rendered inevitable the evolution of the NEP into a full-fledged capitalism. The delegates at Congress XV were moved to reconsider the dicta of Lenin: "If peasant farming is to develop further, we must firmly assure also its transition to the next stage, and this next stage must inevitably be one in which the small, isolated peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, will by a process of

gradual amalgamation form large-scale collective farms.”²⁴ In the spirit of the Master, Stalin posed the question and gave his answer:

What is the way out? The way out is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on the common cultivation of the soil, to introduce collective cultivation of the soil on the basis of a new and higher technique. The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, not by pressure but by example and persuasion, into large farms based on common, co-operative, collective cultivation of the soil with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture. There is no other way out.²⁵

Congress XV therefore “declared war” on the kulaks and took steps, in the words of its resolutions, to “restrict the development of capitalism in the countryside and guide peasant farming toward socialism.” In pursuit of these directives, the Soviet authorities empowered the courts to confiscate grain surpluses from kulaks who refused to sell them at low fixed prices, exempted a third of the poorest peasants from the land tax, and placed at their disposal a quarter of the grain confiscated from their more prosperous neighbors. Instructions were also issued for an increase in the number of *Sovkhozes* or State Farms and for the promotion of *Kolkhozes* or collective farms through the consolidation of individual holdings into large-scale enterprises.

Fear of foreign attack, prompted by the developments of 1927, contributed to this decision, for it was assumed that in the long run a socialist, collectivized agriculture would prove more productive than a capitalist agriculture. Congress XV resolved that:

The Central Committee of the Party must build up its foreign policy on the following fundamental lines. First, by carrying out a policy of international peace, which is nothing other than a struggle against the dangers of imperialistic wars. This policy of international peace is at the same time a fundamental condition for the development of socialism within the USSR. Second, by the strengthening in every way of the brotherly ties between the workers of the USSR and those of the Western European countries, as well as the laboring masses of other oppressed countries. Third, by the further systematic development of economic relations with the capitalist countries, provided that the economic independence of the USSR shall be secured. Fourth, by the constant strengthening of the means of national defense and

especially the power and fighting capacity of both the Workers' and Peasants' Army and Navy. Fifth, by the accumulation of necessary economic reserves, such as grain, goods, currency, and special reserves of defense.

The Congress also directed the Gosplan to prepare the first of a series of Five Year Plans for the development of socialized industry. Lenin had long ago anticipated such a program. The Red Army required a solid industrial base. Collective agriculture, moreover, presupposed the production of tractors, combines and other machines for large-scale mechanized farming and of other manufactures to be exchanged for foodstuffs. The engineer, V. I. Grinevsky, in his book *Post-War Prospects of Russian Industry* (1919), had urged a systematic development of heavy industry and the location of new plants in the Urals and Western Siberia. The Gosplan prepared its blueprints early in 1928. The first *Piatiletka* or Five Year Plan went into effect on October 1, 1928. In the following April the 16th Party Conference rejected the "minimal" variant of the Plan and adopted the "optimal" quotas. In a mood of crusading enthusiasm Congress XVI (June, 1930) decided to "complete the Five Year Plan in four years," i.e., by December 31, 1932.

What followed was a harrowing, even if inspiring, ordeal for the entire urban population and an embittered struggle throughout the countryside. The agrarian revolution of 1917-18, involving the expropriation of the aristocracy and the division of its estates among the peasants, had increased the number of family plots from roughly 16,000,000 to 25,000,000. The new revolution led finally to the consolidation of almost all of these individual farms into 250,000 *Kolkhozes*. Whether this radical transformation of Soviet agriculture could have been achieved by propaganda and material inducements in an orderly and economical fashion is debatable. It was in fact achieved by a resumption of "class war" in the villages and by a return to the conditions of 1918, when the "Committees of the Poor" terrorized and expropriated the more prosperous villagers. Stalin had urged collectivization by "example and persuasion." But by the autumn of 1929, when the program got fully under way, the slogan was: "Liquidate the Kulaks as a Class!" Their rights to hire labor and rent land were rescinded. The poorer peasants were allowed to pool all the possessions of the kulaks in the new collectives. In many districts enthusiastic

Party leaders pushed the program far ahead of schedule and established "communes," in which all property was collectivized, instead of "artels" in which only land and tools became common assets.

The result was resistance and tragedy. The kulaks had been encouraged under the NEP to "get rich" and had contributed the larger share of the restoration of agricultural production. They were now forced into collectives and therewith lost not only their homes, lands and equipment, but their horses, cattle and even chickens. Their natural resentment led to punitive measures. Early in 1930 all village Soviets were dissolved and replaced by new Soviets elected exclusively by the poorest peasants. The "dekulakization" of the more prosperous took the form of denying them membership in the collectives and deporting hundreds of thousands to the far north and Siberia where they were housed in GPU concentration camps and forced to work at lumbering, road-building and the construction of canals and railways. Their fellows in the villages had no leadership but decided as one man, with the unanimity and stubbornness of wronged farmers the world over, to oppose their oppressors. Their opposition took the initial form of slaughtering their cattle and horses in preference to having them collectivized. The result was a grievous blow to Soviet agriculture, for most of the cattle and horses were owned by the kulaks. Between 1928 and 1933 the number of horses in the USSR declined from almost 30,000,000 to less than 15,000,000; of horned cattle from 70,000,000 (including 31,000,000 cows) to 38,000,000 (including 20,000,000 cows); of sheep and goats from 147,000,000 to 50,000,000; and of hogs from 20,000,000 to 12,000,000. Soviet rural economy had not recovered from this staggering loss by 1941.

Stalin sought to save the situation. But for once his measures were too little and too late. In January, 1930, he had resolutely endorsed the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class (Cf. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 21, 1930²⁶). In *Pravda* of March 2, 1930, however, he rebuked the more ardent comrades in a memorable article entitled "Dizzy With Success."²⁷ He noted that 50% of all farms had been collectivized—more than double the number envisaged in the Plan. "People are often intoxicated by such successes, they become dizzy with success, they lose all sense of proportion, they lose the faculty of understanding realities. . . .

In such cases care is not taken to *consolidate* the successes achieved and systematically to *utilize* them for the purpose of advancing further. . . . It cannot be said that this dangerous and harmful frame of mind is really widespread in the ranks of our Party. But this frame of mind nevertheless exists in our Party and, moreover, there are no grounds for asserting that it will not spread." Collectivization should be voluntary. "Collective farms cannot be set up by force." Stalin condemned "distortions" and insisted upon the *artel* as the appropriate form of collectivization, with no pooling of houses, gardens, orchards, livestock and poultry. Some "revolutionaries" are "disintegrating and discrediting" the movement. Some begin collectivization "by removing the church bells. How revolutionary indeed! Blockheads!" The Central Committee published resolutions. A halt was called.

But great damage had already been done. More followed. Many members now left the collectives. In the autumn, 48 officials of the Commissariat of Agriculture were executed for sabotage, theft and oppression of the peasants. In March, 1933, the GPU announced that 35 more officials had been found guilty of a counter-revolutionary plot and had been tried and executed. They included Feodor Konar, *alias* Polashchuk, Vice-Commissar of Agriculture, who confessed to having acted for years as a Polish spy and to having directed a conspiracy to reduce food output and to drive the peasants to desperation. Many indeed were desperate. In the Ukraine most of the kulaks appear to have become completely demoralized as a result of systematic persecution. Some murdered officials, set the torch to the property of the collectives, and even burned their own crops and seed grain. More refused to sow or reap, perhaps on the assumption that the authorities would make concessions and would in any case feed them.

The aftermath was the Ukraine "Famine" of 1932-33. Its existence was never acknowledged by Soviet spokesmen. Lurid accounts, mostly fictional, appeared in the Nazi press in Germany and in the Hearst press in the United States, often illustrated with photographs which turned out to have been taken along the Volga in 1921. During the summer of 1933 Moscow barred foreign reporters from the Ukraine, although continuing, with bureaucratic inconsistency, to admit tourists by thousands—the present writer among them. The "famine" was not in its later stages a result of a

food shortage, despite the sharp reduction of seed grain and harvests flowing from special requisitions in the spring of 1932 which were apparently occasioned by fear of war with Japan.²⁸ Most of the victims, the number of whom cannot be ascertained in the absence of any official or accurate information, were kulaks who had refused to sow their fields or had destroyed their crops. Observation in the villages suggests that this portion of the peasantry was left to starve by the authorities and the collective farmers as a more or less deliberate policy. Large numbers (again unspecified) were deported to labor camps where some died of malnutrition and disease and others were rehabilitated into useful citizens. The human cost of "class war in the villages" was horrible and heavy. The Party appeared less disturbed by dead kulaks than by dead cows. The former were "class enemies" . . .

The grim and brutal battle for collectivization was nevertheless crowned with ultimate victory. Congress XVI in June, 1930, pushed the attack. Stalin called it "the Congress of the sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realization of solid collectivization." In January, 1933, the Central Committee decided to organize "political departments" in the Machine and Tractor Stations serving the *Kolkhozes*. Some 17,000 Party members went out into the countryside to work for the cause. By 1933 over 200,000 tractors and 25,000 combines were in use. By the end of 1940, 99% of all arable land throughout the Union was included in the collectives. The balance represented State Farms and a scattering of individual holdings. The *Kolkhoze* members painfully learned to become mechanics and to make mechanized agriculture pay dividends to themselves and the State. Opposition and doubt gave way to confidence and energetic participation in the new agriculture, which had demonstrated its superiority over the old ways.

The ruthless struggle for rapid collectivization and industrialization was accompanied by arrests, executions and various trials of obstructionists, saboteurs and scapegoats. During the earlier years the GPU, "the unsheathed sword of the proletarian dictatorship," retained its power to make arrests, conduct secret trials and impose sentences. In December, 1930, in a spectacular public trial, eight engineers and intellectuals, headed by Prof. Ramzin, were sent to prison after confessing to a conspiracy, subsidized

from abroad, to establish an "Industrial Party" for the purpose of replacing the Soviet power with a bourgeois régime. * In March, 1931, a group of Mensheviks were sent to jail after confessing to a sabotage plot, allegedly planned at a secret meeting in Moscow in the summer of 1928 with Rafael Abramovich, Menshevik leader in exile. Abramovich published an "alibi," purporting to prove that he had resided in Germany and Belgium during the entire summer. In March, 1933, Allan Monkhouse, Leslie Thornton, William MacDonald and three other British subjects, plus various Russians, all employed by the Metropolitan-Vickers Company, were arrested for espionage and sabotage. Several confessed and received prison sentences in April. London imposed an embargo on Soviet goods. In July it was lifted when the jailed Britishers were released and deported. Other similar episodes marked these hectic years. Thousands of Soviet citizens suffered even heavier penalties for theft of State property (made a capital offense by the law of August 7, 1933) and for interfering in other ways with the fulfillment of the Plans. Allegations abroad that all or most of the confessions in such cases were fraudulent are not convincing. At the same time, in view of the sweeping authority of the GPU and the merciless determination of the Soviet leadership to crush all opposition, many who were innocent doubtless suffered along with the guilty.

Within the Party the miseries and frustrations engendered by the great adventure of building socialism found expression in the "Right Deviationists" who followed Bukharin and Rykov. In their concern for the kulaks and for the future of agriculture, those who had formerly supported the majority of the Central Committee against the Trotskyites now sought to make common cause with their erstwhile foes against Stalin. In July, 1928, Bukharin secretly visited Kamenev who jotted down the comments of his guest and sent the notes to Zinoviev who despatched them abroad to Trotsky's followers, by whom they were later published: "We (i.e., Bukharin, Rykov and Mikhail Tomskey) consider Stalin's line fatal to the Revolution. . . . He is an unprincipled intriguer who subordinates everything to his appetite for power. . . . While

*Ramzin and four other defendants were sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted to 10 years' imprisonment. On July 7, 1943, Prof. Ramzin was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Stalin prize of \$30,000 for the invention of the Ramzin turbo-generator.

giving way, he has kept hold of the leadership and later will strangle us. . . . What is to be done? . . . Stalin's policy is leading us to civil war. He will be forced to drown the rebellion in blood." ²⁹ Early in 1929 clandestine negotiations were apparently begun for the formation of a bloc of Right and Left Oppositionists. When Rykov, Tomskey and Bukharin proposed to quit the Central Committee, they were condemned by their colleagues for "this saboteur policy of resignations." In November, 1929, however, the Central Committee removed Bukharin from the Politburo, warned other Rightists, and ruled that propagation of the views of the Right Deviationists was incompatible with Party membership.

Not for another five years were the dissenters and anti-Stalinists conspirators within the ranks to bring down upon themselves the full wrath of the Party and State. In the interim they recanted and professed obedience to Party decisions. The Party moved forward in its herculean task under a leadership which by 1931 included among the members of the Politburo such able administrators as Vyacheslav Molotov, successor to Rykov as Chairman (Premier) of the Sovnarkom; Valerian V. Kuibyshev, Chairman of the Gosplan; Y. E. Rudzutak, Commissar for Communications; G. K. Ordjonikidze, Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; and Klementy E. Voroshilov, Commissar for Defense. By the time of Congress XVI, whose 1,268 delegates assembled on June 26, 1930, the Party for the first time had more than a million members (1,261,000) and over 700,000 candidates. Congress XVII, meeting in January, 1934, had 1,225 delegates, speaking for 1,874,000 members and 935,000 candidates. At this "Congress of Victors," Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskey, Kamenev and Zinoviev renounced their past mistakes and eulogized the Party leadership—with something less than full sincerity, as was soon to become clear. New Party rules were adopted. To all outward appearances the crusading brotherhood which ruled the USSR was not only more successful than ever before in carrying out its program but was solidly united in the pursuit of its purposes.

Its central objective, that of building a mammoth structure of heavy industry on socialist foundations, was carried far towards completion between Congresses XV and XVII. The machine age came swiftly to the "dark people" of the steppes, long wedded to their ancient ways and, save for sporadic outbreaks of violent revolt, politically and culturally inert since the days of the

Mongols. By millions the sons and daughters of illiterate *muzhiks* now learned to read and write, to handle modern tools, to understand motors and assembly lines and even in many cases to become technicians and engineers. These exhilarating experiences, opening out new vistas in every direction, overshadowed the incalculable wastage and wreckage and the incredible squalor and want of the new industrial centers. Whenever production fell amid the advances and retreats of the First Five Year Plan, brigades of *Udarniki* or shock-workers were rushed to threatened sectors of the industrial front to hold the line. Factories sprouted like mushrooms on this strange battlefield. On the great bend of the Dnieper, a new citadel arose, under the direction of Hugh L. Cooper, American engineer: the Dnieper River Power Station with its gigantic dam and mighty turbines. Far to the east, Magnitogorsk sprang from the soil as a bastion of the Ural-Kuznetsk industrial combinat. Pipelines in Transcaucasia, railways in Turkestan, plants for manufacturing motor cars, tractors and agricultural machinery in Gorki, Stalingrad, Rostov, Kharkov and Chelyabinsk all were visible symbols of victory.

All difficulties were met by setting higher goals, by exhorting all to greater efforts and by pouring millions of new proletarians into industry. Quality was sacrificed to quantity. Workers whose output was far below western European and American standards were supplemented by other workers in endless numbers, equally inefficient but inspired by the new gospel and able to learn and produce results. Between 1929 and 1930 wage-earners worked five days and rested one in overlapping shifts with no regard to Sundays or holidays, so that many industrial establishments operated seven days a week and twenty-four hours a day with three daily shifts. Living standards, measured in consumers' goods and housing, although not in social services and educational opportunities, declined during the first Plan. The result was a ceaseless migration of workers from district to district in search of more favorable conditions, with a labor turnover of amazing proportions. Under the second Plan, 1933-38, life became easier, if not less hectic, and the labor supply became more stable. In 1935 a coal miner named Alexi Stakhanov stumbled upon some of the elements of "Taylorism," with its time-motion-and-efficiency methods of rationalizing production. Through teamwork he greatly increased his daily output and became the symbol of

"Stakhanovism" in all industry. "Speed-up," piece-work and bonuses became the order of the day. To "overtake and surpass America" in industrial production became the watchword. This goal was as yet beyond accomplishment. But in striving toward it the USSR was to become the second most powerful industrial State of the world.

4. SECURITY BY BALANCE

Peace was the prime concern of Soviet diplomacy during the NEP and the Five Year Plans. This familiar truism unfortunately throws little light on the international position and policies of the USSR. All sane statesmen profess love for peace and abhorrence of war, since the conscience of man ordinarily demands obeisance to the ideal of brotherhood and forbids approval of murder, arson and brutality. The secret joy which flows from abandoning inhibitions, yielding to rage and hatred, and committing acts of violence and cruelty is a guilty joy which must always be denied or rationalized. So long as men retain their senses they must therefore condemn all praise of war and praise all condemnation of war. All governments in all sane and stable societies win public approbation by denouncing war and glorifying peace—and sometimes by acting as if the words were meant. In the 20th Century the only departures from these age-old precepts have been undertaken in the Fascist despotisms, expressing in the psychopathic frenzy of their subjects, and in the planned and purposeful mobilization of evil by their rulers, the social death and putrescence of the national communities where they have arisen. Only here have power-holders glorified slaughter and destruction and deliberately led their demented minions to the shambles.

In the normal processes of diplomacy (and the 1920's were a decade of relative normalcy), foreign policy is motivated neither by a passion for peace nor a wish for war. These are but alternative conditions under which actual objectives are pursued. The basic purposes of all high politics are fixed by the nature of the State System and by the persistent habits and values of Western mankind in modern times. They comprise the preservation of the existence, the independence and the "sovereignty" of the State and, as a means thereto, the maintenance and enhancement of its power vis-à-vis potential enemies. These goals are everywhere

regarded as more important than peace, which can always be had by those who deem peace paramount through the sacrifice of these purposes in the face of threats from other sovereignties. Whatever the preferences of pacifists may be, patriots never willingly abandon the symbols of sovereignty in order to avoid bloodshed. War in their defense is invariably judged necessary and righteous when peace means subjugation. The leaders and peoples of the Soviet State, as they have repeatedly and vigorously demonstrated, have always been prepared to fight for the fundamental national rights cherished in all States.

Soviet attachment to peace has never been a product of peculiar proletarian or Communist virtues nor yet of the vaunted non-predatory character of Soviet society. It has been distinguished from similar aspirations in the Western democracies chiefly by a firmer grasp of the relation between means and ends and by a greater willingness and ability, under varying conditions of power politics, to do the things best calculated to keep peace without sacrificing vital national interests. The victory of World Revolution might have meant global peace had it eventuated in a world-wide union of proletarian dictatorships in which national sovereignty and international anarchy would both have disappeared. The defeat of World Revolution necessarily obliged Moscow to defend the sovereignty of the Soviet State in an anarchic world of sovereignties in which all others were "bourgeois" and therefore actually or potentially anti-Soviet.

The gravest peril for the USSR, as for any Power, has always been the possibility of a hostile combination of all other Powers against it. Had the Allies and the Reich not been at war in 1918, the Soviet power would have been crushed. Had Germany not been helpless and neutral in 1919 the Allied and American intervention might have destroyed the proletarian dictatorship. Had Britain and America been enemies instead of allies of the Socialist Fatherland in its mortal combat with the Fascist Axis, the Soviet Union would have been conquered. The USSR has often been isolated in a hostile world and has needed peace as an opportunity for reconstruction and new construction and for a constant strengthening of the industrial, agricultural and demographic bases of Soviet fighting capacity. When Russia equals or surpasses America in economic potential, the Kremlin need no longer fear any possible combination of Powers against it. Pending this event,

Soviet security requires that other Powers be kept divided and balanced among themselves if they cannot be united with the USSR by bonds of common purposes. When the wolves quarrel, the sheep are safe.

During the 1920's Soviet diplomacy was ably directed by Chicherin and his astute aide, Maxim Litvinov, who formally succeeded as Commissar for Foreign Affairs on July 25, 1930. (Chicherin, long failing in health, lived in retirement thereafter and died on July 7, 1936.) The details of the complex problems and policies of the Narkomindel during these years have been set forth elsewhere at length.³⁰ The broad design was primarily determined by continuing Soviet fears of renewed intervention by the Western Powers. These fears were by no means groundless.

Anti-Sovietism as a guide to national policy was especially conspicuous in Great Britain in the 1920's. Moscow sought to neutralize Tory animosity, partly by concessions, partly by embarrassing the more ardent Russophobes among British leaders, and partly by giving diplomatic support on various issues to the "revisionist" States: Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and China. After protracted negotiations the first Labor Cabinet signed two draft treaties with a Soviet delegation on August 8, 1924, both subject to parliamentary approval. The commercial treaty, providing for most-favored-nation treatment and for extension to the USSR of the British program of export credits, met with little objection. The general treaty was assailed by Conservatives for requiring a loan to the Soviet Government, to be guaranteed by the British Government, as a condition of compensation to British property owners and bond-holders. The Liberals, led by Asquith and Lloyd George, also opposed this bargain. Since MacDonald's majority in Commons depended upon Liberal support, this decision threatened the survival of the Cabinet. On October 8, 1924, the Cabinet fell on a vote censuring its decision to abandon the prosecution for sedition of J. Ross Campbell, editor of the Communist *Workers' Weekly*. The merits of the Soviet treaties played a major role in the election campaign.

Election day was set for October 29, 1924. On October 25 Mr. J. D. Gregory of the Foreign Office sent a protest to the Soviet Chargé, Rakovsky (simultaneously releasing it to the press), against an alleged appeal from Zinoviev to the British Communist Party for "armed insurrection." Rakovsky at once declared the

"Zinoviev Letter" a forgery. Ramsay MacDonald, who had been tricked by the Tory-minded bureaucrats in the Foreign Office, remained silent and finally asserted, two days before the polling, that he did not know whether the Letter was genuine. In the new House the Laborites were reduced from 191 to 151 and the Liberals, who never recovered from this blow, from 159 to 40. The Conservatives won a majority and named a Cabinet headed by Stanley Baldwin, with Sir Austen Chamberlain as Foreign Minister.

This was not the first instance, and was far from being the last, of political reactionaries winning electoral victories by the use of the Bolshevik bogey. The Baldwin Cabinet dropped the Soviet treaties. By June of 1925 Lord Birkenhead, Sir Douglas Hogg, Sir Robert Horne and other Red-baiters in high places had joined *The Daily Mail*, *The Morning Post* and Sir Henry Deterding of Royal Dutch Shell in demanding a rupture of relations with Moscow. Chicherin warned of "the grave consequences which will ensue if Lord Birkenhead's threats materialize." After the brief General Strike of May, 1926, called in support of the British miners, the Trade Union Congress appealed for international support of the miners' union which continued on strike. The largest contribution, over £1,000,000, came from the Soviet Trade Unions. Tory denunciation of the Kremlin now rose to new heights. Conservative opinion was scandalized by the presence in Stratford-on-Avon, at the 362nd celebration of Shakespeare's birthday, of Soviet Chargé Ivan Maisky, who had been invited by mistake and had insisted on accepting the invitation. His successor, Leonid Krassin, died suddenly in London on November 24, 1926. All Soviet efforts to effect a settlement of outstanding questions were rebuffed by Downing Street, where it was apparently hoped that an attitude of hostility would somehow cause the USSR to meet British claims, abandon the Comintern, relax the State monopoly of foreign trade and perhaps abandon Bolshevism *in toto*.

These expectations having been frustrated, the Tory leaders moved toward more extreme measures. On May 12, 1927, the Home Office ordered a police raid on Arcos, Ltd., a British corporation conducting Anglo-Soviet trade, and on the HQ in the same building of the Soviet Trade Delegation which enjoyed diplomatic immunity under the agreement of 1921. Sir William

Joynson-Hicks asserted that his agents were searching for a missing document, allegedly stolen by an Arcos employee. The document was not found. Moscow protested. Prime Minister Baldwin accused Soviet representatives of espionage and anti-British propaganda. On May 26, 1927, he terminated the trade agreement and severed Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations. In April of 1928 Lord Birkenhead made a "private" visit to Berlin where he sought to promote an Anglo-French-German anti-Soviet bloc, a project which received no encouragement from Stresemann.

The British election of May 30, 1929, resulted in a Conservative defeat and a Labor-Liberal majority in Commons. Ramsay MacDonald, head of the second Labor Cabinet, displayed his customary timidity and vacillation in the negotiations which ensued, though his Party was pledged to a restoration of Soviet relations. Not until October 1, 1929, did Foreign Minister Arthur Henderson and M. Dvoglevsky, Soviet Ambassador to France, sign an agreement for a resumption of relations. Commons approved on November 5 by a close vote of 324 to 319. Sir Esmond Ovey became British Ambassador in Moscow. Gregory Sokolnikov was officially received on December 20 as Soviet Ambassador to the Court of St. James. On April 16, 1930, a temporary Anglo-Soviet commercial accord was signed, providing for most-favored-nation treatment and reestablishing, with diplomatic immunity, a Soviet Trade Delegation in London.³¹

Official relations between the Soviet Union and the United States remained non-existent, thanks to Washington's continued refusal to recognize the Soviet regime. Trade developed to a point approximating its pre-1914 levels. American companies sold machinery, motor cars, trucks, metals and cotton, and bought furs, manganese, flax and caviar, with American exports to Russia amounting annually to three or four times the value of imports from Russia. Much of this commerce was handled by the Amtorg Trading Company, incorporated in New York in 1924 as an agency of the Soviet import and export offices. Diplomatic relations, however, were unthinkable to the White House and State Department. When Litvinov in March, 1921, sent a message from Lenin to President Harding soliciting negotiations, Secretary of State Hughes replied that "this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations"

pending "convincing evidence" of a restoration of "private property, the sanctity of contracts and the rights of free labor." Russia, said the Secretary, was "a gigantic economic vacuum" and would remain so as long as "the present political and economic system continued."

On July 27, 1922, the State Department announced recognition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, a decision described as not inconsistent with championship of Russian territorial integrity. Boris Bakhmetev, Kerensky's Ambassador, was accused by Senator Borah of misusing funds derived from American war loans and of harboring a "murderer"—i.e., Ataman Gregory Semenov, who visited the United States in the spring of 1922. At the end of April Bakhmetev and the State Department agreed upon his retirement, effective June 30, with Financial Attaché Serge Ughet continuing to be recognized as a representative of Russia for another eleven years. In his first message to Congress, December 6, 1923, President Coolidge declared that he would not "enter into relations with another regime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations. . . . Encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society can be detected. But more are needed. . . . Whenever there appear works meet for repentance, our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia." Secretary Hughes curtly dismissed a proposal from Chicherin for negotiations. Secretary Frank B. Kellogg, who took office in March, 1925, resolutely adhered to the non-recognition policy.³²

The United States and the USSR were the only two Great Powers outside of the League of Nations and the only two which consistently championed non-aggression, neutrality and disarmament. These common bonds, however, were insufficient to bring about a reversal of the American attitude. Despite mutual interests in opposing Japanese aggrandizement, Washington and Moscow were sharply at odds in Eastern Asia. A Sino-Soviet accord of May 31, 1924, signed by Leo Karakhan and Wellington Koo, renounced all Russian privileges, concessions and rights of extraterritoriality in China and provided for joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railway to the exclusion of other Powers. Washington protested to China, but without result. When Moscow raised its envoy to China to the rank of Ambassador and named Karakhan to the post in the summer of 1924, the United

States not only refused to follow this example but sought, again in vain, to prevent Karakhan from securing possession of the Russian Legation in Peking.

These frictions multiplied in the summer of 1929 when the young Manchurian warlord, Chang Hsueh-liang arbitrarily seized the Chinese Eastern Railway and refused to restore, or pay compensation for, Soviet rights in the line. When Red troops crossed the border in retaliation against raids by Chinese and White Russian forces, Washington developed a lively interest in the controversy. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson made a secret proposal to London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and Tokyo on July 25, suggesting a neutral study commission, reciprocal withdrawal of troops and interim management of the railroad by a board of 5 Chinese, 5 Russians and a "neutral" chairman. Stanley K. Hornbeck of the State Department aroused Soviet suspicions by speaking (on August 27 in Williamstown, Mass.) of neutralization of the railway as a traditional American policy. By November Soviet forces were making large-scale raids into Manchuria. Chang capitulated and opened negotiations which were concluded on December 3 with a Moscow-Mukden pact restoring joint Sino-Soviet management of the railroad. Secretary Stimson, through France, had meanwhile invoked the Kellogg Pact on December 2, with Germany and Japan declining to join in his *démarche*. On the next day he was rebuked by Litvinov for "unjustified pressure," unfriendly interference and unwelcome "advice and counsel" to a government which his own government refused to recognize. The incident suggested the unwisdom of a prolonged absence of diplomatic relations between Powers with interests in the same area, but produced no change of policies in Washington during the balance of the Hoover Administration.

Moscow had already shocked the Western Powers by its attitude toward disarmament—the magic formula which was widely believed to hold the secret of world peace during the 1920's. On December 7, 1925, the League Council had established a "Preparatory Commission" to pave the way for a general disarmament conference. The USSR accepted an invitation to participate after the Swiss Government agreed to make amends for the murder of Vorovsky. Litvinov arrived in Geneva in November, 1927, at the fourth session of the Commission. He threw the other delegates into consternation by insisting that the

way to disarm was to disarm. He proposed an immediate world-wide agreement for the dissolution of all land, sea and air forces, the scrapping of all armaments, the abolition of military training and the discontinuance of military budgets, defense ministries and general staffs. This startling suggestion, as Litvinov said to Congress XV, was "received as a sacrilege, as an attack on the very foundations of the League of Nations, as a breach of all the proprieties."

So long as national sovereignty, international anarchy and power politics are the pillars of the Western State System, all governments evaluate proposals for disarmament in terms of their probable effect on relative fighting capacity. The USSR is no exception. The abolition of armies, navies and weapons would reduce fighting power to a matter of fists, sticks and stones. Next to China and India, the Soviet Union had the largest supply of all three. Litvinov's heresy was perfectly calculated, however, to embarrass the other diplomats. At the fifth session of the Commission, Litvinov was supported by the German and Turkish delegates. He appealed for American support but was rebuffed by Hugh Gibson. Lord Cushendon accused Litvinov of "insincerity" and was answered with a crushing *tu quoque*. The Soviet proposals were rejected. Litvinov then offered a plan for partial and gradual disarmament on a quota basis, which was also rejected. "May those who believe that they have indefinite time at their disposal," said he, "not receive a rude shock one day." The General Disarmament Conference, with its 232 delegates from 57 countries presided over by Arthur Henderson, did not meet in Geneva until February 2, 1932. The draft convention of 60 articles, which was the basis of its discussions, offered no promise of disarmament. On the opening day the Japanese Navy was bombarding Shanghai. The Geneva enterprise slowly expired in tragic failure.³³

The Narkomindel had meanwhile woven an impressive web of peace pacts. Through the use of the then popular panacea for preserving peace by outlawing war, the objective of Moscow was to thwart any combination of Powers against the USSR. Tory Britain was not unnaturally envisaged as the most probable source of inspiration for such efforts. Winston Churchill (November 28, 1925) referred to the "dark power of Moscow," based on "a band of cosmopolitan conspirators gathered from the underworld." Lord Birkenhead spoke of the Soviet regime as "a junta

of assassins and thieves." British proposals of 1924 for an Anglo-French-German guarantee pact were viewed in the Kremlin as a scheme to unite the Western Powers against Russia.

Chicherin, with the support of German Ambassador Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, sought to persuade Wilhelmstrasse to remain faithful to the Rapallo policy. On October 16, 1925, however, a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was initialed at Locarno by Stresemann, Briand, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini, et al. This "Rhine Pact" provided for a joint Anglo-French-German-Italian-Belgian guarantee of the German-French and German-Belgian frontiers, to become effective as soon as Germany should become a member of the League of Nations. Supplementary treaties between Germany on the one hand and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the other provided for arbitration or adjudication of all future disputes not settled by diplomacy. Moscow not only viewed these obligations as a basis for a possible anti-Soviet bloc but feared that the Reich as a League Member might lend itself to joint action against the USSR under Article 16 of the Covenant. The result of Soviet pleas, and of the reluctance of the German Republic to make an irrevocable choice between East and West, was the signature, by Stresemann and Ambassador Nikolai Krestinsky, of a new German-Soviet treaty on April 24, 1926.

This agreement embodied the basic formula of all Soviet peace pacts during these years. It was foreshadowed by the treaty of December 17, 1925, signed in Paris by Chicherin and Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Foreign Minister of Turkey, who was smarting from the award of Mosul to Iraq by the League Council two days previously. Turkey and the USSR each agreed to remain neutral in any war involving the other and pledged themselves not to attack one another nor to enter into any blocs, coalitions or agreements against one another. The Soviet-German treaty, concluded for five years and subsequently extended, reaffirmed the Treaty of Rapallo and specified that "should one of the Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful attitude, be attacked by one or more third Powers, the other Contracting Party shall observe neutrality for the whole duration of the conflict" (Art. 2). If such a conflict should occur or a coalition be formed "with a view to the economic or financial boycott of either of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to adhere to such

coalition" (Art. 3). Stresemann further pledged his Government to oppose any anti-Soviet moves at Geneva and to decide for itself whether the USSR should ever be deemed an aggressor and to what extent, if any, the Reich would apply League sanctions.³⁴ Moscow concluded similar non-aggression and neutrality pacts with Lithuania (September 28, 1926), Afghanistan (August 31, 1926), Iran (October 1, 1927), Estonia (May 2, 1932), Latvia (February 5, 1932), Finland (January 21, 1932), Poland (July 25, 1932, extended May 5, 1934, to December 31, 1945) and finally with France (November 29, 1932).

Neutrality is the antithesis of collective security. The Soviet peace pacts of the 1920's were in principle and purpose the negation of the League Covenant. The latter sought to generalize war by obligating all States to join forces against aggressors. The former sought to localize war by obligating each signatory to remain aloof from any conflict in which the other might be involved. For Moscow, as for Washington, the formula for peace was not the Wilsonian precept of "making any war everybody's business," but rather the injunction of "keeping out of other people's wars." American isolationism and Soviet fear of hostile coalitions led to a similar result in foreign policy. Moscow was in no sense "isolationist." But under the conditions of the time it correctly envisaged its security in terms of pledging as many other States as possible to refrain from aggression and to observe neutrality in any armed clash in which the USSR might be involved. Unlike the neutrality pacts concluded by Berlin in the 1930's, the Soviet formula was not designed to isolate neighboring States and render them ripe for aggression but was a reflection of anxiety lest the USSR become a victim of aggression. Since no other State could be expected to come to the aid of the Soviet Union, Soviet safety lay in isolating the attacker rather than encouraging a possible joint attack in the name of collective security.

Litvinov completed his design for peace by a number of other instruments. On August 27, 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris was signed, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and pledging the Parties to settle all disputes only by pacific means. Kalinin spoke of it as merely "more talk" and "a huge smoke screen." But Litvinov saw advantages in Soviet adherence. On August 31 he signed it in Moscow on behalf of the Soviet Union, which was the first Power to ratify it. He then proposed to Poland

the conclusion of a supplementary accord putting the Pact of Paris into effect immediately between the two States without waiting for a general exchange of ratification. Warsaw asked the participation of the Baltic States and of Rumania, which had no diplomatic relations with Moscow because of Soviet refusal to acknowledge Rumanian title to Bessarabia, seized by Bucharest in 1918. Without modifying Soviet policy regarding the lost province, Litvinov accepted Rumanian participation. On February 9, 1929, the "Litvinov Protocol" was signed at the Narkomindel by representatives of the USSR, Poland, Rumania, Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania and Turkey adhered on April 1, Danzig on April 30 and Iran on July 4, 1929.

Four years later Litvinov salvaged from the wreckage of the London Economic Conference a "Convention for the Definition of Aggression." On July 4, 5, and 6, 1933, representatives of the USSR, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Afghanistan, Iran, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia signed a compact based on the Politis Report (May 24) to the Disarmament Conference which in turn was an outgrowth of Litvinov's proposals. Aggression was defined as declaration of war, invasion, attack on territory, vessels or aircraft, naval blockade, and support of armed bands invading another State. "No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for aggression."

THE SHADOW OF FASCISM

I. BETWEEN HIROHITO AND HITLER

TO CONVERT imperialist war into civil war was Lenin's favorite formula for international peace and global proletarian revolution. To convert civil war into imperialist war became the formula of Fascism in the 1930's for the solution of the problems posed by the catastrophic breakdown and prolonged stagnation of capitalistic economy. In none of the afflicted societies did the débâcle foreseen by Marx and Lenin create favorable conditions for the proletarian revolt which they and their followers anticipated. In several national communities it produced new despotisms brought to power by frightened industrialists and aristocrats, and fanatically supported in the name of anti-Bolshevism by the desperately insecure and neurotic masses of the lower middle class. The new tyrants restored production by programs of colossal rearmament. They kept peace at home by waging war abroad. First and last, the major target of their plans for aggression was the Soviet Union—as they never tired of boasting, once they discovered that those with wealth and influence in the “decadent” democracies were favorably impressed by such advertising. The anatomy of disaster is still fresh in many memories.

Newsflash: On “Black Thursday,” in late October of 1929, stock prices break disastrously on the New York Stock Exchange. A panic of selling is temporarily arrested by the intervention of J. P. Morgan & Co. But on October 29 the bottom falls out of the market. By the end of the day sixteen and a half million shares have changed hands. By the end of the year security prices have declined \$15,000,000,000. Within two years stock losses total

\$50,000,000,000 and affect 25,000,000 Americans. During 1931, 2,000 banks in the United States close their doors, 28,000 business firms go bankrupt and the price of wheat falls to its lowest point in 250 years. Four million American unemployed in the fall of 1930 grow to seven million by 1932 and thirteen million by 1933. At the end of the Hoover Administration every bank in the United States closes its doors and American business is in a state of almost complete paralysis.

Newsflash: In May of 1931 the Kredit-Anstalt bank of Vienna finds itself unable to meet its obligations, thanks to politically inspired French withdrawals and the efforts of other creditors to liquidate their loans and investments. German banks are heavily involved. In their efforts to come to the rescue, they weaken their own position and call for help from British banks which hold Central European obligations in large amounts. When the British bankers find themselves unable to stem the panic, the Bank of France and the American Federal Reserve Bank advance credits. All is of no avail. In the face of huge gold losses and disastrous deflation, the British Government suspends the gold standard on September 21, 1931. The Dominions, the Scandinavian States and Latin America follow suit. Japan goes off gold in December, 1931. The United States does likewise in June, 1933. Six million workers are soon jobless in Germany. Hitler's Nazis win 6,400,000 votes in the Reichstag election of September 14, 1930; 13,400,000 in the presidential election of April 10, 1932; and 13,745,000 (37% of the total) in the Reichstag election of July 31, 1932.

Newsflash: On September 18, 1931, in the fourth year of Hirohito's reign of "Radiant Peace," a bomb explodes on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden. Six hundred Japanese troops, righteously indignant, storm and burn the Peitaying barracks of China's Northeastern Army in a "furious battle" in which 320 Chinese and 2 Japanese are killed. Within a few days Lieut. Gen. Honjo's Imperial Japanese Kwantung Army occupies Mukden and all the towns and railways of southern Manchuria. His aides, including Jiro Minami, the "Little Hitler," and Kenji Doihara, the "Lawrence of Manchuria," help direct the seizure of all of the vast province of northeastern China. Soldiers of the Kuomintang offer feeble resistance. Statesmen at Geneva utter feeble protests. Men of Nippon bombard and occupy Shanghai early in 1932. Manchuria becomes "Manchukuo" in September,

under "Emperor Kang Teh" (Henry Pu-yi), last of the Manchus. The Western Powers speak weak words and do nothing.

All these events, separated in space by thousands of miles, are closely linked on the calendar and on the fever chart of a sick world. They are diverse symptoms of the anxieties, frustrations and aggressions of a global community lacking government and lacking means, apart from total war, of clothing the ragged and feeding the hungry. The only national economy not grievously stricken by the Great Depression was that of the USSR. Its effects on the Soviet Union were limited to a painful disturbance of foreign trade: world prices of exported raw materials fell more rapidly and sharply than those of imported machines and manufactures, thereby requiring larger exports to pay for smaller imports. Elsewhere the disaster produced either national paralysis, as in the Western democracies, or national hysteria, as in Central Europe and Japan. World politics became a contest between the comatose and the insane. The former regarded the latter as the guardians of civilization against Bolshevism. The result was the gravest political and military threat from abroad which the Soviet Union had ever faced.

If World War II be viewed in the broad perspective of a long process of social disintegration and civil and international violence, the conflict must be regarded as having begun where it was to end: in the Far East. Three days after the "Mukden Incident," *Izvestia* (September 21, 1931) asserted that the action of the Kwantung Army represented "a new, particularly acute stage in the permanent Japanese-Chinese conflict" and a fresh demonstration of "the depths of the collapse and the degree of weakness to which China has been brought by the Kuomintang, feudal-bourgeois reaction—the shameful agents of world imperialism." Tokyo solicited Soviet non-interference as a *quid pro quo* for Japanese passivity during the Manchurian affair of 1929. Litvinov challenged the analogy, championed respect for treaties, and expressed "serious alarm" over the Japanese occupation of Central and Northern Manchuria (*Izvestia*, November 21, 1931). Molotov told the Central Executive Committee at the close of the year that the League Powers had shown their "complete lack of desire and ability" to halt the conflict, which he described as "the most important problem of our foreign policy," calling for unflagging Soviet vigilance.

True to his formula of localizing all hostilities, Litvinov in December, 1931, offered Yoshizawa a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression and neutrality pact. There was no reply. The Narkomindel refused to cooperate with the Lytton Commission, sent belatedly by the League to investigate the Manchurian imbroglio. Moscow distrusted Geneva and had no wish to provoke Japan, particularly since London and Washington were unable to agree on joint action. Agreements on trade credits and Soviet oil exports were concluded between the USSR and Japan late in 1932, along with new accords regarding Japanese access to the salmon and crab fisheries off Kamchatka and nearby coasts. These rights, guaranteed by Article II of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 and reaffirmed by the Peking accord of 1925, were subject to annual bargaining over rentals. When Moscow, on December 12, 1932, accepted Chinese proposals for a resumption of diplomatic relations, severed since the break of 1927, Foreign Minister Uchida raised the bogey of Communist influence in China, always a useful device to elicit acquiescence in Japanese aggression from Geneva, Paris and London.

The Kremlin's policy was shaped, as always, by a desire to avoid the danger of an anti-Soviet combination among other Powers. Soviet spokesmen viewed the report of the Lytton Commission with skepticism since, despite its criticism of Japanese action, it sought to safeguard Japan's special interests in Manchuria and commented sympathetically on Japanese fears of Communism. Litvinov declined the League invitation to make the USSR a member of the Advisory Committee established in February, 1933, to seek the application of the Lytton recommendations. Most of the States on the Committee, he observed, "do not maintain any relations with the Soviet Union and consequently are hostile to it." His Government supported the cause of justice and peace in the Far East, but, "anxious by all means to prevent a further extension of the military conflict and its possible development into the source of a new world conflagration, has adopted a course of strict neutrality from the very beginning."¹ Neither neutrality in Moscow nor verbiage at Geneva, however, was capable of diverting the Japanese militarists from their appointed course.

When Ambassador Troyanovsky in Tokyo found it impossible to make progress with the proposal of a non-aggression pact, Moscow looked to its guns and at the same time considered major

concessions as a means of averting or postponing a clash. In his report to the Central Committee on January 10, 1933, Stalin explained the 6% lag in the fulfillment of production quotas under the First Five Year Plan by "the refusal of neighboring countries to sign non-aggression pacts with us" and the resultant necessity of increasing the output of armaments. In the Second Plan provision was made for heavy investments in the Soviet Far East.

In view of constant Japanese interference with the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Litvinov on May 2, 1933, suggested its sale. The road was originally constructed under the Li-Lobanov accord of 1896 and was under joint Sino-Soviet management after 1924. The crisis of 1929 ended with the agreement of December 3 and the Khabarovsk Protocol of December 22 restoring the *status quo*. In 1931 China lost control over Manchuria. Litvinov was proposing the sale of Soviet rights to "Manchukuo"—i.e., Japan. He refused to acknowledge the validity of Chinese protests and at the same time insisted on protection of the "property rights" of the Soviet people whose money had been used in Tsarist times to build the railway. Discussions opened in Tokyo in June, 1933. Moscow asked 625,000,000 yen. Manchukuo offered 50,000,000. Moscow reduced its price to 200,000,000 yen. After protracted bargaining, featured by many deadlocks, the deal was closed on March 23, 1935, with the payment of 140,000,000 yen plus 30,000,000 yen in pensions to Soviet employees. Moscow thus liquidated at heavy sacrifice a valuable asset on foreign territory, hoping thereby to reduce friction with Tokyo. Experience was to demonstrate that the military fanatics who were increasingly in control of Japanese policy understood only the language of superior force.

In his report to the Central Executive Committee in December, 1933, Litvinov characterized Soviet-Japanese relations:

From the time of the signing of the Peking Agreement until the end of 1931 the best good-neighbor relation existed between us and Japan. There were no conflicts, no serious misunderstandings, and whatever misunderstandings arose were settled by peaceful diplomatic negotiations. There were no threats from one side or the other. . . . This situation began to change after Japan began its military operations in Manchuria. . . .

These actions were, as you know, characterized by all the outside

world, including the League of Nations to which Japan herself belonged, as a violation of such agreements as the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact. The occupation of Manchuria was, however, also a violation of the Portsmouth Treaty, confirmed by the Peking Agreement, under which Japan did not have the right to maintain troops in Manchuria above a certain minimum. We declined to take part in the international actions undertaken and planned at that time, first, because we did not believe in the honesty and consistency of the governments participating in these actions and primarily because we did not seek, nor do we now seek, armed conflict with Japan. . . . (But) the more calmly and more complacently we behaved, the more provocative became the Japanese authorities in Manchuria. . . .

Along with infringing our rights on the railroad, political figures in Japan, including official representatives of the Japanese Government, began to discuss openly and even in the press the question of war against the Soviet for the purpose of seizing the Primore and the whole Far Eastern Krai. . . . In Manchuria near our border a large number of Japanese troops were concentrated, war materials were brought, railroads and highways were built, etc. In this way the danger not only of the seizure of our railroad by Japanese arms, but a direct danger to our frontier was created. Under these circumstances there was nothing left for our Government to do but to begin to fortify our frontier, transferring the necessary forces for that purpose and taking other military measures.²

The year 1933 also saw the United States at long last grant diplomatic recognition to the USSR. Prior to the election of 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt had expressed his intention of giving sympathetic consideration to a change of policy. Various factors entered into the final decision. The decline of American exports to the USSR from more than \$100,000,000 in 1930 and 1931 to \$9,000,000 in 1933 influenced political and business opinion. Common anxiety regarding Japanese and Nazi ambitions played a role, albeit not one publicly mentioned on either side. At the London Economic Conference Raymond Moley and William C. Bullitt conferred with Litvinov and subsequently arranged the procedural details of recognition. On October 10, 1933, President Roosevelt invited President Kalinin to send a representative to Washington "to end the present abnormal relations" between the two peoples. Kalinin replied on the 17th, expressing the view that

lack of relations had had the effect of "complicating the process of consolidating world peace and encouraging forces tending to disturb that peace."

Litvinov, travelling via Warsaw, Berlin, Paris and the Cunard Liner *Berengaria*, reached Washington on November 7. He stayed with Boris Skvirsky, head of the Russian Information Bureau, and told pressmen that all questions could be settled in half an hour. But nine days of discussion ensued with Roosevelt, Hull and State Department officers. Recognition was opposed by the Hearst press, the *Chicago Tribune*, Congressman Hamilton Fish, Bainbridge Colby and Japanese officialdom. Eugene Lyons, United Press correspondent in Moscow, was already preparing his poison pen attacks on the USSR, since, as Arthur Upham Pope aptly puts it, "Hell hath no fury like a frustrated doctrinaire idealist."³ Lyons reported armed clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces and implied that recognition was desired by the Soviet leaders for the purpose of involving the United States in Far Eastern complications. He later retracted his story, which Litvinov described as a Japanese plot to wreck the negotiations, with Lyons as cat's-paw. When Tokyo issued a categorical denial of Lyons' report, he declared that he had been "framed" by the Soviet authorities. Such episodes added flavor to the negotiations but had no effect on their outcome.

On November 16, 1933, the texts of various communications were released. President and Commissar agreed to an exchange of Ambassadors (William C. Bullitt and Alexander Troyanovsky) and expressed the hope that diplomatic relations would lead to cooperation for "mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world." Litvinov agreed that the USSR should refrain "from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States"; should restrain all persons and organizations under its control from all agitation or propaganda aimed at "bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions"; and should not permit on its territory any organization or group aiming at intervention in, or revolutionary propaganda against, the United States. Roosevelt accepted reciprocal obligations and included in the compact a guarantee (willingly accepted by Litvinov to the tune of relevant citations from Soviet legislation) that Americans in the Soviet Union would be granted

complete and unqualified religious liberty and would enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in legal protection. Questions of financial claims and counter-claims were deferred. But Litvinov expressly agreed to waive all counter-claims arising out of intervention in Siberia, thanks to his "examination of certain documents of the years 1918 to 1921 relating to the attitude of the American Government toward the expedition into Siberia, the operations there of foreign military forces and the inviolability of the territory of the USSR."

This settlement proved not to be lacking in sources of subsequent controversy, particularly as to the unpublished verbal understandings arrived at. In later debt negotiations with Ambassador Bullitt, Litvinov asserted that it had been understood in Washington that new loans would be granted in return for payments on old debts and claims. Secretary Hull contended that initial payments on past obligations must precede any fresh advances. The United States guaranteed commercial credits through the Export-Import Bank, which was founded for this specific purpose. But the Johnson Act, passed in April, 1934, forbade public loans to any foreign government already in default and made the sale of securities of such governments or subdivisions thereof a criminal offense. The Soviet Government has never defaulted on any of its own obligations. It was nevertheless held in default for declining to pay the Kerensky debt unless it received compensation for damage done in North Russia in the intervention of 1918-19. Negotiations over these matters were terminated on February 1, 1935, with an agreement to disagree. A commercial accord was signed in Moscow, however, in July, 1935, by which the USSR pledged itself, in return for American tariff concessions under the reciprocal trade agreements, to purchase \$30,000,000 worth of American goods during the ensuing year. This figure was modest by comparison with what would have been possible under more favorable credit arrangements. The accord was renewed from year to year at somewhat higher levels. The two Powers now at least had the means of direct communication with one another and the opportunity to cooperate in meeting common dangers.

Adolf Hitler had meanwhile become *Reichskanzler* on January 30, 1933. The delivery of Germany into the hands of an organized gang of homicidal maniacs was not the result of an electoral

victory. The Nazi Party lost 2,000,000 votes in the Reichstag election of November, 1932. The Brown Shirt fanatics came to power as a result of a conspiracy hatched in Cologne early in January by Hitler and Franz von Papen, meeting at the home of the banker, Baron Kurt von Schroeder. Other industrialists, bankers, junkers, militarists and political adventurers, including Fritz Thyssen and Alfred Hugenberg, joined the plot and prevailed upon old President Paul von Hindenburg to dismiss Chancellor von Schleicher in favor of a "coalition" Cabinet of Nazis and reactionaries. The burning of the Reichstag building on February 27 was the Nazi equivalent of the "Zinoviev Letter." In the last election, March 5, 1933, 44% of the terrified voters cast Nazi ballots, certain that they were thereby saving the Reich from an imminent Communist revolution. How Hitler's madmen secured a parliamentary majority by arresting the Communist deputies and how they subsequently suppressed all other parties, terrorized all opposition, and established a despotism dedicated to intolerance and conquest is a familiar story.

Unlike most of the Western statesmen, Litvinov had no illusions regarding the ultimate consequences of the Nazi revolution, for he had read *Mein Kampf*:

The annihilation of France must be looked upon solely as a means of gaining finally the possibility of expansion for our people. Today there are 80,000,000 Germans in Europe! The justification of this foreign policy will be acknowledged when after a hundred years 250,000,000 Germans will be living on this continent (pp. 766-7). . . . We start anew where we terminated six centuries ago. We reverse the eternal Germanic migration to the South and to the West of Europe and look Eastwards. In this way we bring to an end the colonial and trade policies of pre-war times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future. If we speak of new soil we can but think first of Russia and her subject border States (p. 742). . . . Never forget that the most sacred right in this world is the right to the soil which one may till for oneself, and that the holiest sacrifice is the blood shed for this soil (p. 754). . . . If the German people had possessed that safe herd instinct, based on blood, the German Reich would probably today be mistress of the globe . . . (through) the victorious sword of a master nation (pp. 437-8).⁴

The words of Alfred Rosenberg were also not lost on the Soviet leaders. This rabidly anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic Baltic

German was a fugitive from the Russian Revolution. He became Hitler's mentor, Nazi dictator of *Weltanschauung* and author of the most popular Nazi "philosophical" work, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (Munich, 1930), wherein he wrote (p. 601):

"From West to East" is now the direction from the Rhine to the Vistula, "from West to East" must resound from Moscow to Tomsk. The "Russian" who cursed Peter and Catherine was a real Russian. Europe should never have been forced upon him. In the future, after the separation of the non-Russian territories (the western provinces, the Ukraine, the Caucasus) he will have to be content to transfer his center of gravity to Asia. . . . Let him turn his "word" to the East where they may be room for it, having first cleansed it of that admixture of ideas of Baboeuf, Blank, Bakunin, Tolstoi, Lenin, and Marx, called Bolshevism. In Europe, which is alien to him and which he hates, there is no room for him any more.

The Japanese equivalent of the Nazi blueprint for conquest was the secret program of July 25, 1927, submitted to the Emperor by the then Premier, General Tanaka. The Tanaka memorial was smuggled out of Japan and first published by *The China Critic*, September 24, 1931. It was denounced in Tokyo as a forgery. It was in fact an authentic and authoritative statement of the purposes of the warlords of Nippon. It read in part:

In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we are able to conquer China, all the other Asiatic countries and the countries of the South Seas will fear us and capitulate before us. The world will then understand that Eastern Asia is ours. . . . With all the resources of China at our disposal, we shall pass forward to the conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia and even Europe. But the first step must be the seizure of control over Manchuria and Mongolia. . . .

It seems that the inevitability of crossing swords with Russia on the fields of Mongolia in order to gain possession of the wealth of North Manchuria is part of our program of national development. . . . Sooner or later we shall have to fight against Soviet Russia. . . . One day we shall have to fight against America. If we wish in future to gain control over China we must crush the United States.

The anti-Soviet coalition which was to crystallize in 1936 in the Anti-Comintern Pact and in 1940 in the Triple Alliance began

to take shape in 1933-34. Japan gave notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations on March 27, 1933, and Germany on October 14. In the summer of 1934 a Japanese squadron visited German ports. Trade agreements and exchanges of military and naval officials followed between Berlin and Tokyo. Nazi publicists now discovered that the Japanese were the "Aryans" or "Nordics" of the Orient. On December 29, 1934, Japan denounced the Washington Naval Treaty and embarked upon an arms race with Britain and America. In Berlin the Nazi leaders fostered a "Russian National Socialist" movement among émigrés while Rosenberg dreamed of restoring Hetman Pavel Skoropadsky to his role of 1918 as a German puppet in the Ukraine. The visionaries of Tokyo and Berlin knew that no conquest of Eastern Siberia and no creation of a Ukrainian "Manchukuo" could be attempted unless the power of the USSR were broken in the process. And the breaking of Soviet power by force required, as a necessary prelude, the weakening of Soviet power by fraud, conspiracy and internal disruption.

2. SECURITY BY COALITION

A Power confronted with open threats of attack by a hostile coalition has need of armaments and allies. To localize war through neutrality pacts suffices when no coalitions exist, or when one foreign coalition is balanced by another. When a powerful enemy bloc comes into being, however, with no adequate counterpoise, the seekers after safety must strive to generalize war by supporting "collective security" and by pledging as many States as possible to act together against aggression. The prospective victims who refuse to hang together are certain to be hanged separately. In recognition of these new realities Soviet politics and diplomacy after 1933 were directed toward increasing Soviet fighting power and building an anti-Fascist coalition.

The men of the Kremlin assumed that in the worst event the USSR would prove capable of defending itself. They further assumed that if the Western Powers should prove incapable of collective action the anticipated attack might yet be deferred by a Soviet reversion to a balance-of-power policy, involving accords even with Fascist States. In his report of January 26, 1934, to Congress XVII, Stalin stated the prospects candidly:

Some bourgeois politicians think that war should be organized against the USSR. Their plan is to defeat the USSR, divide up its territory, and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that it is only certain military circles in Japan who think in this way. We know that similar plans are being hatched in the leading political circles of certain States in Europe. Let us assume that these gentlemen pass from words to deeds. What may be the upshot? There can hardly be any doubt that such a war would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie, not only because the peoples of the USSR would fight to the very death to preserve the gains of the Revolution . . . (but because) it would be waged not only at the fronts, but also behind the enemy's lines. The bourgeoisie need have no doubt that the numerous friends of the working class of the USSR in Europe and in Asia will do their best to strike a blow in the rear at their oppressors who start a criminal war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries. And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame us if some of the governments so near and dear to them, which today rule happily "by the grace of God," are missing on the morrow after such a war. One such war against the USSR was waged already, if you remember, 15 years ago. As is well known, the universally esteemed Churchill clothed this war in a poetic formula—"the march of fourteen States." You remember, of course, that this war rallied the working people of our country into one united camp of heroic warriors, who stalwartly defended their workers' and peasants' homeland against the foreign foe. You know how it ended . . . It can hardly be doubted that a second war against the USSR will lead to complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in Asia, and to the destruction of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries . . .

Some German politicians say that the USSR has now taken an orientation towards France and Poland; that from an opponent of the Versailles Treaty it has become a supporter of that treaty, and that this change is to be explained by the establishment of the Fascist regime in Germany. That is not true. Of course we are far from being enthusiastic about the Fascist regime in Germany. But Fascism is not the issue here, if only for the reason that Fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the USSR from establishing the best relations with that country. Nor is it a question of any alleged change in our attitude toward the Versailles Treaty. It is not for us, who have experienced the shame of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, to sing the praises of the Versailles Treaty. We merely do not agree to the world being flung into the abyss of a new war on account of this Treaty. The same must be said of the alleged new orientation taken by the USSR. We never had any orientation towards Germany, nor have we any

orientation towards Poland and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation at the present time is toward the USSR, and toward the USSR alone. And if the interests of the USSR demand *rapprochement* with one country or another which is not interested in disturbing peace, we take this step without hesitation . . . Those who want peace and are striving for business intercourse with us will always receive our support. And those who try to attack our country will receive a stunning rebuff to teach them not to poke their pig snouts into our Soviet garden again.

The shape and size of the menace to be met are best suggested by noting the milestones of Fascist diplomacy.⁵ Following the German-Italian quarrel over Austria in 1934, negotiations were initiated in search of a basis of cooperation. The Berlin-Vienna Accord of July 11, 1936, and the joint German-Italian attack on the Spanish Republic launched a week later, paved the way for the formation of the "Axis." Before massed thousands of goose-stepping fanatics and civilian hysterics, Hitler at Nürnberg declared in September that "if I had the Ural mountains with their incalculable store of treasures in raw materials, Siberia with its vast forests, and the Ukraine with its tremendous wheat fields, Germany under Nationalsocialist leadership would swim in plenty." Said Rosenberg: "The Soviet Union's Government is controlled by Jewish interests and it is money stolen from the Russian people by the Jews that is being used in an attempt to awaken the underworld in all nations to march against European culture." Added Göbbels: "Bolshevism must be annihilated." On October 25, 1936, Ciano and Ribbentrop signed a secret pact. Commented Il Duce: "It is no wonder if today we raise the banner of anti-Bolshevism. This is our old banner!" On November 18 the two Caesars of Fascism took their first joint step in diplomacy: simultaneous recognition of Franco's rebels as the Government of Spain.

Less than a week later, on November 25, 1936, Ribbentrop and Mushakoji, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, signed the five-year "Anti-Comintern Pact," pledging collaboration between their States against "Communist subversive activity." Italy adhered on November 6, 1937. Tokyo recognized Italian title to Ethiopia. Rome recognized Manchukuo. Trade agreements followed. On the first anniversary of the Pact, Matsuzo Nagai, Minister of

Transport, sent greetings to Göbbels: "The Sino-Japanese conflict is for us a holy war to free the Chinese people from the Red Peril." The Reich recognized Manchukuo on May 12, 1938. The German-Italian treaty of military alliance (May 22, 1939) and the Tripartite Pact (September 27, 1940) threatening the United States with war, were the capstones of the Fascist coalition.

Four days before the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed, *Izvestia* (November 21, 1936) declared that "the two most aggressive Powers in the world have formed a bloc" and are engaged in a "conspiracy against peace," directed as much against Britain and America as against the USSR. The answer must be "organization of collective security and real protection for peace." Said Litvinov:

As for the Japanese-German agreement which has been published, I would recommend you not to seek for any meaning in it, since it really has no meaning for the simple reason that it is only a cover for another agreement which was simultaneously discussed and initialed, probably also signed, and which was not published and is not intended for publication. I declare with all sense of the responsibility of my words that it was precisely to the working out of this secret document, in which the word Communism is not even mentioned, to which were devoted the 15 months of negotiations between the Japanese military attaché and the German super-diplomat. . . . The Japanese Government assured us that it was still considering the non-aggression pact we proposed to it and that such a pact might be concluded after the settlement of all questions in dispute; now, however, it has made the conclusion of such pacts dependent upon Germany's consent, lessening thereby the independence of its own foreign policy. The anti-democratic aggressive Fascist countries have had their say. . . . They issue one challenge after another to peace-loving and, in the first place, to democratic nations. It now rests with those nations to speak.⁶

Moscow feared attack in the East from a Japan in control of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and much of China. Moscow feared attack in the West from an Axis in control of truncated Austria, feudal-Fascist Hungary, corrupt Rumania, helpless Bulgaria and wavering Yugoslavia. Despite Warsaw's alliance with Paris and its peace pacts with the USSR, Poland veered toward the Axis camp. Pilsudski was less anti-German than anti-Russian. His friend, Josef Beck, became Foreign Minister, November 2, 1932. Warsaw and

Berlin signed a ten year non-aggression pact on January 26, 1934. At Pilsudski's funeral in Cracow, May 18, 1935, Laval, fresh from a hurried visit to Moscow, conferred at length with Göring.

The orientation of Pilsudski's Colonels, who continued to rule Poland, is suggested by the widely circulated book of Wladimir Studnicki, *Poland's Political Aims* (1935): "Poland has the strongest interest in a victory of Japan over Russia. Participation in a Russo-Japanese war would be possible if Poland were to ally itself with Germany with this in view. No attention need be paid to France which occupies today a secondary position. Poland and Germany could lay the foundations of a great Central European bloc." At the London Economic Conference, Alfred Hugenberg had circulated a memorandum demanding the return of the German colonies and an international "mandate" to the Reich to "reorganize" Russia through the use of German "constructive and creative genius." Dr. Schacht told the Governor of the Bank of France, according to Pertinax (*Echo de Paris*, November 3, 1935), that "we have no intention to change our western frontiers. Sooner or later Germany and Poland will share the Ukraine, but for the moment we shall be satisfied with making our strength felt over the Baltic provinces."

The Second and Third Five Year Plans made provision for a vast Soviet war industry capable of supplying a modern, mechanized defense force. In the Maritime Provinces a self-sufficient Red Banner Army of 250,000, under General Vasily Bluecher (Galen), was established to parry a possible Japanese attack from Manchukuo. A thousand bombing planes based at Vladivostok were calculated to impress Tokyo with the unwisdom of aggression. The Trans-Siberian was double-tracked. A new railroad was laid north of Lake Baikal to Komsomolsk on the lower Amur, with branches southward to Khabarovsk and eastward to the coast opposite Japanese Sakhalin. Frontier defenses were everywhere strengthened. Alone among European military forces, the Red Army kept pace with the growth of the *Wehrmacht* by expanding its regular troops to a million men by 1935, to two millions by 1937 and to almost three millions by 1939, all equipped with guns, tanks and planes turned out by the new heavy industries. Said Defense Commissar Voroshilov in 1936: "When the enemy attacks the Soviet Ukraine or Soviet Byelorussia or any other part of the Soviet Union, we will not only pre-

vent his invading our own country but will defeat him in the territory whence he came."

Against the Japanese danger it was impossible to make even a beginning of organizing an effective coalition. America, Britain and France, though all threatened by Tokyo, were paralyzed. While their diplomats appeased the aggressors, their exporters supplied the Japanese war machine with oil, rubber, scrap iron and all else needed to continue aggression. *Izvestia* (May 21, 1937) endorsed the Australian project of a Pacific security pact but warned that such a policy required "that the Powers do not refuse ahead of time to participate in a real struggle for peace in the Pacific, that they do not prefer their attempts to reach agreements with the aggressor, and that they do not retreat before his impudent demands."

China, the first victim of attack, was as helpless as the Western Powers. Rather than resist Japan, Chiang Kai-shek preferred to conduct annual crusades against the peasant Soviets of the northern provinces. Extreme measures were required to change his mind. When he visited Sian Fu in Shensi in December, 1936, he was kidnapped by the troops of Chang Hsueh-liang, who freed him only on condition that he cease his war against Red China, work for anti-Japanese unity, and cooperate with the Communists and northern warlords against the invader. As a result of this prospect, and of their own defeat at the polls at home, the Nipponese militarists launched a new and murderous assault on China, beginning with the clash on the Marco Polo Bridge near Lukouchiao, southwest of Peking, on July 7, 1937.

The initial Chinese protest at Japanese aggression was sent to the USSR as well as to the signatories of the Nine Power Pact. An American squadron, for the first time since the Revolution, made a courtesy call at Vladivostok at the end of July. In pursuit of their new program of conquering all of China, Japanese forces machine-gunned the British Ambassador, bombed and sank the U.S.S. *Panay* and raided Soviet Consulates at Tientsin and Shanghai. Now, if ever, a four-power coalition was called for to halt the madmen of Tokyo. But the only result of the crisis was the signature of a five-year Sino-Soviet neutrality pact on August 21, 1937, by which the signatories renounced aggression and agreed "not to render assistance of any kind, either directly or indirectly" to any third Power which might attack the other. Litvinov's pleas

at Geneva for effective League action against Japan came to nothing. The USSR accepted the invitation to attend the Brussels Conference of the signatories of the Nine Power Pact. But Litvinov soon left the Belgian capital and reported to his people what had happened:

China applies to the League of Nations for protection, referring to the corresponding points in the Covenant. The League forms a committee, the committee appoints a subcommittee, and the latter elects an editorial committee. A paper is drafted and addressed to Japan: "We do not approve of your offensive. Probably it is based on a misunderstanding. Please come to confirm this and, lest you feel lonely among us, we are inviting your kindred spirit and friend, Germany." From Japan comes confirmation that there is no misunderstanding at all, that she is on the warpath quite deliberately and agrees to discuss matters only with China and only on terms of the latter's surrender. Disarmed by this reply, the League decides to refer the question to the Powers most concerned in Far Eastern affairs, signatories to the so-called Washington Treaty which is violated by Japan for the second time. (It was violated the first time by the occupation of Manchuria.) And so the Brussels Conference is called, and the Soviet Union is also invited, although she is not a signatory to the Washington Treaty. What does this conference do? Its activity was very neatly hit off in a cartoon which I saw in a foreign newspaper. This shows the honorable delegates of eighteen States, not without great effort and strain, dragging a letter to the postbox for Japan. In this letter, as you know, they again demand Japan's confirmation whether she is deliberately committing her aggression in China and request her to stop and accept mediation. Confirmation is not long in coming. Japan, even with an inflection of resentment, replies that there is no need to bother her; she has repeatedly stated that she is attacking China quite deliberately and for quite definite aims. She does not need anybody's mediation; she is ready to negotiate only with China—about capitulation, of course—and the only thing the conference can do is to make China agree to this capitulation. This reply disarmed the Brussels Conference, just as the first reply disarmed the League of Nations, and the Conference was closed.⁷

Only in Outer Mongolia did it prove possible for Moscow to acquire an "ally" against Japan. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the ancient land of Jenghis Khan, under the leadership of the Khutukhta or "Living Buddha," had broken away from Chinese control. Between 1921, when the regime of Baron Ungern-Sternberg was liquidated and a Soviet-Mongol treaty of

friendship was signed, and 1925, Soviet troops had remained in Mongolia. With the death of the last Khutukhta in 1924, after twenty-three earthly incarnations, a popular revolution against the feudal-theocratic rule of the Lamas and princes led to the establishment of a "Peoples' Republic" fashioned on Soviet models. The northwestern area of Tannu-Tuva had already become an "independent" Soviet protectorate in 1923. The Peoples' Republic, with its capital at Ulan Bator, was still nominally under Chinese suzerainty but looked to the USSR for protection against Japanese pressure which became heavy in 1936. On March 1 Stalin told Roy Howard that "if Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian Peoples' Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. Stomoniakov, Litvinov's assistant, recently informed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow of this and pointed to the immutable friendly relations which the USSR has maintained with the Mongolian Peoples' Republic since 1921."

On March 12, 1936, at Ulan Bator, a Soviet-Mongolian Protocol was signed putting into formal effect a "gentlemen's agreement" of November 27, 1934. For a period of ten years "the Governments of the USSR and of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic undertake in the event of military aggression against one of the Contracting Parties to give each other every assistance, including military assistance" (Art. 2). Troops stationed by one State in the territory of the other by mutual agreement would be withdrawn, as in 1925, as soon as the necessity had passed (Art. 3). China protested on the ground that the Protocol violated Article 5 of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924. Litvinov retorted that the pact did not "violate to the slightest degree the sovereignty of China." Moscow charged that Tokyo had inspired the protest. A Soviet-Japanese press war raged throughout the year and thereafter. But Japanese-Manchukuo forces were halted at the Mongolian border by the knowledge that the Red Army would resist any farther advance.

The militarists of Tokyo persistently refused to negotiate a non-aggression pact, arguing that all outstanding issues should first be settled. Involved negotiations over fisheries and frontiers pursued their tedious course. With the signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact, Moscow refused to revise or replace the fisheries convention of 1928 and made Japanese rights dependent upon

annual agreements. The Kwantung Army and the soldiers of Henry Pu-yi indulged in cautious experimentation to test out the will and the power of Moscow to defend the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. This policy was safe since Tokyo knew that the Kremlin would not take the initiative in precipitating a full-scale war. This policy was also conclusive; all the experiments had the same outcome.

Soviet diplomacy was supplemented by force. Arms achieved that which diplomacy alone could not have accomplished: the prevention of open war. The major clashes which convinced the Sons of Heaven that war with Russia would be unwise were interspersed among hundreds of border incidents. During the spring and summer of 1937 Japanese units on the Amur River south of Blagoveshchensk sought to occupy various islands claimed by the USSR. The incident was publicized throughout the world out of all proportion to its significance. In January, 1938, Zhdanov criticized the Narkomindel before the first session of the newly elected Supreme Soviet, contending that it "should be more resolute in its attitude toward the arrogant, hooligan and provocative conduct of the agents of Japan and of that puppet State called Manchukuo." At the end of July, in the region southwest of Vladivostok, a Japanese division occupied Chankufeng Hill and another eminence to the north, both west of Lake Hassan near the juncture of Korea, Manchukuo and the Soviet hinterland of Possiet Bay. Early in August a Soviet division, aided by tanks and bombers, drove out the intruders with several hundred casualties on both sides. Litvinov and Ambassador Shigemitsu signed an armistice on August 11, 1938, restoring the status quo.

Early in May, 1939, new hostilities began in the district of Nomonhan, southeast of Lake Bui-Nor along the Khalka River, easternmost point of Outer Mongolia. Moscow came at once to the defense of the Peoples' Republic. Intermittent fighting continued through the summer until Soviet-Mongol forces routed the invaders at the end of August, destroying or capturing 8 tanks, 144 guns and 600 planes. A truce of September 16 restored the *status quo*. Having learned a costly lesson, the men of Nippon henceforth refrained from challenging Red forces to battle. Less resistance was to be encountered in other directions.

If the geopolitics of Soviet strategy called in the Orient for that which was unattainable—i.e., alliances with China, Britain and

America to checkmate Japanese ambitions—it called in the West for allies on Germany's flank and rear. The French post-Versailles alliance system already embraced Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. British and Soviet support of this bloc would have rendered the Nazi Reich helpless. Moscow was willing and anxious to effect such a combination. London, Paris and Warsaw were befogged in illusions and evasions. Yet the effort was persistent. It resulted in a coalition which, had it not been betrayed by the Anglo-French appeasers, could easily have halted World War II long before it began.

Soviet entry into the League of Nations was the point of departure for the attempts of the Narkomindel to organize collective security against aggression. Little progress was made until the coming to the Quai d'Orsay of Louis Barthou in the wake of the Fascist riots in Paris of February 6, 1934, and the ensuing resignation of the Daladier cabinet. Barthou, serving under Premier Gaston Doumergue, was 72 years old and a staunch conservative. He was the only French Foreign Minister during a fateful decade who understood the nature of the Nazi menace and saw how it might be met. The French-Soviet non-aggression pact of November 29, 1932, had paved the way for a *rapprochement*, as had the visit of Litvinov to Paris in July, 1933, and the September journeys to Moscow of Edouard Herriot and Pierre Cot. Barthou spent the spring of 1934 visiting Warsaw, Prague, Geneva (where he conferred with Litvinov), Bucharest and Belgrade, hoping to strengthen the French-Polish alliance and to weld the "Little Entente" and "Balkan Entente" into a firm structure of security.

Litvinov, like Barthou, realized that the safety of France and the USSR required an alliance. Without illusions, he had accepted Nazi renewal (May 5, 1933) of the 1926 neutrality treaty. In September, 1933, he concluded a non-aggression pact with Italy. But he ignored overtures from the Wilhelmstrasse during his passage through Berlin in December. He took it for granted that in the end nothing would halt the Axis drive to war save a counter-mobilization of superior force. He now endorsed the familiar French view that security must be organized in concentric circles and argued (May 18, 1934) that in the first circle must stand France, the USSR, the Baltic States, Poland and the Little Entente; in the second, the Mediterranean Powers; and in the third the Pacific Powers. His fears of a German-Polish-Finnish bloc

against Muscovy were enhanced by the Polish-German pact of January, 1934, and German rejection of his proposals of March 28, 1934, for a joint guarantee of the four Baltic States. He therefore supported Barthou's project of a mutual assistance pact on the Locarno model among France, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the Baltic States.

But the project failed despite the blessing of Sir John Simon in July. Berlin and Warsaw both refused to participate save on conditions which would have made the arrangement meaningless. The attempt at least demonstrated, even to the British Cabinet, that there was no workable alternative to a French-Soviet alliance. Soviet membership in the League, it was agreed, should be a first step. Chicherin had opposed the Geneva organization with what he called "absolutely undiluted, unmixed, unwavering, unswerving" enmity. But Stalin told Walter Duranty on Christmas Day, 1933, that "notwithstanding the withdrawal of Germany and Japan—or perhaps just because of this—the League may become something of a check to retard the outbreak of military actions or to hinder them. . . . If historical events should follow such a course, then it is not impossible that we should support the League of Nations despite its colossal defects."

Barthou had induced Prague and Bucharest to grant full recognition to Moscow on June 9, 1934. Bulgaria and Hungary did likewise, but not Yugoslavia whose King Alexander had a horror of "regicides"—though his own father had come to the Serbian throne in 1903 through the murder of his predecessors. By the end of August, Barthou had secured general assent to an invitation to the Kremlin to join the League and to take a permanent seat on the Council. Swiss, Portuguese and Irish objections could be ignored. Polish objections were more serious. Pilsudski's henchmen, already notorious for their oppression of the Byelo-Russians and Ukrainian populations of the eastern provinces, feared that Litvinov at Geneva might raise the question of the Polish treatment of minorities. They distrusted Soviet disclaimers of any such intention. On September 13, 1934, at the 15th League Assembly, Josef Beck declared that "pending the introduction of a general and uniform system for the protection of minorities, my Government is compelled to refuse, as from today, all cooperation with the international organizations in the matter of the supervision of the application by Poland of the system of minority protection."

In the sequel the Western Powers acquiesced in Polish repudiation of the minority treaty as the price of Polish support of Soviet membership in the League. On September 12 Barthou had sent Litvinov a formal invitation from the Council. On September 15, despite De Valera's protest, letters were exchanged and the Council voted to invite the Assembly to approve. On September 18, 1934, third anniversary of the Mukden Incident, the Assembly voted to approve Soviet admission, 38 against 3 (Switzerland, Portugal and The Netherlands), with 7 abstentions (Argentina, Belgium, Cuba, Luxembourg, Panama, Peru and Venezuela). Marcel Houdon of the League Secretariat sought to embarrass Litvinov and his colleagues by bringing them into the gloomy Bâtiment Electoral ten minutes before the Assembly President, R. J. Sandler of Sweden, had concluded his welcoming speech. (Such petty spite found later expression in assigning to Litvinov the chairmanship of the Committee on Seaweeds.) Josef Beck sneered at the whole proceeding. But Litvinov's words from the rostrum were a clarion call to a world which might have saved itself infinite suffering had its leaders listened and acted:

We represent here a new State—new, not geographically, but new in its external aspects, its internal political and social structure, and its aspirations and ideals. The appearance in the historical arena of a new form of State has always been met with hostility on the part of old State formations. . . . The idea in itself of an association of nations contains nothing theoretically unacceptable for the Soviet State and its ideology. The Soviet Union is itself a league of nations in the best sense of the word, uniting over 200 nationalities, 13 of which have a population of not less than one million each, and others, such as Russia and the Ukraine, a population running into scores of millions. I will make so bold as to claim that never before have so many nations coexisted so peacefully within a single State, never before have so many nations in one State had such free cultural development and enjoyed their own national culture as a whole and the use of their own language in particular. In no other country are all manifestations of racial and national prejudice so resolutely put down and eradicated as in the Soviet Union. Here, as regards equality of rights, are neither national majorities nor minorities, since no nation either in theory or practice has less rights and fewer opportunities for cultural and economic development than another. . . .

The Soviet State has, however, never excluded the possibility of some form or other of associating with States having a different po-

litical and social system, so long as there is no mutual hostility and if it is for the attainment of common aims. . . . The organization of peace! Could there be a loftier and at the same time more practical and urgent task for the cooperation of all nations? . . .

One thing is quite clear to me, and that is that peace and security cannot be organized on the shifting sands of verbal promises and declarations. The nations are not to be soothed into a feeling of security by assurances of peaceful intentions, however often they are repeated, especially in those places where there are grounds for expecting aggression or where, only the day before, there have been talk and publications about wars of conquest in all directions, for which both ideological and material preparations are being made. . . . Far be it from me to overrate the opportunities and means of the League of Nations for the organization of peace. I realize, perhaps better than any of you, how limited these means are. I am aware that the League does not possess the means for the complete abolition of war. I am, however, convinced that, with the firm will and close cooperation of all its members, a great deal could be done at any given moment for the utmost diminution of the danger of war, and this is sufficiently honorable and lofty a task, the fulfillment of which would be of incalculable advantage to humanity.

The Kremlin was now fully committed to collective security. The enterprise was auspiciously begun. But the obstructionism of the Polish Colonels, who were to persist to the end in their anti-Soviet orientation, was an evil augury. Still more ominous was the tragedy which brought Pierre Laval to the Quai d'Orsay: on October 9, 1934, one Vlada Georgiev, a Macedonian terrorist in the pay of Ante Pavelich's Croatian *Ustaschi*, a revolutionary movement linked with Fascist conspirators in Budapest, Rome and Berlin, perpetrated a double assassination in Marseilles. The victims were King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Foreign Minister Louis Barthou of France.

3. THE YEARS OF FEAR

The techniques of disintegration employed by the master-conspirators of Berlin and Tokyo in preparation for world conquest became shockingly familiar to the Western democracies only after 1938. The wooden horse with which the Homeric Greeks took Troy by a ruse became a new symbol. General Franco's boast in

1936, while four columns of his troops advanced on Madrid, that the Republican capital would fall through an internal "fifth column" of Fascist sympathizers furnished a new name to an old device. Four years later Vidkun Quisling, betrayer of Norway, was to make his name a universal synonym for treachery. The systematic use of "internal aggression" (in Litvinov's phrase) was well advanced long before the innocents abroad had any inkling of what was afoot. Wherever these weapons aided the Caesars to victory, their precise nature became a matter of common knowledge. Refugees revealed how their countries had been enslaved. Traitors and their employers openly boasted of their treachery. Wherever the tools failed to produce expected results, much remained obscure or unknown.

The USSR was an arena in which the enemy met defeat in political warfare years before he failed in military warfare. The secrecy of each maneuver and counter-move makes it impossible as yet to reconstruct the intricacies of the plots within plots and wheels within wheels whereby the Soviet citadel was attacked and defended. Every aspect of this hidden war is still wrapped in a haze of speculation and controversy, save only the central fact that the attack was unscrupulous, merciless and ineffective and that the defense was ruthless, relentless and successful. What is beyond question, albeit wholly ignored in most contemporary comments, is that Fascist conspirators did all in their power during the 1930's to disrupt and weaken the Soviet Union, as they were doing simultaneously in other communities earmarked for subjugation. Their arsenal of weapons, here as elsewhere, included assassination, sabotage, bribery, blackmail, treason and rebellion.

On December 1, 1934, Sergei Mironovich Kirov was murdered in Leningrad. This crime followed upon others, linked together by common threads running to Berlin, Rome or Tokyo. Nicholas Titulescu, Foreign Minister of Rumania, was a target of Nazi assassins earlier in the same year, and died of poisoning in Switzerland two years later. Alexander and Barthou fell in Marseilles seven weeks before Kirov died. Engelbert Dollfuss, Chancellor of Austria, was shot to death on July 25, 1934. Ion Duca, Premier of Rumania, was slain on December 19, 1933. Chang Tso-lin, warlord of Manchuria, was fatally bombed on June 3, 1928, while travelling by train to Mukden. Other attempts against less prom-

inent targets were numerous. Murder, both retail and wholesale, was a fine art and an instrument of national policy for the new Caesars. Its uses were not confined to non-Soviet States.

Earlier in the year the Party of the Revolution had pursued its course in apparent unity. Congress XVII met in January, 1934, as a "Congress of Victors." The 1,225 voting delegates spoke for 1,874,000 members. The ranks had been temporarily closed to new applicants in 1933 while members judged unworthy were expelled in large numbers. In his report on the work of the Central Committee, Stalin declared that the Party must be kept "in a state of mobilization for the fulfillment of the Second Five Year Plan," on which Molotov, Kuibyshev and Kaganovich presented reports. New Party rules were adopted, emphasizing discipline and duty, designating local cells as "primary organizations" and raising qualifications for admission in terms of the number of sponsors and years of probation required of candidates, with minimum requirements for industrial workers of five years standing. Provision was also made for the establishment of "sympathizers groups" of non-Party people.

Stalin had emphasized the need of trained personnel and more efficient administration in insuring fulfillment of decision. To promote this objective the old Central Control Commission of the Party and the Commissariat of Workers and Peasants Inspection were replaced by a Party Control Commission under the Central Committee and a Soviet Control Commission under the federal Sovnarkom. Stalin also warned against dangers from bourgeois Powers and against "bourgeois survivals in men's minds"—e.g., opportunism, deviationism and local nationalism. Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev all publicly flayed themselves like penitents and sought renewed grace by eulogizing the Stalinist leadership. There were no other hints of the tempest which was soon to break. On July 10, 1934, the GPU was abolished and replaced by a Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), headed by Henry Yagoda, a sinister figure who was later to confess to betraying the State of whose internal security he was the custodian.

Kirov, born in the province of Viatka in 1886, had joined the Party in Tomsk amid the disorders of 1904-06. The Great Revolution found him a Bolshevik leader in Vladikavkaz (Ordjonikidze), already honored for having been four times arrested and sent to jail or exile. In the civil war he directed the defense of

Astrakhan and the restoration of Soviet power in the Caucasus. At Congress XI he was elected a member of the Central Committee, where he became one of the staunchest opponents of the Trotskyites and Right Deviationists. From the post of Secretary of the Leningrad Committee of the Party, he rose to become a member of the Politburo (1930), a member of the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR and, along with Zhdanov and Kaganovich, one of the three Secretaries of the Central Committee serving under Stalin. By 1934 he was widely regarded as No. 2 among the Party leaders.

At 4:30 p.m. of December 1 Kirov was shot to death in Smolny Institute by Leonid Nikolayev, a young Party member formerly employed in the Leningrad branch of the recently abolished Commissariat of Workers and Peasants Inspection. Rumor held that Kirov was having a love-affair with Nikolayev's wife. But the inquiry revealed that the assassin's motives were not private but political. What has since become known of the background of the conspiracy is even today but a small fraction of what is unknown and unknowable. In confidential files, in unpublished letters and memoirs, in the rubble of blasted buildings scattered from Berlin to Tokyo, in the silent tongues of thousands of victims of violence repose secrets which may never become public knowledge. Only spiritualists deny that dead men tell no tales. The dead include not only those sentenced to death in the USSR, but numerous Fascist agents killed by their principals for knowing too much.

Three days after Kirov's death it was announced that the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR would try 71 persons who had been arrested (39 in Leningrad and 32 in Moscow) on charges of counter-revolutionary conspiracy. None was a Party member. Most had entered Soviet territory from Poland, Latvia and Finland. Almost all had been arrested prior to December 1 for allegedly subversive activities having no immediately visible connection with the assassination. On December 6, as Kirov's ashes were entombed in the Kremlin wall, 66 of the 71 were reported executed after a secret trial. On the following day Radek publicly denounced "counter-revolutionists" and "imperialists," while 12 more "White Guards" were arrested in Minsk, reportedly with concealed weapons on their persons. Of these, 9 were executed on the 11th. In Kiev 37 persons were arrested on

December 10, of whom 28 were said to have been executed a week later. In none of these cases were the court proceedings public. By mid-December the Soviet press was writing of foreign plots against the Ukraine and linking the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev with the conspiracy (cf. *Izvestia*, December 16-18, 1934). On December 21, which was Stalin's 55th birthday, 13 more arrests were made in Leningrad. All those apprehended were members or ex-members of the Party who were said to have participated, along with Nikolayev, in a "Leningrad Center" of terrorists composed of followers of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Two days later 15 more Party members were arrested in Moscow, including Zinoviev and Kamenev.

On December 26, 1934, an official announcement declared that the murder was part of a far-reaching plan to kill Stalin and other leaders and to destroy the Soviet regime by terrorism and intervention. One group of plotters was headed by Shatsky and another by Kotolynov who had ordered Nikolayev to kill Kirov. The assassin was said to have received 5,000 rubles from a foreign consul who established contacts between the local conspirators and Trotsky. On December 29 Nikolayev and 13 other Party members were executed after a secret trial. By this time Helsinki was reporting mutinies in Soviet labor camps while the Warsaw correspondent of *The Daily Express* of London was telling of anti-Semitic riots in Moscow and Leningrad and clashes between troops and peasants near Tashkent. All these reports were fictitious. On the last day of the year George Bissenieks, Latvian Consul General in Leningrad, was recalled. His Government denied any connection with Kirov's death. *Izvestia* and *Pravda* identified him as the Consul who had paid Nikolayev and asserted that a "Great Power" (i.e., Germany) had aided him in his work. On January 16 Zinoviev and Kamenev were reported to have confessed to breaches of Party discipline. A week later Medved, head of the Leningrad NKVD, was sentenced to prison along with several of his subordinates for having known of the plot and done nothing to prevent its consummation.

The unfolding of a series of conspiracies and the exposure, trial and punishment of the participants extended over a period of three years. Valerian Menzhinsky, former head of the GPU, had died on May 10, 1934; Maxim Peshkov, son of Gorky, on May 11; and Valerian Kuibyshev, originally head of the Gosplan and Vice-

Chairman of the Sovnarkom, in October, 1934. Maxim Gorky died in July, 1936. All these deaths were apparently a result of illness. But Henry Yagoda later confessed to bribing and blackmailing the attending physicians into administering harmful drugs to their distinguished patients.

On January 17, 1935, Zinoviev was sentenced to 10 years in jail, Kamenev to 5 and other defendants to varying terms, all for knowing of the plot against Kirov and failing to act. Following this secret trial, Soviet justice pursued its course in three dramatic and highly publicized open trials before the Military Collegium of Supreme Court of the USSR, headed by V. V. Ulrich as Presiding Judge with A. Y. Vyshinsky as State Prosecutor.

I. August 19-24, 1936: Zinoviev, Kamenev, I. N. Smirnov, G. Yedvodkimov, V. Ter-Vaganian, S. Mrachkovsky, I. Bakayev, Y. Dreitser, V. Olberg, M. Lurye, N. Lurye, T. Reingold, R. Pikel, E. Holtzmann, K. Berman-Yurie and F. David, all sentenced to be shot with confiscation of personal property.

II. January 23-30, 1937: Yuri L. Pyatakov, Leonid P. Serebryakov, Nikolai I. Muralov, Yakov N. Drobnis, Yakov A. Livshitz, Mikhail S. Boguslavsky, Ivan A. Knyazev, Stanislav A. Rataichak, Boris O. Norkin, Alexei A. Shestov, Yosif D. Turok, Gavriil Y. Pushin, Ivan Y. Hrasche—to be shot; Gregori Y. Sokolnikov, Karl B. Radek and Valentin V. Arnold—imprisonment for ten years and deprivation of political rights for five years; Mikhail S. Stroilov—imprisonment for eight years and deprivation of political rights for five. Confiscation of personal property of all the condemned. "Enemies of the people, Lev Davydovich Trotsky, and his son, Lev Lvovich Sedov, who were in 1929 deported from the USSR and by the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of February 20, 1932, were deprived of citizenship of the USSR, having been convicted by the testimony of the accused Y. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, A. A. Shestov and N. I. Muralov, and by the evidence of V. G. Romm and D. P. Bukhartsev, who were examined as witnesses at the trial, as well as by the materials in the present case, of personally directing the treacherous activities of the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre, in the event of their being discovered on the territory of the USSR, are liable to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR."⁸

III. March 2-13, 1938: Alexei I. Rykov (Lenin's successor as Chairman of the Sovnarkom, 1924-30), Nikolai I. Bukharin, Henry G. Yagoda, Nikolai N. Krestinsky, Arkady P. Rosengoltz, Vladimir I. Ivanov, Mikhail A. Chernov, Gregory F. Grinko, Isaac A. Zelensky,

Akmal Ikramov, Faizulla Khodjayev, Vasily F. Sharangovich, Prokopy T. Zubarev, Pavel P. Bulanov, Lev G. Levin, Ignaty N. Kazakov, Benjamin A. Maximov-Dikovsky and Pyoti P. Kryuchkov—to be shot; Dmitry D. Pletnev—imprisonment for twenty-five years; Christian G. Rakovsky and Sergei A. Bessonov—imprisonment for twenty and fifteen years respectively; confiscation of personal property of all the condemned; Pletnev, Rakovsky and Bessonov to be deprived of political rights for five years after expiration of terms and to have terms counted from day of arrest.

The politics of purgatory reached far beyond these public trials in which all the defendants made detailed confessions. Many other notables were liquidated in the Great Purge. On June 11, 1937, after a closed trial by court-martial, Judge Ulrich sentenced to death on conviction of espionage and high treason Marshal Tukhachevsky, Gens. R. P. Eideman, I. E. Yakir, I. P. Uborevich, V. I. Putna, A. I. Kork, B. M. Feldman and V. M. Primakov. Voroshilov asserted that General Yan Gamarnik, Assistant Commissar of Defense, who had taken his own life on May 31, had participated in the crime of seeking to overthrow the Soviet regime and restore "the yoke of the landlords and the industrialists." On December 19, 1937, it was announced that Karakhan, Yenukidze and six other Party leaders had been executed. Many of Litvinov's Ambassadors, Ministers and aides were dismissed, arrested or executed. Among others who fell were Serebrovsky, successor to Pyatakov as Commissar for Heavy Industry; Mikhail Tomsky, long head of the trade union, who committed suicide in mid-August of 1936; Cherviakov, President of the CEC of the Byelo-Russian Republic, also a suicide; Liubchenko, President of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom; Admirals Orlov and Sivikov; and numerous diplomats, Union and Republican Commissars, industrial managers, etc.

The number of little people who were purged cannot be estimated. No public accounting was given. In the Ukraine one-quarter of the Party members were expelled, and throughout the Union one-fifth. Of these many were arrested, some were exiled and a number were executed. In an atmosphere of universal suspicion, characterized by witch-hunting and a search for scapegoats, the Party leadership and the Soviet press may deliberately have exaggerated the scope and severity of the purge as a means of intimidating doubtful elements. It is probable that many of

those who vanished, and some of those sentenced to death, were not in fact executed but were demoted and transferred to remote districts. When all allowable deductions are made, however, it is still certain that thousands lost their lives and that tens of thousands lost their liberties for varying terms of imprisonment or exile. And it is equally certain that some who were innocent suffered along with the guilty, for such a result was unavoidable in a "cleansing" of such magnitude, partly conducted in its earlier phases by persons who were themselves convicted later of treason.

Contemporary efforts to explain this macabre drama, which to outsiders looked like *Le Grand Guignol* come to life, ranged from unqualified endorsement of Trotsky's own story to full acceptance of the official Kremlin version. Even so sober and careful an observer as Arnold J. Toynbee wrote that the purges constituted "the self-erasure of the Soviet Union," which had become "a gigantic madhouse," for "the fact of Muscovy's madness in A.D. 1937 was not in doubt."⁹ The most popular explanation at the time in America and Western Europe was the one widely advertised by disillusioned ex-champions of Sovietism, eagerly seconded by Trotskyites, Socialists, Fascists and many anti-Soviet conservatives and liberals. This thesis held that Stalin had betrayed the Revolution, made himself the "Bonaparte" of the "Thermidorian" reaction, and become a personal despot and a moral monster. To advance his personal power he had butchered the "Old Bolsheviks"—whose Society was in fact dissolved on May 25, 1935. He and his tools had given a façade of plausibility to part of the massacre by inventing accusations, "framing" the accused, extorting "confessions" and staging an elaborate criminal farce. By this logic all the accused, including Trotsky, were the innocent victims of a bloodthirsty tyrant, vengefully bent upon exterminating all critics and possible rivals.¹⁰

Against this thesis stands almost 2,000 pages of testimony in the three public trials. The picture here painted by the defendants is one of a widespread conspiracy. The Left Oppositionists or Trotskyites and the Right Deviationists, led by Bukharin and Rykov, were linked in a secret bloc, in part directed from abroad by Trotsky. Their purposes included sabotaging Soviet industry and agriculture; promoting nationalist and secessionist movements; murdering outstanding Soviet leaders; preparing the way for a *coup d'état*; delivering military and economic information

to the Polish, German, Japanese and British Intelligence Services; securing Nazi and Nipponese assistance in return for promises of ceding Soviet territory; disorganizing the Red Army in the event of war; and seeking to seize power with the aid of foreign enemies. To these and similar charges all the accused in the public trials confessed in full. Apart from differences of ideologies and definitions of interests and political purposes, these crimes were not different in content, motivation and relationship with the Axis Powers from those of thousands of Trojan horsemen and Fifth Columnists in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. These latter crimes became known to the world in 1940 and thereafter, at a time when no one found them incredible. The earlier crimes in the USSR became known through the confessions of the culprits and were at the time dismissed by most outside observers as completely incredible.

In retrospect the portrait of conspiracy spread on the Soviet court record appears to the present writer, as it did at the time, to be closer to reality than any alternative explanation. The internal details of the plot and the motives behind the confessions are all set forth in the testimony. The culprits failed in their larger purposes because they became ever more muddled, desperate and self-defeated with each passing year. They perceived, contrary to their hopes and beliefs, that the Second Five Year Plan, as it developed under Stalin's leadership, was not failing but was accomplishing its objectives. They also perceived that the Stalinist analysis of the international situation was essentially correct while their own expectations were as false as their plans were fatal. For these reasons they failed. For these reasons also they finally confessed, out of a subjective necessity of redeeming themselves in their own eyes by serving anew, even in disgrace and in the face of death, the cause they had served all their lives.¹¹ In many of its other aspects, however, the purge became "dizzy with success," after the manner of 1930, and produced shocking abuses and injustices. But the denials and counter-accusations of Trotsky and his supporters, despite the doubt they cast on the time or place of certain episodes, do not invalidate the major theses of the Prosecutor and the accused. Neither do they lend credibility to the hypotheses of a "frame-up" based on false confessions.

Those who have read the preceding chapters will have no difficulty in understanding how and why Leon Trotsky, for all his

denials, came to play the role of Judas. It is unnecessary to accept the stereotyped vocabulary of Party, Government and press in the USSR which invariably depicts Trotsky and his collaborators as "fiends," "wreckers," "agents of Fascism" and "restorers of capitalism." All political vocabularies adapted to a time of crisis are oversimplified for popular consumption. All political trials in all States involve elements of stagecraft and propaganda. It is enough to note that Trotsky had become a political failure, a fallen hero, and a vain and vengeful foe of Stalin and Stalinism. His *amour propre* and his hopes of vindication demanded action against the enemy. The aggressions bred by his frustrations had only one target. That target had become inseparable from the Soviet State itself.

While always denying that he sought to remove Stalin and overthrow the "Stalinist bureaucracy" through the use of the methods attributed to him in Moscow, he never indicated publicly what alternative methods he proposed to use.* In 1929 he wrote: "The policy of the Opposition has nothing to do with the preparation for an armed struggle. . . . Our course is one of inner reform."¹² But on April 17, 1937, when pressed by Carleton Beals to admit that he had once dismissed Lenin's Testament as a falsification, he commented: "In modern civilization everybody is obliged from time to time not to tell the truth." No one can know the precise time at which Trotsky made up his mind that Stalin's leadership of the Party must be destroyed by violence. Only later did he openly put his decision into words and secretly attempt to translate words into deeds. The deeds he never acknowledged, preferring to create the impression that an experienced revolutionist with his own great talents as a conspirator would either resort to no deeds or would rely on parliamentary methods in a context where such methods could obviously have no effect. The words, however, are unmistakable in meaning. As early as March 2, 1932, Trotsky wrote:

Stalin has brought you to an impasse. You cannot come out on the road without liquidating Stalinism. You must trust to the working

*But in the *Bulletin of the Opposition*, October, 1933, he wrote: "The Stalin bureaucracy . . . can be compelled to hand over power to the Proletarian vanguard only by FORCE." He later told the *New York American* (Hearst), January 26, 1937: "Stalin has put himself above all criticism and the State. It is impossible to displace him except by assassination."

class, give the proletarian vanguard the possibility, through free criticism from top to bottom, to review the whole Soviet system and pitilessly cleanse it of the accumulated rubbish. It is time, finally, to fulfill the last urgent advice of Lenin: to remove Stalin.¹³

This was not a summons to assassination. But Trotsky never explained how he proposed to resolve the dilemma created by his own interpretation of Stalin's role. He had already failed to bring about a peaceful and orderly change in the direction of the Party. If such a change was still possible, Trotsky had no ground for denouncing Stalin as a tyrant. If such a change was no longer possible, as Trotsky insisted, then it followed that change could be achieved only by force. This was in fact Trotsky's position in the middle 1930's. In *The Revolution Betrayed*, 1936, Trotsky wrote (pp. 287-8 and 165-6):

There is no peaceful outcome for this crisis. No devil ever yet voluntarily cut off his own claws. The Soviet bureaucracy will not give up its positions without a fight. The development leads obviously to the road of revolution. . . . The bureaucracy can be removed only by a revolutionary force. And, as always, there will be fewer victims the more bold and decisive is the attack. To prepare this and stand at the head of the masses in a favorable historic situation—that is the task of the Soviet section of the Fourth International.

Healthy young lungs find it intolerable to breathe in the atmosphere of hypocrisy inseparable from a Thermidor. . . . The more impatient, hot-blooded, unbalanced, injured in their interests and feelings, are turning their thoughts in the direction of terrorist revenge. . . . Although completely impotent to solve the problems which it sets itself, this individual terror has nevertheless an extremely important symptomatic significance. It characterizes the sharp contradiction between the bureaucracy and the broad masses of the people.

A professional revolutionist, once embarked upon preparing a revolution, becomes the enemy of the friends of his enemy and the friend of his enemy's foes. Within the USSR, Left Oppositionists and Right Deviationists were potential allies. Of their leaders Trotsky had a low opinion. But this had not precluded an anti-Stalin bloc in 1926, nor was it a barrier to concerted action in the 1930's. Outside of the USSR the most formidable foes of the "Stalinist bureaucracy" were the Nazi leaders of the Reich and the warlords of Japan. Lenin had not hesitated in 1917 to make use of the national enemies of Russia for revolutionary pur-

poses, nor did he balk in 1918 at large territorial concessions when it became clear that nothing less could save the Revolution. Lenin was anti-imperialist but he was more passionately anti-Kerensky and anti-Menshevik. Trotsky was anti-Fascist but was more bitterly anti-Stalinist. In his eyes Stalin was a heretic, traitor, monster and devil. Among all religionists heretics are invariably hated more than infidels.

Moral revulsion at assassination as a political weapon was a sentiment unknown to Trotsky, for all his initial Marxist objections to individual terrorism. Revolution and counter-revolution are exercises in hatred. The wish to kill is the child of the will to hate. For frustrated and desperate personalities, the wish to kill is the father of hopes and plans for killing. "Playing politics never pays," said Radek, "unless you risk your head." Those who risk their heads are seldom solicitous of other peoples' heads. For all Bolsheviks mass terrorism was a legitimate weapon because effective, while individual terrorism was rejected because ineffective. "We were never concerned," wrote Trotsky, "with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about the 'sacredness of human life.' We were revolutionaries in opposition, and have remained revolutionaries in power. To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him. And this problem can be solved only by blood and iron."¹⁴ Under the conditions of the 1930's the Oppositionists, having no other effective weapons at their disposal, concluded that assassination might prove effective.

In this conjunction of men and motives, the killers who held power in Berlin and Tokyo found their opportunity. In the capitalist democracies they found allies among industrialists, aristocrats, anti-Semites, native Fascists, reactionary army officers, political adventurers and prostituted journalists and politicians. In the USSR a corps of potential Quislings could be recruited only from the ranks of the secret dissenters within the Party and from such diplomats and army commanders as favored continued Soviet collaboration with the *Reichswehr* against the Western Powers rather than a program of collective security designed to checkmate Japan and the Axis. The elements of such a "Fifth Column" were in fact organized and partially mobilized for action with the aid of Trotsky, Tukhachevsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda and other dissidents. Thanks to the

vigilance of the NKVD and to the inhibitions, confusions and quarrels among the conspirators, the plot ended in failure, exposure, belated repentance and punishment.

In the suppression of the conspiracy the Soviet authorities rejected the ancient maxim that it is better that a thousand guilty persons escape than that one innocent person be penalized. They preferred to see a thousand innocents liquidated rather than see a single traitor escape. This procedure, wholly obnoxious in ethics and law, was deemed a political necessity in terms of a long-run calculation of the greatest good of the greatest number. The ultimate issue was life or death for the Soviet State and victory or enslavement for all its peoples. Had the plot not been exposed and crushed, the Soviet Union in the early 1940's would have suffered the fate of Spain, Czechoslovakia, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Nazi technique which prepared sixteen other countries for occupation, subjugation and partial extermination between 1938 and 1941 was precisely the technique set forth in the confessions of the accused in the Moscow trials. Had the conspiracy not been ruthlessly suppressed, Hitler and Hirohito would have won their war not only against the Soviet Union but against Britain and America as well.

On August 21, 1940, Leon Trotsky died in Mexico City from wounds inflicted upon him the day before in his heavily guarded house in Coyoacan by Jacques Mornard van den Dresche *alias* Frank Jackson *alias* Leon Jacome *alias* Leon Haikys, etc. The assassin (sentenced April 16, 1943 to a twenty year prison term) was at once labelled by all Trotskyites and anti-Soviet groups as a paid killer of the GPU, hired by Stalin to slay his enemies. No evidence has ever been adduced to substantiate this contention. The murderer said, apparently in all sincerity, that he was a Trotskyite who had slain Trotsky for "betraying" Trotskyism.

The convulsions of these bitter years weakened and partially demoralized the CPSU (B). After the death of Kirov, all members were required to have their records verified anew and to exchange old Party cards for new ones. "In a number of the organizations," declared the official Party history, "utterly intolerable chaos in the registration of Communists was revealed."¹⁵ When the admission of new members was resumed, the Central Committee instructed the primary organizations, by a resolution of September 29, 1936, to "increase Bolshevik vigilance to the utmost, to hold aloft the

banner of the Leninist party, and to safeguard the ranks of the Party from the penetration of alien, hostile and adventitious elements."

New abuses developed out of excessive zeal to insure loyalty and discipline. In February, 1937, Zhdanov charged that a number of local organizations were violating the principle of democratic centralism. The Central Committee accordingly resolved that intra-Party democracy must be restored by the free election through secret ballots of all directing bodies; by voting for individual candidates and not for lists; by restoring the right of challenge and criticism in all Party elections; and by holding elections in primary, district and city organizations annually and in regional, territorial and Republican organizations every 18 months. The rules and practices of the Party were thus brought into closer harmony with the democratic ideals expressed in the new Soviet Constitution. By the time Fascist aggression and Western appeasement had rendered World War II inevitable, the ruling elite of the USSR had cleansed itself of dubious elements, closed its ranks and made itself once more a disciplined brotherhood of leadership, capable of serving and saving people and State in the ordeals to come.

4. GRAND ALLIANCE AND PEOPLES' FRONT

The murder of Alexander and Barthou, following upon the slaying of Dollfuss and Duca and followed by the killing of Kirov, accelerated rather than retarded diplomatic attempts to prevent the death of millions of others in a general holocaust. Laval, to be sure, was full of tricks. Out of deference to Hitler, Ribbentrop and Pilsudski, he postponed further negotiations for an Eastern Locarno, though agreeing with Litvinov on December 5, 1934, to exchange information, avoid bilateral discussions with others, and "refrain from renouncing the enterprise without having by common consent agreed upon the disutility of continued negotiations." On January 7, 1935, Laval in Rome struck his fatal bargain with Mussolini, involving secret French acquiescence in Fascist designs against Ethiopia. On March 1 the Saar valley was formally restored to the Reich. Anglo-French parleys in London had led on February 3 to an announcement soliciting Nazi participation in a "general settlement," involving a Western European air pact for

mutual defense against aerial aggression, pacts for mutual aid in Eastern Europe, a general disarmament accord to replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and German reentry into the League.

Berlin asked bilateral Anglo-German negotiations. Foreign Minister Sir John Simon, one of the major architects of the disaster to come, agreed to visit Berlin on March 8 to discuss armaments. On March 5 Baron von Neurath informed Downing Street that Hitler had a "cold" and would appreciate a postponement of Simon's visit. Two days later, in deference to French and Soviet objections to his plan, Simon told Commons that Anthony Eden would visit Paris, accompany him to Berlin and then visit Moscow. The Berlin visit was now set for March 24. On Saturday, March 16, 1935, Hitler exploded a political bombshell in the form of an announcement, in violation of Part V of Versailles, of the reintroduction of universal conscription in the Reich and the open reestablishment of the German army—"exclusively for defense," said Der Führer, "and thereby for the maintenance of peace."

In emulation of Simple Simon, Sir John coupled his mild protest with a request that Berlin renew its invitation. Hitler cheerfully complied. The diplomacy of irresponsibility in which the Western Powers now indulged caused Soviet hopes to grow dim but not yet to flicker out. In notes delivered to London and Paris on February 20 the Narkomindel had welcomed the Anglo-French accord of February 3 and championed "the necessity of adopting the most prompt and effective measures to counteract military aggression through pacts of mutual assistance." Nine days after the Nazi *coup* Sir Austen Chamberlain asserted that "there is no doubt about the necessity of the cooperation of Soviet Russia in any complete system of European security."

On March 28, 1935, Anthony Eden, then Lord Privy Seal, reached Moscow in the company of Viscount Cranborne and Ivan Maisky, now Soviet Ambassador in London. He was dined and wined by Litvinov. He conferred with Molotov and Stalin. The British Sovereign was toasted. "God Save the King" was played at the Moscow opera. Eden visited the new subway and inspected aircraft factories. Devotion to collective security went so far that the butter on the table at Litvinov's dacha was stamped: "Peace is indivisible." When Eden boarded the Warsaw train, Litvinov said: "I wish you all success, for your success will be our success

now." The long communiqué of March 31 championed collective security, asserted that "there is at present no conflict of interests between the two Governments on any of the main issues of international policy," and expressed hope of German and Polish participation in the proposed eastern European mutual assistance pact.¹⁶

This hope proved vain. The result was the signature at the Quai d'Orsay on May 2, 1935, by Pierre Laval and Ambassador Vladimir Potemkin, of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France and the USSR. On May 16 at Prague President Eduard Beneš and Ambassador Serge Alexandrovsky signed a similar pact between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Laval insisted that the agreement be limited to Europe and linked with the Covenant. Moscow and Paris pledged themselves to come to one another's aid against unprovoked aggression by any European State "in application of Article 16 of the Covenant." They further agreed to act in the event of any failure of the League Council to reach a unanimous decision. A Protocol specified that the alliance would operate only in the event of aggression against the territories of the parties rather than against that of their other allies. Should the League Council fail to act against the aggressor, France and the USSR would nevertheless join forces for mutual defense.¹⁷ The pact of Prague was similar, but obligated the parties to come to one another's aid only "insofar as assistance may be rendered by France to the party victim of aggression." Beneš visited Moscow where ratifications were exchanged on June 9, 1935. Laval also visited Moscow in mid-May but hastened away to meet Göring in Cracow and returned to Paris with no visible intention of ratifying the French-Soviet alliance.

It had taken open Nazi rearmament to induce the slippery Laval to sign the Soviet pact. It required Nazi repudiation of the Locarno Treaties and remilitarization of the Rhineland, announced March 7, 1936, to bring about French ratification. Not until March 27 were ratifications exchanged at Moscow, putting the pact into effect for five years thereafter. Litvinov had come to London in January to attend the funeral of King George V. Moscow, moreover, was to reach a satisfactory compromise with Downing Street in the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, by which Turkey was permitted to refortify the Straits. Soviet war vessels were granted unqualified access to the Mediterranean in peace-time, in

contrast to limited access to the Black Sea for naval forces of outside Powers. But the Anglo-German naval accord, signed June 18, 1935, by Ribbentrop and Sir Samuel Hoare (who had succeeded Simon), was a heavy blow to Soviet hopes. It granted the Reich 35% of British naval tonnage and parity in submarines, thereby giving Germany potential naval control of the Baltic. By 1936 the men of Moscow had long since begun to suspect that those most influential in shaping British and French policy had no intention of halting German rearmament or Fascist aggression in Asia, Africa or Europe.

The Kremlin supplemented its diplomatic efforts to avert Armageddon by fostering a reorientation of the propaganda and policies of Communist Parties throughout the world. This shift of the Comintern "line" promoted the treasonable conspirings of the Trotskyites within the USSR and led to their attempts abroad to form a "Fourth International." It constituted a further repudiation by the Party leadership of the world revolutionists within the ranks. It was dictated primarily, however, by the realization that the crisis of capitalism was not inaugurating a "Third Period" (following the post-1918 crisis and the recovery of the 1920's) in which proletarian revolution would become a possibility, but was instead initiating on a world scale an epoch of savage Fascist reaction which could be opposed only by a union of all anti-Fascist forces.

The German Communist Party, largest in the world outside of the USSR, went down to complete defeat before the Nazi assault. Such of its leaders as escaped execution or imprisonment continued for a time to echo Moscow in denouncing the Social Democrats as "Social Fascists" and in regarding Hitlerism as a passing episode. Only slowly was a new course charted. The heroic if futile resistance of the Socialist workers of Vienna to the clerical Fascism of Dollfuss (February, 1934) helped to effect the transition, as did the revolt of the Spanish Socialists in Asturias in October. On February 12, 1934, French Communists joined French Socialists in a one-day general strike. For the first time since 1929 Communists sought a truce with Socialists in the face of a foe now recognized as formidable and fatal to both.

The new dispensation found expression in the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow from July 25 to August 20, 1935. The new General Secretary was Georgi Dimitrov, Bul-

garian Communist-in-exile who had won world-wide admiration for his defiance of Göring during the Reichstag fire trial in Leipzig in 1933. From a "united front" of Communists and Socialists, the Comintern moved rapidly to the formula of a "People's Front," embracing bourgeois democrats and all other groups prepared to join forces against the common danger. World revolution was abandoned. Defense of democracy against war and Fascism became the watchword. In France the *Front Populaire* of Communists, Socialists and Radical Socialists won the elections of April and May, 1936, and brought Léon Blum to the Premiership in June. In Spain the *Frente Popular* won the election of February and brought to power a liberal coalition in which the small Communist minority, contrary to widespread delusions abroad, played a moderate and even conservative role.

The Comintern now adapted its strategy to the purposes of the Narkomindel. Diplomatic and military coalitions among non-Fascist States were paralleled by efforts to promote political coalitions among all anti-Fascist forces within all States. Both devices were destined to fail by 1939. The new program nevertheless marked a permanent shift of Communist objectives away from global proletarian revolt and dictatorship to a defense of peace and democracy. In view of the past, inevitable skepticism prevailed abroad regarding the sincerity and permanence of the change. But the Soviet leaders, and their Communist followers abroad, were at least resolved that henceforth the vision of international working class solidarity could be served only by making the security of the Soviet Union the paramount concern of all the comrades everywhere.¹⁸

By a curious paradox, reflecting the disposition of democratic governments to capitalize upon old prejudices rather than face new realities, the very Congress of the Comintern which formally registered the abandonment of World Revolution furnished the occasion for a sharp diplomatic clash between Washington and Moscow. Ambassador Bullitt had already lost his initial popularity through his lavish social displays of conspicuous waste and his ill-concealed resentment at the failure of the Soviet leaders to yield to his desires. When Earl Browder appeared at the Comintern Congress to report on the progress of the cause in the United States, Secretary Hull instructed Bullitt to protest vigorously at what was alleged to be a violation of Litvinov's anti-propaganda pledge

of 1933. The Narkomindel, in rejecting the protest, asserted that the Soviet Government could not "take upon itself, and has never taken upon itself, obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International." Hull declared that the United States would await developments but that in the event of continued propaganda "the friendly and official relations between the two countries cannot but be seriously impaired." Bullitt, like many other disenchanted radicals, now began to hate that which once he had loved. He was transferred to a new post in the summer of 1936. His wealthy and conservative successor, Joseph E. Davies, who reached Moscow in January, 1937, proved to be both a more sympathetic and a more objective observer, well qualified to repair the damage that had been done.

That the United States and the Soviet Union should quarrel at a time calling imperatively for cooperation to prepare against the gathering storm was symptomatic of the tragic confusions and frustrations of all the non-Fascist world in the 1930's. The final wrecking of Soviet hopes and plans, however, was primarily the work of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. Irresponsibility and appeasement were to engulf all free peoples in common disaster, with France and Britain among the first to pay the fearful price exacted by the folly of their leaders.

5. THE GREAT BETRAYAL

"The vindication of the obvious," once observed Justice Holmes, "is sometimes more important than the elucidation of the obscure." Distrust and fear of the USSR have blinded many Western observers to the obvious realities of world politics during the decade which began with bomb explosions near Mukden and ended with bomb explosions at Pearl Harbor. The aggressions which led to the agonies of the early 1940's were made possible by the military resurgence of Japan and the Nazi Reich during the 1930's. Fascist aggrandizement and mobilization for global conquest were made possible by the attitudes and actions of the social elites and political leaders of Great Britain, France and the United States. The drift toward doom could have been halted only by suppressing any aggression anywhere through prompt collective action by all the non-Fascist Powers. This had been Woodrow Wilson's formula for keeping the peace. It was also the formula of Litvinov, Molotov

and Stalin. It was repudiated in Washington, Paris and London where Fascist aggression was met not with resistance but with acquiescence or connivance.

Far from deserting the enterprise of collective security the Communists in the Kremlin, alone among contemporary rulers, served the cause until the last possible moment and hoped against hope to the end that a common front could be achieved. The cause was lost. In the sequel all that is meaningful and hopeful in Western culture entered into the valley of the shadow and was saved from death only by the suffering and sacrifice of millions. This disaster was the fruit of the failure of America, Britain, France and the USSR to act together in time. To assess blame for the catastrophe is not an academic exercise in historical analysis or moral judgment. It is the only possible way of avoiding new catastrophes in the future. The verdict of the record is unmistakable and obvious: responsibility for the breakdown of collective security rests on the Western democracies, not on the Soviet Union.

The melancholy details of the record need no restatement, save as they bear upon the situation in which the USSR found itself by 1939. Eight times during the preceding eight years the aggressors posed to the Western democracies a test of their willingness to organize and enforce peace. Eight times the Soviet Union called for collective action against aggression. Eight times the Western Powers evaded their responsibilities and blessed the aggressors.

The first test was posed by the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in September, 1931. China, a member of the League, was attacked by Japan, also a member of the League. All League members were pledged to act to defend the political independence and territorial integrity of each member and to apply economic and military sanctions against aggression. The United States and the Soviet Union were not League members. Both offered to initiate and support collective action. Britain and France refused to act, beyond resolutions, investigations and endless debates at Geneva. Sir John Simon evaded Secretary Stimson's pleas. Japan left the League and kept Manchuria.

The second test was posed by Hitler's repudiation of the disarmament clauses of Versailles on March 16, 1935. The United States did nothing, although its rights under the German-American treaty of 1921 were violated. The Soviet Union, though having no obligation to enforce German disarmament, urged action.

Litvinov at Geneva declared (April 17) that the Nazi step "constitutes a violation of the Covenant and consequently a violation of obligations undertaken toward the other members of the League, constituting a threat to peace. The League of Nations cannot close its eyes to facts . . ." British and French leaders talked—at Stresa, Geneva and London. The Reich was reprimanded with verbal censure and praised with tangible deeds. Simon and Hoare, supported by Prime Ministers MacDonald and Baldwin, negotiated and signed the naval pact which recognized Germany's right to rearm. While democratic diplomats uttered empty words and beat their breasts, Nazi madmen uttered threats and beat plowshares into swords.

The third test was posed by the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. Laval had approved in advance. Hoare had agreed with Laval in September that while League sanctions should be imposed for the sake of appearances, none should be contemplated which might halt the invasion or provoke Italian resistance. Baldwin's Tories won an overwhelming majority in the British election of November 14, 1935, by pledging full support of the League Covenant. A fortnight later Hoare and Laval agreed to restore "peace" by giving Mussolini Ethiopia. The American Congress, by the "Neutrality" Act of 1935, forbade Americans to sell arms to belligerents. Ethiopia was in desperate need of foreign arms. Italy needed none. Il Duce floated to victory on a sea of American oil. The United States, in its befuddled anxiety to "keep out of other peoples' wars," helped to make the world safe for aggression.

Litvinov's appeals at Geneva for aid to Ethiopia were ignored. Black men died in agony from Fascist poison gas. T. A. Lambie, Secretary of the Ethiopian Red Cross, wrote in *The Times* that "the permanent blinding and maiming of hundreds of helpless women and children should cause ourselves to ask the question: whither? . . . Today a few thousand peasants in Wallo will be groping their way down the dark years because of a dictator whose name they had never heard of, but whose decree of ruthlessness has put out their eyes. Wallo is a long way from Charing Cross—yes, but not for planes . . ." No one listened. Badoglio entered Addis Ababa in triumph on May 5, 1936. The hypocritical farce of sanctions were abandoned. The League died at Geneva on the 4th of July. Blum and Halifax urged "peace." Haile Selassie spoke

in bitterness: "God and history will remember your judgment. . . . What reply have I to take back to my people?" The answer was betrayal and desertion. Litvinov spoke to a hall of shame:

Every member of the League must now realize his individual responsibilities for the failure of the common action in defense of the independence of a co-member of the League. . . . There are those who deny collective security on principle, who substitute for international solidarity the slogan, "Every man for himself," preach the localization of war and declare that war itself is the highest manifestation of the human spirit. . . . We do not want a League that is safe for aggressors. . . . Let us be frank. I am far from idealizing the Covenant. Its imperfections lie not so much in its articles as in its reservations and obscurities. Therefore, the thing is not to talk of reforming the Covenant, but of making it explicit and stronger. . . . Only if sanctions are obligatory will there be an end of mistrust, an end to the fears that if some States not affected directly by the conflict make considerable sacrifices in one case, other unaffected States will act less idealistically in another case. Assurance is needed that in all cases of aggression, irrespective of the degree of concern in the conflict, sanctions will be applied by all, and this can be achieved only if sanctions are made obligatory. . . .

In an ideal League of Nations military sanctions too should be obligatory for all. But if we are yet unable to rise to such heights of international solidarity, we should make it our concern to have all continents and, for a start, at least all Europe covered with a system of regional pacts, on the strength of which groups of States would undertake to protect particular sectors from aggression; and the performance of these regional obligations should be deemed equivalent to the performance of the covenanted obligations and should enjoy the full support of all members of the League of Nations. These regional pacts should not supersede the League Covenant, but supplement it, otherwise they would be nothing but pre-war groups of alliances. It is along these lines that I conceive the perfecting and strengthening of the League of Nations, and the Soviet Government is prepared fully to cooperate with the other members of the League. . . . To strengthen the League of Nations is to abide by the principle of collective security, which is by no means a product of idealism, but is a practical measure towards the security of all peoples, to abide by the principle that peace is indivisible!

The fourth test was posed in the midst of the outrage in Africa by Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Washington did nothing. London and Paris sent protests and

passed resolutions. At the League Council meeting in London on March 17, Litvinov quoted *Mein Kampf* and declared: "One cannot fight for the collective organization of security without taking measures against the violation of international obligations. We, however, do not count among such measures collective capitulation to the aggressor, capitulation in the face of the violation of treaties, or the collective encouragement of such violations. . . . I declare on behalf of my Government that it is ready to take part in all measures that may be proposed to the Council of the League by the Locarno Powers and will be acceptable to the other members of the Council." The only answers were empty echoes, words without content, gestures without motion. Hitler began the building of the Siegfried Line. Belgium resumed neutrality. French power to aid France's eastern allies was at an end.

The fifth test was posed by the Fascist attack on the Spanish Republic, unleashed by Franco's rebellion of July 18, 1936. Blum proposed "non-intervention"—i.e., a common policy of forbidding the Spanish Republic to buy arms abroad for its own defense. The London "Non-Intervention" Committee did what it could to see that the Loyalists received no aid. It concealed and even promoted a steady flow of troops, planes, tanks and guns to Franco from Lisbon, Rome and Berlin. The Roosevelt Administration, obedient to Downing Street and the wishes of the Vatican, saw to it that Madrid could buy no American arms. Asserted Litvinov:

Here is an attempt at a forcible implantation in Spain from without of a Fascist system, an attempt to force upon the Spanish people a Fascist Government with the aid of bayonet, hand-grenade and bomb. If this attempt were to succeed, there would be no guarantees against its repetition on a wider scale in relation to other states. . . . There are some people who consider themselves supporters of the League of Nations and who think that the League of Nations can be kept alive only on condition that nothing will be asked of the League and nothing expected, and that any appeal to the League in any serious international affair is an attempt upon the existence of the League. These people would like to change the League into a "universal" mummy and admire its inertness and imperturbable calm. . . . I would like to express the confidence that the League Council, not only in the interests of Spain, but in the interests of international justice and the preservation of peace, and also in the interests of the League itself, will throw its word into the scale and render all possible support to the Spanish people.

The League Powers preferred to render all possible support to the aggressors. The USSR sought to save the Spanish Republic by counter-intervention. The effort failed in the face of the determination of the Western democracies that Fascism should conquer Spain. At the end of March, 1939, the heroic resistance of the Loyalist Forces, deserted and betrayed to the Axis by Paris, London and Washington, was at last beaten down. At the funeral of Spanish democracy the voice of John Donne came singing down the centuries to Frenchmen, Britons and Americans: "Send not to know for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee . . ."

The sixth test was posed by the resumption of the Japanese attack on China in July, 1937. *Pravda* (September 22) declared that "the blood of whole peoples" was being spilt and that aggression could be halted only by the "collective repulse of the Fascists by all the Governments interested in peace, the collective defense of indivisible peace." Once more the democratic Powers acted on the premises that peace was divisible, that aggression should be appeased, and that collective action would involve greater risks than inaction. In the apt words of Arnold J. Toynbee: "They made their momentous choice neither on the absolute criterion of morality nor on the relative criterion of expediency, but on that trivial distinction between this moment and the next which keeps the sluggard cowering between the blankets when the house is burning over his head."

The seventh test was posed by the Nazi seizure of Austria on March 12, 1938. Lord Halifax had visited Hitler in Berchtesgaden in the preceding November and convinced Der Führer that Britain would not oppose the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*. On February 20, 1938, Hitler had publicly demanded that Eden resign as Foreign Minister. In protest at Chamberlain's appeasement policy, Eden resigned the same night. Halifax succeeded. When informed of the rape of Austria, he exclaimed: "Horrible, horrible, I never thought they would do it!" On March 17 Litvinov warned that Czechoslovakia was in danger and proposed a conference to discuss collective means of "checking the further development of aggression and eliminating an aggravated danger of a new world massacre." In a statement to the press he asserted: "Tomorrow might be too late, but today there is time yet, if all States, particularly great States, take up a firm, unambiguous stand on the problem of the collective salvation of peace." But the British Cabinet

declined to assume any new commitments. The Soviet proposal was dismissed as "premature."

The eighth test was posed by the unleashing, through propaganda, diplomacy and terrorism, of the Nazi campaign against Prague in the summer of 1938. Moscow was pledged to the defense of Czechoslovakia. Tukhachevsky had conferred with Beneš and General Sirovy—and then revealed the plans of joint defense to German Generals and the Gestapo in Berlin. The revelation of his treason by Czech agents led to his speedy arrest, trial and execution. Moscow remained pledged to the defense of Czechoslovakia. Paris was likewise pledged. The Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street, however, had other plans and hopes which required the betrayal and destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic. Chamberlain flew three times to Germany on the principle that "if you don't concede the first time, fly, fly again."

On September 19 the Prague Cabinet received an ultimatum demanding that it surrender Sudetenland to Hitler, along with all the Czech border fortifications. The source of the ultimatum, incredibly, was not Berlin but Paris and London. Moscow offered to defend Czechoslovakia even after the French betrayal had released the USSR from any such obligations under the pacts of 1935. Amid the ruin of his hopes, Litvinov spoke with heavy heart at Geneva on September 21, 1938:

The League was created as a reaction to the World War and its countless quarrels; its object was to make that the last war, to safeguard all nations against aggression, and to replace the system of military alliances by the collective organization of assistance to the victim of aggression. In this sphere the League has done nothing. Two States—Ethiopia and Austria—have lost their independent existence in consequence of violent aggression. A third State, China, is now a victim of aggression and foreign invasion for the second time in seven years, and a fourth State, Spain, is in the third year of a sanguinary war, owing to the armed intervention of two aggressors in its internal affairs. The League of Nations has not carried out its obligations to these States. At the present time a fifth State, Czechoslovakia, is suffering interference in its internal affairs at the hands of a neighboring State, and is publicly and loudly menaced with attack . . .

A fire-brigade was set up in the innocent hope that, by some lucky chance, there would be no fires. Things turned out differently, however. Fires have broken out in defiance of our hopes, but luckily not

in our immediate vicinity. So (say some) let us dissolve the fire brigade—of course not forever, but merely temporarily. Directly the danger of any fire disappears, we shall reassemble the fire brigade without a moment's delay . . .

At a time when there is being drawn up a further list of sacrifices to the god of aggression and a line is under the annals of all post-war international history, with the sole conclusion that nothing succeeds like aggression—at such a moment, every State must define its role and its responsibility before its contemporaries and before history. That is why I must plainly declare here that the Soviet Government bears no responsibility whatsoever for the events now taking place, and for the fatal consequences which may inexorably ensue.

The fruit of Anglo-French policy was the Peace of Munich of October 1, 1938, concluded at a Four-Power conference to which the USSR was not invited and from which the Czechs were excluded. Having consummated the ruin of Czechoslovakia with deliberate intent and considerable political finesse, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain concluded a non-aggression pact with Hitler and returned to London with happy words: "I have brought back peace with honor. I think it is peace for our time." In December Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, with the blessing of Premier Édouard Daladier, signed a non-aggression pact with Ribbentrop in Paris. With the reduction of the Czech army to helplessness, General Gamelin, top commander of the military forces of the French Republic, lost 45 divisions without lifting a finger to save them. London and Paris were now committed to the "localization" of future wars and to the deflection of Axis aggression eastward. Said Hugo Vavrečka, member of the Czech Cabinet: "It is a case without parallel in history that our allies and friends should impose conditions upon us which are usually imposed upon vanquished enemies. It is not a lack of courage that induced our Government to take the decision which grips our hearts. . . . God knows that more courage is needed for living than for committing suicide. . . . We shall not blame those who left us in the lurch, but history will pronounce a judgment about these days." Said Winston Churchill: "France and Britain had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war."

The entire French alliance system was now destroyed. All Danubia and Balkania were at the mercy of the Axis. Czechoslo-

vakia had been outflanked by the Nazi occupation of Austria. Poland was now outflanked by the Nazi victory at Munich. Far from appreciating the fact, the Warsaw Colonels joined Hitler in destroying Czechoslovakia through their armed seizure of Teschen on October 2. Two days later *Le Journal de Moscou* wrote: "In effect France has with its own hands and without having consulted the USSR annulled the Soviet-Czech pact which was a corollary to the French-Soviet pact and one of the important elements of a regional eastern pact. . . . The loss of its allies and isolation—this is the price which France will have to pay for capitulation before the aggressor." The great democracies had all but lost World War II before it had begun. No comparable instance of folly and perfidy on the part of the responsible leaders of self-governing peoples is available in all the past records of human weakness, stupidity and crime.

The question of the motives and assumptions of the democratic statesmen who thus condemned the world to war and their own people to hideous suffering is no longer open to serious controversy. Millions of Americans, Britons, and Frenchmen had come to believe that the way to have peace was to refuse to fight, meanwhile throwing other peoples' children to the wolves. A large proportion of the propertied classes in the Atlantic nations admired Fascism and supposed that their own interests would be served by maintaining and extending Fascist power. A decisive group of democratic diplomats and political leaders, moreover, fondly hoped and fervently believed that a free hand for the Fascist Triplice on three continents would eventuate in a German-Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, that "civilization" would thereby be "saved from Bolshevism," and that France, Britain and America could remain neutral while Fascism and Communism destroyed one another or the Fascist Powers fell to fighting among themselves over the Soviet carcass. All these assumptions were tragically false. Democratic appeasement, like Fascist aggression, was the fever chart of the desperate sickness of a disordered world.

A microcosm of this macrocosm is to be found in the political situation in Prague on September 21, 1938, immediately before the Cabinet reached its decision to accept the Anglo-French ultimatum. President Beneš considered the advisability of risking war by welcoming Soviet aid and rejecting the demands of the Western Powers. Moscow could bring no public pressure to bear in

favor of such an outcome, since any such steps, leading inevitably to a break with the Anglo-French leaders, would have played into the hands of the appeasers and perhaps precipitated a Soviet-German war in which the Western Munichmen would not only have stood aside but would have blessed the Nazi crusade against Bolshevism. The Kremlin nevertheless offered armed assistance. When the issue was raised among the Czechoslovak leaders, Rudolf Beran, head of the reactionary Agrarian Party, declared that if Beneš summoned "Communist aid" he and his followers would call in the Nazis and unleash civil war. The People's Front Cabinet in France had faced similar threats from those whose slogan was "Better Hitler Than Blum!" Beneš yielded. The Nemesis of the West condemned its victims to suicide.¹⁹

The attitudes and expectations of many British and French leaders, before they belatedly saw the light, are mirrored in numerous public utterances. A few examples will serve.

Winston Churchill in Rome, January 20, 1927:

I could not help being charmed by Signor Mussolini's gentle and simple bearing and by his calm, detached poise in spite of so many burdens and dangers. . . . If I had been an Italian I am sure that I should have been whole-heartedly with you from the start to the finish in your triumphant struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism. . . . Your movement has rendered a service to the whole world. . . . Italy has shown that there is a way of fighting the subversive forces which can rally the masses of the people, properly led, to value and wish to defend the honor and stability of civilized society. She has provided the necessary antidote to the Russian poison. Hereafter no great nation will go unprovided with an ultimate means of protection against the cancerous growth of Bolshevism.

Lloyd George in Commons, November 28, 1934:

In a very short time, perhaps in a year or two, the conservative elements in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe. . . . Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend.

Leopold S. Amery in *The Forward View* (1935):

The first condition of European peace today is the frank acknowledgment that Germany's armaments are now her own affair and nobody else's. . . . The doctrine of the inevitable contagion of war

is of course pure nonsense. . . . It would be no concern of ours to prevent Japanese expansion in Eastern Siberia.

Ambassador Robert Coulondre, reporting to Georges Bonnet from Berlin, December 15, 1938 (*French Yellow Book* of 1939, No. 33):

The will for expansion in the East seems to me as undeniable on the part of the Third Reich as its disposition to put aside—at least for the present—any idea of conquest in the West; the one is a corollary of the other. . . . It has been as plain to me that Germany has no claims in the direction of France. . . . To secure mastery over Central Europe by reducing Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a state of vassalage and then to create a Greater Ukraine under German control—this is what essentially appears to be the leading idea now accepted by the Nazi leaders. . . . In order to achieve this, Rumania must be subdued, Poland won over, and Soviet Russia dispossessed. German dynamism is not to be stopped by any of these obstacles and in military circles they already talk of the advance to the Caucasus and to Baku . . .

Soviet leaders had few illusions regarding the motives which led the great democracies to nourish the Frankenstein monster of Fascism. Conclusions were drawn. After a last vain effort to recapture collective security in the spring of 1939, Soviet policies were changed under circumstances which will be reviewed in a later chapter. In the immediate aftermath of Munich, Soviet spokesmen saw clearly what was to come.

When the epigones of Pilsudski prepared to join Hitler in destroying Czechoslovakia, the Soviet press expressed itself in no uncertain terms. *Izvestia*, September 27, 1938: "Polish Fascist detachments have provoked a clash with Czech frontier guards . . ." September 28, 1938: "New provocations of Polish Fascists on Czechoslovak frontiers. . . . *Gazetta Polska* has again come out with impudent attacks on Czechoslovakia and repeated demands for the immediate annexation of Teschen by Poland." October 3, 1938, in a dispatch by S. Moravan from Prague: "Reaction Lifts Its Head—With one hand Hitler has signed the Munich decision, and with the other he has unchained his Polish dogs for the purpose of provoking Czechoslovakia and driving her to full partition . . ." October 6, 1938: "The campaign of the Polish Government press for the complete partition of Czechoslovakia continues. All official newspapers come out today with placards: 'Within a certain time

there must be created a common Polish-Hungarian frontier.' . . . The organ of the Foreign Ministry, *Express Poranni*, supports the demands of the Hungarian Fascist *Magyarshag* for the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine."

On the broader issue *Izvestia*, reflecting the prevailing views in the Sovnarkom and Politburo, was no less explicit. In the issue of September 29, 1938, its Geneva correspondent asserted that it was not a question of a "fight for Czechoslovakia but of a fight against German hegemony in Europe. In asking Rome to join in the solution of the problem, Chamberlain is simply strengthening the bargaining power of the aggressor." The Prime Minister was accused of paying homage to Hitler by his visits. September 30, quoting the Czech journal, *Narodni Osvobozeni*: "We remind the western nations once again that they are making a fatal error in trying to decide questions of a general European peace without the peoples of Central Europe and the East." A dispatch from Geneva in the issue of October 2 asserted that the ultimate purpose of Hitler was not reflected in the Munich accord, for it envisaged the full partition of Czechoslovakia. In the same issue Ilya Ehrenburg, under the title of "The Second Sedan," wrote from Paris:

The Parisian brokers have observed a "minute of silence": on the steps of the Bourse they prayed for the four "peace-makers." Finishing their prayers, they again cried out: "Royal Dutch," "Rio Tinto," etc. Organized parades greet the "peace-makers." The people of France are not to blame either for the partition of Czechoslovakia or for this tragic vaudeville. . . . Now, as I am dispatching these lines, the celebrating crowd rejoices on the Champs Élysées. Hitlerite bands at this moment are occupying towns and villages of Czechoslovakia. With what pride I now think: I am a Soviet citizen! There is no people which loves peace more than my people, but they know also what is their Fatherland—truth and honor. . . . Besides the four "peace-makers," there is still on this earth the Red Army.

The official Soviet verdict on Munich found expression in a long editorial in *Izvestia* on October 4, 1938, entitled "The Politics of Pacifying the Aggressor":

In a short interval there have occurred events the meaning of which is not limited to changes on a geographical map. It is not the first time nor is it even the first year that peoples are encountering Fascist aggression which is persistently dragging country after country into a Second Imperialist War for a partition of the earth. Abyssinia, Spain,

China, Austria, Czechoslovakia—one after the other have become the victims of gluttonous Fascist cannibals. But first of all we recognize that the seizure of foreign territory and the crossing by foreign troops of frontiers guaranteed by international treaty is something other than a “triumph” or a “victory” for peace. . . . It is indeed great bravery to allow a whole State to be torn to pieces! Chamberlain assures mankind that in the future it can look forward to “new efforts” in this direction. What is in prospect? Will they not now gather in London and Paris to consider the German “national minorities” in Rumania? Or is it possible that they plan to discover the existence of an Italian national minority in Spain? The “rainbow” perspectives, hinted at by Chamberlain in his message, will certainly find sincere approbation in Berlin and Rome. . . . The little nations will be destroyed one after the other. But war is not necessary in order to accomplish this and as a result “European peace will be consolidated.”

Will it be possible to deceive oneself for long with similar hopes? Official British and French circles are now attempting by means of loud exultation on the occasion of the attainment of a “peaceful triumph” to mask the base and vile character of the Munich deal. Nevertheless, illusions pass and facts remain. It remains an evident, prosaic fact that the capitulation of the so-called democratic nations before the aggressors has to the eye postponed war but in actuality has brought war nearer and with it immeasurably disadvantageous conditions for England and France. . . .

The Soviet Union occupies a plain and unmistakable position. It is a complete stranger to the politics of pacifying the aggressor, which the ruling circles in England and France are trying to pass off under the label of “consolidation of European peace.” . . . If in the words of the Soviet representative (Litvinov at Geneva, September 21) the straightforward and honorable policy of the Soviet Union is clearly declared—a policy of defending peace and observing fidelity to international obligations, then the Munich conference, leading to the partition and spoliation of Czechoslovakia, casts a clear light on the policy of the present ruling circles in England and France who have gone over to the cause of the Fascist aggressors.

THE SOVIET STATE

I. UNITED REPUBLICS

AT ALL TIMES and places men have found it necessary, in order to save themselves from the evils of anarchy, to subordinate the many to the command of the few. The manifold symbols, habits, and practices through which rulers command obedience from the ruled make up the ancient and ubiquitous institution of the State, with its variable *credenda*, *miranda* and *horrenda* and its constant claim to a monopoly of force and to universal authority over all within its territorial confines. That the Communist rulers of the USSR, with their vision of the "withering away of the State," should have been the builders of the first "total" State of the 20th Century is, for some, an example of the rational adaptations of means to ends, for others a destruction of ends by means, and for still others an illustration of hypocrisy, paradox or dialectics.

Verdicts reflect preferences. To Soviet leaders the preferences of the infidels have always been of small concern save as they have found expression in the foreign policies of other Powers. In Russia, as elsewhere, political practices and purposes are products less of dogma than of the trial-and-error of experience and the interaction between far-reaching aspirations and immediate necessities. The decisive impact of external relations in shaping the dictatorship of the proletariat in its period of genesis has been suggested above. The origins and development of the constitutional structure of the Soviet power will here be examined in the hope of illuminating its present configuration and probable prospects.

Constitutions are political symbols long peculiar to the At-

lantic communities. When the Decembrists (1825) demanded "Constantine and Constitution!" many Russians assumed that "Constitution" must be Constantine's wife. The device of a Basic Charter was borrowed by the Communist Party from non-Russian and non-Marxist sources. In the early revolutionary movements in Muscovy, constitutionalism was always a daydream and a frustrated hope, inherited from Western liberalism. In the gospel according to Marx and Engels, constitutions were dishonest façades for the rule of the bourgeoisie, though conceded to be an advance over feudal anarchy and royal absolutism. In the evolution of Western politics the notion of a Supreme Law, defining and limiting governmental power, is definitely of bourgeois origin, even though the men at Runnymede who forced King John to sign *Magna Carta* were not burghers but barons. The adoption of the concept by the Bolsheviks necessarily appears to most Western observers as a highly artificial, if not hypocritical, gesture.

This evaluation, however, minimizes the various uses of political symbols and ignores Marxist devotion to most of the ultimate ideals of Western liberalism. In all ages and cultures, power-holders have deemed it wise to clothe the ugly nakedness of power in some vestments representing the common good. Rulers are thus identified among the ruled with Justice, Reason, and Virtue. The myth of the divinity of kings, like the later myth of the divine right of kings, long served this purpose. In addition to limiting power, constitutions exalt and dignify those who wield power and promote respect and obedience from those over whom power is exercised. This function has major significance in a "total" State. In the USSR the constitutional myth has been employed to strengthen the imperatives of the revolutionary cult. That cult, moreover, accepts as axiomatic in principle (even if it appears often to violate them in practice) the basic postulates of human equality and rationality which are reflected in Western constitutionalism. In common with most modern social scientists, Bolsheviks repudiate the idea that the State originated in a "social contract." They further repudiate the notion that that government is best which governs least. Yet Bolsheviks have from the outset embraced the idea of a constitutional charter as a basis of public law, partly because such a charter obscures and softens the harsh realities of power and partly because it is a

means of solemnly reaffirming the purposes of their living faith.

During the first two months of Soviet rule, there was no "constitution," unless the early decrees, especially the Lenin-Stalin "Declaration of the Rights of the Nationalities" (November 15, 1917), deserve to be so regarded. All agreed that the preparation of a basic law was the task of the Constituent Assembly. But this body suffered the fate anticipated as long ago as 1903 by Plekhanov, who then said: "If the safety of the revolution demanded the temporary limitations of such and such a democratic principle, it would be criminal to hesitate. . . . It is an admissible hypothesis that we, Social Democrats, might be against universal suffrage. . . . If elections should turn out ill, we should have to try to dissolve (the delegates) at the end of two weeks."¹ The dispersal of the Assembly on January 19, 1918, in less than two days, created a vacuum in popular expectations that had somehow to be filled. The Party leaders concluded that the appropriate authority to prepare a constitution was the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which had convened simultaneously with the Constituent Assembly.

This assumption of constituent powers by a legislative body, which is frowned upon in American (but not in British) political practice, eventuated in two documents: "A Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People," and a resolution on "The Federal Institutions of the Russian Republic." Stalin played a leading role in the elaboration of both. In February, 1918, a committee of deputies, utilizing these two documents along with certain earlier resolutions of Soviet Congresses and various later proposals, formulated a draft charter of 25 articles, in which the term "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic" (RSFSR) was used for the first time. The mechanics of government here sketched out reflected current practice: an all-Russian Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, meeting every three months, would exercise supreme power and would choose a Central Executive Committee (CEC) and a Council of Peoples' Commissars (Sovnarkom). A drafting committee named by the existing CEC, and including Stalin, Sverdlov, and Bukharin, met on April 8, 1918, to perfect the blueprint.

The first Soviet Constitution, ratified by the Fifth Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918, and put into effect nine days later, was the work of this group. In 90 articles, grouped in 17 chapters,

the purposes and principles of the Soviet power were set forth (cf. *Izvestia*, July 19, 1918). A preamble charged the local Soviets to reprint the document and display it prominently in public places, while the Commissar for Education was instructed to introduce "into all schools and educational institutes, without exception, the study of the basic principles of the present Constitution and their explanation and interpretation." The first section, echoing in much of its language the original Communist Manifesto, consisted of the Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring and Exploited Peoples:

1. Russia is declared a Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. All central and local authority is vested in these Soviets.

2. The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of national Soviet Republics.

For the purpose of "suppressing all exploitation of man by man, of abolishing forever the division of society into classes, of ruthlessly suppressing all exploiters, of bringing about the socialist organization of society and the triumph of socialism in all countries," the Constitution (§3) proclaimed the socialization of all land, forests, mineral wealth, waterways, banks, "livestock and appurtenances"; the ratification of the law on workers' control of industry; the repudiation of prerevolutionary debts "as a first blow at international financial capitalism" and as a step toward "the complete victory of the international revolt of the workers"; the introduction of compulsory labor; the disarmament of the propertied classes; and the development of the Red Army. The revolutionary function of the Constitution was set forth (§§9 and 10) as follows:

The principal object of the Constitution of the RSFSR, which is adapted to the present transition period, consists in the establishment of the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry, in the form of the strong All-Russian Soviet power, with the aim of securing the complete suppression of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and the establishment of socialism, under which there shall be neither class divisions nor State authority. The Russian Republic is a free socialist society of all the laboring people of Russia. All authority within the boundaries of the RSFSR is vested in the entire working population of the country, organized in the urban and rural Soviets.

In its allocation of authority to public agencies, the Constitution of 1918 vested supreme power in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting semi-annually and composed of one representative of urban Soviets for every 25,000 voters and one representative of provincial (rural) Congresses of Soviets for every 125,000 inhabitants (§25). The ratio of over-representation of the proletariat, as compared with the peasantry, was not 5 to 1, as often stated, but perhaps 2 to 1, assuming an average of 2½ non-voting inhabitants to each voter. The Congress elected a Central Executive Committee of not more than 200 members, described (§31) as "the supreme legislative, administrative and controlling organ of the RSFSR." The CEC, in turn, appointed the Cabinet or Sovnarkom, comprising 18 Commissariats. Like the Congress of the United States, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and its CEC were vested with enumerated powers (§§49-52), but since they were of very broad scope and included "altering and supplementing of the Constitution," this legislature resembled more closely the British Parliament which, in theory, possesses unlimited sovereignty.

Specific restrictions on the Soviet Congress were few. The Bill of Rights set forth in this first Constitution was sketchy. It included general acknowledgment of "freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda" (§13), "freedom of expressing opinion" through a workers' press (§14), liberty of assembly, association, and free and universal education (§§15-17), "asylum to all foreigners persecuted for political and religious offenses" (§21), and "equality of all citizens irrespective of race or nationality" (§22). Foreigners in Russia, "provided that they belong to the working class or peasantry," were granted citizenship and full political rights (§20). All citizens (§§18-19) were declared to have the duty of military service and of work: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

Among the more striking features of the national legislature under the 1918 Constitution was the mode of its election. Soviet deputies, like American Senators and Presidents under the Constitution of 1787, were not elected by voters but chosen by other elected deputies—from the city Soviets directly and from the village Soviets indirectly through a hierarchy of Congresses of Soviets in rural districts (*Volosts*), counties (*Uezeds*) and provinces (*Gubernias*), with each body sending delegates to the next

higher body, as in the traditional form of American political party organization. This system of indirect representation, supplemented by a right of recall (§78), involved a choice of law-makers by voters only at the lowest level—i.e., city and village Soviets. Only here were there any elements of functional or occupational (as distinct from geographical) representation. "Elections are conducted according to established practice" (§66)—i.e., openly and orally and not by secret ballot. The right to vote and be elected was granted, with no residence requirements, to all citizens over 18 "irrespective of sex, religion or nationality," provided they were engaged in productive work, domestic pursuits or military service or were incapacitated for work (§64). Both rights were expressly denied (§65) to employers hiring labor for profit, persons living on unearned incomes, private businessmen, monks, clergymen, former agents of the Tsarist police, members of the former dynasty, lunatics, imbeciles and "persons convicted of infamous or mercenary crimes for a period fixed by law or judicial sentence."

The Communist Party is nowhere mentioned in this constitution, which went into effect on the eve of terrorism, rebellion and foreign intervention, in the sequel to which all other parties were suppressed. The document was designed to cover with the garments of formal legality the nakedness of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was about to become the dictatorship of the Party. Like all constitutions, it was not only a basic law but, in intent, a work of propaganda, a piece of sacred literature, and a guide to the good life. In borrowing the device of constitutionalism from the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks at the same time borrowed from Western Marxism and (without acknowledgment) from the Russian past a conception of the State which in practice negated the liberal ideal of a limited "government of laws and not of men." To all Bolsheviks, the organization of power adequate to change society and the destiny of man was far more important than the building of safeguards against abuse of power. In the Marxian dialectic, true freedom, followed by the ultimate disappearance of all coercion, was to be had only through the replacement of capitalism by socialism. Soviets, CEC's, and Sovnarkoms were merely the vehicles through which revolutionary authority was exercised. Constitutional documents legitimized these agencies and emotionally identified them with the awe-

inspiring majesty of sovereignty. The substance of power, however, resided in the monolithic comradeship of rulers who successfully claimed a monopoly of legality and commanded obedience in the name of the proletariat.

The Constitution of 1918 was limited to the RSFSR. It was adopted at a time when the Ukraine, the Caucasus and other frontier regions were not under Moscow's authority. By 1921 other Soviet Republics had been set up in these areas and had entered into treaty relationships with the RSFSR. In December, 1922, at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Stalin introduced a resolution proposing the creation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A commission of delegates drew up a "Treaty of Union" (December 30, 1922) among the RSFSR, the Byelo-Russian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the trans-Caucasian SFSR. The Tenth Soviet Congress of the RSFSR became the First Congress of the USSR. A Union Constitution was ratified by the new CEC of the USSR on July 6, 1923, and given final approval by the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR on January 31, 1924. This Federation of four Republics became a Union of six in 1925 with the establishment of the Uzbek and Turkmen Republics. The elevation of Tadzikistan to the status of a Republic brought the member States to seven. By 1936 the same process in the Kazak and Kirgiz areas, coupled with the dissolution of the trans-Caucasian SFSR into its component units (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), brought the total of the federated Republics to eleven.

The Union Constitution of 1924 followed closely the RSFSR model of 1918, both in its federal structure and in its hierarchy of Soviet bodies. A preliminary section, taken from the Treaty of December 30, 1922, emphasized "mutual confidence and peace and the brotherly collaboration of peoples" in "the camp of socialism," in alleged contrast to "national enmity and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars" in "the camp of capitalism." The USSR was described as "a voluntary union of equal peoples," "a trustworthy bulwark against world capitalism, and a new decisive step along the path of the union of the workers of all countries in a World Socialist Soviet Republic." The Constitution itself, a document of 72 articles grouped in 11 chapters, begins with an enumeration of some two dozen federal powers,

with all other powers reserved to the member Republics, each of which "retains the right of free withdrawal from the Union," subject to approval by all the Republics. Art. 2 specified that the ratification and amendment of the Constitution "comes exclusively within the competence of the Congress of Soviets of the USSR."

This body was made the supreme organ of federal authority. Like its local counterparts in the RSFSR and the other Republics, it consisted of deputies not elected directly but chosen by urban Soviets, with one deputy for each 25,000 voters, and by provincial and district Soviet Congresses (or, in Republics not having such Congresses, by Republican Congresses) with one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants (§§8-10). Union Congresses met in ordinary session biennially (annually prior to 1927) and in extraordinary session on the call of the federal CEC or of either of its chambers or of any two Republics. The Congress, however, had less the character of a parliamentary body than that of a large mass meeting, consisting of almost 2,000 members convened for only a week at a time. The Soviet analogue of a federal parliament under the 1924 constitution was the Union CEC, chosen by the Congress and divided into two chambers: a Soviet of the Union, chosen in proportion to population from the delegates of the Republics to the number (by 1936) of 451, with 300 from the RSFSR, 75 from the Ukraine, 30 from Transcaucasia, 13 from Byelo-Russia, etc.; and a Soviet of Nationalities, consisting of 5 delegates for each Republic and one delegate for each Autonomous Region within the Republics, to the number of 136 members. The CEC met in ordinary sessions three times a year and in extraordinary sessions on the call of its Presidium or of the CEC of any one of the Republics. The federal CEC was vested with authority to enact legislation (§§16-20) by a majority vote of both chambers.

The executive agencies of federal government were headed by the Presidium of the CEC and the Union Sovnarkom. The former body, consisting in final form of 27 members chosen by the two houses of the CEC, was described (§29) as "the supreme legislative, executive and administrative organ of authority of the USSR" between sessions of the CEC, to which it was "responsible." The Presidium was charged with carrying out the Constitution and all resolutions of the CEC and of the Union Congress

of Soviets (§30) and empowered (§§31-33) to "suspend and repeal the resolutions of the Sovnarkom and individual Commissariats of the USSR and also of the CEC's and Sovnarkom's of the Republics"; to "suspend resolutions of the Congresses of Soviets of the Union Republics and subsequently to present such resolutions for examination and confirmation" by the federal CEC; to "issue decrees, resolutions and ordinances" and to examine and confirm draft decrees submitted by the Union Sovnarkom and by federal and Republic CEC's, "their Presidia and other organs of authority."

The Union Sovnarkom or federal Cabinet, identified (§37) as "the executive organ of the CEC of the USSR," consisted of the heads of executive departments or Commissariats. The 10 Commissariats originally established by the Constitution embraced 5 All-Union Commissariats (Foreign Affairs, War and Marine, Foreign Trade, Communications, Post and Telegraphs), functioning throughout all the territory of the federation through their own officials, and 5 United or joint Union-Republican Commissariats (National Economy, Food, Labor, Finance, and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection), functioning through the corresponding Commissariats of the Republics. Each Commissar presided over a departmental Collegium, appointed by the Sovnarkom as a whole, to which he was obliged to report all decisions and from which, in the event of dissent, he might expect complaints to the Sovnarkom.

Judicial functions were entrusted by the 1924 Constitution to a system of federal courts, headed by the Supreme Court of the USSR, "exercising final judicial control" for the purpose of "confirming revolutionary legality" and "coordinating the efforts of the Union Republics in the struggle against counter-revolution." The Supreme Court was charged with responsibility for delivering "guiding interpretations" of federal law to the Supreme Courts of the Republics, examining the constitutionality of federal and Republican legislation, deciding legal controversies between Republics, and examining accusations against the highest federal officials (§43). The Supreme Court consisted of 15 members (11 until 1925), appointed by the Presidium of the CEC and divided into civil, criminal and military collegia. A Procurator of the Supreme Court exercised the duties of an Attorney General or State Prosecutor. The Constitution (§§61-63) also made men-

tion of the GPU, attached to the Sovnarkom with its President having an advisory voice in the deliberations of the Commissars. The Procurator was charged with supervision of the legality of the acts of the GPU.²

This apparently cumbersome structure of national government was even more intricate than has been suggested, since the basic law of the USSR embraced the Constitutions of the Union Republics and of the constituent parts of the RSFSR. From observation limited to scanning the documents, British students could read into it the parliamentary principle of executive responsibility to the legislature. American observers could find a plausible facsimile of the doctrine of separation of powers and of federal-state relations in the United States. Most, if not all, such projections of Anglo-American experience onto the Soviet scene are unwarranted by the actual conduct of government. Despite surface resemblances to alien systems, and potentialities of development toward Western practices, the Soviet hierarchy was *sui generis*. It has never functioned, moreover, save within the controlling discipline and dynamism of the Party. These considerations are equally applicable to the Constitution of 1936.

2. THE STALIN CONSTITUTION

Between 1929 and 1935 the economic and social order of the USSR underwent the most drastic transformation which has ever occurred in a similar period in any major community. In the Soviet Union as elsewhere, political practices deeply imbedded in the habits of rulers and ruled change less rapidly than the texture of social living and the activities by which men and women earn their daily bread. Political vocabularies, with their sacred stereotypes and highly emotionalized symbols and slogans, are modified even more slowly. Political man, even when a citizen of a revolutionary State, is a conservative animal. Communists, however, pride themselves on their energy as innovators and swear by the Marxist dictum that political institutions are but the superstructure of class relations flowing out of prevailing modes of production. The collectivization of agriculture and the tremendous upsurge of industrialization, accompanied by the crises and convulsions already reviewed, transformed Soviet society and economy almost beyond recognition. The Party leadership there-

fore concluded in the course of the Second Five Year Plan that the constitutional structure dating from the early period of the NEP was no longer appropriate to the needs of a new epoch.

The transformation of the GPU into the NKVD in the summer of 1934 foreshadowed the direction of change. Soviet membership in the League of Nations, coupled with championship of solidarity with the Atlantic democracies against Fascism, contributed toward the decision to democratize the State. The murder of Kirov, who undoubtedly would have had a major role in the enterprise, delayed action. The Great Purge which ensued coincided with the movement toward constitutional change and robbed the revisions of much of their efficacy in persuading people, both at home and abroad, that the dawn of a new freedom had come. The objective of a new basic charter was nevertheless pursued and at length achieved, after extensive and intensive discussion throughout the Union.

The Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets voted on February 6, 1935, to appoint a Constitution Commission to draw up an amended text embodying equal suffrage, direct election, secret ballot and recognition of "the present relation of class forces" in the light of the growth of socialist industry, the end of the kulaks and the triumph of collectivization. On the next day the CEC named a Commission of 31 to draft a new document. Stalin became its president. In June, 1936, the completed draft was published in hundreds of thousands of copies and in all languages of the USSR. General discussion was encouraged and almost demanded by the Party leaders. Over half a million meetings were held, attended by no less than 36,000,000 people. After many thousands of proposed changes were sifted out, 150 were given serious consideration and 43 were adopted.

At the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets on November 25, 1936, Stalin delivered a lengthy address on the revised draft. He dwelt first on the changes of recent years which had "eliminated all the exploiting classes"; "transformed the proletariat into the working class of the USSR, which has abolished the capitalist economic system, has established the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production, and is directing Soviet society along the road to communism"; converted the peasants into collective farmers, "emancipated from exploitation";

and established a new Soviet Intelligentsia, serving the masses. The new Constitution, continued Stalin, must not be a program of the future—e.g., the achievement of communism—but a “summary of the gains already achieved”—e.g., socialism.

Unlike bourgeois constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR proceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society; that society consists of two friendly classes, of workers and peasants; that it is these classes, the laboring classes, that are in power; that the guidance of society by the State (the dictatorship) is in the hands of the working class, the most advanced class in society; that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by and beneficial to the working people.

After paying his respects in sarcastic vein to bourgeois critics of the draft Constitution, with special attention to Nazi comments, Stalin asserted:

I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the USSR. If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit. As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and consequently freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes . . . say, capitalist and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. . . . In the USSR there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests—far from being mutually hostile—are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence there is no ground in the USSR for the existence of several parties, and consequently for freedom for these parties. In the USSR there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. . . .

They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the USSR, on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democracy are violated not by the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the USSR is the only thoroughly democratic constitution in the world.

Following an extended commentary on proposed changes, some approved and others rejected, Stalin concluded:

The international significance of the new Constitution of the USSR can hardly be exaggerated. Today, when the turbid wave of Fascism is bespattering the socialist movement of the working class and besmirching the democratic strivings of the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution of the USSR will be an indictment against Fascism, declaring that socialism and democracy are invincible. The new Constitution of the USSR will give moral assistance and real support to all those who are today fighting Fascist barbarism. . . . While for the peoples of capitalist countries the Constitution of the USSR will have the significance of a program of action, it is significant for the peoples of the USSR as the summary of their struggles, a summary of their victories in the struggle for the emancipation of mankind. After the path of struggle and privation that has been traversed, it is pleasant and joyful to have our Constitution which treats of the fruits of our victories. . . . This arms our working class, our peasantry, our working intelligentsia spiritually. It impels them forward and rouses a sense of legitimate pride. It increases confidence in our strength and mobilizes us for fresh struggles for the achievement of new victories of communism.³

On December 1, 1936, the deputies unanimously adopted a Resolution (*Izvestia*, December 2, 1936):

Having heard and deliberated upon the report of the President of the Constitution Commission of the CEC of the USSR, Comrade J. V. Stalin, concerning the project of a Constitution for the USSR, the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the USSR resolves that: (1) the project of the Constitution for the USSR presented by the Constitution Commission of the CEC of the USSR be approved and accepted in its fundamentals. (2) An Editorial Commission composed of 220 persons be formed to examine inserted corrections and to complete and institute the final text of the Constitution of the USSR. (3) The Editorial Commission be charged within a three-day term with presenting to the Congress the final text of the Constitution and considering at the same time the results of the all-national deliberation on the projected Constitution as well as the deliberations of the Congress itself.

The Editorial Commission contained such Party leaders as Andreyev, Beria, Vyshinsky, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Litvinov, Mikoyan, Molotov and Ordjonikidze; such military figures as Blucher, Budenny, Voroshilov, Zhukov and Shaposhnikov;

such intellectual celebrities as Alexandrovich, Bogomolets, Burdenko, Korchagina-Alexandrevskaya, Lisenko, and A. N. Tolstoi; and such prospective purgees as Yegorov, Yezhov, Tukhachevsky, Uborovich and Yakir. The mandate commission of the Congress, which was the last to meet under the 1924 Constitution, compared the Eighth Congress with the Second, which had ratified the earlier charter (cf. *Izvestia*, December 2, 1936). In 1924 there had been 1,535 delegates, in 1936, 2,016, reflecting the representation of the new industrial cities and an increase in population "six times as great as that achieved by Germany in the same period." Of the 2,016 deputies, the RSFSR had 1,310, the Ukraine 370, Kazakistan 75, Uzbekistan 65, Byelo-Russia 62, Azerbaijan 42, Georgia 37, etc. In 1924, 90% of the delegates were Party members, in 1936 only 72%. In 1924 there were 58 women delegates, in 1936, 419. In the Eighth Congress workers (of whom 97% were Stakhanovites) comprised 42% of the total; peasants (all from collective farms) 40%; and intellectuals 18%. For these gains, declared Y. A. Yakovlev, "we are obliged to the best Leninist, the creator of the new Constitution, the great son of the Soviet people of whom our nation is proud, who in the family of every worker and peasant is called the father of toilers—our leader, Comrade Stalin!" (Ovation.)

In addressing the Congress on the same day, Nikita S. Krushchev, a member of the Politburo, declared (*Izvestia*, December 2, 1936):

The Fascists, especially the German, are now shouting about their triumph over Marxism, but this "triumph" is one of jesters and clowns of the Middle Ages. And here we are accepting our Constitution and celebrating the victory of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, a victory which is not only ours but is also that of toilers the world over. . . . The German Fascists have illusions about the breakdown of our Socialist State and they rave about seizing lands to the East. . . . If the Fascists attack us, we, our Red Army, together with the German working class, will drown Fascism not in glory but in their own blood. . . . All the toilers of our country know that the brains of the Revolution and the cement strengthening the forces of the Revolution is our Bolshevik Party, the Party of Lenin-Stalin. . . . In the Stalin epoch, the epoch of victorious socialism, the working class under the leadership of our great leader (*Vozhd*) will conduct a far-reaching battle for the final victory of communism and for its triumph the world over.

Headlines in the Soviet press spoke of "Unforgettable Days," "Great Charter for Liberated Humanity," "The Stalinist Constitution Lights Our Way," "For Strengthening the Peace and Security of the USSR." On December 5, 1936, which was made a national holiday, the Eighth Congress unanimously adopted the Constitution as finally revised by the Editorial Commission.

The new charter, the full text of which will be found in the Appendices, abolished class discriminations in voting, indirect elections and balloting for candidates by a public show of hands. Provision was made (§§ 134-142) for "universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot." All persons over 18, save lunatics and criminals deprived of electoral rights by a court sentence, were granted the right to vote and to be elected, "irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities." All deputies in all Soviets—Union, Republican and local—were to be chosen by direct election in single-member constituencies. All voting was henceforth to be confidential and by ballot. All deputies were subject to recall by a majority of their electors. The right to nominate candidates (§141) was secured to "public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies." These provisions were made applicable to all elections throughout the territory of the Union. In contrast to the United States, where citizenship is defined by the federal Constitution and suffrage by the States within the limits of federal constitutional restrictions, both citizenship and suffrage in the USSR are defined in the Union Constitution.

Major changes in the structure of federal government were also introduced. The old Congress of Soviets, with its CEC of two houses, was replaced by a bicameral national legislature, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, elected for four years. The Soviet of the Union, corresponding to the American House of Representatives, consists of deputies chosen from districts of 300,000 population each. It had 569 members at the outset, and 647 by 1941 as a result of the annexations of 1939-40. The Soviet of Nationalities in the original draft was to have been appointive, like the United States Senate prior to the 17th Amendment. In response to popular proposals, which Stalin expressly approved, this upper chamber was made elective on the basis of 25 deputies

for each Union Republic, 11 for each Autonomous Republic, 5 for each Autonomous Region and 1 for each National Region. Its membership was 574 at the outset and 713 by 1941. All federal legislation requires a majority vote in each house. The two chambers, meeting jointly, choose a Presidium of 42 members, headed by a President (Kalinin). The Presidium has 16 (originally 11) Vice-Presidents, one for each Union Republic. The Supreme Soviet is normally convened by its Presidium twice a year, with special sessions meeting on the call of the Presidium or of any one of the Republics. The Supreme Soviet appoints the Union Sovnarkom, consisting at the outset of 25 Union Commissariats and 15 Union-Republican Commissariats.

On paper this design for power establishes a completely democratic system of government by all modern definitions of democracy. It was currently hailed in the USSR as "the most democratic constitution in the world." To what extent and in what sense, if any, it has been a vehicle of democracy in its actual operation, will be considered below. Here cognizance may usefully be taken of the general principles of governance which are stated or implied in the document.

The Soviet Constitution, unlike that of the United States, does not purport to establish what is generally termed a "Presidential" system of government. Its scheme (on paper) comes closer to a "parliamentary" system, comparable to that of the United Kingdom, the French Republic, the Weimar Republic and other Continental democracies. Stalin (November 25, 1936) rejected the proposal that the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet be popularly elected: "According to the system of our Constitution there must not be an individual President in the USSR, elected by the whole population on a par with the Supreme Soviet, and able to put himself in opposition to the Supreme Soviet. The President in the USSR is a collegium, it is the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, including the President of the Presidium, elected not by the whole population, but by the Supreme Soviet and accountable to it. Historical experience shows that such a structure of the supreme bodies is the most democratic, and safeguards the country against undesirable contingencies." The responsibility of the executive (here the Sovnarkom and the Presidium) to the legislature is the antithesis of the American system and the essence of the parliamentary system.

This principle is likewise the negation of the familiar American principle of the "separation of powers." Michael T. Florinsky errs in saying, in his treatise on Soviet Government, that "in contrast with its predecessors, the present government of the Union is based on the principle of the separation of powers."⁴ In rejecting the suggestion that the Presidium be empowered to pass provisional acts of legislation, Stalin asserted, to be sure, that "legislative power in the USSR must be exercised by only one body, the Supreme Soviet" and that "it is time we put an end to a situation in which a number of bodies legislate." But the crucial point here is that Lenin argued for the fusion of executive and legislative functions in the same agencies and that this conception, in a form similar to the Western principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament, was written into the Constitution of 1936. The American Founding Fathers, influenced by Montesquieu's misunderstanding of English Government, regarded any union of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the same hands as tyranny. They therefore provided for three separate and independent branches, each checking and acting as a balance against the others. This arrangement is wholly at variance with the actual English practice of legislative supremacy, whereby Parliament is authorized to appoint and, with qualifications, to remove both executive and judicial officials of top rank. Similarly, the Supreme Soviet appoints the Sovnarkom and Presidium and the Supreme Court. Judicial and executive agencies are thus deprived of that equal and coordinate position with the legislature which they enjoy in the United States.

Cabinet responsibility to the legislature is not set forth in the Soviet Constitution in the form of any requirement that the Sovnarkom must resign or call new elections when it loses the support of a majority of the deputies in the Supreme Soviet. The only circumstance in which new elections may be called by the Presidium, prior to the end of the four-year term of the deputies, is when the two chambers fail to agree, after reference of a disagreement to a conciliation commission (§47). But Arts. 48 and 65 imply the possibility of a relationship among voters, legislators, and Ministers comparable to the parliamentary scheme, which is also not set forth in law in Great Britain but is one of the conventions of the Constitution. The Soviet pattern, in practice thus far, is extremely remote from the British model. But, under conditions

which have not yet developed (and may never develop) government under the Soviet Constitution could evolve into a genuinely parliamentary system with no amendments of the basic charter.

3. THE WAY OF FEDERALISM

The greatest glory of the Soviet State is its achievement of effective equality in rights and opportunities for peoples of all races, languages and cultures. The most hateful form of man's cruelty to man has ever been the contempt of members of "superior" racial or national groups for "inferior" peoples, condemned to the role of pariahs or scapegoats for no reason other than difference from their fellows in pigmentation, mother-tongue or folkways. The Western democracies have achieved the legal shadow, but not always the social substance, of the ancient vision of a fellowship among equals wherein each personality is judged by individual character and worth rather than by race, color or previous condition of servitude. The Fascist tyrannies have shown anew, amid hideous orgies of intolerance, sadism and scientific massacre, that those who treat others as sub-human themselves become sub-bestial. The Soviet vision of fraternity finds expression in Art. 123 of the Constitution of 1936:

Equality of rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law. Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.

This ideal is the basis not only of Soviet nationality policy since 1917 but of the federal structure of the USSR. As early as 1912 the "wonderful Georgian" (Lenin's term for Stalin) assumed a position of leadership in developing the Party's program of racial and national equality.⁵ This program was not merely a repudiation of Tsarist policies of "Russification," discrimination and oppression against Jews, Georgians, Tartars, Tadjiks and all other minority peoples, but was a powerful echo of the original Communist Manifesto. The Marxist dream of brotherly love among nations and races was a product of the unbrotherly gospel of hatred among classes. To Christians and liberals, class hatred is

as evil as race hatred. The latter in most of its modern manifestations is a product of middle-class neuroses and of the anxieties of the rich in the face of the insecurities of the poor. In the Fascist States, mass aggressions were deflected away from elite groups onto scapegoat minorities. Race hatred, moreover, has no terminal point save the extermination of its victims and the brutalization of its practitioners. The Marxist creed of class hatred, while equally degrading to the values of human dignity and decency, aims at the establishment of a classless society in the wake of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the revolutionary struggle toward this goal the embattled disciples of Marx are compelled, both by principle and expediency, to fight racial and national prejudice in all their forms, since these are rightly assumed to be among the most lethal weapons of the enemy class.

This combat, waged persistently from the beginning of the Soviet regime, has been pressed on many fronts. Under the formula of a new civilization "national in form and proletarian in content," each ethnic group has been guaranteed cultural autonomy and local self-determination within the political and economic framework of Soviet society. To the formerly subject peoples of Siberia and the Russian Middle East, Red Moscow has brought literacy and ardent encouragement to develop local arts and folklore. The pre-literate tribes of the Caucasus and other wild regions have been given alphabets (usually Latin rather than Cyrillic) for the reading, writing and enrichment of their native languages. A merciless struggle against prejudice and chauvinism has been an integral part of the creative adventure of bringing light and learning not only to the once benighted *muzhiks* of Muscovy but to the less numerous peoples of the forgotten enclaves and oppressed border areas of the vast Tsarist empire.⁶

Here is the greatest achievement of Party and State in changing traditional human nature, and the most potent source of unity and strength among the Soviet peoples. In the face of this accomplishment Fascist apostles of intolerance have been reduced to frenzied despair, while even the most bitter critics of the Bolshevik regime among Western democrats are compelled to grant grudging praise. In the field of inter-racial and inter-national relations the Soviet Union has unquestionably made the most notable contribution of modern times to the practical realization of the ideals of liberalism and Christianity.

The geographic and administrative structure of the Soviet State is a mirror of these purposes. As of 1941, the USSR consisted of 16 Republics, of which the RSFSR was easily the most extensive and most populous with its 15 Autonomous Republics, 6 Autonomous Regions and 10 National Districts. Four of the lesser Union Republics also contained Autonomous Republics or Autonomous Regions, as indicated below: ⁷

<i>Units</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area (sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Capital</i>
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic	114,337,428	6,322,350	Moscow
<i>Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics</i>			
Bashkir	3,304,476	54,233	Ufa
Buriat-Mongolian	569,713	127,020	Ulan-Ude
Chechen-Ingush	732,838	6,060	Grozny
Chuvash	1,110,592	6,909	Cheboksara
Crimean	1,184,060	10,036	Simferopol
Daghestan	977,900	13,124	Makhach-Kala
Kabardino-Balkarian	377,485	4,747	Nalchik
Kalmyk	231,935	28,641	Elista
Komi	335,172	145,221	Sykt'yvkar
Mari	607,874	8,994	Yoshkar-Ola
Mordovian	1,248,982	9,843	Satansk
North Ossetian	345,592	2,393	Ordjonikidze
Tatar	3,067,740	26,200	Kazan
Udmurt	1,282,987	14,494	Izhevsk
Yakut	420,892	1,169,927	Uakutsk
<i>Autonomous Regions</i>			
Adygei	254,055	1,505	Maikop
Cherkess	97,233	1,273	Sulimov
Jewish	113,925	14,204	Birobidjan
Karachai	157,540	3,821	Mikovan-Shakhat
Khakass	284,404	19,161	Abakan
Oirot	169,631	35,936	Oirot-Tura
<i>National Districts</i>			
Aginsk Buriat-Mongol	} not avail- able	10,930	Aginskoe
Chukot		254,991	Anadyr
Evenki		208,033	Tura
Komi-Permiatsk		8,916	Kudymkar
Koriak		119,968	Palana
Nenets		82,797	Narian Mar
Ostiak-Vogul		311,360	Ostiago-Vogulsk
Taimyr		286,643	Dudinka
Ust Ordin Buriat		11,124	Ust-Orda
Yamalo-Nenets		176,760	Salakhard

<i>Units</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area (sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Capital</i>
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	42,272,943	202,540	Kiev
Byelo-Russian S.S.R.	10,525,511	89,300	Minsk
Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.	892,977	64,220	Petrozavodsk
Estonian S.S.R.	1,120,000	18,050	Tallinn
Latvian S.S.R.	1,950,502	24,700	Riga
Lithuanian S.S.R.	3,134,070	22,800	Vilna
Moldavian S.S.R.	2,321,225	13,680	Kishinev
Georgian S.S.R.	3,722,252	26,875	Tbilisi
Abkhazian A.S.S.R.	293,147	3,358	Sukhum
Adzhar A.S.S.R.	169,946	1,080	Batum
South Ossetian A.R.	111,501	1,428	Stalinir
Armenian S.S.R.	1,346,709	11,580	Erevan
Azerbaijan S.S.R.	3,372,794	33,200	Baku
Nakhichevan A.S.S.R.	138,528	2,277	Nakhichevan
Nagorno-Karabakh A.R.	180,063	1,659	Stepanakert
Kazak S.S.R.	6,458,175	1,059,700	Alma-Ata
Uzbek S.S.R.	6,601,619	146,000	Tashkent
Kara-Kalpak A.S.S.R.	111,501	79,631	Turtkul
Turkmen S.S.R.	1,317,693	171,250	Ashkhabad
Tadjik S.S.R.	1,560,540	55,545	Stalinabad
Gorno-Badakshan A.R.	41,769	25,784	Khorog
Kirgiz S.S.R.	1,535,439	75,950	Frunze
	202,467,877	8,337,740	

Except among advocates of world federation, federalism in the United States is a design for government which everybody praises and almost nobody understands—despite the fact that modern federalism was the unique contribution of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic, which has ever since remained the most impressive single example of its successful application. Any evaluation of Soviet federalism presupposes criteria of what is, and what is not, a federal government. Every organization of power on a national scale involves some principle of distributing authority between central and local organs. Where local communities retain full “sovereignty” and vest in central agencies only such powers as they agree upon, with the localities free to modify the allocation at their option, the resulting scheme is usually termed a *confederation*, which differs from an alliance only in the establishment of permanent central bodies through which common purposes are pursued. Examples: the League of Nations, the Confederate States of America, the United Nations

(with qualifications), and the United States, 1781-89. Where central agencies conclusively determine what powers localities shall exercise, the pattern is that of a *unitary* government. Examples: the United Kingdom, France, Massachusetts, the Ukraine, Quebec.

Federal Unions stand between these extremes. Powers of government are here distributed between central and local organs by means of a constitution which neither alone can change, so that each is indefeasibly vested with its own sphere of authority. Federalism likewise involves dual citizenship and two areas of law. The framers of the American Charter of 1787, guided by various ancient and modern strivings toward the goal of *E Pluribus Unum*, hit upon these devices as the most promising solution to the problem confronting them. That problem was one of insuring the efficacy of national government without destroying the autonomy of the states. All early proposals in the Philadelphia Convention contemplated the coercion of the states by means of what would now be called "economic and military sanctions." This formula, which Alexander Hamilton described as "one of the maddest projects ever devised," would have led to the rejection of the Constitution or, in case of acceptance, to the ultimate breakdown of the new system in irresponsibility or chronic strife.⁸ The inventive genius of the founders finally inspired them to substitute for the coercion of the states the enforcement on individuals of national law, within its restricted sphere, through state and federal courts. Thus, Article VI, the "central clause" of the American Constitution:

. . . This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or Public Trust under the United States.

Under the juridical theory of the American system, "sovereignty" resides in the people of the Union who delegate a portion

of it to their state governments and another portion to the United States, with the latter exercising only the powers specified or enumerated in the Constitution, and the former enjoying all other ("residual") powers not expressly denied to them. In some federations the local units—e.g., the provinces of Canada—have only specified powers with all others vested in the central government. But in every federation the geographical "division of powers" (as distinct from the functional "separation of powers") is made by an authority assumed to be superior to both the local and national governments. In the United States popular sovereignty is expressed through the process of making and amending the national and state constitutions. Obedience to the federal will is achieved not through the exercise of compulsion on the states in their corporate capacity, but through the application of federal law by all courts in ordinary litigations.

These essential attributes of federalism are all found in the Soviet system. In his authoritative treatise, *Sovietskoi Gosudarstvennoi Pravo* (Soviet State Law), published by the Juridical Institute, Moscow, 1938, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky⁹ defines sovereignty as follows (p. 262f.):

By sovereignty is meant the supremacy of State power, the force of which is unlimited and independent in internal affairs and independent in external affairs . . . In the USSR sovereignty belongs to the multi-national Soviet people which gives effect to it by means of its Socialist State in the person of its supreme organs of power. . . . Existing in a system of States, the USSR is not dependent on any of them in external affairs. . . . The socialist economic system and the socialist ownership of the means of production are the primary economic bases of the sovereignty of the Soviet people as personified in its Union Government.

The 1936 Constitution describes the USSR as "a federal State formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics, having equal rights" (§13). Twenty-three federal powers are enumerated, with all others left to the Republics (§§14-15). The Soviet equivalent of Article VI of the American Constitution is found (cf. Appendix) in §§ 19, 20, 105 and 130, by which the primacy of federal law is assured. Amendments to the Union Constitution (§ 146) require a two-thirds vote of each chamber of the Supreme Soviet but do not, as in the United States, require ratification by state legislatures—i.e., the Supreme Soviets

of the Union Republics. These, however, are equally represented in the Soviet of Nationalities and in theory (§17) could secede if dissatisfied with a constitutional amendment.

This right of secession is unqualified in the 1936 Constitution, whereas its exercise was subject to approval by all the Republics under the 1924 Charter. The right to secede has never been formally granted in any other true federation. The assertion of such a right in the United States precipitated the Civil War. Its peculiar symbolic significance in Soviet legal theory stems from the ideal of complete self-determination for the members of the Union. But ideal and reality are here widely at variance. The right, guaranteed in theory by the Constitution, cannot in fact be exercised so long as all the Republics are ruled by the Communist Party. Under all currently imaginable circumstances, any proposal to secede would be branded as a breach of Party discipline and as counter-revolution. Soviet spokesmen nevertheless insist, with doubtful logic, that it is precisely the right of secession which makes Soviet federalism genuine while its absence makes bourgeois federalism spurious. Stalin (*Izvestia*, April 3, 1918, as quoted by Vyshinsky) wrote: "Of all existing federal unions, the most characteristic of the bourgeois-democratic order appear to be the American and Swiss federations. Historically they were derived from independent States—by means of confederation they became federations, by which in operation they changed into unitary States, retaining only the form of federalism." The latter statement is, of course, false. Vyshinsky's own commentary on bourgeois federalism (*Soviet State Law*, pp. 227f.) also leaves much to be desired as an accurate evaluation:

The ideologists of the Constitution of the U.S.A. (Hamilton, Madison, etc.) regarded equal voting of the States in the Senate as a recognition of the portion of sovereignty left to them. . . . Such "equality" of the States is self-deceptive. Capitalism stimulates contradictions between separate areas (industrial vs. agricultural areas, etc.) and brings about economic exploitation of some areas by others. . . . The general tendency in the development of federal governments from the end of the 19th Century illustrates the extraordinary widening of the competency of central organs of federal power at the expense of the component parts. . . . The State apparatus became the primary implement of a distinct clique of monopolistic capital. . . . In the U.S.A. a formal federation covers up plutocratic centralization.

Vyshinsky's observations on American political corruption and on discrimination against Negroes come closer to realities, but do not lend any greater plausibility to the official Communist thesis regarding the right of secession. That this thesis is held in all seriousness, however, is shown by Stalin's remarks of November 25, 1936, in rejecting the proposal that all Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics be raised to the status of Union Republics upon attaining a certain level of economic and cultural development:

This would not be a Marxist, not a Leninist approach. The Tatar Republic, for example, remains an Autonomous Republic, while the Kazak Republic is to become a Union Republic; but this does not mean that from the standpoint of culture and economic development the Kazak Republic is on a higher level than the Tatar Republic. The very opposite is the case. The same can be said, for example, of the Volga-German Autonomous Republic and the Kirgiz Union Republic, of which the former is on a higher cultural and economic level than the latter, although it remains an Autonomous Republic. What are the grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics? There are three such grounds.

First, the republic concerned must be a border republic, not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics have a right to secede from the USSR, a republic, on becoming a Union Republic, must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the USSR. And this question can be raised only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign State, and consequently is not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Of course, none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the USSR. But since the right to secede from the USSR is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper. . . .

Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that republic. Take the Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example. It is a border republic, but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority in that republic; on the contrary, they are a minority. Consequently, it would be wrong and illogical to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category of Union Republic.

Thirdly, the republics must not have too small a population; it should have a population of, say, not less but more than a million, at least. Why? Because it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet

republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain its existence as an independent State. There can hardly be any doubt that the imperialist beasts of prey would soon lay hands on it.

In addition to the hypothetical right of secession, Soviet federalism differs from its American analogue in another respect. In the United States federal executive and legislative officials have no authority to annul state legislation. The necessary task of preventing the local commonwealths from violating the federal Constitution, Congressional statutes and treaties has in practice been entrusted exclusively to judicial bodies, with the final word spoken by the United States Supreme Court. The highest judicial tribunal of the USSR has a comparable function. At the same time, however, the federal Presidium is empowered to annul decisions and orders of the Sovnarkoms of the Republics if they depart from existing law (§49e), while the federal Sovnarkom, subject to reference to the Presidium, may suspend decisions and orders of the Republican Sovnarkoms (§69). Federal powers, moreover, include authority to ensure conformity of the Republican Constitution with the Union Constitution (§14d) and, by implication, permit the Supreme Soviet to annul statutes enacted by Republican Congresses of Soviets. This arrangement would be matched in the United States if Congress, as well as the Supreme Court, could annul acts of state legislatures, and if the Cabinet in Washington could provisionally suspend orders of Governors and their councils.

These peculiarities of Soviet public law, however, need not be equated with central coercion of local units which is incompatible with authentic federalism. In the USSR, as in Britain and the Continental democracies, the Constitution is politically, rather than judicially, interpreted and enforced. The uniquely American institution of judicial supremacy is not at all an essential aspect of federalism. In a federation where legislative supremacy is the rule, the central legislature and executive have power to nullify acts of local units which are in conflict with federal constitutional, statutory or treaty provisions.

On paper and in juridical theory, the USSR conforms to the requirements of a true federation: powers of government are divided between Union and Republics by a Constitution binding upon both and envisaged as an expression of sovereign power

superior to both; all Soviet nationals are citizens of the Union and of the Republic in which they reside; and Union law is enforced on individuals through Union and Republican courts. In practice (cf. the constitutional revisions of February, 1944), the evolution of the Soviet federation has been in the direction of greater, rather than lesser, autonomy for the member Republics. The ideal of cultural self-expression for minority groups, which is the inspiration of Soviet federalism, is not in any sense a theory on paper but a concrete reality, marking a notable milestone in the march of mankind toward equality and fraternity.

While Republican and local governments lie outside of the purview of the present study, a few general comments may be ventured. The territory of the USSR embraces not only 16 Union Republics, but, as of 1941, 19 Autonomous Republics (of which 15 are within the RSFSR), 10 Autonomous Regions* (of which 7 are in the RSFSR), and 10 National Districts, all in the RSFSR. Of these, the Autonomous Republics have Constitutions which are confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic in which they are located (§60b of the Union Constitution). While the Soviet Union might conceivably be viewed as a federation of federations, it appears a fair inference from doctrinal statements and actual practice that the powers of the Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions and National Districts are all in fact fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics in which they are located. This circumstance warrants the judgment that all of the 16 Union Republics, including even the RSFSR, have unitary rather than federal governments.

Local subdivisions of administration display a bewildering complexity and mutability which are surprising to those who imagine the USSR to be a rigidly regimented totalitarian monolith. Rapid shifts of population and changing local interests explained the kaleidoscopic confusion of *oblasts* and *krais* (comparable in size to American states), *okrugs* (counties), *volosts* and *rayons* (townships). That the process is not conducive to efficiency in local management, however, is suggested by Stalin's comment in 1936: "There are people in the USSR who are eagerly and indefatigably disposed to rehash the *krais* and *oblasts*, bringing obscurity and confusion to the work. The draft Constitution

* The 10th is Tannu Tuva, established in October, 1945, as the Tuvian Autonomous Region.

creates a bridle for these people. And this is desirable, because here, as in many other places, we need an atmosphere of certainty, stability, clarity."

Despite this hope, new changes followed on a large scale in 1937 and thereafter. During the war several new National Districts were formed, while the Volga-German Republic, listed in the Constitution as one of the Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR, was abolished on September 24, 1941, its territory divided among adjoining regions, and its people settled in Siberia. This step, which normally would have been taken by the authorities of the RSFSR, was decreed by the Presidium of the USSR in the name of national defense. A comparable disregard of constitutional niceties was displayed on May 28, 1938, when the Kandalaksha region was transferred from the Karelo-Finnish Republic to the Province of Murmansk of the RSFSR by the federal Presidium instead of by the authorities of the K-FSSR and the RSFSR. In both procedure and substance, Soviet methods of altering areas of local government exhibit a flexibility which often savors of the arbitrary, and a variability which at times suggests experimental fumbling rather than adherence to established principle.¹⁰ But all these aberrations have their counterparts in local government in most American states with their many meaningless units and overlapping jurisdictions. They may fairly be set down in the USSR less as products of bureaucratic bungling and federal meddling, prominent as both have been in Soviet administration, than as instances of local diversity and experimentation within the framework of federal unity.

4. THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

Said Stalin to Roy Howard on March 1, 1936, in commenting on the provisions of the new Constitution relating to elections:

It seems to you that there will not be an electoral struggle. But there will be, and I foresee a very lively electoral struggle. We have not a few institutions which work badly. It sometimes happens that one or another local organ of power does not know how to satisfy one or another of the many-sided and ever-growing needs of toilers of city and country. Did you construct a good school or not? Did you better living conditions? Are you not a bureaucrat? Did you help make our work more effective, our life more cultured? Such will be the

criteria with which millions of electors will approach candidates, discarding the unfit, crossing them out of the lists, putting forward the best and nominating them as candidates.

This statement, requoted in *Pravda*, February 17, 1938, was widely interpreted abroad as a pledge of electoral contests under the new dispensation. It refers expressly, however, to nominating procedure and implies that only one candidate for each office will finally be named. With few exceptions this has in fact been the rule since the adoption of the new Constitution. Soviet elections most commonly assume the form of all-but-unanimous endorsement of the candidates whose names appear on the ballot. To Western liberals this procedure savors of Fascist and Nazi plebiscite techniques. In reality, however, Soviet candidates are not imposed from above save insofar as Party directives may sometimes, but by no means invariably, determine the final choice among a multiplicity of local aspirants. The result is not "democracy" as understood in the West. But neither does it involve the absence of widespread public participation in picking elective office-holders.

All sane Soviet citizens, not under judicial deprivation of their electoral rights as a penalty for crime, are entitled to vote at the age of 18. Under the law of August 19, 1938, citizenship is granted to all who enjoyed it on November 7, 1917, and did not subsequently lose their status, and to all lawfully naturalized persons. All born on Soviet territory, and all born abroad but domiciled in the USSR and unable to prove foreign nationality, are deemed Soviet citizens.¹¹

The first election held under the 1936 Constitution took place on December 12, 1937, for the new Supreme Soviet. In preparation for the event the old federal CEC appointed a Central Electoral Commission which directed a hierarchy of local commissions in registering voters and candidates, conducting propaganda, supervising the preparation of ballots, envelopes and ballot boxes, counting the ballots and announcing the results. Electoral districts, established at least 45 days before the election, were to be fixed by the CEC and subsequently by the Supreme Soviet itself. For purposes of registering voters and casting and counting ballots (but not for purposes of representation) the RSFSR was divided into 93,927 precincts, of which 2,047 were on boats. The population of some of the urban precincts was as

large as 150,000, while districts in the lesser Republics varied between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants.

Candidates were proposed in the constituencies by trade unions, cooperatives, Komsomol units, cultural societies, army regiments, collective farms and the primary organizations of the Party, with the latter in most instances advising other groups in areas where it was decided not to nominate a Party member. No candidate could be nominated by an individual, but all voters were entitled to attend meetings where nominees were proposed. Efforts of church congregations to propose candidates were disallowed by the Electoral Commission, though this would doubtless be permitted now. Procedure conformed closely to the Election Regulations later issued by the Supreme Soviet. Voting lists were compiled by agents of city and rural Soviets on the basis of house-rolls, membership lists of collective farms and personal canvassing. In the absence of any residence requirement, all temporary and permanent inhabitants were listed alphabetically in each precinct. Those moving before election day or engaged in travel were granted certificates by local Soviets, entitling them to vote wherever they might be. The lists thus compiled were posted in local Soviet HQ 30 days before the election. All citizens were entitled to complain of omissions or errors, with each complaint to be dealt with inside of 3 days by the Soviet Executive Committee, with appeal to the Peoples' Courts which were required to reach a decision in open hearings within 3 days in the presence of the complainant and a representative of the Soviet.

Qualifications for candidates were the same as those of voters, except that no candidate could be a member of an Electoral Commission and each was required to consent in writing to be a nominee. The names of proposed candidates were to be published in the local press 25 days before the election. Ballots were to be printed 15 days before the election. In most districts several candidates were proposed, usually by acclamation in the various nominating groups. But in virtually all districts only one candidate for each seat in the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities (1,143 in all) appeared on the ballot. Of the total thus nominated, 37 were dropped and replaced by others on the order of the Central Electoral Commission. This elimination of all but one candidate normally took place within the 10 days between the publishing of names and the printing of ballots.

The procedure is nowhere set forth by law or decree. As Rose Somerville observes, the machinery of elimination is "not revealed by the public records."¹² It amounted to a highly informal "primary," inevitably guided by the local Party members. The choice of deputies was thus made not at the election but during the campaign in the name of a "bloc of Party and non-Party people." Of the 569 candidates for the Soviet of the Union, 81% (and of the 574 candidates for the Soviet of Nationalities, 71%) were members or candidates of the Party. Others were designated as "non-Party Bolsheviks."

This mode of selection, while wholly incompatible with Western standards of democracy, bears little resemblance to procedures in the former Axis countries with which Anglo-American critics of the USSR have often compared it. Fascist plebiscites allowed voters no voice in the nomination of candidates. In the Third Reich all elections were abolished save for members of the Reichstag. Here the leadership of the Nazi Party prepared its list of candidates and printed the names of the first 10 on the ballot all over the country, with no provision whatever for popular consultation. While detailed local studies are unavailable, it would appear that in Soviet elections the final choice of the single candidate for each office is made by the district Electoral Commission in consultation with the Party local, with the outcome flowing from local pressures and preferences expressed in mass meetings and in conferences among nominating groups rather than from "dictation" by the Kremlin. The absence of any "primary" by secret ballot, or of any other formal procedure for registering popular preferences among aspirants, precludes any certainty that the favored candidate is necessarily the favorite of his constituents. Yet the conclusion is unwarranted that voters have no voice in nominations.

Soviet theory continues to anticipate multiple nominations for membership in the Supreme Soviet. Soviet practice already embraces such arrangements in local elections. The statutes provide for "run-off" elections two weeks after the original polling if less than half of the registered voters cast ballots or if no candidate receives an absolute majority. While it does not appear that this familiar democratic device, nor the constitutional right of popular recall, has ever been applied to federal offices, the possibility of at least 3 candidates for a single seat is clearly contem-

plated.¹³ Mayors of cities are commonly elected by popular choice through secret ballot from among four or five candidates. The same is true for members of village and urban Soviets in which non-Party members usually constitute two-thirds or three-quarters of the deputies.

If the first federal election day was a gala occasion, the preceding nation-wide campaign to get out the vote had all the earmarks of an educational crusade. Scores of millions of copies of election pamphlets and books were published on the records and qualifications of candidates. "Delegate Campaigners" were elected in pre-election conferences in all precincts to organize campaign workers and act as official electioneers. Most urban precincts had *Agitpunkts* for reading, lectures and entertainments. The Soviet press teemed with slogans and resolutions: "All to the polls!" "Let us transform Election Day into a great holiday in celebration of the unity of Soviet youth around Stalin!" "Comrade Communists: Vote for the Non-Party candidates in the same friendly manner as for Communist candidates! Comrade Non-Party Voters: Vote for the Communist candidates in the same friendly manner as for Non-Party candidates!" "Party and people are indivisible!" "Long live the Invincible bloc of Communists and Non-Party people!"¹⁴ Wrote *Pravda*, December 10, 1937:

As a result of the Stalin policy the Soviet people has for 16 years been delivered from war-clashes and lives a peaceful life and has the opportunity to continue without hindrance its peaceful labors. . . . The Party is going to the elections with a program: peace . . . , extensive strengthening of the industrial might of the Fatherland . . . , securing gains in the Stakhanovite record . . . , increasing the success of collective farms . . . , attainment of new heights of cultural creativeness. The people know that in the Party of Bolsheviks there is no dichotomy of word and deed. . . . Stalin can reckon on our good faith. . . . History will record this day, when ninety million free citizens of a Socialist country go to the ballot box. Let us all be participants in this historic act! Vote for the candidates of the Bloc of Communists and Non-Party men. In this way you will strengthen in a forceful manner the might of the Soviet Union, you will raise still higher the Soviet power, you will brighten the great banner of Lenin-Stalin in the eyes of workers of all countries! Let us conduct the election in such a manner that the Party and Comrade Stalin will say: "Horosho!"

Speaking in Tashkent, where among other constituencies he stood for election, Lazar Kaganovich assured his auditors (*Pravda*, December 10, 1937) that no real popular rule was possible in the bourgeois countries where all power is in the hands of "a few hundred millionaires, bankers, factory owners. . . . Bourgeois writers and politicians have difficulty in seeing the secret of our Party and whence it gets its strength. . . . The roots and sources of our powerful, glorious and popular Party of Bolsheviks are in the people themselves. It is the flesh, bones and blood of the toiling masses. Many parties exist in the world, but the history of mankind has never known and does not now know such a Party as ours. And this is not boasting, but is objective historical truth, as is shown by the struggles of our Party under the glorious banner of Lenin-Stalin in past decades. I assure you that I shall be first of all a loyal son of our Party, a faithful and everlastingly devoted pupil of my great teacher, Comrade Stalin."

In expressing his appreciation to those who had nominated him in a Moscow district, Stalin, in an address broadcast over the Union from the Bolshoi Theater on election eve (cf. *Pravda*, December 12, 1937), touched on many matters dear to Bolshevik hearts:

What can be added to the speeches of our leading comrades, Kalinin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Yezhov, etc.? . . . I could have prepared some light speech about everything and nothing. It is possible that such a speech would amuse the public. It is said that masters of such speeches reside not only in capitalist countries but also here in the Soviet State. But first of all, I am not a master of such speeches. . . . I know the meaning of confidence. It naturally confers upon me new and additional duties and responsibilities. . . . Among us Bolsheviks it is not the accepted thing to shirk from responsibility. I accept it willingly. . . . It is more than an election; it is really a public holiday for our workers, our peasants and our intellectuals.

Never in the history of the world has there been such a really free and democratic election, never! . . . (Elections are held in capitalist countries) in a set-up of class struggle, class hatred; in a set-up of pressure on voters from capitalists, landowners, bankers and other sharks of capitalism. It is impossible to call such elections—even if they are general, based on equality, secret and direct—fully free and fully democratic elections. Only within socialist society can there be such a democratic election. . . . Ten years ago one could discuss whether

or not it was possible to build a Socialist State here. It is no longer a question for discussion. Now it is a question of fact, of actual life, of a way of life which is permeating the whole being of the people. . . .

In capitalist states there exist some odd and, I would say, wholly eccentric relations between deputies and voters. Before the elections deputies entice and frolic with the voters, are obliging before them, wail and whimper about loyalty, give heaps of all kinds of promises. . . . (But afterward) the deputy can shift from one camp to another, he can change from the correct to the incorrect road, he can even embroil himself in unnecessary machinations, he can turn somersaults at his pleasure: he is independent. But here voters have the right to recall their deputies at any time if they begin to evade, if they shift from the line, if they forget about their dependence on the people, on the voters. That is a wonderful law, comrades. The deputy must know that he is the servant of the people, its messenger to the Supreme Soviet and he must conduct himself along the line which the people have ordered him to follow. . . .

The people must demand of their deputies that they be such precise and unmistakable workers as Lenin himself was, that they be as fearless in battle and as merciless to the enemies of the people as Lenin himself was . . . free from all panic, wise and cautious in deciding complex questions, righteous and honorable and filled with love for the people. Can we say that all candidates for deputy are such workers? I would not say that. There are all sorts of people on the earth and there are all sorts of workers on the earth. . . . There are the vague and indefinite people who are neither fish nor meat and will neither give a candle to God nor a poker to the Devil. . . . The people must influence deputies systematically and inspire them to follow Lenin's example. The functioning of the voters does not end with the election.

Individuals were permitted to be candidates in several Republics at once, both Union and Autonomous, but not in more than one constituency in any one Republic. Stalin and Molotov were nominated in scores of districts. The Party Central Committee decided which leaders would accept which nominations. Molotov and Stalin were candidates in all the Union and Autonomous Republics. Yezhov accepted 20 nominations, Voroshilov 19, Kaganovich 17, Andreyev 11, Kalinin 10, Zhdanov 9, etc. Many Party leaders later accepted election as members of the Supreme Soviet of Union Republics as well. No compilation is conveniently available of the number of seats in the federal or Republican Supreme Soviets which have been held by the same people, but

it is an appreciable fraction of the whole. This curious arrangement would be unrepresentative and unworkable in legislatures whose members are salaried and assumed to have full-time jobs. Its prevalence in the USSR is further evidence, if any be needed, that all major policies are formulated not in Soviet legislative chambers but in the inner councils of the Party.

Sunday, December 12, 1937, was a day of singing, dancing and merrymaking. It was also a day of earnest dedication to civic duty by all Soviet citizens, very few of whom shared the view abroad that an election whose results were predetermined must be a mockery. To a people who were voting by secret ballot for the first time in 20 years, this was a minor detail. Oldsters could recall elections to the impotent Duma in Tsarist times, but the suffrage had been narrowly restricted. Now all could vote. No matter that the unsuccessful candidates had already retired and that the new parliament would do the Party's bidding. From the Party had come the new Constitution and the new life which, for all its rigors, was infinitely better for the masses than the old. The goals were unanimity now and solidarity forever. Polls were open from 6 a.m. until midnight. Moscow and other cities were aglow with bunting, garlands and flags. Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov voted in precinct 58 of the Lenin election district of the capital. Others voted by millions in town and countryside, in lonely villages and remote valleys, in Arctic outposts and desert oases, on ships at sea and even at railway stations where booths were set up for passengers in transit.

The results were impressive. Voting was secret. Counting was honest. Of the 93,639,458 enfranchised Soviet citizens, 90,319,436 or 96% cast ballots. Of the ballots for deputies to the Soviet of the Union, 636,808 were invalid and 632,074 had names crossed out. In electing the members of the Soviet of Nationalities, the voters cast 1,487,582 invalid ballots and crossed out names in 562,402 instances. "Invalid" ballots were those spoiled by incorrect marking or by the writing in of names. Even the over-enthusiastic voter who wrote in Stalin's name in districts where he was not a candidate rendered the ballot invalid. Apart from refusing to vote, the only means of final protest in the privacy of the voting booth was to cross out candidates' names or write in the names of others. But protestants were few. In only three Union Republics did less than 95% of the registered electors vote:

Turkmenistan, 94.2%; Uzbekistan, 93.5%; and Kirgizia, 94.3%. In the Ukraine 97.8% voted and in the RSFSR 96.8%. The participants in only one Republic (Kirgizia, 97.2%) cast fewer than 98% of their ballots for the "Bloc of Party and Non-Party People" (cf. *Pravda*, December 17, 1937). The "victors" who filled the 1,143 seats comprised 855 Party members and 288 non-Party members. Of the total, 354 were workers or peasants, 120 Red Army or Navy men, 78 non-official intellectuals and 51 members of the NKVD. Women elected numbered 184.

In Western eyes unanimity is the best proof that an election is a travesty. In the Soviet view unanimity was evidence that the masses were solidly behind the regime. *Pravda* (December 17, 1937) naïvely pointed out by means of a chart that while the popular vote for the party in power in the most recent elections had been only 71% in Japan, 60.5% in the United States, 56.6% in France and 53.6% in Great Britain, it was 98.2% in the USSR. Poland and Germany were omitted on the ground that in the former 53.4% of the voters had boycotted the election while in the latter the voters had "no democratic rights." In bourgeois States, said *Pravda*, elections reflect the peoples' will only "in a crooked looking-glass." In the Soviet Union, solidarity and unanimity are the rule. Ergo: "the Soviet Government is the most powerful and stable Government in the world! The Soviet Government is an authentic peoples' government!" The same theme was reflected in the selected foreign press comments retailed in Soviet newspapers. Czechoslovak journals were quoted on the unanimity of the Soviet citizens. *Pravda* quoted *L'Humanité* on election day: "Voting unanimously for the freedom and independence of their Socialist Fatherland, supporting the peace policy of their government, the citizens of the Soviet Union make possible the strengthening of collective security and the defense of our people also from the horrors of war."

That the election results impressed many non-Communists abroad with the unity of the voters or the reality of democracy in the USSR is to be doubted. Far more impressive would have been a free contest among rival candidates in which those of the "Bloc" had won 60% or 55% of the votes. It does not follow, however, that the Soviet people, who have never known parliamentary democracy, were not sincerely convinced of the need for unanimity and deeply impressed with its attainment. Electoral

unanimity is an old Slavic custom, long antedating Sovietism and Marxism. It is reflected in the procedure of the ancient Russian *Veche* or assembly and in the *liberum veto* of the Polish Diet. Stalin and his colleagues were neither perpetrating a fraud nor capitalizing upon the very real dangers confronting the country from abroad. Stripped of its modern trimmings, the way of Soviet elections is an age-old Russian way, reflecting the constant search for unity among a people long weakened by feuds and factions and menaced by powerful foes.

With the coming of war, the second federal election, scheduled for December, 1941, was indefinitely postponed, as were Republican and many local elections. Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics had been elected in June, 1938, and local Soviets in December, 1939. In both instances the form and substance of the ceremonies were similar to those of the first election under the 1936 Constitution. The federal Supreme Soviet first met in January, 1938, again in August and twice annually thereafter. All the Supreme Soviets chose new Presidia and Sovnarkoms at their first sessions. These executive bodies, like their parent legislatures, carried on with little change during hostilities and thereafter.

The passion for unity finds renewed expression in the legislative procedure of all Soviets. All votes are unanimous. Deputies make, and listen to, speeches and reports on many controversial issues. But no question is brought to a vote unless unanimity is assured. This practice leads many Western observers to conclude anew that the deputies are merely puppets whose every motion is a result of strings pulled behind the scenes by Party bosses. Closer observation would suggest that in Soviet legislatures, as in elections, means other than yes-and-no votes are employed to reconcile divergencies and arrive at an effective consensus. In the USSR the law-making process, like the electoral process, is not a method of making decisions on national policy as it is in the West. But neither is it a simple business of "rubber-stamping" decisions made elsewhere. It is rather to be thought of as one of the important means whereby the Party leaders maintain close contact with the non-Party masses and adjust the line to popular complaints, aspirations and demands within limits determined by the leaders' judgment of what is possible and what is necessary.

Soviet law-makers receive no salaries and have other jobs. But

they ride gratis on railways and ships and are paid expenses for travel, correspondence and study: for members of the federal Supreme Soviet, up to a maximum of 1,000 rubles a month when the body is not in session and the deputy is engaged in governmental work in his district, plus 150 rubles a day during sessions.¹⁵ As in all legislatures, the work of law-making is done in committees rather than on the floor. Most Soviets have committees on credentials, legislative proposals and the budget, along with various temporary committees. The federal Supreme Soviet has permanent committees in each chamber on credentials (mandates), legislation, the budget, and foreign affairs. As in parliamentary regimes, most legislative projects, as well as the budgets, originate with the Cabinet or Sovnarkom. Little information is available in print on the committee system of Soviet law-makers. But it is in committees, rather than in plenary sessions, that data are assembled and digested, controversies resolved and statutory projects agreed upon.

The work of a deputy is focussed more on his relation with his constituents than on bill-drafting and legislative debates. He is a liaison agent between his electors and the Party leaders. Seldom can he effect any major change of policy by insisting that his district "demands" this or that. Still less can he imitate American legislators in securing patronage, obtaining favors and building up a personal political machine. Yet he cannot limit his activities to trying to force unpopular measures down the throats of resentful voters. In the Soviet scheme a deputy is useful in his special function only insofar as he can reflect popular wishes and thereby supply the top leadership with the indispensable knowledge which all rulers must have if they are to know what the multitude prefers, wants, hopes for, or insists upon, and what the multitude will welcome, support, tolerate or oppose.

From the perspective of the West this method of achieving government by the consent of, and with the participation of, the governed appears crude, clumsy, inefficient and undemocratic. It is a method which fosters conformity and intimidation rather than active controversy and self-reliant independence of judgment—as is shown, for example, by the Soviet passion for "self-criticism," actively fostered by the Party to correct these defects. But it also fosters solidarity, cooperation and widespread political education (always within the limits of the official credo) and a

general sense of belonging to the community and participating in common tasks. These values are prized most highly in Soviet politics. They are perhaps undervalued in the Atlantic democracies with their welter of lobbies, pressure-groups, and self-seeking blocs. Democracy becomes a tragic vacuum when freemen, unable to unite effectively for creative purposes, dissipate their heritage in irresponsibility and demagoguery. The most perfect design for self-government is empty when its beneficiaries lack sufficient unity and insight to comprehend and master the baffling problems and disruptive cleavages which threaten all of Western culture with chaos. Since 1917 the record of Anglo-American democracy, to say nothing of its Continental counterparts, is not impressive for cohesion, foresight and collective capacity to distinguish between facts and fictions. When judged in terms of long-run national interests, the Soviet record strikes a better balance, both in foreign and domestic policy.

Yet in actual operation the Soviet system of power and policy-formulation is not democracy. Only uncritical adherents to the Party line will seek to attribute this quality to it. And only those who despair of the capacity of democratic communities to avoid future disasters would seek to substitute the Soviet scheme for familiar Anglo-American practices. Under the 1936 Constitution, without amendments, the USSR could become a democracy in the Western sense. It has not as yet become one. Dictatorship, albeit of a wholly new type, does not become democracy by calling it such, even though the naming process is revealing of aspirations. As Sir John Maynard puts it:

The new Constitution will not enable the Russian peoples to change their rulers without the use of force or the violation of law. In this power, existing in differing degrees and in differing forms, in the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, much of northern and western Europe, the British dominions and in germ also in British India, consists the essence of Democracy. It is not complete, even in the so-called democratic States, because of the weighting of the scales in favor of wealth. In such degree as it exists, it contains the secret of peaceful political growth. It makes possible the distinction between opposition to the Government and enmity to the State: for lack of which, independent thinkers grow into traitors and differences of opinion become potential revolutions. The Constitution of the USSR is not democratic: in spite of the document. Nor indeed do the conditions make democracy possible. What is aimed at is a discipline which shall remake man in a

new image, and the cooperation of the patient in the process of re-making. The Russian people is *at school*.¹⁶

What may justly be said is that the dictatorship of the Party, operating through pseudo-democratic structures and procedures, has thus far been a necessity for the building of socialism, the defense of the State, and the salvation and victory of the Soviet peoples in a hostile and formidably menacing world. Survival is the first law of life, in politics as elsewhere. Had the USSR been a political democracy of the Western type during the past 20 years, had its people been permitted to choose what was soft, easy and pleasant rather than what was hard, painful and necessary, the Soviet Union would not exist today. Its destroyers would also, in all likelihood, have destroyed the independence of Britain and the freedom of America as well, for the military collapse of Russia would have rendered the victors invulnerable and invincible. Dictatorship has been the price of survival for the USSR and for the United Nations. Herein lies its justification—save in the eyes of those who are concerned only with the propriety of means and never with the primacy of ends, or with the eternal verities to the exclusion of the tough tasks of the day, or with the virtues of national suicide under unrestricted freedom as against the vices of national survival by way of coercion.

Despite the lamentations or sadistic rejoicings of irreconcilable haters and embittered ex-lovers, there are no solid reasons for assuming that the dictatorial means thus far used have forever destroyed the possibility of attaining democratic ends in the USSR. The Marxist dream stems from democratic values. Its Soviet apostles have returned to them in form. They will yet return to them in substance if the non-Soviet world will permit them to. The Soviet citizenry has meanwhile found in its own system the elements of creative discipline and unity necessary for collective survival and for all the hopes of the future.

5. HOW MANY FREEDOMS?

"Real liberty," declared Stalin to Roy Howard in 1936, "can be had only where exploitation is destroyed, where there is no oppression of one people by another, where there is no unemployment and pauperism, where a person does not shiver in fear

of losing tomorrow his job, home, bread. Only in such a society is it possible to have real, and not paper, liberty, personal and otherwise.”¹⁷

In Soviet ideology liberty consists primarily of freedom from want and fear. The other two of President Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” (January 6, 1941)—freedom of religion and freedom of speech—are purely coincidental. By Western standards, want and fear have been the common lot of most of the Soviet peoples since 1917. Bad housing, poor clothing and meager and monotonous food spell “want” to all the burghers of Atlantica, and to many among the masses of Eurasia as well. “Fear” is the correct name of the physiological reaction evoked by the GPU and NKVD, the allied interventionists, the Nazi invaders, the masters of the Party machine within the country, and all the enemies of the Party machine abroad. But fears and wants vary in kind as well as in degree. In the Atlantic democracies in recent decades the common man has wanted security, opportunity and riches and has found his wants usually denied, except in wartime. He has feared bankruptcy, joblessness and penury and has tasted bitterly of all during the years of peace. His fellow in the USSR, so long as he conformed to the Party line, has had no fear of losing his job or not having a job, and no fear of being exploited for private profits by employers or advertizers or retailers. Except in wartime, he has enjoyed both security and opportunity. In proportion to his talents, he has even had riches by comparison with his less talented neighbors.

In the West, fear is an economic phenomenon, flowing from periodic breakdowns of production and distribution. In the Soviet Union, fear is a political phenomenon, springing from the intolerance of the disciples of orthodoxy. Which fear is theoretically the more fearful can be decided only by psychologists and philosophers. Both Joe Doakes and Ivan Ivanovich will settle for a job. If it includes the right to criticize or insult President, Prime Minister or Vozhd, so much the better. If not, a job without free speech may still seem preferable to free speech without a job. For the millions who lead marginal lives, the privilege of unrestrained invective is less important than the privilege of eating and enjoying the dignity which goes with productive work. Both Joe and Ivan, during the past generation, have feared war. Both have had war, thanks to the incapacity of their respective leaders

to act together to prevent it. The Ivans have suffered infinitely more agony from war than the Joes. Their war experiences reveal other significant differences. For Western workers, war meant jobs and big money (for those "deferred" for essential war work) as a concomitant of a further enrichment of the wealthy whose markets and profits were guaranteed. For Soviet workers, war meant an unwelcome interruption of the job, backbreaking sacrifice without increased wages, and no enrichment of the wealthy beyond rewards for personal merit to those contributing most to the war effort. Fear and want in East and West are different experiences.

Be it noted, however, that in all human communities freedom (by any definition) is not a product of anarchy but of order. Disorder means violence and the end of all freedom, save for those who are rich, strong and first on the trigger. The Atlantic democracies have established a free political order, but have thus far failed, except in wartime, to establish an economic order assuring jobs to all able and willing to work. The USSR has provided this opportunity in abundance, but made its enjoyment contingent upon unqualified acceptance of the governmental policy, social program and economic plan which makes jobs for all possible. The West has successfully reconciled order and freedom in politics, but has not achieved a comparable synthesis in economics. Soviet economy has achieved an impressive measure of both order and freedom, in the sense of mass participation in planning and management, but Soviet polity has sacrificed freedom for order. To combine the two is the dream of all Utopians. In the absence of such a combination, two worlds are sundered. The nature of their differences in terms of the daily lives of ordinary people is the only possible basis on which Westerners can fruitfully analyze the problem of freedom in the USSR.

The "Bill of Rights" in the Soviet Constitution of 1936 is a bill of duties as well as of rights. For example: "Work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the [Biblical] principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat'" (§12). "It is the duty of every citizen to abide by the Constitution, to observe the laws, to maintain labor discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse" (§130). Other duties include military service (§132) and protection of "socialist property as the

sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system" (§131).

The rights guaranteed in return for the performance of these duties may be classified as Personal Rights, Political Rights, Property Rights and Social Rights. The first of these categories embraces equality of the sexes (§122). Women are entitled to full equality with men as regards work, wages, rest, leisure, social insurance and education. They enjoy "pre-maternity and maternity leave with full pay, and . . . a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens." Personal rights also include full equality among races and nationalities (§§110 and 123). These rights, sometimes more honored in the breach than in the observance in Atlantica, are unquestionably the best protected of all rights in the USSR.

Other personal rights listed in the Constitution (§§124-128) embrace the familiar liberties for which the middle class revolutionists of Western Europe and America once fought, bled and died: freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly and association, and inviolability of persons, homes and correspondence, plus (§111) public trials, "unless otherwise provided for by law," and right of counsel. In the land of the Soviets these rights thus far are more aspirations than realities. They are observed only within the limits of the Party line. For deviators and dissenters, civil liberties in the Western sense are as yet non-existent.

No role is yet recognized in the USSR for the principle enunciated by Justice Holmes, dissenting in *United States vs. Rosika Schwimmer*, 279 US 644 (1928): "If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." Neither is there any place in the Soviet Union as yet for an earlier (1919) dictum of Justice Holmes in another famous dissent, *Abrams vs. United States*, 250 US 616:

When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . While

that experiment is part of our system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and primary purpose of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.

The concluding proviso of the late, great American jurist might be deemed by some to justify Soviet curtailments of civil liberties, since the safety of the country has been periodically threatened by enemies at home and abroad. Yet it may reasonably be argued that restrictions upon personal liberties have been disproportionate to the objective needs of defense.

Freedom of religion (or the lack thereof) in the USSR has attracted particular attention in the West. Marxist materialism, combined with the close identification between Tsarism and the Orthodox priesthood, accounts for the agnosticism of all Bolsheviks and serves to explain the original Communist attitude toward institutionalized Christianity. At the outset the Revolution disestablished the Church, confiscated its properties, disfranchised the clergy, and forbade public or private religious instruction of the young, save in family circles. Small congregations of believers, however, were permitted the free use of church buildings and their ceremonial appurtenances, provided that such groups should limit their activities to divine services, own no corporate property, and acknowledge no higher ecclesiastical authorities. On January 19, 1918, the Patriarch Tikhon, with the support of the *Sobor* or episcopal council of the Church, excommunicated the Bolsheviks and declared war on the Soviet State. In the civil conflict of 1918-21, Tikhon and many other Church officials ardently supported the Whites.

Subsequent developments comprise a long and complex tale. Suffice it to say that the Party, recognizing partial defeat in its struggle to destroy religious faith, relaxed its offensive in the 1930's and finally, under the impact of total war, abandoned much of its original program and granted wide privileges to a purified and now loyal Church. The end of the NEP, however, coincided with a new attack upon religion. The "League of Militant Atheists," founded in 1925, had 10,000,000 members by 1932. Its activities, directed by Emilian Yaroslavsky, ranged from such scientific enterprises as the translation of Sir James Frazer's

The Golden Bough to the supervision of anti-religious museums and the publication of anti-religious literature. By 1936 the Party line had shifted. The new Constitution re-enfranchised the clergy, though still guaranteeing freedom of anti-religious propaganda as contrasted with freedom of religious worship. The diminution of the campaign for universal godlessness was reflected in the decline of membership in the League to 7,000,000 by 1937 and to 3,000,000 by 1940. By the latter year there were 8,338 churches, synagogues and mosques registered throughout the Union (compared with almost 250,000 in the United States for a population only 60% as large); 58,442 clergymen; and 30,000 registered groups licensed to meet for religious purposes. On June 26, 1940, the six-day week was abolished in favor of the traditional seven-day week, with Sunday as a day of rest for all and of worship for those so inclined.

On the eve of war official attitudes toward the Church became less hostile, partly because many citizens remained believers and partly because the success of socialization had removed any class basis for ecclesiastical opposition to the Soviet power. Following the Nazi invasion and the rallying of the Orthodox priesthood to the Fatherland, the League of Militant Atheists was dissolved, its publications discontinued because of the "paper shortage," and its publishing facilities ultimately turned over to the Church. Yaroslavsky passed from the scene. The historical role of religion in the building of old Russia received new recognition. On September 12, 1943, the aging Metropolitan Sergei of Moscow was elected Patriarch of all Russia by an officially sponsored *Sobor*. For the first time since the Revolution the Soviet authorities permitted the publication of religious periodicals and books and the opening of theological institutes for the training of priests. In October a State Council on Church Affairs, attached to the federal Sovnarkom and headed by Georgi Karpov, was established to promote "genuine religious freedom." It was dubbed by wits the "Narkombozh," or Commissariat of God. The death of Sergei in May, 1944, was followed by the convening of a new Council in January, 1945, participated in by representatives of foreign Orthodox Churches. Here, Metropolitan Alexei was chosen as the new Patriarch.¹⁸

Whether these developments may be equated with full religious liberty in the Western sense is debatable. On the one hand

the Party has blessed (and been blessed by) the Orthodox Church and has even used it as an instrument of policy in Slavic Europe. On the other hand, church and school remain separated, the supremacy of secular over ecclesiastical authority is inviolate, and Party members cling to atheism. The hostility of the Vatican is fully reciprocated. The Kremlin will not permit proselyting activity by alien groups, nor will it grant to any international religious body a position of privilege and property rights, both of which the Roman See, at least on the European Continent, traditionally identifies with "religious freedom." The Soviet citizen may profess what faith he chooses and may have his church building and services if he and his co-religionists are willing to meet the costs of maintenance. But the Soviet State is committed to the cult of Science and offers no incentives to religiosity. The Party leadership still regards profession of religious beliefs as a relic of superstition and, with some exceptions, as a disqualification for posts of trust.

Freedom of thought is not a value necessarily cherished by "free thinkers." A regime fiercely dedicated to a secular faith may tolerate, but will scarcely encourage, ecclesiastical ideologies. It is never disposed to deal gently with competing political creeds. The secular faith of the USSR is the chief spiritual weapon of an elite which controls as public enterprises all theaters, cinemas, concert halls, galleries, museums, laboratories, schools, universities, publishing houses, printing plants, newspapers and radio stations. Under these circumstances there obviously cannot be freedom of expression and opinion in the Western sense, since all media of communication are under a single political control and are used for political purposes. Neither can there be intellectual, academic, esthetic or scientific freedom as these things are known in Atlantica. Writers, teachers, artists and investigators who yield to temptation to criticize socialism, praise capitalism, or deviate from (or misunderstand) the Party line cannot hope to continue their work.

Foreign critics readily conclude that the Soviet intelligentsia is in helpless bondage and consists of sycophantic automatons, reduced to complete sterility. Nothing could be farther from the truth. No government anywhere at any time has done more than the USSR to promote art and science by providing facilities for

training, work and publication, and by giving scientists and artists economic security through regular salaries plus generous rewards for achievement through royalties, prizes and numerous privileges. That this policy has paid dividends is shown by the striking accomplishments of Soviet music, drama, cinema and literature as well as the biological and physical sciences. Yet all of the contributors have lacked "freedom" in the Western sense. And since freedom is commonly viewed in the West as the *sine qua non* of productivity, the enigma of Soviet culture seems to many quite inexplicable, particularly to those given to compiling cases (and there have been many) of Soviet intellectuals who have been dismissed, degraded or even purged for political non-conformity.

This "mystery" cannot here be resolved, nor can the fascinating story of the new intelligentsia be here related, despite the fact that in a total State all intellectual endeavor is politicalized and is therefore part of the story of politics.¹⁹ It may be suggested, however, that "freedom of thought"—i.e., liberty to disseminate significant symbols via sound waves or light waves—is somewhat smaller in the West and somewhat greater in the USSR than is often assumed by those who belabor the Soviet bureaucracy for its alleged enslavement of thinkers. Like all freedoms, intellectual freedom is relative, never absolute. The limits of tolerance are relatively wide in the democracies. But they are nonetheless limits, imposed by current folkways and mores, by material rewards and deprivations, by subtle social pressures and often by the power of the State itself. The limits are unquestionably narrower in the Soviet Union, though less narrow than they were before April 23, 1932, when the Central Committee dissolved the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) and comparable groups in other arts which had hitherto tyrannized over literary and artistic activities with a heavy hand. In the new Union of Writers, as in other professional associations, wide latitude is granted to all members so long as they accept the somewhat loose precepts of "Socialist Realism" or "Socialist Humanism" as guides. Despite occasional wranglings among the pedants of orthodoxy regarding "Marxist" or "non-Marxists" biology or physics, Soviet scientists, including "pure" scientists, have enjoyed relative freedom and more security than their Western colleagues. The traditions of the Academy of Sciences, established

by the great Tsar Peter, have been carried on and vastly enriched, as all foreign guests perceived during the gala celebration of its 220th anniversary in June, 1945.

But differences of dimension in the intellectual freedom permitted in East and West are perhaps less significant than qualitative differences in the function of the limitations. Effective freedom for the artist, writer or scientist of Atlantica is usually related, in the acquisitive society in which he works, to the utility of his output in aiding others to make money. The cash nexus of the market supplies a rough measure of the contribution of the artist and intellectual to the needs of his fellows, as it does for the business entrepreneur in a different field of skills. Yet where private wealth is the standard of success and the index of influence, many will inevitably strive for it by methods which promote debasement of creative activities. Such comparable temptations and vices as afflict Soviet intellectuals flow not from the pursuit of personal riches but from political controls which often conflict with personal integrity. At the same time these very controls, albeit imperfect and subject to abuse, are the means of assuring that the Soviet scientist, artist or writer will serve society rather than gratify private passions for conspicuous consumption or corporate pressures for dividends to stockholders. The goals of Soviet society are self-consistent and explicit. They are shaped by the Party and must be accepted by all who are not to become outcasts.

But it is precisely this lack of freedom which makes the intellectual, to a far greater extent than in the West, an integrated member of the community. Much evidence supports the view that the arts and sciences flower most abundantly not when their practitioners enjoy a minimum of social restraint, and least of all when "freedom" means community aimlessness and disintegration, but rather when creative minds are mobilized in the service of a great faith shared by all. The great glories of classical sculpture and architecture and of Western music, painting and building were the work of those who served divinity and humanity within the restricted confines of cults granting them little freedom but much satisfaction in achieving integration with the whole society in which they lived. Communism is the religion of the USSR. The USSR is an integrated society. Should the Soviet Union, as is quite possible, produce a scientific and esthetic outflowering unparalleled in the Atlantic world, this result will stem

not from any relaxation of political restraints and directives but from the spiritual unity of a dynamic community, all of whose members are consecrated to social purposes. To the degree to which this function of public control remains a living reality in the USSR, lack of intellectual freedom may stimulate, rather than depress, creative effort.

Another challenge to Soviet cultural endeavor is the insatiable hunger for new experience on the part of a vast population only recently liberated from mass illiteracy. Soviet intellectuals have an almost unlimited market for their wares. To take but a single index, there are published annually in the United States, in years of peace, something less than 10,000 book titles. In the USSR it is not at all unusual to have more than 40,000 books published yearly. In 1938 the total number of copies printed was 692,700,000. Even the most abstruse scientific works, published in editions of many thousands, are snatched up in bookshops within a few days after their appearance. Lest it be supposed that this gigantic volume of literature consists primarily of pulp fiction, school texts or commentaries on Marxism, be it noted that in 1937-38 the works of Byron were issued in 6 languages in almost half a million copies, those of Shakespeare in 34 languages in a million copies, those of Dickens in 8 languages in almost two million copies, and those of De Maupassant in 13 languages in three million copies.²⁰ During the war years, the works of Konstantin Simonov and the late Alexei Tolstoi sold over 22,000,000 copies, almost equally divided between them.

To return to the Soviet Bill of Rights, the political privileges guaranteed by the Constitution (§§134-142) are well protected within the limits already suggested. The same may be said of the new property rights. Collective farms hold their lands without charge and in perpetuity (§8). Every household in a collective has a plot of land, including house, livestock, poultry and tools, as its private property for family use (§7). "Alongside the socialist system of economy," every citizen has the right to carry on personal labor, "precluding the exploitation of the labor of others" (§9). He likewise has a right to inherit personal property and is entitled (§10) to personal ownership of income from work, savings, homes, furniture and articles of personal use and convenience. The first article of the Civil Code specifies that all property must be used for the social good and may be forfeited

if misused. But Soviet citizens have as much right as people in other lands to cultivate the joy, pride and responsibility which are commonly supposed to attend individual ownership of apartments, homes and gardens.

Freedom from taxes has not been one of the gains, nor yet one of the aims, of the Revolution. In the USSR, as elsewhere, the enjoyment of property rights, both collective and individual, presupposes contributions to the public revenue. Poll taxes and protective tariffs on commercial imports are, of course, non-existent. But taxes on possessions, on income and on inheritances are as much a part of the Soviet fiscal system as in Britain or America. Since 1930 public revenues have been derived largely from taxes on the profits of State enterprises, and from the turnover tax which is a kind of sales tax added to the selling prices of goods. It is utilized for purposes of economic planning and control as well as for raising revenue. This relatively painless excise is the most important single source of governmental funds in the USSR. In 1932 the turnover tax contributed 17½ billion rubles, out of total revenues of 30 billions, to the consolidated Union budget which includes the revenues and appropriations of the Union Republics and comprises almost all the major items of national expenditure and investment represented by purely private transactions in the West. By 1935 the turnover tax supplied 50 billions out of the total of 67, and by 1940, 160 billions out of 178. In the 1945 budget, totalling 307.9 billions (including 137.9 for war purposes) as compared with 268 billions for 1944, over half of all revenue was derived from the turnover tax plus the profits tax.²¹

Public control of all wages and prices and of all significant operations of production and distribution raises the theoretical possibility of dispensing entirely with all taxes in the usual sense. Revenues for current governmental expenditures, as well as capital accumulations for investment, could be derived exclusively from the planned profits of socialist enterprises. But such an arrangement, while it might commend itself to many Utopians, would diminish the sense of individual responsibility and participation in the maintenance of the State which goes with tax payments and constitutes a part of the symbolic cement of any community. At any rate, the fiscal theory and practice of the USSR do not as yet reveal any movement toward the withering away of taxation.

Freedom from unemployment, exploitation and overwork, and from neglect and penury in sickness, disability and old age, are among the major objectives of the Soviet State. These social rights (cf. §§118-120) represent the great gains of the Revolution and are among the best protected of all rights of the Soviet citizen. Within the inevitable limits of ideological conformity, and of available facilities amid the growing pains of rapid industrialization, all have a right to work, to payment proportionate to contribution, to leisure and vacations with full pay, to insurance against illness and old age and to free medical and dental service at all times. The nationwide system of socialized medicine is one of the brightest stars in the Soviet crown. Its progress is indicated by comparative figures for 1913, 1928 and 1941: physicians, 19,785, 63,162 and 130,348—almost half of them women; urban and rural medical centers, 5,597, 13,204 and 26,973; sanatoria and health resorts, 2,000, 36,100 and 132,000; maternity hospitals, 6,824, 27,338 and 141,873; and hospital beds, 142,310, 217,744 and 661,431²²—as compared with 1,324,381 in the United States. Soviet citizens as yet are less well protected against the hazards of disease, accident and senescence than members of the upper and middle income groups in the West. But they may fairly be said to be far better protected than scores of millions of the underprivileged in the Atlantic communities.

Freedom from ignorance through free public education for all (§121) has ever been a central purpose of the Soviet regime. The liquidation of illiteracy, along with the abolition of racial and national discrimination, must be regarded by all just observers, without respect to their views of property and profits, as a gigantic contribution of the USSR to the emancipation of man. Russian elementary and secondary schools in 1914-15 numbered 105,524 with 7,896,249 pupils. In the USSR of 1930-31 there were 152,813 schools with 17,614,537 pupils; and in 1938-39, 171,579 with 31,517,375 pupils. Early revolutionary experimentation has given way in recent years to more conventional methods of discipline and instruction. Coeducation, introduced in 1918, was abolished in the autumn of 1943 in the Soviet ten-year secondary schools on the ground that sex equality had already been achieved and that the segregation of boys and girls would promote greater efficiency in teaching. A decree of October 2, 1940, introduced small tuition fees in upper secondary schools and universities,

with a system of scholarships for talented but indigent pupils and a program of free vocational training for the rest.

These departures from the principles of free and "progressive" education have been widely interpreted abroad as evidence of "reaction" and of the restoration of "class privileges" in the USSR. They are more simply and accurately explained in terms of the desire of the Party leadership to foster a larger measure of individual and family responsibility for education; to raise standards of higher education to the level of those best fitted for intellectual work; and, in the light of the appalling human losses of war, to interest Soviet womanhood in home-making and child-rearing as well as in careers in the trades and professions. All three objectives appear to be well on their way toward realization.²³

Freedom for love and freedom from involuntary parenthood have in recent years undergone comparable transvaluations, officially motivated by the same considerations. Though Lenin had only contempt for the early revolutionary disciples of "free love" who fostered sexual laxity and promiscuity, Soviet legislation from the outset recognized no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, permitted free abortions in public clinics (despite objections from the medical profession), and made of marriage and divorce simple civil formalities, costing only a few rubles, at the Registration Bureaus ("Zags"). Despite official efforts to encourage contraception through birth-control clinics, abortions in Moscow alone averaged 12,000 a month by the middle 1930's. Extensive public discussion of the proposal to abolish legalized abortions indicated that a majority of women in urban centers desired to retain the practice. A law of December 27, 1936, nevertheless made permanent the decree of the preceding June which forbade abortions save for reasons of health. *Izvestia* (December 5, 1936) pointed out that since the imposition of the ban the number of registered births in 19 sample cities had increased from 33,796 for July–November, 1935, to 68,511 for the same period of the following year. Other measures, culminating in the decree of July 8, 1944, have made divorce difficult and expensive, imposed special taxes on unmarried adults and on families with fewer than three children, and offered graduated money bonuses, medals and titles to mothers of many children, thereby putting reproduction as well as production on a piecework basis of compensation.²⁴

Here again disenchanted foreign radicals have cried tyranny, while conservatives have perceived heartening evidence of a Soviet return to ancient ways. But the motivation of the new policy of glorifying marriage and the family is quite simple: a chronic labor shortage, aggravated by colossal war casualties, calls for more babies. Children are most numerous and most likely to grow into productive citizens where family life is stable. The State therefore penalizes erotic irresponsibility, offers incentives for large families, and insists that the personal planning of parenthood be undertaken before, rather than after, conception. The lines between regimentation, liberty and license in such matters are always difficult to draw. The current Soviet program affords greater security to wives and mothers through the curtailment of the freedom of husbands and fathers. Few thoughtful Western observers will regard the results as an instance of intolerable despotism or as a return to Puritanism and prudery, which have never played a significant role in Russian morality.²⁵

Freedom from lawlessness and from arbitrary acts of officialdom are as much the goals of jurisprudence in the USSR as they are in the Western democracies. But in the Soviet Union the commands of the State are fully equated with the welfare of society. Law is envisaged not as a set of norms anterior and superior to government, but as a tool of politics and a weapon of class rule—pending the complete attainment of the “classless society” and the “withering away of the State.” Wrote Marx: “Personal freedom is possible only in the collectivity.” This principle, coupled with fear of foreign aggression, has meant that in Soviet law public order invariably takes precedence over private liberty. Definitions of anti-social acts are inevitably broader than in the Atlantic world. The independence of the judiciary (cf. §112) and the protection of the individual against agents of the State (cf. §§111, 127, 128) are defined in ways far removed from Western standards. Thus the Soviet Criminal Code specifies that acts dangerous to the State, even if not specifically listed as crimes, may be punished by analogy to the closest statutory offense. A law of August 7, 1932, provided the death penalty for theft of public property. A statute of April 7, 1935, applied the full penalties of the Criminal Code to juvenile delinquents. Political offenders may be exiled by the NKVD without public trial, though the original right of the political police to impose sentences of

imprisonment or execution by Star Chamber proceedings no longer prevails. At all points the protection of the State against treason and crime is deemed more important than the protection of the individual against abuse of authority.

Yet the widespread impression in the United States that Soviet citizens "have no rights" and that Soviet officials are vested with arbitrary power, unrestrained by law, is contrary to fact. The basic principles of Soviet law are embodied in a series of codes. The judicial system embraces a complex hierarchy (cf. §§102-117), headed by the federal Supreme Court which is chosen for a five-year term by the Supreme Soviet. Peoples' courts with limited original jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, are popularly elected for terms of three years. Among the unique features of the Soviet judiciary are the local "Comradely Courts," for the settlement of controversies over wages and working conditions, and the series of *Gosarbitrage* (State Arbitration) agencies for the adjustment of disputes over contracts among socialist business enterprises.²⁶ In considering the work of these various bodies in the light of the Russian past and the contemporary exigencies of revolution, reconstruction, socialization and war, it would be manifestly absurd for foreign observers to expect as high standards of legal logic, procedural safeguards and abstract justice as are to be found in the English-speaking lands with their relative freedom from invasion or internal strife and their centuries-old tradition of "a government of laws and not of men." Even more absurd are the efforts of many to deny the achievements of Soviet law and justice and to depict all Soviet jurisprudence as a farce, played by terrorists at the expense of a population of slaves.

These efforts in recent years have reached a *reductio ad absurdum* in connection with Soviet penal colonies. Soviet treatment of criminals has always displayed a combination of the most severe measures of punishment for political offenders with the most enlightened practices of psychiatric and occupational rehabilitation for non-political culprits. Since 1929 extensive use has been made of Correctional Labor Camps, whose inmates have engaged in road construction, canal-building, and other public works, often under highly adverse conditions of climate, housing, nutrition, and sanitation. Many such convicts have received amnesties, prizes, and honors for work well done. For reasons which seem to them sufficient, the Soviet authorities have not seen fit

to publish statistics regarding these penal institutions. In so vast a land no private observer, inside or outside of such camps, can possibly estimate the total number of inmates. If arrests for crimes of violence and theft were to number 2,000,000 annually in the USSR, with prisoners serving long-term sentences totalling 200,000, the result would be proportionate to the situation in the United States. There may well be a comparable number of political prisoners in penal camps. All such estimates, however, are guesswork. Official Soviet secrecy has combined with ignorance and malice abroad to encourage anti-Soviet journalists to engage in a truly amazing competition in this field. Thus, among recent guesses as to the number of convicts in the USSR (usually offered as "authoritative" and doubtless accepted as gospel by the gullible) are the following:

Boris Souvarine (*Stalin*, p. 641): "In 1937 . . . fifteen million condemned in the various categories would probably be the number most in accord with the facts."

David J. Dallin (pen-name of David Y. Levin, Right Menshevik émigré) in *The Real Soviet Russia* (Yale, 1944), p. 189: "Equivalent to the population of a country like Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia, or the Argentine and . . . certainly not less than the population of Australia. The number of people subject to forced labor is not less and is probably greater than the total number of industrial workers at liberty in Russia." This is somewhat lacking in precision, since the imaginative Mr. Dallin gives the number of industrial workers as "about eight million" (p. 96), the number of "workers, rural and urban" as 20,000,000 (p. 96), the number of "workers" as 32,000,000 (p. 97) and "forced labor" as 16,000,000 (p. 97).

Max Eastman and J. B. Powell (*Reader's Digest*, June, 1945, p. 15) avoid such difficulties by citing "authorities" and by treating a difference of 5,000,000 one way or the other as negligible: "In Siberia whole regions are given up to these concentration camps where from *15 to 20 millions* of Russian citizens are dying a slow death at hard labor." (Italics in original. "Authorities" cited in footnote, with respective estimates: Alexander Barmin, 12,000,000; Boris Souvarine, 15,000,000; Victor Kravchenko, 20,000,000.)

Arthur Koestler, *The Yogi and the Commissar* (Macmillan, 1945), pp. 178f.: "10% of the population. . . (Quoting an anonymous "B":) 'Officials of the regime grew very angry at estimates over 20 million; up to that figure their attitude was one of tacit admission.' This is one first-hand report among many . . ."

Such "estimates" occasionally involve the estimators—e.g., David J. Dallin—in mathematical difficulties. Thus Koestler on a single page (p. 175, *op. cit.*) "reveals" that 15,000,000 people turned up "missing" in the Soviet census of 1937 and says seven lines later that "eye-witnesses put the mortality among prisoners at 30% per annum." The "guesswork" here is particularly interesting, since such a mortality among the 20,000,000 or more persons continuously domiciled (by Koestler et al.) in labor camps during the past decade would mean that at least 6,000,000 died annually, with total deaths of 60,000,000. This difficulty, to be sure, is readily resolved by Dallin (*op. cit.*, p. 105) who postulates a Russian "population deficiency" of 120,000,000 since 1914. More clever calculators, however, have been skeptical of the possibility of persuading even the most credulous that more than a third of the Soviet population has died in imprisonment, with a tenth of the survivors still in confinement. More recent "experts" have disposed of the problem with greater ingenuity. Thus William L. White, *Report On The Russians* (Harcourt, Brace, 1945) pp. 61-2:

Slowly I am beginning to understand this place and its people. Suppose you had been born and spent all your life in a moderately well-run penitentiary. . . . There is, however, one difference between inmates of the Soviet Union and of the Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing, where I have often visited an old friend. . . . Should my Kansas friend decide that his penitentiary was not well run, and express the hope that there might be a change of wardens, he would run no danger of being shot were he overheard by a stool pigeon.

And thus the Hon. Clare Booth Luce, mimicking Göbbels at his best in a Blue Network broadcast, May 29, 1945 (reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, May 31, 1945): "Murder . . . slave camps . . . slavery . . . immoral nature of this communism that is sweeping Europe. . . . The Russians too are yearning for freedom. . . . It is a heartbreaking pity that the heroic but enslaved Russian people—the common men of Russia—are not free to aid us in an effort to enlarge the area of human freedom. But we must understand that the plain people of Russia live in a vast concentration camp, the prisoners of their own leaders. . . . These two worlds are doomed to come into conflict." With the whole population of the USSR neatly consigned to penitentiaries and concentration camps, all further need of juggling with per-

centages disappears. Of Soviet citizens, 100% are convicts and slaves, and the outcome of the next war should be in no doubt. Q.E.D.

The decisive external factor which has caused the Communist rulers of the Soviet Union to impose severe restraint upon personal freedom is represented by the preceding quotations, and by the attitudes behind them and the policies in which they have often found expression. It is futile for Walter Lippmann²⁷ and other liberals to plead for Western standards of civil liberties in the Soviet Union as an aid to cooperation with the West so long as innumerable Western publicists and politicians, united only by fear and rage, continue to spread blood-curdling fantasies about the USSR among their own people and to call for new armed crusades to crush Bolshevism. The men of Moscow, fully supported by the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, will never relax their vigilance against dissidents at home so long as implacable enemies abroad continue to preach hatred and plot war. Those who call for the incarceration or extermination of the rulers of the USSR as "murderers" will continue to have their own agents and sympathizers within the Soviet jurisdiction incarcerated or exterminated. And whenever this occurs, the professional Soviet-phobes will shout bloody murder and call for war. No easy way out of this vicious circle is as yet available. Power to change the international threat, and thereby to promote greater domestic freedom in the USSR, does not lie exclusively in Soviet hands.

The decisive internal factor which has promoted the perpetuation of the dictatorship has been the resolve of the Soviet elite to remake man and society in a new image in order that a new freedom might ultimately be attained. The reforging of the land and people, in the heat of fierce propaganda and under the hammer of ruthless compulsion, has been shown by events to have been a necessity for national survival. It has been no less necessary as a means of liquidating evil legacies of ignorance, prejudice and technical backwardness.

The Party has essayed the role of Prometheus, bringing the gift of light to the "dark people." The foe against whom it has fought most fanatically has been the age-old heritage of the primitive *muzhik* of the steppes. Despite his latent talents and enormous potentialities, and despite the transformation of many of his chil-

dren into new citizens, he can still be seen working on the great plains or wandering in the new cities. He wears filthy rags. He is barefoot or shod in sloppy straw sandals. Left to himself, he is slovenly, unkempt, incompetent. He lives in misery and stinking wretchedness. He is illiterate, superstitious and stubborn in his all but invincible stupidity. He typifies what Marx called "the idiocy of rural life." He is the eternal Man With the Hoe. The first condition of his liberty is emancipation from his own habits. He cannot be free to do what he likes, for what he likes to do will keep him a slave. He must therefore be converted or coerced into becoming the man with the micrometer, determined to change himself and his fellows into participating members of a socialized industrial civilization.

What freedoms will finally emerge if and when the task is done (and if and when alien threats have ceased) remains to be seen. Meanwhile the central purpose of the Revolution, served inescapably by illiberal methods, is still a purpose of liberation. That it has been well served all over the Eurasian Heartland will be denied only by the blind. The purpose was once well put by Boris Pilnyak:

Peasant life is known—it is to eat in order to work, to work in order to eat, and, beside that, to be born, to bear and to die. Our Revolution is a rebellion in the name of the conscious, rational, purposeful and dynamic principle of life against the elemental, senseless, biologic automatism of life: that is, against the peasant roots of our old Russian history, against its aimlessness, its non-teleological character, against the holy and idiotic philosophy of Tolstoi's Karataev, in *War and Peace*. It will take decades to burn out Karataev's philosophy, but the process has begun.²⁸

THE BALANCING OF POWER

I. CONGRESS XVIII

THE SECULAR PRIESTHOOD in control of the Soviet State confronted with open eyes the menace of coming war during the years when the clash of arms was still confined to Ethiopia, China and Spain. Preparations for keeping the peace if possible, and for defending the Socialist Fatherland if necessary, were mirrored in the new Constitution, in the elections of 1937-39, and in the Second and Third Five Year Plans. These purposes also found expression in Litvinov's program in the Narkomindel and Dimitrov's program in the Comintern for combatting Fascism through a global union of all anti-Fascist forces. Within the Party other steps were taken toward the same end. The paroxysms of the Great Purge drew to a close in 1938. In order to repair the damage, close ranks, and inspire the membership with new energy, the Central Committee for the first time in five years convoked a Congress. It turned out to be the last before the breaking of the storm over Europe. It also marked a major watershed in the changing patterns and purposes of the Party itself.

The Congress met in Moscow, March 10-21, 1939.¹ The years since Congress XVII had witnessed the gravest crisis and widest cleansing among the membership, the completion of collectivization and the speeding up of industrialization at home. Growing anarchy abroad had been marked by the fall of Addis Ababa, the rape of Nanking, the siege of Madrid, and the betrayal of Austria and Czechoslovakia to the Nazi Reich. Early in the preceding summer all Party organizations had held meetings and chosen new officers and committee members, a goodly quarter

of whom were elected to responsible posts for the first time. The voting delegates to Congress XVIII numbered 1,567, representing c.1,600,000 members, a reduction of 270,000 since the preceding Congress. "But," said Stalin, "there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, for the Party strengthens itself by clearing its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality. That is a big achievement." The most striking characterization of the international situation, remarkable alike for its analysis of the past and its forecast of events to come, was made before the Congress on March 11 by D. Manuilsky in a report of the Party's delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern:

The plan of the British reactionary bourgeoisie is to sacrifice the small States of southeastern Europe to German Fascism so as to direct Germany eastward—against the USSR; to attempt, by means of such a counter-revolutionary war, to retard the progress of socialism and the victory of communism in the USSR; to buy off Germany, with her imperialist claims on British colonies. At the same time the British reactionaries would like to use the USSR to draw the fangs of German imperialism, to weaken Germany for a long time to come, and to preserve the dominant position of British imperialism in Europe. . . .

But the British reactionary bourgeoisie are digging their own graves with their predatory plans. By secretly supporting Japanese aggression in China, they are paving the way for the ousting of Britain from the Far East; by their concessions to Italian Fascism, they are paving the way for the loss of Britain's position in the Mediterranean; by granting loans to the Fascist aggressors, they are augmenting the latter's military might and the chances of their own defeat. By strengthening German Fascism, they are paving the way for the partition of their own empire. By their plans of attack on the USSR, they are paving the way for the collapse not only of Fascism, but of the entire capitalist system. (Applause.) . . .

The moribund capitalist world will not save itself by a counter-revolutionary war on the Soviet Union, but will only hasten its own destruction. The armed resistance of the great Soviet people will stir up the whole world of labor, all those whose right to liberty, work, a better life, and an independent country has been trampled under foot by Fascism. It will rouse proletarians and working people in all corners of the globe, who will realize that the hour of retribution for their centuries of suffering is at hand. It will let loose throughout the world a mighty movement of anti-Fascist forces, heartened by

the tremendous power of resistance offered by the Soviet people to Fascism. It will spur on to struggle peoples who have hitherto avoided coming to grips with Fascism. It will turn against Fascism the peoples of the Fascist States, who will have arms placed in their hands. For the Fascist governments it will be a war not only against the Soviet Union, but also against their own peoples. For the Soviet people, for the working people of the world, for all advanced and progressive mankind, it will be the most just and sacred war ever waged in the history of humanity . . .²

Honest confession is good for the soul. Admission of past errors, no less than confidence in future achievements, is deemed good for the Party. The longest speech at the Congress, next to Molotov's, was made by corpulent, cherubic Andrei A. Zhdanov (b. February 26, 1896), Leningrad leader, son of a Ukrainian school inspector of Mariupol, member of the Party since 1915, of the Central Committee since 1930, secretary of the Central Committee since 1934, and chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR since the summer of 1938. Zhdanov's address was in part a commentary on the new Party rules, which he had played a large role in formulating, and in part a denunciation of the mistakes and tragedies of the recent past which the new rules were intended to correct. Like all the speeches of March, 1939, it concluded with a eulogy of Stalin—"the genius, the brain, the heart of the Bolshevik Party, of the whole Soviet people, of the whole of progressive and advanced humanity." But its gist was "self-criticism," embellished with numerous examples of abuse of authority. By unwritten law, the "self" is never Stalin, never colleagues in good standing and seldom the speaker, but merely "the Party" and sometimes "we," garbed in the anonymity of collective responsibility. Thus Zhdanov on March 18, 1939:

Experience has shown that in practice the rights of Party members are often violated. There have been frequent cases of bureaucratic and hostile elements hounding and persecuting members for criticism and self-criticism. There have been frequent cases of decisions concerning the activities or conduct of Party members being adopted in their absence. We know of quite a number of cases of hostile and bureaucratic elements forbidding the Party members to address certain given statements to the higher Party bodies. . . . There have also been cases of infringement of the rights of Party members to elect and be elected. . . . It has been repeatedly pointed out by Lenin and Stalin that a bureaucrat with a Party card in his pocket is the most

dangerous and pernicious kind of bureaucrat, because, possessing a Party card, he imagines that he may ignore Party and Soviet laws and the needs and interests of the working people. By inscribing the rights of Party members in the Rules we shall place in the hands of the Party a powerful weapon for combatting swelled-headedness, bureaucratic self-importance and conceit, and for improving the contacts between leaders and led. . . .

Mass purges . . . are attended by many mistakes, primarily by the infringement of the Leninist principle of an individual approach to people. . . . There were numerous cases of unwarranted expulsion from the Party, and of hostile elements who had wormed their way into the Party taking advantage of the purges to persecute and ruin honest people. . . . During the purge of 1933 the largest group of persons expelled from the Party comprised the so-called passive elements. It was in respect to them that most mistakes were committed. . . . The slandering of honest people under the guise of "vigilance" is at the present time the most widespread method used to mask and screen hostile activities. If you want to discover still unexposed enemy wasps' nests, look for them above all among the slanderers. . . . In some organizations the slanderers lost all sense of restraint and simply put their feet on the table. . . .

We must get an iron broom and sweep our Party house clean of this garbage. (Loud applause.) The refusal to be worried about human beings, the reluctance to investigate the charges brought against a man on their merits, is a malady which still ails a good many leaders of our Party organizations. There are still quite a number of people in our organizations who like to insure themselves and be on the safe side. . . . These people forget that our whole work of building socialism, our whole educational work, is designed to remold the minds of men. That is what our Party exists for, that is why we strove for and achieved the victory of socialism, that is why we are undertaking the tasks of communist development, namely, to remold people, their ego. If there are some who think that remolding the minds of men does not apply to Party members, that Communists are born free of all prejudices and absolutely require no re-education, this is nothing but an idealistic and schematic view of people. This way of judging people abstractly, in accordance with a ready-made standard, instead of studying them in all their connections and manifestations, condemns one to passivity, to a pessimistic view of people. This pessimistic view looks back on the past. This way of judging people has nothing in common with Bolshevism. . . . All this is a Menshevik backsliding. . . . If you scratch these pseudo-moralists, you will find plenty of hypocrites and humbugs among them. You'll never cook your porridge with a lot of grave-diggers like this. (Loud applause.) . . .³

The new rules were designed to remedy these and other abuses.⁴ They abolished the four grades of applicants (industrial workers, non-industrial workers, peasants, and others), with their varying requirements of probationary periods and endorsements by members, established at Congress XIV. Henceforth anyone 18 or over could apply for membership on the basis of recommendations from three Party members of three years' standing, with a uniform probation period of one year. All members were now guaranteed the right to criticize any Party worker at Party meetings; to elect, and be elected to, all Party organs; to be present at all meetings making decisions regarding their conduct and activities; and to address statements and questions to any Party body, including the Central Committee. Mass purges were abolished. Expulsions would in future be dealt with as individual cases, with elaborate safeguards against unjustified action. In the election of all Party bodies, voting must now be by secret ballot and by individual candidates rather than by lists, with an unlimited right of challenge and criticism. All Party meetings should be "not for parade and the formal and ceremonial approval of decisions" but for "genuine discussion."

Other changes introduced Military Departments in each Party local or primary organization, in all district, city, area, regional (*rayon*) and territorial (*oblast*) committees and in the Central Committees in each Republic. Their function was to assist in the registration and convocation of recruits, mobilization, air defense, etc. The old institution of the Party Conference was put into the rules, with the stipulation that it must be summoned at least once a year and composed of elected representatives of local organizations, with the basis of representation and the election procedure determined by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). The Conference was empowered to replace as many as one-fifth of the members of the Central Committee elected at the preceding Congress by new members chosen from among the alternates, and to elect a corresponding number of alternates. Other decisions of the Conference would be binding on all Party organizations only with the endorsement of the Central Committee.

The Komsomols (Young Communist League) would henceforth be subordinated to, and guided by, the Party, with their Central Committee under the orders of the Party Central Com-

mittee and all locals under the orders of corresponding Party units. Congresses must in future meet not less frequently than once every three years. Party dues were fixed at 20 kopeks per month for members earning 100 rubles a month or less, up to 2 rubles for those earning 250–300 rubles, 2% of earnings up to 500 rubles a month, and 3% over 500 rubles. Entrance fees were set at 2% of monthly earnings.

These rules indicate the resolve of the leadership to parallel the governmental arrangements of the 1936 Constitution by a restoration of intra-Party democracy and, in Zhdanov's words, "to put an end to the violations of the principles of democratic centralism which formerly prevailed in the Party." Lenin's original conception of a free brotherhood of comrades, settling differences through discussion, electing their own leaders and carrying out majority decisions with iron discipline, had been respected during the years of fear more in shadow than in substance. Members might propose or even oppose, at considerable risk, but the Politburo disposed and reposed in the seats of power. All this was now to be changed by making the Party a truly representative and democratic organization of the membership.

These decisions, however, proved to be a guide to the future rather than an achievement of the present. They were carried out only in part. No Conference met in 1939 or 1940, though Conferences were to be annual. The 18th Conference met in February, 1941. Its *leitmotif* was expressed by young Nikolai A. Voznesensky, chairman of the Gosplan: "Keep your powder dry and do not stint means for the production of aircraft, tanks, munitions, warships and shells." Congress XIX, which would have met in 1942, was deferred. These departures from the rules, like the suspension of Soviet elections, were due to the outbreak of war. Precarious neutrality, defensive aggrandizement and resistance to invasion all called for unity and discipline rather than for government by talk. The course charted on the eve of hostilities was to prove possible of realization only in the post-war epoch.

Meanwhile the top leadership displayed a high degree of constancy and continuity. Congress XVIII elected 72 members, most of them new, to the Central Committee, 68 alternates, a Commission of 27 to revise the program, and a Central Auditing Commission of 50.⁵ On March 22, 1939, the newly elected Central

Committee held its first plenary meeting and elected from its members the three principal executive organs of the Party: the Politburo * (Andreyev, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Mikoyan, Molotov, Stalin and Krushchev, with Beria and Shvernik as alternates); the Secretariat (Andreyev, Zhdanov, Malenkov and Stalin); and the Organization Bureau (Orgburo), comprising Andreyev, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, L. Mekhlis, N. Mikhailov, Stalin, Shvernik and Shcherbakov. The chairmanship of the important Party Control Commission of the Central Committee, charged with discipline and training of the membership, went to Andreyev.

These men, all of them able and tireless disciples of "Leninism-Stalinism," were the leaders who were to guide the Soviet Union across treacherous diplomatic swamps, through the grim valley of invasion and defeat, and ultimately into new fields of glory, victory and peace. With few exceptions they had reached the top posts in the Party in 1934 or earlier and still held them a dozen years later. The ultimate test of any system of power lies in the quality of the people it breeds and brings to posts of authority. The careers of the major Communist leaders, even in bare outline, suggest the types of skills and experiences which make for political success in Soviet society.⁶

To begin with the youngest and most recent addition to the top ranks of the Party hierarchy, Nikolai A. Voznesensky, Georgi M. Malenkov and the late Alexander S. Shcherbakov joined Beria and Shvernik as alternate members of the Politburo in February, 1941, at the time of the 18th Conference. Here also considerable numbers of new members were named to the Central Committee, including Ivan Maisky, V. G. Dekanosov (Ambassador in Berlin), Otto Kuusinen and General Georgi K. Zhukov. The youth-

* In addition to those here listed, the full members of the Politburo in 1934 included Y. E. Rudzutak, P. P. Postyshev, S. V. Kosior, G. I. Petrovski, V. Y. Chubar, and R. I. Eikhe. *Pravda* of January 19, 1938, reported that Postyshev had been removed. *Izvestia* of January 29, 1938, reported that Kosior had been relieved of the Party Secretaryship in the Ukraine and of membership in the Politburo. Petrovski was awarded the Order of Lenin, according to *Izvestia* of February 9, 1938. Chubar was still Vice-Chairman of the Sovnarkom as late as January, 1938. None of those named has been mentioned in *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, however, since February, 1938, and all were presumably relieved of Party and governmental posts for incompetence or doubtful loyalty during the last stages of the Great Purge. On the other hand the core of the Politburo, as of 1945, has enjoyed membership since 1934 or earlier. Among the older leaders, Krupskaya died February 27, 1939, and Ordjonikidze February 18, 1937.

ful Voznesensky was born near Tula, December 3, 1903, into the family of an office worker. He joined the Party in 1919 and became a leader of the Komsomols in his native Chernsky County. He was a classmate of Shcherbakov at the Sverdlov Communist University, 1921-24. After several years of Party work in the Don Basin, where he distinguished himself in economic planning, he graduated in 1931 from the Moscow Institute of Red Professors where he became an instructor. By 1935 he was head of the Leningrad City Planning Commission and presently Vice-Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. The year of Munich found him, at the age of 35, in the high post of Chairman of the Gosplan, in which capacity he played a leading role in the drafting of the Third Five Year Plan. In March, 1939, he became a member of the Central Committee and in April a Vice-Chairman of the federal Sovnarkom. Early in 1942 he joined the State Committee on Defense (War Cabinet). In recognition of his writings in economics, he was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences in October, 1943.

Malenkov was born in Orenburg (now Chkalov), January 8, 1902. As a young volunteer in the Red Army he worked his way up to the post of political commissar of the Eastern and Turkestan fronts and became a Party member in April, 1920. In the 1920's and the 1930's he served as a Party functionary on the staff of the Central Committee and in the Moscow city organization. Like Voznesensky, he was made a member of the Central Committee at the time of Congress XVIII. He was the youngest of the original five members of the State Committee on Defense. With his "card index brain" and his managerial talents, he has been equally useful as a member of the Orgburo in supervising Party personnel and as a Vice-Chairman of the Sovnarkom in directing heavy industry. For his services in the production of planes, motors and tanks he was awarded (October, 1943) the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, the Order of Lenin, and the Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal.

Molotov, son of a salesman, was born March 9, 1890, in Vyatka Province in the town of Kukarsk (now Sovietsk). He joined the Party in 1906. After being arrested in 1909 and spending two years in exile in Vologda, he entered the Polytechnical Institute of St. Petersburg, contributed to the Bolshevik paper, *Zvezda*,

and became secretary of *Pravda*. He became a member of the Central Committee shortly before the fall of the Tsardom. By 1926 he was a member of the Politburo. He became chairman of the federal Sovnarkom in December, 1930, and Commissar for Foreign Affairs in May, 1939. His wife established the Soviet perfume industry, became the head of the cosmetic trust, and for a time was an alternate member of the Central Committee—until February, 1941. On Molotov's fiftieth birthday, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet conferred on him the Order of Lenin and renamed the city of Perm "Molotov" and the town of Nolinsk "Molotovsk." In October, 1943, he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. His various books and articles during his earlier years dealt principally with agrarian and industrial problems.

At Congress XVIII Molotov delivered the opening address⁷ and also presented a detailed and highly informative analysis of the Third Five Year Plan.⁸ His conception of the Vision, twenty-two years after October, and of coming events, was vividly portrayed:

A new society has been established equipped with the most modern technique. There has taken shape a Socialist State of workers and peasants which is mounting aloft, is marching onward to the complete victory of communism along the tried and true road of Bolshevism. . . . As you know, the machinations of the class enemy abroad, in the camp of capitalism, particularly the camp of Fascism, have been completely frustrated by us. Their new espionage methods of intervention, in which all these Trotskys, Rykovs, Bukharins, Zinovievs, Tukhachevskys, Radeks, Ikramovs and Lubchenkos played the contemptible role of wreckers, stool-pigeons and filthy agents of foreign espionage services, has suffered complete shipwreck. . . . No enemy can now break down our Soviet Union. . . . Whomever our frank warnings do not suffice, will get to know this at the appropriate hour. . . .

In the capitalist camp they have long since lost faith in inherent powers of development. There, passions are raging over a new redivision of the world. There—some with knives in their belts, others with sword in hand—they are fighting for colonies and for a recarving of States in the interests of the stronger Powers. There, they hold forth in endless speech on the subject of who was cheated, and by whom, in the division of colonial territories after the first imperialist

war, on who was the robber and who the robbed in the division of spoils during the last reshuffling of colonies and in the post-war sharing up of territories in Europe. There is no longer a question of mere threats of war. An imperialist war, involving a number of countries in Europe and Asia, is already on and has assumed vast dimensions. The danger of a new world-wide slaughter is growing, and it comes chiefly from the Fascists and their sponsors. . . .

Capitalism has accumulated no little store of material and cultural values, but it is no longer able to use them, even in its own interests. It has already in many respects begun to strangle progress, science, art and culture. That is a fact; but, then, all the worse for capitalism. There is now somebody to take over the heritage of capitalism. Communism grows out of what capitalism has created, out of its numerous fine achievements in the sphere of economy, material life and culture. Communism reassesses all these values and achievements in its own way—not in the interests of the “elite” of society, but in the interests of the whole people, of all mankind. We must spare no efforts to study this cultural heritage. We must know it thoroughly and profoundly. We must utilize everything produced by capitalism and the earlier history of mankind, and from the bricks made by the labor of man in the course of many centuries build a new edifice, a bright, spacious and sunlit edifice suited to the life of the people. (Loud and general applause.)⁹

Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev, small, prosaic but gifted in the will and skill of power, was born into a peasant family near Smolensk on October 30, 1895. After only two years of school in his native village, he became a factory worker in Moscow and later in south Russia. He first became acquainted with Marxist literature and with Party members at the age of 15, but did not join the brotherhood for another four years, at a time when he worked in a Petrograd cartridge factory and later in the offices of the Putilov (now Kirov) steel works. He organized the Petrograd Metal Workers' Union and played an active part in the Revolution. In 1920 he became a secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and served from 1922 to 1928 as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Railwaymen's Union. He was elected to the Party Central Committee in 1920 and to the Politburo in 1932, after serving as an alternate for six years. He has also served as Chairman of the Control Commission (1930 and again since 1939), Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Vice-Chairman of the Sovnarkom, and Commissar of

Transport until March, 1935, when he was replaced by Kaganovich. In December, 1943, Andreyev succeeded Ivan A. Benediktov as Commissar for Agriculture.

Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, the only Jewish member of the Politburo, is tall, vigorous and vastly efficient. He was born November 22, 1893. Trained as a tanner, he joined the Bolsheviks in Kiev when he was 18 and spent the years before the Revolution in underground work in the Ukraine, including direction of an illegal trade union of shoemakers. During the civil war and immediately thereafter, he played a leading role in organizing the Red Army and in directing Party activities in various places, from Nizhni-Novgorod (Gorky) to Tashkent. In 1924 he became a member and secretary of the Central Committee and from 1925 to 1928 he served as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party in the Ukraine. Kaganovich became Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) in 1928 and was elected to the Politburo two years later. As secretary of the Moscow Regional and City Committees of the Party, he directed the construction of the Moscow subway and subsequently, as head of the agricultural and transport departments of the Central Committee, supervised the organization of political departments on State Farms and in machine and tractor stations serving the collectives. As Commissar of Railways (1935-37 and again 1938-42) he was credited with major improvements in railway transport. He has likewise served as Commissar of Heavy Industry, Commissar of the Fuel Industry, Assistant Chairman of the federal Sovnarkom, deputy to the federal Supreme Soviet and to several Republican Supreme Soviets. On February 20, 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet made him a member of the State Defense Committee. On April 6, 1932, Kaganovich was transferred from the post of Commissar of Railways to that of Vice-Chairman of the Committee for the Coordination of Transport. He holds the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.

Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, born of Armenian working-class parents in Tbilisi, November 25, 1895, joined the Party in his 20th year. In 1918 he was arrested by British forces in Transcaucasia and barely escaped execution along with the twenty-six Baku Commissars. In the final phases of the civil war, he helped to restore Soviet authority in Azerbaijan. As Commissar of the Food

Industry (1934-38), he visited the United States in the summer of 1936 to study mass production methods of food manufacturing, and later was awarded the Order of Lenin for introducing similar methods in the USSR. As early as 1926 Mikoyan was named Commissar of Foreign and Domestic Trade. In 1937 he became Vice-Chairman of the federal Sovnarkom and in 1938 Commissar of Foreign Trade. He has been a member of the Politburo since 1935. In 1942 he joined the State Defense Committee. For his work in organizing the supply services of the Red Army in food, fuel and clothing, he was again awarded the Order of Lenin and named Hero of Socialist Labor in 1943.

Nikita Sergeyevich Krushchev, a miner and son of a miner, was born in a mining camp near Kursk, April 17, 1894. He joined the Party in 1918, fought in the civil war, and completed his neglected education in the Moscow Industrial Academy, which he entered on a Party assignment in 1929. During the middle 1930's he was a Party leader in the Moscow district and shared honors with Kaganovich for initiating the construction of the subway. Krushchev has served as a member of the Central Committee (since 1934), first secretary of the Party in the Ukraine (1938), alternate member of the Politburo (1934) and full member since his election in March, 1939. He is a deputy in the federal Supreme Soviet and a member of its Presidium, as well as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine. With Timoshenko, he shared responsibility for military operations in the Ukraine in 1941-42 and helped to organize guerrilla warfare against the invaders. In 1943 he was named a Lieutenant General and awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd class. In the following year he became Chairman of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom and received the Order of Lenin on his fiftieth birthday.

Klimenti Efremovich Voroshilov, son of a railroad watchman and a scrubwoman, is one of the older Party leaders, having been born February 4, 1881, in the Ukraine. Sent to work in a mine at the age of seven, he did not learn to read or write until he was twelve. At the age of 15 he was employed in the metal works at Lugansk (now Voroshilovsk) and at 18 was already a revolutionary organizer and strike leader. He joined the Party in 1903, suffered imprisonment for his activities in 1904-06, and met Lenin and Stalin in 1907, after which he was almost continuously in

prison or exile until the Revolution. With Djerzhinsky, he helped to organize the Cheka. With Stalin, he led the defense of Tsaritsin and later commanded various armies against Denikin, Pilsudski and Wrangel. With the death of Frunze (1925), Voroshilov became Commissar of Defense and joined the Politburo in the following year. Since 1940 he has been Vice-Chairman of the Sovnarkom and Chairman of its Committee on Defense. For his services he has been awarded two Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner and many other honors. He served as an original member of the State Defense Committee of 1941, but was replaced by Bulganin and transferred to other duties on November 22, 1944.

Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, the most venerable member of the ruling group, was singularly blessed in his choice of parents, birthday and vocations. Born of poor peasants in the province of Tver (now Kalinin), November 7, 1875, he was first apprenticed to a landlord and then became a youthful worker in the Putilov works in St. Petersburg, where he was repeatedly arrested and exiled as a revolutionary agitator. He was one of the original Bolsheviks of 1903. By 1916 he had been arrested 14 times. As one of Lenin's closest colleagues, he became President of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in 1919, a post which in its various transformations he continued to hold thereafter—as Chairman of the CEC of the USSR (1923f.) and Chairman of the Presidium of the federal Supreme Soviet (1938f.). Kalinin has been a member of the Politburo since 1925. He was awarded the Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday and the title of Hero of Socialist Labor in 1944 on the 25th anniversary of his election as Chairman of the CEC. At 70 he remains the prototype of the shrewd but simple peasant, short, bearded, kindly and tough. He still spends much time among peasants, hearing complaints, receiving petitions and serving generally as a highly respected collective grandfather.

Other life histories of the highest ranking Party leaders serve to confirm the pattern already suggested. Lavrenti P. Beria, Georgian chief of the NKVD; Nikolai M. Shvernik, Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR and Kalinin's probable successor as Chairman of the federal Presidium; and the late Alexander S. Shcherbakov, Zhdanov's brother-in-law who died May 10, 1945, —all in varying degree share with Stalin and their colleagues those

traits and experiences which, thus far, are the prerequisites of political eminence in the USSR: peasant or proletarian origin, poverty-stricken youth, little formal education (only Zhdanov has had university training and could be deemed an intellectual), much informal education in the school of hard knocks, early conversion to the cause, fame won in revolutionary agitation and organization, and a generous measure of vision, courage, unflagging energy, relentless determination and genius for holding many jobs simultaneously and for directing and inspiring subordinates to perform the impossible. These leaders are not fawning yes-men or wordy agitators or arbitrary bureaucrats, but hard-driving executives.

This is obviously not a political elite of philosophers and theoreticians, most of whom fell from the seats of the mighty during the Great Purge. Neither is it an elite of warriors. Many of its members, notably Voroshilov and Stalin, have been military commanders, but the new Marshals of the Red Army, though all Party members, have not as yet gained entry into the top ranks of the political leadership. The key figures of the Central Committee are civilian administrators, distinguished primarily by the managerial skills which spell deference, income and influence in a society dedicated to the central planning of socialized production and distribution. The number of able younger men—e.g., Voznesensky and Malenkov—who have risen to the top from the ranks suggests that this elite is capable of renewing itself from below without loss of vitality. The verdict of events, in the gravest ordeal to which any ruling group could be subjected, demonstrates that the men of the Central Committee are equal to their tasks.

That the ever-darkening shadow of Fascist aggression and democratic appeasement threatened the Soviet Union with the most dire peril in its history was fully appreciated and commented upon at length by all who spoke at Congress XVIII. The leading address was that of Stalin, delivered on March 10, 1939. His words, though generally ignored abroad at the time and still ignored by some alleged "experts" (e.g., David J. Dallin¹⁰) on Soviet diplomacy, constituted a remarkable evaluation of world politics between the recent "peace" of Munich and the coming war over Danzig. Here also was an equally remarkable statement of the plans and expectations of those responsible for Soviet foreign policy:

It is not so easy in our day suddenly to break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the Fascist rulers. That is why the Fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it. . . . A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern, not on these States. If you don't believe it, read the "Anti-Comintern Pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan. This is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous this whole clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hot-beds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. But war is inexorable, it cannot be hidden under any guise. For no "Axes," "Triangles" or "Anti-Comintern Pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain—and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive States. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.

It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor States, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive States, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors. . . . Incredible, but true. . . . To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these States to the aggressors? . . .

The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of "neutrality." . . . The policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one an-

other; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents. Cheap and easy! . . .

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some 700,000, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over 30,000,000, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible of course that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough strait-jackets for them in our country. (Thunderous applause.) But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish to talk seriously of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian-Ukraine? Imagine: the gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you. Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any Fascist bosses. Is that a way to live? . . . As I look at you I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me . . . well, so be it: I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast territory." (General laughter and applause.)

Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the west and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades.

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naïve to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is poli-

tics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them. . . .

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit.

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries which have common frontiers with the USSR. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet State.

3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders. . . .

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are: 1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries; 2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by war-mongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them; 3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost; 4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations. . . .

In case of war, the rear and front of our army, by reason of their homogeneity and inherent unity, will be stronger than those of any other country, a fact which people beyond our borders who love military conflicts would do well to remember.¹¹

2. THE ALLIANCE THAT FAILED

March, 1939, month of Congress XVIII, was also the month of disenchantment in the relations between the Axis madmen and the Western Munichmen. Prior to the Ides of the month of the war god, Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were unreservedly committed to appeasement. By delivering into the hands of the Caesars every coveted component of power from Catalonia to

Kiangsu, London and Paris hoped to keep "peace"—by gambling on a Fascist-Soviet war. The final Anglo-French betrayal of the Spanish Republic on January 18 was followed by the fall of Barcelona a week later and by the Fascist conquest of Madrid on March 28. But the satisfaction of Chamberlain, Daladier and their colleagues was rudely shattered by another development which cast grave doubts on their basic premise.

That premise had been well put on Christmas Day, 1938, by Mgr. Augustin Volosin, Premier of the easternmost province of truncated Czecho-Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine: "The creation of a great Ukraine will be realized in the near future. I believe Ukrainians of the whole world will be able to return to a liberated fatherland, to their brothers who are now so brutally suppressed by Poland and Soviet Russia." After Munich, Volosin's tiny realm became the base of the Nazi *Drang nach Osten* against Red Muscovy. Aging General Anton Denikin in Paris asserted that Hitler had promised the conquest of the Ukraine and Transcaucasia to White officers, whom Denikin denounced for accepting Nazi and Japanese gold. It was this expectation and hope, so persistently cherished by ruling classes and political leaders in Britain and France, that waned in March, 1939.

On Tuesday the 14th Father Tiso, the Slovak clerical-Fascist who had conferred with Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berlin, proclaimed the "independence" of Slovakia under German protection. On the same day President Emil Hacha and Foreign Minister Frantisek Chvalkovsky, called to Berlin by the Führer, were browbeaten into signing a document annexing Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich. On the 15th, five days after Stalin's address in Moscow, German troops poured into Prague. At Hradcany Castle that afternoon, Hitler proclaimed the annexation. What was left of Czecho-Slovakia was expunged. The Munichmen were not disturbed. Bonnet told the French deputies on Tuesday that the Anglo-French guarantee of Czecho-Slovakia promised at Munich had never been put into effect. *The Times* observed that the British Government had "no specific obligation to take any action." Chamberlain told Commons on Wednesday that he did not wish to associate himself with any charges of a breach of faith. "It is natural that I should bitterly regret what has occurred. But do not let us on that account be deflected from our course." Sir John Simon urged no commitments.

Not until Friday the 17th at Birmingham did Chamberlain take cognizance of public indignation and announce a change of attitude toward Nazi aggrandizement. The decisive event which convinced him of Hitler's "perfidy" was not the seizure of Prague but German consent (Thursday, March 16) to Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine. This decision led Ambassador Robert Coulondre in Berlin to report to Bonnet that in all probability "the Reich, before carrying out its vast program to the east, will first turn against the Western Powers." Anyone who had read *Mein Kampf* would have known that Nazi strategy contemplated the annihilation of France before, and not after, the attempted conquest of Russia. Chamberlain and his confreres had mistakenly assumed that the Nazi seizure of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia would be followed by an assault on the USSR. In casting aside the spearpoint of attack, Hitler had "betrayed" his Western friends and made it clear that the weak and not the strong would be the next victims of his madness. The immediate task of the Anglo-French leaders was to regain the strength they had thrown away by trying to rebuild an effective coalition against the Reich.¹²

Only by the success of this effort could World War II have been averted. The enterprise was at once warmly endorsed by the Soviet leaders. They were rebuffed by Chamberlain, who preferred to negotiate first with Poland and only later and reluctantly with the USSR. The effort finally failed because of the refusal of the Munichmen to accept Soviet terms for an alliance, even though these terms, as Churchill, Lloyd George, Eden and others repeatedly pointed out, were the only possible terms on which such an alliance could accomplish its purpose. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay quibbled and equivocated in the hope of recapturing the lost dream of an Axis-Soviet war in which France and Britain could play the neutral role of *Tertius Gaudens*. The Kremlin eventually drew the necessary conclusions, abandoned all attempts at collective security, and so arranged matters that the Soviet Union could play the "happy third" in a war between the Axis and the Western Powers. This tragedy stemmed directly from the Nemesis which has repeatedly led to disaster in the past and may yet lead to new disasters in the future. The essence of this Nemesis is fear and suspicion of Communism by all the Tories of Atlantica and fear and suspicion of Toryism

by all the Communist leaders of the Soviet Union. The gap could not be bridged until all alike were involved in collective catastrophe by virtue of their inability to take collective action in time against a common menace.

On March 17, 1939, Halifax and Bonnet instructed Ambassadors Henderson and Coulondre to present separate notes of protest to the German Foreign Office. Litvinov's proposal of a conference to consider joint action was rejected as "premature," precisely the reply he had received in March, 1938. He suggested a meeting of representatives of Britain, France, Poland, the USSR, Rumania and Turkey. The answer was negative. He then suggested an Anglo-French-Polish-Soviet conference. The answer was again negative. Litvinov was obliged to present his own separate note of protest to Berlin on March 18, refusing to recognize the legality of the Nazi seizure of Czecho-Slovakia. Perceiving that no united action against them was in prospect, the Nazi leaders replied with fresh defiance: on March 22, under threat of invasion, Lithuania was compelled to cede Memel to the Reich and to sign a non-aggression pact with Berlin.

Responsibility for the rejection of a common front against Hitler rested in the first instance on the rulers of Poland and in the second on those of Britain. President Ignacy Moscicki, Premier-Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz and Foreign Minister Josef Beck, carrying on in the best quasi-Fascist and anti-Soviet tradition of Pilsudski, declined British suggestions (March 21) for a joint conference with the USSR. The British Cabinet acquiesced, despite the fact that London had thus far made no pledge to Warsaw and could easily have made its guarantee dependent upon Polish collaboration with the USSR. By ignoring Moscow and opening discussions with Warsaw, Chamberlain and Halifax encouraged the Polish reactionaries in their pitiable delusion that Poland was a "Great Power." On March 31 Chamberlain told Commons that "in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, H. M. Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position."

Beck arrived in London on April 3. He sought assurances that Poland and Rumania would share in the benefits of any international effort to deal with the problem of refugees from anti-Semitic persecution. On this issue he received an evasive answer. But on April 6 a joint communiqué announced that London and Warsaw were prepared to sign a reciprocal mutual assistance pact (not actually signed until August 25) and that meanwhile they would render one another assistance against any threat to the independence of either.

For the first time in 20 years the British Government had assumed a specific obligation of collective defense against aggression in Eastern Europe. But it had made its commitment not to the USSR, which alone had power to act, but to the deluded megalomaniacs of feudal Poland who had no power whatever. There is no documentary evidence that Downing Street made any serious effort at any time during 1939 to induce Warsaw to accept Soviet collaboration. The Axis reply was immediate: Mussolini seized Albania on April 8. On the 13th Chamberlain announced that Britain would defend Greece and Rumania against any threat to their independence. These obligations remained unilateral, since the half-Fascist politicians of Bucharest and Athens had neither the wish nor the will to defy Hitler by assuming a reciprocal commitment. On May 12 Chamberlain declared that Britain and Turkey had agreed on mutual support "in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean." No treaty was concluded until October 19, 1939, and then only with elaborate safeguards and loopholes, excluding among other things the possibility of Turkey being called upon to fight the USSR. Ankara subsequently evaded its obligations. Not until February 23, 1945, did Turkey declare war, at a time when the action was devoid of all military significance.

Chamberlain's "coalition" thus consisted of a passive France, an impotent Poland, a helpless Greece and Rumania, and a Turkey unwilling to act. Without Soviet participation, said Lloyd George, these commitments were "sheer madness." Hitler registered contempt, in his reply to Roosevelt's appeal of April 15 for pledges of non-aggression, by ridiculing American policy and denouncing the German-Polish non-aggression pact of January, 1934, and the Anglo-German Naval Accord of June, 1935. On May 22 Ciano and Ribbentrop signed in Berlin a formal German-

Italian treaty of military alliance, dubbed the "Pact of Steel" but actually *Ersatz* by virtue of Ciano's secret stipulation that since Rome would be unready for war for another three years the Reich should not precipitate hostilities. Thanks to years of appeasement, however, Germany alone was quite capable of making a bid for mastery of Europe. Anglo-French efforts to establish a counter-weight were fruitless without American and/or Soviet support. The aid of the United States was not to be had because of Congressional and public repudiation of any prior commitments. The American slogans were: "Keep Out of Other Peoples' Wars" and "Make the World Safe for Aggression"—by denying American arms and loans to aggressors and their victims alike. The support of the USSR, which alone among the Powers had consistently championed collective security, was easily to be had if the Anglo-French leaders had been honestly desirous of having it.

The record indicates that they had no such desire and could not be suspected of honesty. On April 4 *Pravda* published a cartoon of a silk-hatted British lion in a lifeboat throwing a life-preserver, weighted with rocks, to small nations struggling in a shark-infested sea. Said Lloyd George: "If we are going in without the help of Russia, we shall be walking into a trap." Churchill asserted that Soviet participation was "a matter of life or death." Chamberlain was evasive. Not until April 15 were serious discussions opened between Halifax and Ambassador Ivan Maisky in London, and between Litvinov and Ambassador Sir William Seeds in Moscow. Kalinin sent to Roosevelt "deep sympathy and cordial congratulations" on his message of the 15th. Maisky returned to Moscow for consultation late in April and then went back to London. The Kremlin asked a binding alliance. London refused, preferring a more "flexible" formula which would leave Warsaw and Bucharest free to decide the extent, if any, of Soviet aid against Germany, and would leave Paris and London free to abstain if the Reich, after all, should attack the USSR.

On May 3, 1939, Litvinov resigned his post as Commissar for Foreign Affairs which he had held for nine years. He was the incarnation of collective security. Premier Molotov assumed his duties. There was no explanation save "ill health." Downing Street drew no conclusions. Five days later it proposed that the USSR should agree to come to the aid of France and Britain

should they be obliged to take up arms in defense of Poland or Rumania. Molotov expressed assent on condition that Britain and France agree to come to the aid of the Soviet Union if it were obliged to fight in defense of the Baltic States. All three Powers, moreover, should guarantee all the border States between the Reich and the USSR and all those between the Reich and France and Britain. Chamberlain and Halifax rejected these proposals. Berlin induced Lithuania (March 22), Denmark (May 31), Estonia and Latvia (both June 7) to sign ten-year bilateral non-aggression pacts with Germany, pledging them to neutrality in any conflict between the Reich and third Powers. The Baltic dictatorships feared Moscow more than Berlin. Along with Finland and Poland, they refused to consider any Soviet guarantee or any Anglo-Soviet-French guarantee. Chamberlain contended that the Western Powers could not guarantee small States unwilling to be guaranteed. The Kremlin was not impressed, since London and Paris had shown no reluctance to abandon to the enemy other States (China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia) unwilling to be abandoned.

Molotov told the Supreme Soviet on May 31 that "as yet it cannot even be said whether these countries (France and Britain) are seriously desirous of abandoning the policy of non-intervention, the policy of non-resistance to the further development of aggression. May it not turn out that the present endeavor of those countries to resist aggression in *some* regions will not serve as an obstacle to the unleashing of aggression in *other* regions?" The Western Powers had at last (May 27) accepted the principle of reciprocity, albeit with reservations, but had not yet agreed to guarantee the Baltic States. The USSR, said Molotov, would sign no pact save on the basis of (1) a binding alliance; (2) a joint guarantee of all European States bordering on the Soviet Union; and (3) a concrete accord for joint defense of the guaranteed States in case of attack. "Such is our opinion, an opinion we force on no one, but to which we adhere." As Molotov spoke, Chamberlain was fishing in Hampshire as the guest of Sir Francis Lindley, a pro-Japanese and bitterly anti-Bolshevik Tory diplomat. The Prime Minister rebuffed all suggestions that he go to Moscow.

The negotiations ultimately broke down on the issue of Soviet participation in the defense of Poland and the Baltic States against possible Nazi aggression. Britain and France were wholly in-

capable of defending them. By refusing to join the USSR in a joint pledge of defense, Paris and London fostered Soviet suspicion that they were still seeking a loophole for a German-Soviet war in which the Western Powers would stand aside. Despite the British pledges to Poland and Rumania, the Baltic highway of attack remained open. The Warsaw Colonels, moreover, refused to consider the entry of Soviet forces into Polish territory against German invaders. Without such an arrangement and without joint guarantees and military bases in the Baltic States, the Soviet leaders saw no way of halting the aggressor short of Soviet territory and no protection against Anglo-French desertion in the event that Poland and the Baltic States should be overrun. It was precisely this price which Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were unwilling to pay for a Soviet alliance.

In mid-June Chamberlain sent Munichman William Strang to Moscow to "assist" Seeds. He was empowered to offer only "consultation," always a formula for irresponsibility, in the event of any threat to the USSR in the Baltic. Zhdanov wrote in *Pravda*, June 29—as his "personal opinion"—that "the British and French Governments have no wish for an equal treaty with the USSR." They had delayed the negotiations. London and Warsaw had agreed to come to one another's aid in the event of aggression against Holland, Danzig or Lithuania, although none of these States had agreed to be guaranteed. Yet London and Paris had "artificially invented a stumbling block" by refusing to join Moscow in guaranteeing the Baltic States without their consent. Zhdanov saw no hope. As the parleys dragged on, the Narkomindel insisted that the Baltic States, with or without their consent, must be protected against Nazi subversion from within as well as Nazi invasion from without.

London would not agree, even though Chamberlain conceded that "indirect aggression may be just as dangerous as direct aggression." On July 31 he announced that an Anglo-French military mission would go to Moscow, headed by the wholly undistinguished Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Erle-Drax and General Joseph Doumenc. Molotov had named Voroshilov, Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov and Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov to deal with the visiting missionaries. The latter travelled by slow boat and did not reach Moscow until August 11. It then appeared that they had no authority to sign any agreement. The politicians

of Warsaw, Kovno, Riga, Tallinn and Helsinki were still adamant in their rejection of Soviet aid against the Reich. London and Paris still supported them. Molotov and Stalin now decided that Zhdanov's pessimism was justified and that Soviet safety must be sought by other means.

The fateful conclusion that no workable alliance could be negotiated with the Chamberlain and Daladier régimes was supported by the course of British diplomacy in other fields during the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. On March 16, immediately after the fall of Prague, agents of the Federation of British Industries and the Nazified *Reichsgruppe Industrie* concluded a series of Anglo-German cartel agreements. In May the British Cabinet permitted the transfer to Berlin of £6,000,000, in gold, deposited in London on behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia in the name of the Bank for International Settlements. After Chamberlain had at first dismissed this story as a lie, Sir John Simon explained that the Cabinet had no legal power to prevent the transfer by the BIS, on whose Board of Directors Sir Montagu Norman and Sir Otto Niemeyer represented Great Britain. Norman was also on the Board of the Bankers Industrial Development Co., of which another director was Bruno von Schroeder of the I. Henry Schroeder Bank of Germany of which, in turn, another director was Kurt von Schroeder who had helped Ribbentrop, Papen and Thyssen put Hitler in power in January, 1933.

On July 20, 1939, moreover, at the very time when British authorities were refusing a loan of £8,000,000 to Poland unless Warsaw should agree to spend the proceeds in Britain, it became known that Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat, Hitler's economic adviser, had been conferring in London with Robert Hudson and Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's economic advisers, regarding a possible British loan of £1,000,000,000 to the Reich. Hudson explained that even if war came such a loan would be necessary later to insure German "stability" and that meanwhile Germany would be enabled to join the Atlantic Powers "in the economic development of China and of the vast regions of Africa." The project failed, but Sir Nevile Henderson kept assuring Hitler throughout August that if he would be "reasonable" in his demands on Poland, he could have British friendship and perhaps even an alliance. *Mein Kampf* had proposed an Anglo-German-Italian alliance as a prelude to the conquest of Russia.

On July 24 Chamberlain announced a new accord with Japan by which London agreed that "Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove such causes or acts as will obstruct them or benefit their enemies." The British Government and its officials and nationals in China would therefore refrain from "any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by the Japanese forces." London joined Tokyo in deploring the action of the United States on July 26 in giving six months' notice of the termination of the Japanese-American commercial treaty of 1911.

From these developments the men of Moscow concluded that the Western Munichmen had by no means abandoned "appeasement" and much preferred an accord with Berlin, Rome and Tokyo to any solid coalition with the USSR against the Fascist Triplice. All available evidence indicates that this conclusion was correct. Apportionment of responsibility for the failure of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations of 1939 is perhaps irrelevant in the light of the common catastrophe which was ultimately to engulf all the participants. Yet it is altogether probable that if and when the secret record of these discussions is revealed, the documents will demonstrate anew that the fatal vices of shortsightedness and insincerity were more prevalent in Paris and London than in Moscow.

3. THE NAZI-SOVIET TRUCE

All the leading figures of Party and Government attended an impressive review of Soviet air power at the Moscow airdrome on August 18, 1939. Other reviews took place throughout the Union. Great demonstrations were staged by the military air fleets, the mercantile air fleet and *Osoaviakhim*, the civilian organization of aerial and chemical warfare enthusiasts. "The nation," said *Izvestia*, August 20, "has triumphantly celebrated Stalinist Aviation Day. . . . Mighty are the wings of the Soviet people. They have no fear of difficulties, obstacles or worthy foes. There are no limits to the courage and creativeness of a people who have established such an airforce . . ."

On August 19 a German-Soviet trade agreement was signed in

Berlin. The Reich Government granted to the USSR a credit of 200,000,000 marks, at 5% for seven years, for the purchase of machinery in 1939-41, and received a pledge of the delivery of 180,000,000 marks worth of Soviet exports to Germany during the same two year period. *Pravda* said that the commercial accord "may turn out to be a significant step toward further improvements not only of economic but of political relations between the Soviet Union and Germany." *Izvestia* on August 22 featured a front-page article on political discussions "to remove the threat of war and conclude a non-aggression pact." At midnight Wilhelmstrasse announced that Ribbentrop would fly to Moscow to sign the pact.

At 1 p.m., August 23, the Nazi Foreign Minister and 32 aides landed at the Moscow airdrome in two giant Condors. They were met by V. P. Potemkin, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, by M. S. Stepanov and V. N. Merkulov (Assistant Commissars, respectively, of Foreign Trade and Internal Affairs), by the Commandant of the Moscow garrison, the Vice-President of the Moscow Soviet and other dignitaries who were joined by the German and Italian Ambassadors, Count Friedrich von der Schulenburg and Augusto Rosso. No Japanese representative appeared. After lunch at the German Embassy, Ribbentrop and Schulenberg proceeded to the Kremlin where they conferred with Molotov and Stalin. An hour after midnight they attached their signatures to a ten year neutrality and non-aggression pact.*

***TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AUGUST 23, 1939.**

Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and basing themselves on the fundamental stipulations of the Neutrality Agreement concluded between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in April, 1926, the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have come to the following agreement:

1. The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive act and any attacks against each other undertaken either singly or in conjunction with any other Powers.
2. If one of the contracting parties should become the object of warlike action on the part of a third Power, the other contracting party will in no way support the third Power.
3. The Governments of the two contracting parties will in future remain in consultation with one another in order to inform each other about questions which touch their common interests.
4. Neither of the two contracting parties will join any group of Powers which is directed, mediately or immediately, against the other party.

Photographers snapped the broad smiles of guests and hosts alike. Ribbentrop and his party left for Berlin the following noon.

Izvestia (August 24) explained that the aim of Soviet policy was general peace. The two agreements "have the greatest significance not only for relations between the two high contracting parties but also for the international political situation the world over. It is well understood that the establishment of peaceful and good neighborly relations, based on broad economic ties, between two such powerful States as the Soviet Union and Germany . . . cannot help but aid in the strengthening of peace." The non-aggression pact "brings an end to enmity in relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, that enmity which the enemies of both governments sought to foster and extend. . . . Ideological differences, as well as differences in the political systems of both nations, cannot and must not stand in the way of the establishment and maintenance of good neighborly relations."

On the same day and again on August 26 and 27 *Izvestia* published regulations on the calling to the colors of conscripts born in 1918-19. Military service was a "sacred duty." Let all be proud of the recent victories over the Japanese on the Mongol frontier. Medals and decorations for heroism were distributed on August 27. Partial mobilization was soon under way. On September 5 it was announced that troops in the Baltic, Polish and Ukraine frontier districts would remain in service for an additional month and that fresh contingents, totalling 1,500,000 men, would be called up. A new military service law, designed to effect a vast increase in the Red Army, fixed the period of active service at 2 years for ground troops, 3 for aviation and border guards, 4 for coast defense workers and 5 for the Red Navy. . . .

Arms: peace pacts: more arms. In this apparent paradox lay

5. In case disputes or conflicts on questions of any kind should arise between the two contracting parties, the two partners will solve these disputes or conflicts exclusively by friendly exchange of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions.

6. The present agreement is concluded for the duration of ten years with the stipulation that unless one of the contracting partners denounces it one year before its expiration, it will automatically be prolonged by five years.

7. The present agreement shall be ratified in the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification are to be exchanged in Berlin. The treaty comes into force immediately it has been signed.

part of the explanation of what Churchill on October 1 called "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." In truth there was no enigma, no mystery, and no riddle, but only a shock of surprise to those not familiar with the recent course of secret diplomacy. The uninformed included the Western Communist Parties who were caught, in Louis Fischer's phrase, "with their dialectics down." Their editors and leaders, long committed to "collective security" and "Peoples' Front against Fascism," tore their hair, searched their souls, and belatedly perceived that all was for the best and that the new war which Hitler unleashed on September 1 was an "imperialist war" in which the USSR (and the USA) should obviously adopt an attitude of isolationist neutrality in the name of "peace" and "democracy." The Anglo-French military missionaries to Muscovy, who left empty-handed on August 26, were perhaps equally astonished. Chamberlain spoke of the pact as a "bombshell" and "a very unpleasant surprise." But this was pretense. He was not surprised save at the sudden realization that he had been outplayed in the game of "let's you and him fight"—always amusing among small boys but desperate and tragic when played by diplomats.

Voroshilov, in an *Izvestia* interview of August 26, asserted that the refusal of Poland, supported by France and Britain, to grant passage to Soviet troops had made military collaboration with the Western Powers impossible. "It is upon this that the negotiations have been broken off." The *Daily Herald's* story that Moscow had demanded occupation of Polish territories as the price of aid was "a lie from beginning to end, its author an insolent liar and the newspaper which printed it a slanderous paper." Reuter's story that Voroshilov had told the Anglo-French mission that further negotiations were pointless in view of the Nazi-Soviet pact was contrary to the facts. "It was not because the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany that the military negotiations with Great Britain and France were broken off, but, on the contrary, the USSR concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany as a result, among other reasons, of the fact that the military negotiations with France and Great Britain reached a deadlock in view of insuperable differences." On August 31 the Supreme Soviet ratified the pact unanimously and without discussion, after Molotov declared:

Germany abandoned its anti-Soviet policy and offered the most favorable trade agreement ever made at a time when other countries plotted to involve us in a war. . . . Anglo-French leaders insist that the Soviet Union side with these two countries against Germany. But is it not clear to them that we do not have to get involved in war either way? . . . What lies at the root of the attitude of the British and French Governments—of their contradictory policy? These governments fear aggression and need a Soviet pact to strengthen them. But they simultaneously fear that a pact with the Soviet Union might strengthen the Soviet Union, which they do not desire. . . . As a result of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty the Soviet Union is not obliged to enter a war on the side of England against Germany, nor on the side of Germany against England. . . . This pact proves that all attempts to solve European problems without Soviet participation are doomed.

Moscow thus abandoned collective security and reverted to the formula of the 1920's: the localization of war through bilateral neutrality agreements. Such a shift was not suddenly improvised. The pact itself had been drafted earlier in the course of secret negotiations. The Kremlin's purpose was peace as long as possible in order that as much time as possible might be gained to meet the future assault which was deemed inevitable. This objective had remained constant for more than 20 years. The means adopted for its attainment had changed with changing circumstances. The change of midsummer, 1939, had nothing to do with alleged qualities of cynicism, perfidy, deceit, etc. which were now "discovered" in Soviet diplomacy by many commentators—particularly by those who had been most favorably disposed toward the course of the Western Munichmen. Whether the decision was wise or unwise will remain forever debatable. Diplomacy is a fine art, not an exact science. Action is always based on hypotheses—i.e., hunches and guesses—some of which cannot be verified. But the considerations which dictated Moscow's choice were quite simple.

Every Great Power, as has already been suggested in these pages, can seek safety amid the perils of world anarchy through (1) security by supremacy, involving the liquidation of all possible rivals; (2) security by coalition, involving alliances with the least menacing among other Powers against the most menacing; or (3) security by balance, involving neutrality while others

fight, plus an intention to intervene on behalf of the weak against the strong in the event that the strong threaten to effect a dangerous upset in the balance. Moscow had abandoned No. 1—i.e., World Revolution—because it was unobtainable and because continued efforts to attain it fostered a coalition of all other Powers against the USSR. Moscow had embraced No. 2, but found it unworkable because of the attachment of the Anglo-French appeasers to No. 3 in a form favorable to the Axis and perilous in the extreme to the Soviet Union. Moscow finally embraced No. 3 in a form favorable to the Axis and perilous in the extreme to France and Britain.

The only moral to be derived from the study of power politics is that there is no morality in power politics. Political judgments can only be pragmatic: does the policy in question strengthen or weaken national power? In weighing the risks and advantages of alternative courses in 1939, the men of Moscow were moved by alternating hopes and fears. They hoped for the strong anti-Fascist coalition which they had worked for years to build. Short of this, they hoped for a balance of power among the major bourgeois States. They feared above all a coalition of all against the USSR. They feared almost as much an attack by the Fascist Powers with the democracies neutral—i.e., a war without allies against the most formidable of the other Powers. Their first best hope was frustrated by the Munichmen, whose conduct confirmed the worst and first Soviet fears. Their last best hope was still within the realm of the possible. They did not work for or welcome war between the Axis and the West. But in terms of Soviet security such a war would be infinitely preferable to a Fascist attack on the USSR blessed by Paris, London and Washington.

In theory the Kremlin, like the American Congress, might have limited its action to proclaiming impartial neutrality in any conflict that might occur. Moscow would thereby have avoided the odium of a formal pact with Hitler. In practice, however, the dangers of such a course would have outweighed its ideological advantages. It is now clear, despite the complex "negotiations" of the second half of August, that the top Nazi leaders had irrevocably decided by August 15 to invade Poland. On August 1 Ciano noted in his diary that, according to Attolico in Berlin,

"a sudden decision will be made by August 15." Ciano conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop at Salzburg, August 11-13. Of these meetings he wrote:

Ribbentrop is evasive. . . . The decision to fight is implacable. He rejects any solution that might give satisfaction to Germany and avoid the struggle. I am certain that even were the Germans given much more than they asked, they would attack just the same because they are possessed by the demon of destruction . . . There is nothing that can be done. Hitler has decided to strike and strike he will. . . . He repeats his belief that he can localize the conflict in Poland, but his conviction that the great war must be fought while he and Il Duce are still young leads me to believe again that he acts in bad faith. . . . Il Duce (August 15) . . . believes the democracies will still give in, in which case it would be unprofitable for us to offend the Germans. We too must have our share of the booty.¹³

Moscow's intelligence services undoubtedly informed Molotov and Stalin soon after August 15 that Hitler would invade Poland unless confronted by a solid Anglo-French-Soviet coalition. The Ciano diary invalidates the widely held view among critics of Soviet policy that Berlin decided to invade Poland because Moscow had pledged neutrality by the pact of August 23. On the contrary, Moscow signed the pact because Berlin had already decided to invade Poland and because Paris and London, though fully aware of Poland's peril, still refused to accept Soviet terms for an alliance. The Munichmen knew, as will be shown below, what the consequences of their own decision would be. Some preferred to abandon Poland. Others preferred to make a gesture of declaring war. All preferred the destruction of Poland to Soviet defense of Poland. All hoped that the sequel would be a German-Soviet war.

Hitler, Ribbentrop, and most of their colleagues assumed that Paris and London would in the final test abandon Warsaw, as they had abandoned Chungking, Addis Ababa, Madrid, Vienna and Prague. A majority of the Politburo probably shared this assumption. How nearly correct it was is shown by Bonnet's maneuvers on September 1 and 2, immediately after the Nazi invasion of Poland. That he was overruled by Daladier, Halifax and Chamberlain on September 3 does not render the initial assumption of desertion implausible.¹⁴

Under these conditions it would have been suicidal folly for

the USSR to have pledged aid to a Polish Government which spurned all Soviet aid or, in the actual event, to have intervened against the invaders. For Moscow to have done nothing beyond announcing its neutrality would have meant either Nazi occupation of all of Poland, a contingency dangerous in the extreme to Soviet security, or belated military intervention, creating precisely the gravest of all dangers: a German-Soviet conflict, with Paris and London as passive spectators. Berlin, moreover, undoubtedly tendered threats as well as bribes in its overtures to Moscow. In effect the Nazi diplomats offered to pay for a neutrality pact, which they assumed would insure Anglo-French neutrality (since Poland was all but defenseless) by acknowledging Soviet hegemony in Eastern Poland and the Baltic. At the same time they threatened to occupy all of Poland and the Baltic region should Moscow refuse to sign a pact. To defy the threat might mean war for an isolated Soviet Union. To accept the bribe would mean peace. Berlin was gladly offering to Moscow, in exchange for a neutrality accord, components of power for the defense of the Soviet frontiers which Paris and London were wholly unwilling to offer in exchange for a pact of alliance. The Kremlin chose the lesser evil.

From the point of view of the Narkomindel, a formal pact with Berlin had another advantage: it would force Paris and London to clarify their hitherto obscure intentions. Chamberlain had committed his Cabinet to defend Polish "independence" (not territorial integrity) on March 31, but no binding treaty had been signed. Not until August 25, two days after the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, did Halifax and Ambassador Raczynski hastily sign a formal five-year Agreement of Mutual Assistance. Until August 25 there was no documented assurance that Britain would in fact defend Poland. Even this assurance was far from ironclad in the light of past evasions. The Agreement was remarkable, however, in that its terms granted to Warsaw what London had refused to grant to Moscow: the right to resist "indirect aggression" against third States, e.g., Danzig and Lithuania. Downing Street granted Poland a free hand to "protect" neighboring small countries from the Nazis, after having denied any such right to the USSR. Here was further proof, if more were needed, that London had never desired an equal treaty with Moscow.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of all these transactions is

the fact that, despite pretenses of astonishment and charges of deception, the Anglo-French leaders knew from the outset that Moscow would conclude an agreement with Berlin if London and Paris rejected Soviet terms for an alliance against Berlin. On October 12, 1939, M. Henri Berenger, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Senate, wrote without contradiction: "It can be stated that both Paris and London had been warned by reliable sources that an association was being prepared between Berlin and Moscow to divide among themselves the spheres of influence and even the territories from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea, between the Oder, the Danube and the Dniester, from the Carpathians to the Balkans." On June 20, 1939, moreover, the "Friends of Europe Information Service" in London published a bulletin, based on private sources, which outlined accurately the entire program of the Nazi Reich for the next six months, including the German-Soviet Pact as the sequel to the anticipated failure of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations.¹⁵ As early as May 7 Coulondre had reported from Berlin that Hitler was planning an accord with Moscow for the partition of Poland. He repeated his warnings in the most urgent and explicit form on May 22 and throughout June, July and August as an argument for immediate conclusion of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance (cf. *French Yellow Book of 1939*, Nos. 123, 124, 125, 127, 155, 176, 194, 199). It is thus established that the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street knew precisely what would follow if they rejected Moscow's terms for an alliance. They nevertheless rejected them.

Ambassador Henderson, who in his memoirs admitted his "prejudice" and described the USSR as "an oriental despotism" with "cloven hooves," told Hitler on August 23 that he preferred a German-Soviet agreement to an Anglo-Soviet agreement. This was also the preference of Chamberlain, Halifax, Daladier and Bonnet. The inexorable result, as they knew it would be, was the destruction of Poland. Insofar as this unhappy land was "betrayed" in 1939 by those outside of its own incredibly romantic and short-sighted ruling class, the betrayal was not consummated by Moscow on August 23 or September 17, but by London and Paris during the spring and early summer. Insofar as the Munich-men in their course of folly during the year of doom could still be said to have had a policy, it was one of deliberately sacrificing

Poland, as Czechoslovakia had already been sacrificed, in the hope that Berlin and Moscow would quarrel over the spoils.

These unbelievable but fully documented facts do not demonstrate the moral wickedness of the Anglo-French leadership but only its appalling political ineptitude. By the same yardstick Moscow's decisions, bitterly damned by those in the West who had sought to do in reverse exactly what Moscow did, and hotly denounced by many who knew nothing of the realities, are no evidence of turpitude, but merely of diplomatic astuteness. The constant misrepresentation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact as an "alliance" and the distortions of its meaning by Dallin¹⁶ and other anti-Soviet publicists cannot alter this judgment among those concerned with facts rather than fancies. Chamberlain's policy of fostering a German-Soviet war with the Western Powers neutral was a failure, ending in Soviet neutrality in a war in which Britain was soon without allies against the most formidable foe of all time. Stalin's policy of self-protection against the Tory-Nazi threat was a success, inasmuch as it led to an Anglo-German war in which the USSR was neutral.

This policy gained almost two years of precious time to prepare against attack. It also gained valuable strategic positions for defense against the Reich. It lost the good will of all non-Communists throughout the Atlantic world and committed the various Communist parties to a line of isolationism and appeasement which not only deprived them of all hope of winning friends and influencing people, but turned out to be a major disservice to the interests of the USSR itself. The Kremlin felt obliged to abandon these moral imponderables in the interest of *Realpolitik*. The Soviet leadership assumed that Hitler's projected invasion of Poland would cause France and Britain either to remain neutral or to declare war. In the former case, they would henceforth be dependent for their very existence as Powers on the support of the USSR—on Moscow's terms. In the latter case, they would hold the Reich to a stalemate and perhaps ultimately defeat the Axis with American aid. The assumption proved right as to Britain, wrong as to France and incalculably tragic for the Soviet Union because of the Kremlin's undervaluation of Nazi military might. This political sin Moscow shared with Paris and London. All paid dearly for their error. In the last analysis neither the USSR nor the Western democracies won the diplomatic game

of 1939. Both lost. Only Hitler won. The fact remains that Anglo-French policy gave Stalin and Molotov no viable alternative to the course they finally adopted.

4. THE WESTERN FRONTIERS

Soviet objectives in facing the war in the West were to avoid conflict at all costs with the Atlantic allies; to postpone conflict with Germany by making concessions within the assumed limits of safety; and to take advantage of the preoccupation of others by extending Soviet defenses westward. These purposes were pursued behind a façade which disguised what could not be publicly admitted. In the process most of the border territories lost in 1917-21 were recovered as bastions against Berlin.

The Poland of Pilsudski's Colonels perished within a fortnight after Göring's *Luftwaffe* and Brauchitsch's *Wehrmacht* delivered their first shattering blows before dawn of Friday, September 1. Many Polish cavalry officers had dreamed of taking Berlin in a short and glorious campaign. The comment of Jan Karski's major was typical: "England and France are not needed this time. We can finish this alone."¹⁷ But in the age of the Blitzkrieg the techniques of the 18th Century are equally useless in diplomacy and in war. Polish mobilization was never completed. The Polish State at once disintegrated. The broken fragments of its armed forces, like Karski's own detachment, dissolved into "individuals wandering collectively toward some wholly indefinite goal. . . . The Blitz had derailed our minds and emotions, bewildered, stunned, confused, and frustrated us to the point where we hardly knew what had happened."¹⁸ By September 15 Warsaw was surrounded, all the Western provinces were lost, the southern industrial area was overrun and the Nazi claws were clutching at Lvov and even Brest-Litovsk, far to the east. Contrary to tales spun later by romantics in exile, the Polish Army and State had ceased to exist by the middle of the month.

The Kremlin's response to the Polish debacle was not dictated by solicitude for the Byelo-Russians and Ukrainians, though it suited Soviet spokesmen to say so. Neither was it an act of retribution for 1920 nor yet a part of any explicit accord with Berlin. It was rather a strategic necessity to fill a vacuum and prevent the *Wehrmacht* from occupying everything up to the Riga fron-

tier. *Pravda* on September 12 criticized Polish treatment of minorities. Three days later Molotov and Ambassador Togo signed an accord which ended hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchukuo frontier. At 3 a.m., September 17, Potemkin summoned Ambassador Grzybowski and read to him a note from Molotov asserting that the Red Army had been ordered to cross the Polish border:

The Polish State and its Government have virtually ceased to exist. Treaties concluded between the USSR and Poland have thereby lost their validity. Abandoned to her fate and left without leadership, Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency which may create a menace to the USSR. Hence, while it was neutral hitherto, the Soviet Government can no longer maintain a neutral attitude toward these facts. Nor can the Soviet Government remain indifferent when its blood brothers, Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians in Polish territory, having been abandoned to their fate, are left without protection. In view of this state of affairs, the Soviet Government has instructed the higher command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelo-Russia.

Copies were dispatched to other capitals, coupled with assurances of continued Soviet neutrality. At 4 a.m. Soviet troops moved in. Alexei Tolstoi in *Izvestia* (September 18) opined that "our brothers beyond the borders, yesterday's slaves, find that in the future they are to live prosperously and happily." Nazi and Soviet officers conferred in Moscow, September 20-21, regarding a line of demarcation. On the 27th besieged Warsaw surrendered to German forces, while Red troops, having occupied the Galician oil fields, reached the Hungarian frontier. Some resistance was encountered: 737 Soviet soldiers were killed and 1,862 wounded. Over 180,000 Polish troops became Soviet prisoners of war. Had Moscow not intervened, most of these Poles would have been driven into Soviet territory in any case and been interned for the duration.

Also on September 27 Ribbentrop arrived once more in Moscow amid much pomp and feigned cordiality. He departed on the 29th after signing several agreements with Molotov. A "Border and Friendship Treaty" drew a line which followed closely the "Curzon Line" of 1919, though running to the west of it in the

north and south. The USSR herewith occupied 80,000 square miles of formerly Polish territory with a population of almost 13,000,000, as compared with 70,000 miles and 22,000,000 inhabitants allocated to the Reich. In the Soviet zone, according to Polish census estimates of 1939, Poles constituted 39.9% of the population, Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians and Great Russians 40.9%, with the balance Jewish, Lithuanian, German, etc. Poles in the southern area comprised 32.6% and Ukrainians 56.5% of the residents. Molotov told the Supreme Soviet on October 31 that the Soviet zone contained over 7,000,000 Ukrainians, over 3,000,000 Byelo-Russians, over 1,000,000 Jews and over 1,000,000 Poles. Many of the Poles were subsequently deported to scattered points in the USSR.

On October 22 "Peoples Assemblies" were elected in the Soviet zone under procedures similar to Soviet elections. Over 90% of the eligible voters cast ballots, of which 90% were cast for the officially sponsored lists of candidates. The Ukrainian Assembly (October 26) and the Byelo-Russian Assembly (October 29) requested the incorporation of their territories into the USSR, a step which followed on November 1 with the inclusion of the two areas, respectively, into the Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian Republics. Berlin originally had been willing to grant to the USSR the territory between the Bug and the Vistula in return for German control of Lithuania. In the final settlement the territory in question was placed in the German zone while all three of the Baltic States, to Hitler's indignation, were declared by Moscow to be within its sphere. In another agreement of September 28 Berlin and Moscow

voice their opinions that it would be in the interests of all nations to bring to an end the state of war presently existing between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments therefore will concentrate their efforts, if necessary in cooperation with the other friendly Powers, toward reaching this goal. Should, however, the efforts of both Governments remain unsuccessful, the fact would thereby be established that England and France are responsible for a continuation of the war, in which case the Governments of Germany and the USSR will consult each other as to necessary measures.

Molotov's willingness to support this initial Nazi "peace offensive" reveals the conviction of the Soviet leaders that Moscow

stood to lose nothing and to gain much in the event that Paris and London should abandon their wholly ineffective war on the Reich. After such a humiliation, the Munichmen would not remain in power. Their successors would presumably come to terms with Moscow. *Izvestia* (October 9) supported Hitler's peace plea before the Reichstag on October 6 and added: "‘Annihilation of Hitlerism’ is now proclaimed as the principal demand. . . . One cannot destroy any ideology by fire and sword. One may respect or hate Hitlerism, just as any other system of political views. This is a matter of taste. But to undertake war for ‘annihilation of Hitlerism’ means to commit criminal folly in politics." On November 29 Stalin asserted that London and Paris had "attacked Germany" and were therefore responsible for the war. "The Soviet Union openly supported Germany's peace proposals because it believed that the earliest termination of the war would fundamentally alleviate the position of all countries and nations." With France and Britain still intact, peace would have meant a new equilibrium of power in which the USSR could enhance its security, retain its gains and perhaps secure additional benefits by holding the diplomatic balance.

Meanwhile President Moscicki had resigned his post and, as a private citizen, left Rumania, where Smigly-Rydz and Beck were interned. On September 20 a new Polish Government was formed in Paris under Wladyslaw Raczkievich as President, General Wladyslaw Sikorski as Premier and Commander-in-Chief, and August Zaleski as Foreign Minister. They denounced the Nazi-Soviet accord of September 28 as "a violation of all international obligations and of all human morality." Sikorski swore that "no Polish Government will ever accept the German-Russian partition of Poland." Although London and Paris protested the Soviet action, which was vigorously denounced in the Western press, diplomatic relations were not severed. Lloyd George declared that "it would be an act of criminal folly to place the Russian advance in the same category as that of the German." Said Churchill on October 1: "That the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace."

The Narkomindel had already moved to thwart Berlin in the Baltic. These ancient stamping grounds of the Teutonic Knights, ever in dispute between Germans and Slavs, had enjoyed pre-

carious "independence" between wars but were dominated by Britain in the 1920's and by the Reich in the 1930's. Baltic democracy had been shortlived. By the putsch of December 17, 1926, Antonas Smetona had made himself Lithuanian dictator. Konstantin Paets and General Juhan Laidonner established a dictatorial régime in Estonia on March 12, 1934. After conferring in Berlin with Alfred Rosenberg, Karlis Ulmanis seized power in Latvia on May 16, 1934.¹⁹ With Berlin now busy elsewhere, and Paris and London powerless to say nay, Moscow imposed protectorates on the Baltic Republics.

Mutual assistance pacts were signed in the Soviet capital with Estonia on September 28, Latvia on October 5, and Lithuania on October 10, 1939. The Vilna region was restored to Lithuania. The USSR obtained military control of the whole area between Finland and East Prussia through the right to establish bases and garrisons at strategic points. Berlin not only felt it expedient to acquiesce but was obliged to repatriate over 100,000 Germans. By 1941 almost 450,000 Germans (said Hitler bitterly "more than 500,000") had been compelled to return to the Reich from the various eastern areas annexed or controlled by the USSR. The Kremlin had no intention of permitting possible "Fifth Columns" of Germans to remain in the borderlands.²⁰ The Baltic "windows" which Peter the Great had fought for 20 years to win were thus regained within a few days without the firing of a shot.

Soviet diplomacy was less successful in its dealings with other Western neighbors. On September 17 Molotov had sent an invitation to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Shukru Saracoglu. Ankara, long fearful of Italian designs, hoped to conclude its proposed pact with Britain and France without disrupting its relations with the USSR. Molotov asked for a mutual assistance pact, limited to the Straits and the Black Sea, and sought to close the Straits to Anglo-French naval forces. He later asserted that rumors of Soviet demands for territory or for a privileged position on the Dardanelles were "lies." Saracoglu, who arrived on September 25, declined the proposals, doubtless reasoning that if Turkey should become an object of Italian aggression, Moscow could render little aid while London and Paris could move at once.

After being alternately neglected and courted in the Soviet capital, the Foreign Minister departed on October 17 sans pact

but amid new professions of Soviet-Turkish friendship. Two days later Turkey signed its fifteen-year treaty of mutual assistance with France and Britain. Molotov made no protest but registered disapproval. The treaty, however, specified in a separate protocol that Turkey would take no action "having as its effect or involving as its consequence entry into armed conflict with the USSR." This was a clear gain for the Narkomindel. To have threatened Turkey with force, as the Baltic States and Finland were threatened, in order to obtain a pact of mutual aid, would have been dangerous in view of the certainty of Turkish resistance and the likelihood of Anglo-French support of Ankara. Moscow acquiesced.

Finland, like Turkey, also rejected Soviet proposals. Had Molotov acquiesced in the north, as in the south, there would have been no winter war of 1939-40. The Kremlin, moreover, would have avoided much bitter denunciation in the democracies and escaped the risk of military conflict with Britain and France. On the other hand, such a course might well have meant the fall of Leningrad in 1941-42 and the possible loss of the war with the Axis. Finland would in any case have been Hitler's ally, although perhaps in this event a less willing one. Moscow's initial proposals to Helsinki were directed exclusively toward increasing Soviet security vis-à-vis Germany by improving the strategic position of Leningrad and assuring Soviet naval control of the Gulf of Finland. From the perspective of 1946 it is clear that the proposals were wise in terms of Soviet defense, and that Helsinki would have lost little and saved much had it accepted them. But whatever judgment may be passed upon the goals of Soviet policy in dealing with Finland, the verdict regarding the means employed is scarcely debatable: they were lawless, stupid, costly and dangerous, and represent the most striking instance in Soviet diplomacy where action was based upon misinformation and a tragic miscalculation of probable results.

The complex negotiations attending the first Finnish war have been analyzed elsewhere at length.²¹ Here they must be reduced to bare bones. Moscow invited discussions on October 5, 1939. Vaino Tanner and Juho Paasikivi arrived on the 11th. Molotov asked a thirty-year leasehold on the port of Hanko, embracing a Soviet garrison and naval base capable of commanding the mouth of the Gulf, plus the cession of Koivisto, four islands off

Viborg, part of the Karelian Isthmus between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf, and the western portion of the Fisherman's Peninsula near Petsamo on Barents Sea. The territories demanded totalled 2,761 sq. km. Molotov offered in compensation 5,529 sq. km. of Soviet territory in Central Karelia. Helsinki saw no justice in the exchange, since the Soviet proposals would give the Red Navy control of the Gulf and require abandonment of the Mannerheim Line, elaborately constructed across the Isthmus where the Finnish frontier was only 20 miles from Leningrad. These were precisely the results which Moscow was determined to achieve.

The stakes of diplomacy judged worth fighting for, here as always, were the factors decisively affecting future fighting capacity. Finland refused to yield components of power which, once yielded, would greatly reduce its capacity to offer armed resistance to future demands. The USSR refused to accept a situation which rendered Leningrad highly vulnerable to attack by land and sea at a time when a weak Finland, unable or unwilling to maintain neutrality, might become a base of either German or Anglo-French attack on the city of Peter and Lenin. In sundry proposals and counter-proposals each side modified its original position. But when Tanner and Paasikivi finally departed on November 13, their Government was still resolved not to yield Hanko or the Mannerheim Line, while the Kremlin was equally determined upon the attainment of these objectives as minimum requirements of Soviet security.

The tragedy of errors which ensued began on November 26 when Molotov demanded that Finnish troops near Leningrad be withdrawn 25 km. and alleged that Finnish shells had fallen near Mainila, killing 4 and wounding 9 Red Army men. Helsinki denied the incident, rejected the protest and refused the demand. Just as Finland was about to make concessions, Molotov denounced the non-aggression pact and severed diplomatic relations. On November 30 Soviet planes bombed Helsinki and other towns while Red troops crossed the border. On December 1 Moscow announced the establishment of a "Peoples' Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland" in the border village of Terioki (actually in Moscow), headed by Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish Communist who had lived in the USSR for 20 years. When Helsinki sought to resume negotiations through the Swedish Minister, the Narkomindel asserted that it recognized only the Kuusi-

nen regime—with which a mutual assistance pact was signed on December 2, granting all the Soviet demands and more, in exchange for Soviet Karelia and a payment of \$8,400,000.

Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov and their colleagues assumed that Finland would not fight; that most Finns would rally to Kuusinen and overthrow their old leaders; that a show of force would suffice; and that no war would follow. All the assumptions proved wrong. The Politburo also assumed that the Soviet masses would rally to the cause. This assumption likewise proved dubious, despite (or rather because of) the slogans which filled the press. Thus *Izvestia*, November 28: "The patience of the Soviet people will come to an end!" "We are ready to give a stern lesson!" December 1: "The Finnish workers and peasants are our friends!" "Teach the blackguards a lesson!" December 4, on the treaty: "A new victory for the wise policy of peace!" "The plans of the greedy plutocrats have collapsed!" "The people of Finland welcome with joy the news of the establishment of the Peoples' Government." "Only from the hands of the Soviet Union could the Finnish people receive their independence. Only from the hands of the Soviet Union could they receive such a treaty. . . . The world imperialistic clique wished to find in Finland a convenient *place d'armes* for an attack on the USSR. . . . This criminal game has been demolished." Resolutions without number filled the press, from the night shift at the Stalin Auto Plant, faculty and students of the Frunze Military Academy, lumber workers at Archangel, the All-Union Academy of Sciences, streetcar employees at Alma Ata, etc. All demanded punishment of the Finnish "White Guards" and the "liberation" of the Finnish people. The volume and vehemence of this chorus suggests that the Party leaders were doubtful, rather than confident, of public support in the course on which they had embarked. That course was in all respects profoundly mistaken. It evoked no popular enthusiasm in the USSR.

To the amazement and admiration of the Atlantic world, Finnish troops during December and much of January not only beat off Red attacks but inflicted severe defeats on Soviet forces. Western observers concluded at once that the Red Army was all but worthless. In fact the Soviet High Command was in no way responsible for the humiliating spectacle of the Muscovite colossus held at bay by tiny Finland. The fault lay with Stalin, Zhdanov

and the Politburo where no preparations for war had been ordered. Except for the taking of Petsamo, all Soviet drives failed. Bitter cold, heavy snow and Finnish snipers took a heavy toll. No attack was made on the Mannerheim Line. Not until mid-January was it fully appreciated in the Kremlin that all the calculations of November had been false and that nothing short of irresistible force would bring about Finnish capitulation.

During these months of muddling, the Western democracies pursued policies which, for fatuousness and irresponsibility, surpassed those of Moscow. Ignoring the pro-Nazi sympathies of Baron Mannerheim and of other Finnish leaders, Atlantic politicians and publicists almost unanimously rallied to the support of Finnish "democracy" against the Red monster. As H. G. Wells put it: "All of Russia's enemies talk about the sacredness of Finnish democracy, not because they love democracy but because they hate Russia." The rallying at first took the futile form of purely verbal sympathy and later took the dangerous form of preparation for war against the USSR. Neutral America, cherishing Finland as the only non-defaulting war debtor, offered Helsinki generous private charity and public credits totalling \$30,000,000 but restricted the use of the funds, in the name of "neutrality," to the purchase of non-military supplies. "Finland," said Congressman Celler, "asks for bullets and we give her beans. She asks for powder and we give her tea. She asks for guns and we give her broomsticks."

Even more ignominious was the course adopted by the Chamberlain and Daladier Cabinets. When Helsinki on December 3 appealed to the moribund League of Nations, where no action whatever had been taken respecting the war in the West, the Argentine delegation, supported by other Latin Americans, urged the expulsion of the USSR from the League—which had never even discussed the expulsion of Fascist aggressors. Avenol convoked the Council and Assembly and queried Molotov, who replied on December 4 that there was no basis for action since "the Soviet Union is not in a state of war with Finland and does not threaten the Finnish people with war." On December 14 the Council, with Anglo-French support, voted the USSR out of the League.²² The Soviet Union was also expelled from the International Labor Organization on February 5. These steps were the dying convulsions of the Geneva confederation which never re-

sumed activity in the white temple in Ariana Park, now a house of ghosts. In view of the past, Soviet expulsion was a futile act of hypocrisy. In the light of the future, it was an act of folly.

The Munichmen of London and Paris, however, moved to aid Helsinki on their own responsibility. That they should have planned war against the Soviet Union while still at war with the Reich ("phony" as that war then seemed to be) is unbelievable. But this is exactly what they did. On January 19, 1940, Daladier asked Gamelin and Darlan to draw plans for attacking Baku, instigating rebellion in the Soviet Caucasus, and fighting the USSR in the Black Sea. On February 5 the Allied Supreme War Council decided to send troops to Finland. An expeditionary force of six divisions was assembled in British ports. That there was no Anglo-French attack on the USSR was due only to the refusal of Turkey, Norway and Sweden to permit their territories to be used for transit. As late as mid-April, 1940, a month after the Finnish war had ended, Gamelin and Weygand were still discussing a possible bombing of Baku, ostensibly to cut off Soviet oil supplies to Germany. Meanwhile London had dispatched to Finland 101 planes, 114 guns, 185,000 shells, 50,000 grenades, 15,700 aerial bombs, 100,000 greatcoats and 48 ambulances, all of which, as Lloyd George said, was "too late or too little or both." Paris sent 179 planes, 472 guns, 795,000 shells, 5,100 machine guns, 200,000 grenades, etc.

While Fascist Italy exuded ardent sympathy for Finland, the Nazi Reich, busy with preparations for the blows which were soon to conquer all of northern and western Europe, was studiously "correct." Berlin could not then afford to challenge Moscow, however painful an extension of Soviet power in the Baltic might be. Germany threatened Sweden and Norway with war if they admitted Anglo-French forces. In reply to birthday congratulations, Stalin wired Ribbentrop on Christmas Day: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented by blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm."

Having thus added nonsense to error, Stalin at length moved to rectify the blunders already made. Early in February powerful Soviet forces under General Gregory Stern began assaulting the Mannerheim Line. After smashing through it in a brilliant offensive, they reached Viborg by March 3. Mannerheim, who had estimated in January that he would need 30,000 foreign troops by

May, in February that he would need 40,000 by April, and in March that he needed 100,000 at once, decided to yield rather than avail himself of Chamberlain's invitation to make a public appeal for Allied aid. Sweden became intermediary, although the mid-February journey of Sir Stafford Cripps from Chungking to Moscow was perhaps not unrelated to the outcome. Realizing that a continuation of hostilities might well lead to open conflict with Paris and London and to a possible crisis with Berlin, Stalin abruptly abandoned the feckless puppet régime of Kuusinen and on March 8 welcomed a Finnish peace delegation, consisting of Premier Rysto Ryti, Paasikivi, Professor Vaino Voionmaa and General Karl Walden.

On March 12, 1940, Molotov, Zhdanov and Commander Vasilvsky signed a peace treaty. By its terms Finland ceded without compensation the entire Karelian Isthmus, including Viborg and the islands; the northern and western shores of Lake Ladoga; territory east of Merikarvi; and part of the peninsula near Petsamo which, with its port and nickel mines, was restored to Helsinki. Hanko was leased as a naval base at an annual rental of \$330,000. Moscow claimed a right of free transit across the Petsamo district to Norway and Sweden. By Article 3: "both contracting parties undertake mutually to refrain from any attack upon each other, not to conclude any alliances and not to participate in any coalition against one of the contracting parties." This peace was widely, though mistakenly, regarded as a defeat for France and Britain no less than for Finland. Chamberlain's political position was weakened. Daladier was forced on March 19 to yield the French Premiership to anti-Munichard Paul Reynaud, who remarked: "I have come too early." In fact he had come much too late.

Finland had lost between 15,000 (Mannerheim) and 60,000 (Molotov) dead, all to no avail, since Moscow had asked for considerably less in October, 1939, and had offered a net enlargement, rather than a diminution, of Finnish territory. The USSR had lost between 48,745 (Molotov) and 200,000 (Mannerheim) dead and had gained little that could not have been obtained in December had the border incidents and the disastrous Kuusinen experiment not been concocted. On July 10 Kuusinen became Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the new Karelo-Finnish Republic, the 12th of the Union Republics. In his

address to the federal Supreme Soviet on March 29, Molotov declared:

. . . Inasmuch as the Soviet Union did not wish to become the tool of British and French imperialists in their struggle for world hegemony against Germany, we have encountered at every step profound hostility of their policy toward our country. . . . If Finland had not been subject to foreign influences, the Soviet Union and Finland would have arrived at a peaceful understanding last autumn. . . . The Soviet Union, having smashed the Finnish army and having every opportunity of occupying the whole of Finland, did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for its expenditures in the war as any other Power would have done, but confined its desires to a minimum and displayed magnanimity towards Finland. . . . We pursued no other object in the peace treaty than that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, Murmansk and the Murmansk Railway. . . . The task of our foreign policy is to ensure peace between nations and the security of our country. The conclusion must be drawn from this that we must maintain the position of neutrality and refrain from participating in the war between the big European Powers.

5. FACING THE TRIPLICE

For the Soviet Union, as for the United States, the choice between neutrality and war was to be made by others. Neither Power was threatened so long as the Reich and the Anglo-French bloc were stalemated. German defeat would have removed any possible menace to Washington and Moscow. The defeat of France and Britain, on the other hand, would have left both America and Russia at the mercy of a formidable Nazi-Nipponese coalition in control of most of Europe, Africa and Asia. In the grim spring of 1940 this disaster suddenly approached with appalling speed on the wings of the *Luftwaffe* and on the treads of the Panzer divisions. Denmark and Norway were overrun on April 9. The feeble British effort to save Norway came to grief. On May 10 Chamberlain gave way to Churchill as the Nazi hordes poured into Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Belgium, which were conquered, respectively, in 1, 5 and 17 days. On May 14 the invaders broke through the Ardennes (as in 1914), destroyed the French Ninth Army, and took Sedan. The Maginot Line was outflanked. The enemy reached the Channel within a week. On June 3 the B.E.F. quit Dunkirk. Italy declared war 7 days later.

Paris fell on the 14th. On the 16th the French Cabinet in Bordeaux voted to sue for peace. The Pétain régime signed armistice agreements with the Reich on June 22 and with Italy on the 24th.

The world balance of power was herewith subverted by the Axis, which soon became, in form as well as in fact, the Fascist Triplice with the signature of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. The document which Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu signed in Hitler's Chancellery was a logical sequel to American restrictions on exports to Japan, to the Anglo-American exchange of naval bases for destroyers (September 2) and to Vichy's grant to Tokyo (September 22) of the right to maintain bases and garrisons in northern Indo-China. In the name of the "New Order" in Europe and Greater East Asia, Führer, Duce and Mikado threatened the United States by agreeing (Art. 3) "to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." By way of reassuring and neutralizing Moscow, they declared (Art. 5): "Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia." Moscow was not reassured. The great Eurasian Power, no less than the great American Power, would be faced with mortal peril if the Triplice should crush Britain and China, a dream brought measurably closer to realization by the fall of France.

Within the Western State System the structure of power and the character of the rivalry for its possession are such that each aggregation of might capable of reducing other Powers to impotence sooner or later evokes a counter-aggregation against it. Had later been sooner in 1940-41, the peoples of the United States, the USSR and many other communities would have paid a less hideous price for the redressing of the balance and the recapture of their own security. Every rational consideration of self-interest dictated an Anglo-American-Chinese-Soviet alliance for war against the Triplice in July of 1940 rather than in January of 1942. But the limits of the politically possible are fixed less by reason than by sentiment. It is obvious to all that American policy was partially paralyzed and dangerously retarded—until the United States was attacked—by the emotional attachment of

most Americans to "neutrality" in "other peoples' wars." This concept persisted as a non-rational collective symbol long after it had been reduced to a nullity as a legal status through "aid to Britain short of war." What is less obvious is that the Soviet peoples—until the USSR was attacked—were similarly conditioned to "neutrality" in the "imperialist war" among the "bourgeois Powers." Even if convinced of the necessity of intervention, no Vozhd, Politburo or Sovnarkom could have moved the citizenry of the Soviet Union to effective unity, heroic enthusiasm and self-sacrificing devotion in a war dictated by rational *Realpolitik* rather than by a passion for self-defense against invasion.

The consequence of these persisting attitudes after the French collapse was a gradual amelioration of relations among Washington, London and Moscow without the emergence of anything resembling the Grand Alliance called for by the exigencies of the times. Moscow continued "business as usual." The Nazi-Soviet commercial accord of August 19, 1939 was supplemented by additional agreements of February 11, 1940, and January 10, 1941. Grain, oil, timber, cotton, foodstuffs and metals continued to be shipped to the Reich in exchange for machine tools, bearings, chemicals, electrical and optical equipment, etc.²³ While this commerce weakened the British blockade and somewhat enhanced German capacity to make war, it probably increased the relative military potential of the USSR to a greater degree. Hitler's hopes, like those of Napoleon before 1812, that he could avail himself of all Russian resources and close Anglo-Russian trade, were disappointed, despite propagandistic exploitation of German-Soviet commerce in both Berlin and Moscow.

In the midst of the Finnish war (January 2, 1940) Sir William Seeds left Moscow amid rumors of a possible Anglo-Soviet rupture. On March 6 Chamberlain announced that the White Paper on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations of 1939, which had been promised in December, would not be issued. Whether the purpose was to avoid irritating Moscow or to prevent a further discrediting of Tory diplomacy was unclear. Ivan Maisky resumed contacts with Lord Halifax on March 27 for inconclusive discussions of neutral trading rights. Halifax informed the Ambassador on April 19 that his Government was prepared to explore the possibilities of a commercial agreement. Late in May the Churchill Cabinet announced that it would send Sir Stafford Cripps to the USSR

as special envoy. The Narkomindel declared that it saw no need for such a mission but would be glad to receive Cripps as Ambassador. He was named to the post on June 5. He brought to Stalin a letter from Churchill on July 1, but in the course of prolonged discussions found Stalin unwilling to consider any open Anglo-Soviet *rapprochement* against the Reich. Maisky won favorable comment in the British press when he visited East End air raid shelters in October. But thanks, among other sources of friction, to British refusal to recognize Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States, no notable improvement in relations took place until Eden replaced Halifax as Foreign Minister on December 22, 1940. Even then no new trade agreement materialized.

Soviet-American relations likewise followed a course of friction and recrimination, followed by slight improvement. The State Department on December 2, 1939, had announced a "moral embargo" on aircraft exports to the USSR because of Soviet bombardment of Finnish towns. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt, who had succeeded Joseph E. Davies in June, 1938, left the Soviet capital in May, 1940, for an absence of four months. In Washington Ambassador Konstantin Oumansky, who had replaced Troyanovsky in 1939, protested against various trade restrictions. The annual trade agreement (first signed August 4, 1937) was renewed in 1940, but Molotov, in addressing the Supreme Soviet in St. Andrews Hall in the Kremlin on August 1, asserted "there is nothing good that can be said" about relations with the United States. With the signing of the Triplix pact, however, shipments of American machine tools to the USSR were released, while Steinhardt returned to Moscow and Sumner Welles patiently began a long series of conferences, 27 in all, with Oumansky. In November the Narkomindel authorized an American Consulate in Vladivostok, partly as a means of refuting British allegations that Amtorg purchases, along with Japanese goods, were being trans-shipped to Germany across Siberia. In January, 1941, the "moral embargo" was lifted. But nothing approaching a common Soviet-American policy toward the world crisis was attainable.

Moscow and Washington nevertheless responded to Nazi hegemony over Europe in similar fashion. Both Powers strove to strengthen their defenses by increasing armaments, expanding war production and acquiring strategic bastions. The United

States obtained new bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Caribbean and ultimately in Iceland and Greenland. The USSR, while careful to avoid an immediate crisis with Berlin, made haste to effect such changes of frontiers as would enhance Soviet ability to resist Axis attack. A decree of June 26, 1940, increased the normal working day from seven to eight hours and imposed penalties on workers leaving their jobs without permission. Technicians and foremen were required (October 19) to accept assignment to such posts as the State might designate as essential. Provision was made (October 2) for drafting boys from 14 to 17 for vocational training and for service in a Labor Reserve. The Red Army was quietly strengthened for the test to come.

In the far north, Moscow forbade Finland to conclude an alliance with Sweden and Norway. "These efforts," said Molotov, March 29, 1940, "are directed against the USSR and their objective is to gain satisfaction by avenging the war of 1939-40." The veto was effective, but the Kremlin was unable to prevent the Finnish leaders from soliciting (and apparently obtaining even before the end of hostilities) an informal Nazi "guarantee" which implied German aid in a later war of *revanche*. At the end of June Molotov demanded of Paasikivi that Finland demilitarize the Aaland Islands. Helsinki did not yield until October 11, and then only in the face of threats of force. Finland also agreed "not to place them at the disposal of the armed forces of any other Power." When Berlin suggested the transfer of the Canadian-owned nickel concessions near Petsamo to German ownership, Molotov proposed its cancellation in favor of a joint Finnish-Soviet company. Negotiations continued inconclusively into the spring of 1941, by which time the shadow of coming events was hovering darkly over the Baltic.

Finland had become a Nazi satellite as early as the summer of 1940. Soviet insistence on transporting troops through Finnish territory to Hanko was matched by German insistence on sending troops through Finland in transit to and from Northern Norway. London vainly protested to Helsinki, September 27, 1940. Stalin's final error had been to inflict sufficient injury on the vanquished to foster a thirst for revenge without depriving the enemy of power to take revenge. Anglo-French threats of war forbade a Carthaginian peace in March, 1940. By November German threats forbade any resumption of the enterprise. In their resolve

to avoid hostilities with the Reich until directly attacked, the men of Moscow were obliged to see Finland pass into the hands of Hitler.

South of the Gulf, the Narkomindel moved with less hesitancy. On the day of the fall of Paris an ultimatum was dispatched to Lithuania, complaining of the kidnapping of Red Army men, protesting against secret negotiations with Estonia and Latvia contrary to the mutual assistance pact, and demanding the formation of a new government and the admission of additional Soviet troops. Kovno yielded. President Smetona fled to Germany. Red forces poured in. A new democratic régime was created. On June 16 Moscow presented similar demands to Latvia and Estonia, with similar results. Although the Communist parties in the Baltic States were now legalized, the new Cabinets contained no Communists. "Friendly" régimes of liberals and Socialists, willing to renounce the "Baltic Entente" accords of 1923 and 1934, were deemed sufficient for the moment. But a different solution was soon decided upon. In the Baltic elections of July 14-15, 1940, only one list of candidates appeared on the ballot—that sponsored by the "Unions of the Toiling People" which had Moscow's blessing. Over 90% of the voters in all three States approved the list. On July 21 the new parliaments met and petitioned the Supreme Soviet for incorporation into the USSR.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were admitted by the Supreme Soviet on August 1, 5 and 8, 1940, respectively, as the 14th, 15th and 16th Union Republics. Predominantly Lithuanian districts of Byelo-Russia were transferred to the new Lithuanian Soviet Republics. Land, banks and large buildings and factories were nationalized throughout the Baltic, but smaller enterprises were left in private hands. Collectivization of agriculture was forbidden. Soviet rule in the Baltic followed the economic pattern of the NEP. Landless peasants received farms through the partition of larger estates. Cultural autonomy, free public education, social security and increased opportunities for technical and professional training and advancement meant that the Baltic peoples, with the exception of a small minority of erstwhile politicians and large property-owners, obtained tangible benefits from their reunion with Muscovy, despite regrets in certain quarters for the loss of an "independence" which had become a political fiction and a source of economic stagnation.

Berlin acquiesced with a resentment ill-concealed by declarations of indifference. The remaining Germans in the Baltic were expelled. London at first refused to accept the situation and "froze" Baltic assets and shipping. Cripps offered *de facto* recognition in October, 1940, but could obtain no satisfactory *quid pro quo*. It was in Washington that anti-Soviet prejudice, disguised in the garb of righteousness, led to a repetition in reverse of the diplomatic absurdities of 1917. Then the State Department had continued to deal with the agents of a defunct Russian régime and had refused recognition to the Baltic States on the ground that they were properly part of (a non-Soviet) Russia. Now the State Department "froze" Baltic assets and shipping and continued to deal with the diplomatic missions of the defunct governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On July 23, 1940, Under-Secretary Sumner Welles, forgetting the record, announced that "from the day when the peoples of these republics first gained their independence and democratic form of government the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest. The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one State, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign State, however weak." The policy of refusing to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States in the USSR was wholly at variance with the original American attitude toward Baltic "independence" and became an unnecessary irritant in Soviet-American relations for years thereafter.²⁴

The Kremlin was not deterred from its efforts to strengthen defenses against the Reich by irrelevant moralizing abroad. Rumania was rapidly falling under Nazi control. On June 21, 1940, King Carol made himself a totalitarian despot, ruling through a single anti-Semitic "Party of the Nation," dominated by the pro-Nazi Iron Guard. Germanophile Ion Gigurtu prepared to assume the Premiership in the hope of gaining Nazi support against Moscow while Carol moved to repudiate the Anglo-French "guarantee" of 1939. According to Ribbentrop (June 22, 1941), Molotov informed Berlin on June 24, 1940, that Moscow had decided

to annex Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Schulenburg protested that this was "a complete surprise" and highly detrimental to German interests, to which Molotov allegedly replied that the matter was urgent and that an answer was desired within 24 hours. Timoshenko gathered Soviet troops on the Rumanian border. Berlin yielded. On June 26 Molotov handed a note to the Rumanian Minister, asking that "the great wrong done to the Soviet Union and to the population of Bessarabia by the 22 years of Rumanian domination" be righted through the return of Bessarabia and the cession of Northern Bukovina. A reply was requested by the next day. Bucharest ordered mobilization and sought delay. Hitler advised acquiescence. Molotov insisted upon military evacuation of the territories within four days.

Minister Davidescu finally informed the Narkomindel that his Government had decided to yield in order to avoid war. On June 28, 1940, Red troops crossed the Dniester and within 48 hours had reached the Pruth. Over 100,000 Germans were evacuated; 200,000 Rumanians fled across the new border; and an almost equal number moved into the occupied districts from Rumania proper, preferring the rule of Moscow to that of Bucharest. On August 2 the Supreme Soviet incorporated Northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia into the Ukraine, and central Bessarabia into the Moldavian Republic, which became the 13th Union Republic. Berlin and Rome now compelled Bucharest to cede northern Transylvania to Hungary (August 30) and southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria (September 7). The Axis "guaranteed" Rumania's shrunken frontiers. On September 4, 1940, following an unsuccessful Iron Guard putsch, General Ion Antonescu became Premier. Two days later Carol abdicated in favor of his son, Michael, and fled the country with Magda Lupescu. German troops occupied Rumania in October.

Although Moscow effected no further annexations in its efforts to meet the Nazi menace, it sought to prevent German control of Bulgaria and Jugoslavia. In April, 1940, a Yugoslav trade delegation was received by Mikoyan. A trade accord was signed May 11. Belgrade feared aggression by Italy. While the USSR offered no protection, the Soviet press was filled with unflattering references to Fascist ambitions. Berlin, still determined to defer a showdown with the Soviet Union, vetoed Mussolini's plans. On June 24, 1940, Belgrade named Milan Gavrilovich as its first Minister to

Moscow. The Narkomindel cultivated Bulgaria, supported Sofia's demands for Dobrudja, and even suggested a Soviet guarantee of Bulgaria's frontiers. In the duel to come, Berlin was to achieve temporary triumph. But final victory would go to those who swore by the sainted warrior who symbolizes Slavic hatred of the Teuton intruder, and whose name graces the great cathedral in Sofia: Alexander Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod.

THE PATRIOTIC WAR

I. PRELUDE TO COMBAT

THE 12TH DAY of November, 1940, was wet and gloomy in Berlin as Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Sovnarkom and Commissar for Foreign Affairs, arrived in the Nazi capital, accompanied by 30 officials and experts. He remained three days and spent six hours in all conferring with Hitler. He saw Göring, Göbbels, Hess, Ley and Keitel. He was wined and dined by Ribbentrop on the Wilhelmstrasse, and dined and wined his host at the Soviet Embassy, amid a small scale raid by the R.A.F. For the first time in seven years Berliners heard *The International* and saw the Red Flag. From the frontier, on his way home, Molotov wired thanks to the Führer for his "cordial reception" and to Ribbentrop "for the generous and warm reception accorded me and my colleagues." Polite and vague communiqués spoke of "an atmosphere of mutual trust" and "agreement on all questions."

In fact the diplomatic atmosphere resembled the weather. Molotov's visit, in return for Ribbentrop's two visits to Moscow in September, 1939, was more than a courtesy call. It revealed to the participants that Europe was too small for the indefinite co-existence of the Nazi Reich and the USSR. Said Hitler later (October 3, 1941): "In August and September, 1940, one thing was becoming clear. A decision in the West with England which would have contained the whole German *Luftwaffe* was no longer possible, for in my rear there stood a State which was getting ready to proceed against me at such a moment."

In the game of *Realpolitik*, diplomacy gives way to violence when irreconcilable demands are made, when neither side will

yield, and when both sides have exhausted the possibilities of enhancing their relative fighting capacity through bargaining over components of power deemed decisive in a future test of force. In the carefully disguised contest of 1939-41 in which Berlin and Moscow sought to prepare for war against one another, the stakes of diplomacy were in the first instance specific issues of control over intermediate territories, and in the last instance general issues of national life or death in a struggle for supremacy admitting of no compromise.

The successful defense of Britain in the fall of 1940 spelled salvation for both of the great neutrals. Yet Triplice threats against America and Russia were, paradoxically, a product of British resistance. So long as a victor's peace with Britain seemed to be possible, Hitler was contemptuous of Washington and conciliatory toward Moscow—since both would be helpless if Britain fell. On July 19, 1940, Der Führer had told his Reichstag that his conscience impelled him "to appeal to reason and common sense" among Britons. They must not hope for a German-Soviet estrangement. Berlin had no designs on the Ukraine, Rumania or Turkey. "All hope of fresh tension between Germany and Russia is futile."

Once it was clear, however, that Britain could neither be invaded nor induced to make peace, the Nazi leaders sought to frighten America out of further intervention and moved their forces to the southeast as a means of threatening British power in the Mediterranean and at the same time checkmating Muscovy. It was this maneuver which brought Molotov to Berlin. *Pravda* had described the Tripartite Pact of September 27 as a "further aggravation of the war and an expansion of its realm." Six weeks before Molotov's visit the *Wehrmacht* had overrun Rumania. On October 14 Tass had announced that foreign reports of Moscow having been fully informed of German plans "did not correspond to the facts." Berlin retorted that the Tass denial was perhaps true "only with regard to certain details." The Narkomindel had already demanded Soviet participation in the new Danube Commission. London protested. Berlin acquiesced. But when Moscow asked exclusive Soviet-Rumanian control of the Danube Delta, Berlin evaded the issue in protracted negotiations. The infiltration of Nazi troops into Finland, coupled with German designs on Bulgaria and Mussolini's ill-fated attack on Greece

(October 28), sharpened the latent conflict which came to a head in the Berlin parleys of November 12-14, 1940.

According to Ribbentrop and Hitler (June 22, 1941) Molotov asked whether the German guarantee of Rumania was directed against the USSR. He further demanded cessation of Nazi support of Finland and Berlin's assent to a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual aid pact and to Soviet acquisition of bases on the Straits. The latter allegation, said Solomon Losovsky, was "as much like truth as Göbbels is like Apollo." Moscow has never revealed the scope of the Berlin negotiations, except to say (*Pravda*, April 20, 1941) that Hitler had invited Soviet adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Molotov declined to join Berlin, Rome and Tokyo in threatening Britain and America. He in turn asked Hitler to acquiesce in a pact of mutual assistance between Sofia and Moscow. The Führer refused. Molotov likewise sought evacuation of German troops from Rumania and Finland and received no satisfaction. Hitler later complained of "continually renewed extortions."

The result was deadlock. Neither side was yet prepared to use force to make good its demands. Both sides were now convinced that an ultimate test of force was unavoidable. The Kremlin's objective henceforth was to postpone the test as long as possible in the belief that the USSR would grow stronger with time and would be more certain of allies. The Wilhelmstrasse's objective, based on the same assumption, was to precipitate war as soon as possible under conditions as favorable as possible to the Axis cause. The latter requirement presupposed Nazi control of the Balkans as a safeguard to the German southern flank.

The clash of Teuton and Slav in Balkania had precipitated World War I. The same clash, transferred to the Vistula, had precipitated World War II. In the winter and spring of 1940-41 the Balkans were again the arena of a veiled battle of will and wits between the Slavic colossus and the *Furor Teutonicus*. As soon as Ribbentrop was certain that Moscow desired to protect Bulgaria, he sought to secure Sofia's adherence to the Triplice Pact, offering a corridor to the Aegean as bait. King Boris arrived in Berlin three days after Molotov's departure. But under Soviet pressure, with the Bulgarian Communist Party now adopting a completely anti-German line, the King declined "for the present," though agreeing to introduce anti-Semitic legislation and to admit German advisers. Upon returning to his capital,

Boris was offered a Soviet guarantee of Bulgaria's borders by Arcadi Sobolev, special emissary of the Narkomindel. He refused it, but promised "neutrality" as between Berlin and Moscow.

Hitler now summoned Premier Paul Teleki to make Hungary a signatory of the Triplice (November 20). Antonescu followed suit for Rumania on November 23, with Slovakia adhering on the following day. Axis control of Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey would complete the semi-encirclement of southern Russia and furnish a highway for a blow at Britain in the Near East. Moscow limited its protest to a Tass communiqué of November 23: the story in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* that Hungary had joined the Triplice with the consent and even approval of the USSR "does not correspond to fact."

Early in January Bulgarian Premier Bogdan Philov conferred with Ribbentrop in Vienna. On January 12 a Tass communiqué obliquely blamed Berlin for not "consulting" Moscow under the 1939 accord and denied foreign reports that the USSR had consented to an alleged movement of German troops into Bulgaria: "If German troops are in Bulgaria, and if they are continuing to enter the country, this has taken place without the prior knowledge or consent of the USSR, inasmuch as Germany has never broached to the USSR the question of either garrisoning such troops in Bulgaria or of their passage through the country. The Bulgarian Government has never discussed with the USSR the question of allowing German troops to pass through Bulgaria and hence could not have received any kind of reply from the USSR."

Sofia and Berlin professed innocence. Bulgarian Communists renewed their demands for a pact with Moscow. Hitler and his aides correctly concluded that Sofia would never sign such a pact against the German veto, and that in the absence of a pact Moscow would not intervene on Bulgaria's behalf. Nazi agents swarmed into the country. When Sofia signed a non-aggression pact with Ankara on February 17, to insure Turkish passivity when the *Wehrmacht* should move, Tass announced that a Swiss report of Soviet participation in the negotiations "does not correspond to fact." But diplomacy conducted through news agencies and unsupported by force is powerless. On March 1, 1941, Premier Philov signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna. German troops at once occupied Bulgaria.

This *coup* provoked a formal and public protest from the

Narkomindel—addressed however, not to Berlin but to Sofia. On March 3 Moscow declared that Bulgaria's admission of German troops "does not lead to the consolidation of peace but to the extension of the scope of the war and to Bulgaria's becoming involved in it. In view of this the Soviet Government, true to its policy of peace, cannot render any support to the Bulgarian Government in the application of its present policy." Two days later London severed diplomatic relations with Sofia. Moscow kept its envoy in the Bulgar capital but had no means, short of war, of halting the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*. Ambassador Dekanozov, however, was instructed to make a non-public protest to Ribbentrop who later asserted that Moscow had warned Berlin against any occupation of Bulgaria or the Straits. Both were described as within the "security zone" of the USSR, which could not remain a "passive spectator" of threatening events.

The considerations which led the Kremlin to acquiesce, however reluctantly, in German control of Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria made it impossible for Moscow to save Yugoslavia and Greece. The Hitlerite Juggernaut could be stopped only by superior force. Soviet force, even if combined with British and American force, was still inadequate. The USSR, moreover, had little bargaining power because of its policy of avoiding any open use of force unless it should be attacked. The United States pursued a similar course, albeit modified by major departures from technical neutrality through extensive aid to Britain, particularly after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941. Both policies precluded any "preventive war" and left the initiative to the enemy.

Yugoslavia and Turkey became focal points of the first clear instance of Anglo-American-Soviet parallel action. Berlin demanded Belgrade's adherence to the Axis in mid-February. Belgrade, encouraged to resist by London, Washington and Moscow, played for time and suggested non-aggression pacts with both Germany and the USSR. On March 21, however, the Yugoslav Cabinet yielded to a Nazi ultimatum and decided to sign the Tripartite Pact, a ceremony performed in Vienna on the next day. But on the 27th General Dusan Simovich arrested Prince Regent Paul and the Ministers and became head of a new anti-Axis Cabinet under the youthful King Peter. On April 5, as German troops prepared to strike, Minister Gavrilovich and Molotov, in Stalin's

presence, signed in Moscow a five year Soviet-Jugoslav non-aggression pact, immediately effective and pledging mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the signatories and "friendly relations" should either be attacked by a third Power. Berlin replied at once to this open defi. At dawn of April 6 the *Wehrmacht* invaded the South Slav Kingdom while Ribbentrop explained that "England is about to commit another crime against Europe."

The new Blitz, directed by General Sigmund List, was as terrifying as its predecessors. Hungary was forced to join. Premier Paul Teleki committed suicide on April 3. His successor, Ladislaus de Bardossy, was quite willing to help destroy the State with which Budapest had solemnly concluded a non-aggression pact in December. From Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, the invaders descended upon their helpless victims. On the first day the *Luftwaffe* laid Belgrade in ruins and the Panzer divisions reached the Aegean through Thrace. Jugoslavia's capital fell on the 13th. Its army surrendered on the 17th. Two days later the *Hakenkreuz* was flying over Mt. Olympus. Athens fell on April 27th. Airborne troops took Crete. At a cost of 2,559 killed and 5,800 wounded, the *Wehrmacht* struck down Jugoslavia and Greece in three weeks, taking 344,000 Yugoslav prisoners, 218,000 Greeks and 11,000 Britishers. Just as the Reich in 1939-40 had been unable to prevent Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland and the Baltic, so the USSR in 1941 was unable to prevent Nazi conquest of the Balkans.

To foreign reports that Moscow had congratulated the leaders of the Belgrade putsch of March 27, David Zaslavsky replied in *Pravda* (April 1) that the story was "a chemically pure lie," although "the Yugoslav people doubtless have a glorious past and are deserving of congratulations." In the midst of the Blitz, *Red Star* (April 10) declared that the Soviet-Jugoslav pact was "all the more valuable under the new conditions because the Soviet Union always fulfills its international pledges." On behalf of the Narkomindel, Vyshinsky told the Hungarian Minister on April 12 that the Soviet Government "cannot approve" Budapest's policy. "A particularly bad impression is produced upon the Soviet Government by the fact that Hungary began a war against Jugoslavia only four months after she had concluded a pact of eternal friendship."

Jugoslavia and Greece, however, were beyond saving. Soviet intervention would have precipitated hostilities with Germany without preventing the Nazi conquest of Belgrade and Athens. The *Wehrmacht*, confronted by the Red Army in April instead of June, would doubtless have been hampered by the disposition of its forces and would not have been able to sweep into Russia with the irresistible power at its disposal in the summer. Anglo-American opinion would have been favorably impressed by a Soviet crusade against Hitler on behalf of Jugoslavia and Greece. But the Soviet public, like the American public, had been systematically conditioned to avoid conflicts desired (in Stalin's phrase) "by war-mongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." The Soviet citizenry would have responded poorly to a war waged against one bourgeois State invading another. This consideration, generally ignored by foreign commentators but nevertheless decisive in the thinking of the Politburo, required peace with Hitler so long as Hitler refrained from attacking the USSR, even though Hitler should use the "peace" to prepare to attack the USSR.

Soviet diplomacy was more successful in keeping Turkey out of the clutches of the Axis, though in Ankara, as elsewhere, the Narkomindel suffered a final defeat which embittered relations for years thereafter. On the eve of the Balkan Blitz, Franz von Papen's efforts to woo Ankara to the Reich were countered by Anthony Eden, Sir Stafford Cripps, Colonel William J. Donovan, Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov and the Yugoslav and Greek envoys, while Molotov negotiated with the Turkish Minister in Moscow. On March 25, 1941, at Turkey's request, the Narkomindel announced that:

In view of rumors spread in the foreign press to the effect that, should Turkey be forced to become involved in war, the USSR would seek to take advantage of Turkey's difficulties and attack her, and in answer to a number of inquiries, the Soviet Government has informed the Government of Turkey that: (1) such rumors do not correspond to the position of the USSR; (2) if Turkey should actually be attacked and be forced to defend her territory, she can count, on the basis of the non-aggression agreement concluded between Turkey and the USSR, on the fullest understanding and neutrality of the USSR.

Ankara expressed gratitude and extended a reciprocal pledge. Turkey refused to come to the military aid of Greece and Yugoslavia. The USSR refused any pledge to come to the aid of Turkey. But Ankara and Moscow were benevolently neutral toward the victims of the Axis and equally concerned with halting German aggression and yet avoiding war with Germany. In quest of peace and in fear of threats, Turkey concluded a new trade agreement with the Reich on April 25 and toyed with German invitations to join the "New Order" and accept German "protection." Ankara, still dubiously consistent toward its pact with Britain and consistently dubious toward the USSR, contented itself with signing a non-aggression and neutrality pact with Berlin on June 17, 1941. Von Papen had failed to secure a Turkish alliance, but had assured Turkish neutrality in the Nazi war on Britain and in the impending Nazi assault on the USSR. Moscow had already secured assurance against Turkish entrance into the war on the Axis side, but regarded the Ankara-Berlin pact as a hostile gesture. In the German-Soviet war, as in the Anglo-German war, Turkey remained neutral, with many Turkish leaders hoping that Germany would defeat Russia and that Britain would defeat Germany. Such fatuous hopes were ill-calculated to promote Soviet-Turkish cordiality.

Moscow's only notable diplomatic victory in the last spring of precarious peace was the Soviet-Japanese pact of April 13, 1941, by which Nippon and the USSR pledged themselves for a five-year period to neutrality in any war involving the other. The Narkomindel had long sought a non-aggression pact with Tokyo but had received no encouragement until July, 1940. During the wasted years between Mukden and Munich the broad design for power in the Far East resembled its counterpart in the West. London and Washington had spurned Soviet proposals for joint action against aggression in the expectation that the USSR would become the ultimate target of Japanese attack. On its face, Moscow's pact with Tokyo of 1941 accomplished the same purpose in the Far East as the pact with Berlin of 1939 had achieved in Europe. With Hitler and Hirohito girding their loins for war against Britain and America, each Caesar sought to protect his rear by peace pacts with the Kremlin. The Soviet leaders in turn saw much to gain and little to lose by a course of armed neutrality

while the Fascist and democratic blocs fought one another for mastery of the other five-sixths of the globe.

But the actual calculations of the parties were complex and obscure. The Triplice diplomats were entangled in a maze of cross purposes and confusions. Exactly four months after Molotov arrived in Berlin, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka left Tokyo on a long journey across two continents. After leaving gifts in Moscow for Molotov and Stalin, he conferred briefly in the Axis capitals with Führer, Duce and Pope. No new accords were announced. On his return journey he stopped once more in Moscow. On Easter Sunday, after ten days of negotiations, he signed his memorable pact, with an appended declaration pledging mutual respect for the frontiers of Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia.* The satisfaction of both sides found expression in elaborate wining and dining, eloquent professions of friendship,

***A NEUTRALITY PACT BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND JAPAN.**

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, decided to conclude a pact on neutrality, for the purpose of which they appointed as their representatives:

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

For His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the USSR; and Lieut. Gen. Ju San Min, Cavalier of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, First Class, Cavalier of the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class, and the Order of the Golden Kite, Fourth Class.

Who, after the exchange of their credentials, which were found in due and proper form, agreed on the following:

1. Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.

2. Should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

3. The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both contracting parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the contracting parties denounces the pact one year before expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

4. The present pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokyo also as soon as possible.

In confirmation whereof the above-named representatives signed the present pact in two copies, drawn up in the Russian and Japanese languages, and affixed thereto their seals.

and a hilarious farewell at Yaroslavsky Station, with much joking and backslapping among Stalin, Matsuoka and Molotov.

Not for another three years did Moscow reveal how hard a bargain it had driven. On March 30, 1944, a Soviet-Japanese protocol was signed for the liquidation of Japanese coal and oil concessions on Northern Sakhalin—as a condition for the renewal for five years of restricted Japanese fishing rights off the Siberian coast. A Soviet statement disclosed for the first time the secret terms of 1941:

Simultaneously with the signing on April 13, 1941, of the neutrality pact the then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Matsuoka, handed the Soviet Government a written undertaking containing a commitment to solve in a few months the question of the liquidation of the concessions in Northern Sakhalin. This undertaking was confirmed by Mr. Matsuoka May 31, 1941, by a new declaration handed the Soviet Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Tatekawa. At the same time the Japanese undertook to solve the question of the liquidation of the concessions not later than within six months from the day of the signature of the neutrality pact. This commitment was not carried out by the Japanese. Only as the result of negotiations concluded March 30 were the Soviet-Japanese agreements signed on the liquidation of Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin and on the transfer to the Soviet Union of the whole property of the concessions on the conditions stipulated in the agreement. Thus, as the result of the present agreement, Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin are being liquidated 26 years before the expiration of the terms of the concessions agreements.¹

Done in Moscow April 13, 1941, which corresponds to the 13th Day of the Fourth Month of the 16th Year of Showa.

Signed by:

MOLOTOV,
YOSUKE MATSUOKA,
YOSHITSUGU TATEKAWA.

FRONTIER DECLARATION

In conformity with the spirit of the neutrality pact concluded April 13, 1941, between the USSR and Japan, the Governments of the USSR and Japan, in the interests of ensuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare that the USSR pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Moscow, April 13, 1941.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the USSR by:
On behalf of the Government of Japan by:

MOLOTOV.
YOSUKE MATSUOKA,
YOSHITSUGU TATEKAWA.

In the April negotiations of 1941 Matsuoka was plainly the beggar and Molotov the chooser. Why did Matsuoka pay so high a price for a pact which in earlier years Tokyo could have had for the asking? Tokyo seemingly gained nothing. The USSR would not have attacked Japan nor come to the aid of Britain and America against Japan save in self-defense. Moscow refused, moreover, to discontinue its aid to China. Tokyo promised to surrender valuable economic assets as a means of persuading Moscow to accept its promise not to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler had paid an even higher price, though largely at the expense of others, for his pact of 1939. In both cases the long-run calculus was that the USSR could be beaten and conquered after the crushing of American, British and Chinese power in Asia and of Anglo-French power in Europe.

Each aggressor was desperately anxious in the short run to insure peace with Moscow at almost any cost in order to be free to attack the democracies. If the Anti-Comintern pact of 1936 was dust thrown into the eyes of the Western appeasers, the Triplice pact of 1940 was an open announcement of a Nazi-Nipponese program of assaulting Britain and the United States. After 1939 Japanese policy was irrevocably oriented toward this adventure. Berlin and Rome hailed the Matsuoka-Molotov pact as a diplomatic victory over the Atlantic Powers and hinted that they had urged and even inspired its signature. But this pretense, echoed humorously by *Pravda*, was an effort to make the best of a bad bargain.

The fly in the ointment is the fact that the Nazi warlords had already reached their secret decision to attack the USSR when the Soviet-Japanese pact was signed. When the invasion was launched two months later, it provoked a Cabinet crisis in Tokyo leading to Matsuoka's resignation. "Now that I am a free man," he observed, "I shall devote myself to reading." That Hitler should invade the USSR before Britain had been beaten was no part of Hirohito's dream. Japanese designs against the democracies called for a truce with the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia. That Japan in advance should contract itself out of participation in Hitler's assault on Muscovy was no part of the Nazi purpose. Matsuoka, on learning of the plans of the Axis leaders, deemed them a mistake in view of his knowledge of the Red Army, and

hastened to dissociate Japan from the enterprise by paying the Kremlin's price for a peace pact.

Moscow was the gainer. The scrap of paper, to be sure, would have no more value in the eyes of Tokyo than had the earlier Nazi pact in the eyes of Berlin if the militarists should conclude that the Soviet power could be struck down. But they knew better, and were committed to the belief, at the moment more plausible, that America and Britain could be driven out of Asia and the Western Pacific. The pact therefore symbolized a definite assurance that the USSR would not be attacked from the east whatever Hitler might do in the west. The cream of the jest lay in the price which the Narkomindel was able to exact and in the circumstance that Berlin was obliged to acclaim as a victory an accord which reflected German-Japanese disunity and foreshadowed defeat.²

2. AXIS ASSAULT

On the sixth day of May, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued three decrees which were at once broadcast. The first relieved Molotov of his duties as Chairman of the Sovnarkom "in view of his repeated statements that it is difficult for him to fulfill the duties of Chairman simultaneously with the duties of Commissar of Foreign Affairs." The second appointed Josef Vissarionovich Stalin as Chairman (i.e., Premier) of the Sovnarkom. The third named Molotov Vice-Chairman.

This shuffle of posts provoked the most diverse interpretations abroad, ranging from the view that Stalin was preparing for war with Hitler to the opinion, expressed by Kerensky, that he was preparing to join Germany in war against Britain. It actually represented a fusion of Party and State at the highest level in anticipation of a final crisis in Nazi-Soviet relations. Apart from making economic and military preparations for the ordeal to come, a major objective of the Politburo was so to arrange matters that the inevitable war would clearly take the form of Nazi aggression. The strategic risks of such a course were overbalanced by its diplomatic and psychological advantages. Soviet soldiers and civilians would fight like robots if ordered to attack the Reich but would fight like heroes against Nazi invasion. The

Kremlin's purposes were to postpone the clash, explore all avenues for continuing the truce, keep its own record clear by gestures of loyalty to the Nazi-Soviet pact, and prepare for all eventualities. These goals give logical consistency to Moscow's apparently vacillating policies during the last spring of peace.

Since no diplomatic correspondence has as yet been published regarding the exchanges between Berlin and Moscow during these months, any effort to depict demands and proposals on either side is speculative. It is clear that the Narkomindel, beginning in January, protested repeatedly at violations of Soviet territory by German military planes. Between March 27 and April 19, 80 such instances occurred, and between April 19 and the eve of war, 180 (*Pravda*, June 29, 1941). As for German "demands," no records are available. Hitler's objective was not bargaining but annihilation. The making of demands could serve this purpose only insofar as acceptance would weaken Soviet power to resist the *Wehrmacht*. But it was precisely such demands that Moscow would refuse to consider. According to some dispensers of hypotheses, Stalin assumed the Premiership because he had received a secret ultimatum demanding Soviet adherence to the Tripartite pact by May 1.³ Schulenburg subsequently suggested (again according to rumor) that Moscow accept German "policing" of the Ukraine. *Pravda* (May 25) declared that a Berlin report in the Finnish paper *Sanomat* regarding a possible treaty for a German leasehold on the Ukraine was "political nonsense and an idiotic lie."

German demands for demobilization of the Red Army, for joint control of the Soviet oil industry, for increased Soviet exports, for Ukrainian "autonomy," for the restoration of Bessarabia, for disarmament, "guarantees," etc. all figure in the accounts of the tellers of tales. In the end Hitler and Ribbentrop, in lengthy explanations of the decision to attack the USSR, spoke vaguely of Soviet "threats," "disloyalty," alleged border violations, support of Yugoslavia, collusion with Britain and the United States, etc. They made no mention of specific demands presented or rejected by either side in 1941. Said Molotov: "The German Government had made no demands upon the Soviet Union." In the absence of documentary evidence to the contrary, this statement must stand.

Nazi diplomacy was less concerned with wresting concessions

from Moscow than with efforts to neutralize Britain. This story likewise is still shrouded in secrecy. The Nazi warlords, like Napoleon I, having failed to conquer Britain before attacking Russia, decided to conquer Russia before attacking Britain, thereby demonstrating anew the truth of the Hegelian dictum that the only lesson which history teaches is that history teaches no lessons. Hitler's original hopes (cf. *Mein Kampf*) of an alliance with Britain against the USSR had foundered. His peace offers of 1940 had also foundered. Some of his advisers were convinced that war with Russia would be folly unless peace could first be concluded with Britain in the name of anti-Bolshevism. With Russia conquered, Britain would be as helpless before the Nazi Behemoth as Russia would have been had Britain succumbed. In April Rudolf Hess, Nazi No. 2, visited Franco, perhaps in a vain effort to contact arch-appeaser, Sir Samuel Hoare. On May 10, 1941, Hess bailed out of a Messerschmitt 110 over the estate of the Duke of Hamilton in Scotland. He bore a peace offer from Der Führer, probably proposing a German "guarantee" of the British Empire in return for British acquiescence in German annexation of the Ukraine and the Caucasus, Japanese annexation of much of Siberia, and the partition of the remnant of Russia into separate States. But when it became clear that Hess had been tricked and trapped by the British Intelligence Service, Hitler declared him "deranged." On November 6, 1941, Stalin asserted that "the notorious Hess was dispatched to Britain by the German Fascists in order to persuade British politicians to join in a general crusade against the USSR. . . . The Germans miscalculated."

The questions of when the Nazi leaders reached their decision to invade the Soviet Union and when the Soviet leaders first learned of the enemy's plan are still in dispute. Molotov's visit to Berlin marked the end of an unbeautiful friendship. The rulers of the Reich doubtless began to prepare the great crusade immediately thereafter. The Kremlin did not long remain in doubt of things to come. In Prague and Western Poland, Alfred Rosenberg, top Nazi protector of civilization against Bolshevism, quietly resumed his political and propagandistic preparations in November. By December the German General Staff, at Hitler's orders, was working on campaign plans. Early in January Sumner Welles received information, "detailed and from sources which were unquestionably authentic," proving that Hitler and

his General Staff had decided upon an invasion of the USSR in the spring. With the approval of Roosevelt and Hull, he informed Ambassador Oumansky who, according to Welles, "turned very white," expressed gratitude and promised to inform Moscow.⁴ By March the Nazi decision was leaking through a dozen channels, some of them mentioning the exact date of the invasion. Such leaks were "calculated" and could well have been part of a familiar Nazi technique, designed to conceal plans for an invasion of Britain or the Near East—or even of the USSR, since the Nazi reputation for mendacity was by now so well established that all stories from Berlin were taken to mean the opposite of what they said. For once, however, the Nazi tipsters were telling the truth.

Secrecy was impossible with respect to the vast movement of millions of troops into battle positions on both sides of the long frontier. This ponderous massing of the hosts furnished the occasion for a protracted game of verbal thrust-and-parry. At the end of April *Pravda* reported, without comment, that 12,000 German troops had landed with tanks and guns in southwestern Finland, within 50 miles of Hanko. Berlin and Helsinki at once reduced the figure to 1,300, all without arms and, of course, merely in transit to Norway. The Moscow military parade on May Day was attended by Ambassador von Schulenburg, fresh from consultations in Berlin. Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko, Commissar of Defense, declared that "the Red Army must keep its powder dry and be in constant mobilization and preparedness" against "capitalist encirclement" and "the tricks of our foreign enemies." A week later Tass elaborately denied reports of Soviet troop movements along the Western border. "No concentrations of large military forces upon the western frontiers of the USSR is taking place or is contemplated." The only recent shift was that of one division: from Irkutsk to Novosibirsk! On May 17, however, the Narkomindel informed the diplomatic corps that travel in the western border zone was henceforth forbidden.

By June 7, when Sir Stafford Cripps was recalled to London for consultation, it was public knowledge that the *Wehrmacht* had concentrated at least 130 divisions in Poland and Rumania and that the total mobilization of the Rumanian Army had been ordered on the 5th. Finnish preparations were equally open. On June 18 London proclaimed a blockade of Finland as enemy-

controlled territory. Two days later Helsinki ordered general mobilization. Soviet preparations were well advanced by early June, but without fanfare and indeed to the tune of denials. By mid-June some 165 German and allied divisions were massed near the frontier, with perhaps 140 more in rear areas, comprising in all over 4,000,000 troops which, in both numbers and deadly weapons, constituted the most formidable army of invasion of all time. They were faced by a Red Army not yet fully mobilized and maintaining not more than 75 divisions on the frontiers in accordance with the strategy of "defense in depth"—despite *Izvestia's* boast (June 20) that "the enemy will never step across the forbidden boundary."

Meanwhile the Soviet leaders, still seeking to defer the showdown by every means compatible with their own preparations for war, made various gestures of "friendship" toward the Reich. In commercial relations "business as usual" continued, save for a ban imposed in March on transit traffic in arms between Germany and Japan. New Soviet trade agreements were signed with Finland (June 28, 1940), Hungary (September 3), Denmark (September 18), Slovakia (December 6), Germany (January 10, 1941), Rumania (February 26) and Bulgaria (April 4), in each case with Nazi agents or their puppets.⁵ Foreign rumors of friction continued to be denied in the Soviet press. On May 9 the Narkomindel informed the Ministers of Yugoslavia, Belgium and Norway that their diplomatic status could no longer be recognized. On the 12th Molotov accepted a proposal from Rashid Ali Beg Gailani, pro-Axis Premier of Iraq, for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Ambassador Vinogradov in Ankara exchanged notes to this effect with the Iraq Minister on the 16th. On June 3 the Greek Minister was informed that his country's "loss of sovereignty" precluded continued Soviet recognition. These steps aroused resentment in the Atlantic democracies. But they cost Moscow nothing in a strategic sense and prevented Berlin from contending that the USSR was refusing to recognize the "New Order."

"German as well as Soviet diplomacy," says Max Werner rightly, "was based on dissimulation in this period. Each side knew the real intentions of its partner and enemy-to-be. Each knew that its partner realized its true intentions, and each side tried to pretend that it did not know of its partner's knowledge."⁶

As late as early June both the Nazi and Soviet press were still writing about "excellent relations" and Moscow was expelling foreign journalists (e.g., John Scott) who were giving an anti-German interpretation to Soviet policies. The most striking of the various Tass communiqués designed to keep the record straight was a Narkomindel statement of June 13, full of innuendos and double talk.*

This statement, ignored by Berlin, meant in ordinary language: the USSR would like to know what proposals Germany might make as a basis of continued peace; the USSR knows of German

* Even before the arrival in London of the British Ambassador to the USSR, Cripps, and particularly after his arrival, the British and, in general, the foreign press began to disseminate rumors about the "proximity of war between the USSR and Germany." According to these rumors:

First. Germany allegedly presented to the USSR claims of a territorial and economic nature, and negotiations are now under way between Germany and the USSR concerning the conclusion of a new, closer agreement between them.

Second. The USSR allegedly rejected these claims in consequence of which Germany began concentrating her troops on the borders of the USSR for the purpose of attacking the USSR.

Third. The Soviet Union, on its part, has allegedly begun intensive preparations for war with Germany and is concentrating troops at the latter's borders.

Despite the obviously nonsensical character of these rumors, responsible Moscow quarters still found it necessary, in view of the rumors, to authorize Tass to state that these rumors constitute clumsily concocted propaganda of forces hostile to the USSR and to Germany and interested in the further extension and unleashing of war.

Tass declares that:

First. Germany did not present any claims to the USSR and does not propose any new, clear agreement, in view of which no negotiations on this subject could have taken place.

Second. According to information at the disposal of the USSR, Germany is abiding by the provisions of the Soviet-German Pact of Non-Aggression as steadfastly as is the Soviet Union, in view of which, in the opinion of Soviet quarters, rumors about Germany's intention to disrupt the pact and to undertake an attack upon the USSR are devoid of any foundation, whereas the dispatching of German troops relieved from operations in the Balkans to the eastern and northeastern districts of Germany, which is now taking place, is connected, it should be assumed, with other motives having no bearing on Soviet-German relations.

Third. The USSR, as follows from its peace policy, has abided and intends to abide by the provisions of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, in view of which rumors to the effect that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are false and provocational.

Fourth. The summer-camp drill of Red Army reservists now being held, and forthcoming maneuvers, have no purpose other than the training of reservists and the checking of the work of railroad organizations, which is carried out every year as is well known, in view of which to present these measures of the Red Army as inimical to Germany is, to say the least, absurd.

troop concentrations; the USSR is preparing for war; but the USSR will keep the peace until Germany breaks it. On June 28 Solomon Lozovsky, Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, told the foreign press that "this was done in order to elicit from Germany her precise attitude. Since the Nazi press and that of the satellite countries did not publish the Tass statement, it was a clear indication that Hitler did not mean and did not want to observe the Pact. That cleared the air and showed Germany's innovation in international law—namely, that the object of a non-aggression pact is the careful preparation of aggression."

On June 13 the German Embassy in Moscow invited a small audience to view the films of the Nazi Blitz in the Balkans. This method of intimidation via cinema had been used in Copenhagen, Oslo, The Hague, Bucharest and Belgrade, in each case a few days before the arrival of the *Luftwaffe* and the Panzer divisions. Moscow declined to be intimidated. Some days later Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, Krushchev, Beria and Malenkov ostentatiously attended a performance of a modern comedy, *On the Steppes of the Ukraine*. . . . On June 20, by coincidence, Soviet archeologists in Samarkand opened the marble sarcophagus and the ebony coffin containing the bones of Tamerlane, builder of pyramids of skulls and descendant through six generations of Jenghis Khan. From the tomb a ghost marched forth, soon to redden the Russian rivers with blood. But the most frightful massacres of the Mongols were trivial beside the deeds of insane violence which the Nazi hordes were about to inflict upon the Soviet peoples.

At 4 a.m., Sunday, June 22 (exactly 129 years, minus a day, since Bonaparte had crossed the Niemen at the head of the Grand Army), Ribbentrop summoned Dekanozov to the Wilhelmstrasse to inform him that Germany was at war with the USSR. At 5:30 Schulenburg delivered a declaration of war to Molotov's office. The *Luftwaffe* was already bombing Soviet airdromes while thousands of Nazi tanks clanked and thundered across the frontier. Ribbentrop's declaration, broadcast to the world, was a lengthy document but revealed nothing of significance save Nazi determination to destroy the Soviet Union. Hitler's long proclamation, read by Göbbels, sounded familiar themes:

Weighted down with heavy cares, condemned to months' long silence, the hour has now come when at last I can speak freely. . . . Jews and democrats, Bolshevists and reactionaries have the sole aim of

inhibiting the establishment of the new German peoples' State and plunging the Reich anew into impotence and misery. For over ten years Jewish Bolshevik rulers have been endeavoring from Moscow to set not only Germany but all Europe aflame. This has brought us to the hour when it is necessary for us to take steps against this plot devised by the Jewish Anglo-Saxon war-mongers and equally the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center. . . . May God help us, especially in this fight!

Molotov replied before noon in a broadcast to the Soviet citizenry:

The Soviet Government and its head, Comrade Stalin, have authorized me to make the following statement:

Today at 4 a.m., without any claims having been presented to the Soviet Union, without a declaration of war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders at many points and bombed from their airplanes our cities, Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, killing and wounding over 200 persons. There were also enemy air raids and artillery shelling from Rumanian and Finnish territory.

This unheard of attack upon our country is perfidy unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was perpetrated despite the fact that a treaty of non-aggression had been signed between the USSR and Germany and that the Soviet Government most faithfully abided by all provisions of this treaty. The attack upon our country was perpetrated despite the fact that during the entire period of operation of this treaty the German Government could not find grounds for a single complaint against the USSR as regards observance of this treaty. Entire responsibility for this predatory attack upon the Soviet Union falls fully and completely upon the German Fascist rulers. . . .

This war has been forced upon us not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist rulers of Germany who have enslaved Frenchmen, Czechs, Poles, Serbians, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other nations. . . .

This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with an attack of an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon's invasion of Russia our people's reply was War for the Fatherland, and Napoleon suffered defeat and met his doom. It will be the same with Hitler, who in his arrogance has proclaimed a new crusade against our country. The Red Army and our whole people will again wage victorious War for the Fatherland, for our country, for honor, for liberty. . . .

The Government calls upon you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally still more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet Government, around our great leader and comrade, Stalin. Ours is a righteous cause. The enemy shall be defeated, victory will be ours.

Italy, Slovakia and Rumania declared war later in the day, Finland on the 25th and Hungary on the 27th. Denmark severed relations with Moscow on the 26th and Vichy on the 28th. Both encouraged the recruitment of "volunteers" to join the *Wehrmacht* against the USSR, as did Sweden, whose leaders permitted German troop movements from Norway to Finland in order, said Stockholm, to "preserve neutrality." Franco, without declaring war, at once sent Spanish troops to aid the anti-Bolshevik crusade.

The assault was thus launched not by Germany but by all of Fascist Europe. At the outset the Soviet Union had a population of 200,000,000 as compared with Greater Germany's 120,000,000, though the larger proportion of youths among its citizens gave it 1,600,000 men in each average annual draft-age class as compared with the old Reich's 400,000. The Reich and its direct allies, however, contained 242,500,000 people, including occupied France and Spain, with almost 68,000,000 other conquered Europeans supplying food, manufactures and labor power for the German war machine. In steel production (1938) Germany produced 22,876,000 tons annually and German-controlled territories another 27,000,000 tons, compared to a Soviet output of 18,156,000 tons. The Nazi High Command enjoyed a 3:2 advantage over the Red Army in manpower and a 5:2 advantage in the machines of modern war. It controlled the largest and most heavily armed invasion host ever assembled, including the veteran divisions which had conquered all the Continent and beaten to pieces in weeks or days every other army that had opposed them.⁷

By every rational calculation of war potential, the Soviet Union was doomed to swift and complete defeat, regardless of what British or American policy might be. Defeat would have meant not only the enslavement of the Soviet peoples but the ultimate conquest of Britain and China and the reduction of America to helplessness before the unchallenged masters of Eurasia and Africa. This result could be averted only by a miracle of sacrifice,

heroism and military art. That it was averted, albeit at appalling cost, in the most fearful ordeal to which any major nation has ever been subjected, is the best testimony of the morale of the Soviet community and of the strength of its way of life.

3. THE RAMPARTS OF MOSCOW

That the USSR should have been assaulted on the first summer Sunday of 1941 by the most formidable world-conqueror of modern times, already in effective control of all the rest of Europe, suggests a verdict of bankruptcy on the Narkomindel's diplomacy since 1939. The role of *Tertius Gaudens* became impossible as soon as the stalemate between the Axis and the Atlantic democracies was broken by the fall of Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France and the Balkans before the Fascist Goliath. The mortal danger which Britain faced between June and June, 1940-41, is equally eloquent evidence of the bankruptcy of Tory diplomacy. Pearl Harbor was to demonstrate that the United States was similarly incapable of conducting its foreign affairs with wisdom and foresight. All three of the major anti-Fascist Powers were victims of their own unwillingness to act in unison in time. For the Soviet Union the price of error in death and destruction was to be more than ten times the combined price paid by Britishers and Americans.

In retrospect Moscow, like London and Washington, could have pursued a different course offering greater promise of salvation from the deadly danger which came to pass. The actual consequences of theoretical alternatives, however, cannot be demonstrated but only debated. The men of the Politburo were ever concerned with a potential danger which, if realized, would have been greater than the danger which they were at last obliged to face, and would probably have been fatal—i.e., war with the Reich and Japan, with the Atlantic democracies neutral. This was the meaning of Munich and the essence of the ever-renewed appeasers' hope which wrecked the Anglo-Soviet negotiations of 1939. This peril was avoided through the neutralization of Japan and the Anglo-Axis war which assured the Kremlin of one great ally.

But it may reasonably be argued that two opportunities for

safety, or at least for victory at lesser cost, were missed. A Soviet war against Germany in the early summer of 1940, allegedly urged upon Stalin by Shaposhnikov, would have brought into being the Anglo-Soviet alliance a full year in advance and would have caught the *Wehrmacht* with its Panzers down. Such a course, to be sure, would have retarded and perhaps prevented the awakening of America. It might have precipitated a Japanese attack on the USSR. It would assuredly have impressed the Soviet people as an unwarranted war of aggression which they would have supported without enthusiasm. The second lost opportunity was the chance of forging in secret an Anglo-Soviet alliance, with American support, in the winter and spring of 1941. The only factors forbidding such a course were the Party "line" and the Kremlin's illusory hopes of prolonging indefinitely the Nazi-Soviet truce through "correctness" and "appeasement." At bottom, however, Muscovite mistakes were attributable less to excessive confidence in Berlin and Tokyo than to excessive suspicion of London and Washington. In power politics spilt milk must be paid for with spilt blood. Whatever judgment may later be rendered when the full record of diplomacy is available, the USSR in June, 1941, was faced by the gravest (save one) of all possible perils to its existence.

For a few sickening hours in the flaming Sabbath dawn of June 22 Stalin and his colleagues must have feared that the gravest of all perils was still within the realm of possibility. Would Japan strike? Would Britain, with American approval, call off its war on the Reich? The warlords of Nippon were fortunately committed to a *Drang nach Suden*. Hitler's war threw them into consternation. After tentatively promising Ambassador Ott to break his promise of peace with Moscow, in exchange for control of all of Indo-China, Premier Konoye resigned in mid-July and then formed a new Cabinet, excluding Matsuoka. With other fish to fry, Tokyo remained neutral. Ott could get no more than a vague pledge of possible Japanese intervention when the *Wehrmacht* should reach the Volga. Soviet doubts of Anglo-American intentions were fully appreciated in London and Washington. Eden conferred with Maisky at noon of the day of invasion. Churchill went to the microphone Sunday evening with an address long since made ready for the occasion. In one of the greatest speeches

of our time, from the greatest contemporary master of English prose, the Prime Minister said:

At 4 o'clock this morning Hitler attacked and invaded Russia. All his usual formalities of perfidy were observed with scrupulous technique. . . .

All this was no surprise to me. In fact I gave clear and precise warnings to Stalin of what was coming. I gave him warnings as I have given warnings to others before. I can only hope that these warnings did not fall unheeded. . . .

Hitler is a monster of wickedness, insatiable in his lust for blood and plunder. Not content with having all Europe under his heel or else terrorized into various forms of abject submission, he must now carry his work of butchery and desolation among the vast multitudes of Russia and of Asia. The terrible military machine which we and the rest of the civilized world so foolishly, so supinely, so insensately allowed the Nazi gangsters to build up year by year from almost nothing; this machine cannot stand idle, lest it rust or fall to pieces. It must be in continual motion, grinding up human lives. . . .

So now this bloodthirsty guttersnipe must launch his mechanized armies upon new fields of slaughter, pillage and devastation. Poor as are the Russian peasants, workmen and soldiers, he must steal from them their daily bread. . . .

The Nazi regime is indistinguishable from the worst features of communism. . . .

No one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no words that I've spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding. . . .

We have but one aim and one single irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this nothing will turn us. Nothing. We will never parley; we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land; we shall fight him by sea; we shall fight him in the air, until, with God's help we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its people from his yoke.

Any man or State who fights against nazism will have our aid. Any man or State who marches with Hitler is our foe. . . . That is our policy and that is our declaration.

It follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and to the Russian people. We shall appeal to all our friends and Allies in every part of the world to take the same course and pursue it as we shall, faithfully and steadfastly to the end.

We have offered to the Government of Soviet Russia any technical

or economic assistance which is in our power and which is likely to be of service to them. We shall bomb Germany by day as well as by night in ever-increasing measure, casting upon them month by month a heavier discharge of bombs and making the German people taste and gulp each month a sharper dose of the miseries they have showered upon mankind. . . .

The Russian danger is therefore our danger and the danger of the United States just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe.

Let us learn the lessons already taught by such cruel experience. Let us redouble our exertions and strike with united strength while life and power remain.

In Washington President Roosevelt phoned Churchill and conferred with Lord Halifax and with Sumner Welles who drove into the capital from his Maryland estate, Oxon Manor. On Monday noon, after conferring again with Roosevelt at a White House breakfast, Welles read an announcement to the press:

If any further proof could conceivably be required of the real purposes and projects of the present leaders of Germany for world domination, it is now furnished by Hitler's treacherous attack upon Soviet Russia. . . . To the leaders of the German Reich sworn engagements to refrain from hostile acts against other countries—engagements regarded in a happier and in a civilized world as contracts to the faithful observance of which the honor of nations themselves was pledged—are but a symbol of deceit and constitute a dire warning on the part of Germany of hostile and murderous intent. . . . Freedom to worship God . . . has been denied to their peoples by both the Nazi and the Soviet Governments. To the people of the United States, this and other principles and doctrines of communistic dictatorship are as intolerable and as alien to their own beliefs as are the principles and doctrines of Nazi dictatorship. . . . But the immediate issue that presents itself to the people of the United States is whether the plan for universal conquest, for the cruel and brutal enslavement of all peoples, and for the ultimate destruction of the remaining free democracies, which Hitler is now desperately trying to carry out, is to be successfully halted and defeated. . . . In the opinion of this Government, any defense against Hitlerism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German leaders, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defense and security.

Neither America nor Britain spoke with one voice. Senator Robert A. Taft opined that "a victory for Communism would be far more dangerous to the United States than a victory for Fascism." Senator Wheeler urged that the United States should now "just let Joe Stalin and the other dictators fight it out." Herbert Hoover pontificated: "Collaboration between Britain and Russia makes the whole argument of joining the war to bring the Four Freedoms a gargantuan jest." The fellow-isolationists of *The Daily Worker* made a quick change. On June 22 reports of German-Soviet friction were "capitalist lies." The American people, declared the editors, "want none of this war." But in the issue of June 23 William Z. Foster and Robert Minor denounced the invasion of Russia as "an attack upon the peoples of the United States" which called for full American support of the war against Hitler.

Other victims of folly or malice persisted in their prejudices. Thus, Charles A. Lindbergh: "I would a hundred times rather see my country ally herself with England, or even with Germany with all her faults, than with the cruelty, the godlessness and the barbarism that exist in Soviet Russia." George E. Sokolsky: "Soviet Russia has bluffed the world for a quarter of a century, and the bluff has been called. . . . Soviet Russia will soon be eliminated from the war altogether." Martin Dies: "Hitler will be in control of Russia within 30 days." Fletcher Pratt: "It will take a miracle bigger than any since biblical times to save Russia from a quick and complete defeat." *The New York Times*: "It seems probable that Hitler will be able to achieve his main military objectives in Russia within a few weeks." Paul Mallon: "America's diplomats and military men agree in their expectation of what will be the fate of Russia. They both give the Reds no more than four to six weeks." Karl von Weygand, Hearst journalist: "Win or lose the war, the Stalin régime is fairly certain to go. It is doubtful whether the Communist régime can withstand the shock of such a war."

In the United States, Max Werner, Joseph E. Davies, Harry Hopkins, and Colonel Philip Faymonville, who had been Davies' military attaché in Moscow, were almost the only people of prominence who did not share these views. Similar pessimism over Soviet prospects prevailed in Britain, though for obvious reasons there was less glee, even in the most reactionary circles,

over the thought that the USSR would soon disintegrate under Axis blows.

What was crucial for Moscow, and indeed a matter of life or death, was that Churchill had pledged immediate cooperation against the common enemy and that Roosevelt was sufficiently adroit to move in the same direction even while he sought to placate those, including all isolationists and most Roman Catholics, who feared and hated the USSR more than the Nazi Reich. Oumansky saw Welles on June 26 and began discussing the release of supplies. On July 10 he conferred with Welles and Roosevelt. In a radio appeal of July 8 Litvinov called for joint Anglo-Soviet blows against Hitlerism, "the most shameful phenomenon of our age." On the same day a Soviet military and naval mission, headed by General Philip Golikov, reached London. Upon his return to Moscow Sir Stafford Cripps signed with Molotov (July 12) a brief agreement for mutual aid,* constituting a preliminary alliance—despite official avoidance of the terms in London and childish wrangling by Duff Cooper and the BBC over whether *The International* should be played on radio programs as the national anthem of an ally. "It is, of course, an alliance," said Churchill, "and the Russian people are now our allies."

After conferring in London with Harry Hopkins, Lend-Lease Administrator, and with Ambassador John G. Winant, Golikov flew to the United States. By August 1 Hopkins was in Moscow conferring with Ambassador Steinhardt, Molotov and Stalin while W. Averell Harriman, lend-lease aide in London, flew to Washington to confer with Roosevelt. From Stalin, Hopkins received a full report, to be shown only to the President, of Soviet stock-piles, production and anticipated requirements. On August 2 Welles and Oumansky exchanged letters by which the American Government agreed to grant "unlimited licenses" for export to the USSR, identical priorities with Britain, and "all economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet

* His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the present agreement and declare as follows:

1. The two governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.
2. They further undertake that during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

The contracting parties have agreed that this agreement enters into force as from the moment of the signature and is not subject to ratification.

Union in its struggle against armed aggression"—all "in the interest of the national defense of the United States." The New York State Convention of the American Legion adopted a resolution accusing Stalin of "ruthless murder," praising the Dies Committee, and opposing "aid of any kind to Communistic Soviet Russia in its war with Nazi Germany." But most Americans, like almost all Britishers, supported the course their Government had embarked upon.

In mid-August Roosevelt and Churchill held the first of their many meetings. One result of the conference off Newfoundland was the "Atlantic Charter" of August 14, to which the USSR formally subscribed on September 24.* Another result, of even greater immediate importance, was a joint message to Stalin, proposing a conference to plan the allocation of supplies. On the 16th Stalin agreed and a preliminary British credit of £10,000,000 was made available to the USSR. Between September 28 and October 1 Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook conferred in Moscow with Stalin, Molotov, Litvinov, Voroshilov and others. Plans were evolved for maximum Anglo-American aid. "There has at last emerged against Hitler," said Molotov, "a coalition of Powers which will know how to find the ways and means for the eradication of the Nazi poison in Europe."

Harriman reassured those Americans who feared that any equipment sent would be misused: "The clumsy Russian *muzhik* has become a skilled mechanic. Russia has learned to use the ma-

*Ambassador Ivan Maisky, September 24, 1941:

The Soviet Government proclaims its agreement with the fundamental principles of the declaration of Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States, and of Mr. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain—principles which are so important in the present international circumstances.

The Soviet Union was, and is, guided in its foreign policy by the principle of self-determination of nations. It is guided by the same principle which, in fact, embodies recognition of the sovereignty and the equality of nations in its dealings with various nationalities embraced within the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Indeed, this principle forms one of the pillars on which the political structure of the USSR is built. Accordingly, the Soviet Union defends the right of every nation to the independence and territorial integrity of its country, and its right to establish such a social order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and necessary for the better promotion of its economic and cultural prosperity.

The Soviet Union is ready to give a fitting answer to any blow from the aggressor. At the same time it has been, and still is, *building its foreign policy upon the desire to maintain peaceful and neighborly relations with all countries which respect the integrity and inviolability of its borders.*

chine." Roosevelt had felt obliged to instruct Harriman to discuss religion with the Soviet leaders. When the President asserted that Art. 124 of the Soviet Constitution established freedom of conscience, Father Edmund A. Walsh of Georgetown University declared the pledge a "hollow mockery," while Martin Dies rose to protest "in the name of tens of thousands of voiceless Christian martyrs who have been murdered by the Soviets . . . against any effort in any quarter to dress the Soviet wolf in the sheep's clothing of the 'four freedoms.'" By the end of October, however, \$40,000,000 had been advanced out of the stabilization fund against future Soviet gold shipments. On the anniversary of the Revolution, Roosevelt sent greetings to Kalinin and disclosed that on October 30 he had pledged to Stalin \$1,000,000,000 in lend-lease aid.⁸

But the gap between promise and fulfillment was infinitely wider than the proverbial slip between the cup and the lip. Few supplies were available, since American war production was not yet in its stride. The few available were often delayed by bureaucrats who detested the USSR or felt certain that Hitler would be in Moscow before the supplies arrived. U-boats began taking their toll on the Anglo-Soviet route to Murmansk. Under these circumstances Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation in 1941 was provisional and prospective—less military than economic, and less economic than diplomatic.

The State Department sought without success to induce Finland to quit the war. Following the Molotov-Cripps accord, Downing Street collaborated with the Narkomindel in Ankara and Teheran. On August 12 London and Moscow jointly assured Turkey that, "while fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war," they "would nevertheless be prepared to render to Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by a European Power." Four days later an Anglo-Soviet request for the expulsion of Axis agents was presented to the pro-Nazi Government of Iran. When it was ignored, Soviet and British troops entered the country (August 25) while Anglo-Soviet statements explained the need of intervention and pledged respect for Iranian independence and integrity. Premier Ali Khan Mansur gave way to Ali Feroughi. Shah Riza Khan abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. With the junction of Russian and British troops near

Teheran early in September and the acceptance of Anglo-Soviet demands by the new régime, the construction of roads, rail lines and airdromes went rapidly forward and soon made Iran a major Anglo-American supply route to the USSR. These measures, along with staunch British and Soviet resistance to the foe west of the Nile and the Don, were a *sine qua non* of ultimate victory, since they barred the enemy from the oil resources and communication lines of the Near East. On September 9, 1943, Iran declared war on Germany. Turkey belatedly followed suit on February 23, 1945.

Meanwhile the structure of power in Moscow had been streamlined to meet the needs of war. On July 1, 1941, by joint action of the Presidium, the Party Central Committee and the Sovnarkom, a "State Committee of Defense" was created with Stalin as Chairman, Molotov as Vice-Chairman and Voroshilov, Beria and Malenkov as members. All authority was concentrated in this War Cabinet. Stalin assumed control of the Commissariat of Defense, while Marshals Voroshilov and Timoshenko took command, respectively, of the northern and central fronts. On July 20 the Commissariats of Internal Affairs and National Security, recently separated, were again merged into the United NKVD under Beria. On July 3 Stalin addressed the country—to explain military reverses, to promise ultimate triumph, to justify the pact which the foe had broken, and to appeal for guerrilla warfare and "scorched earth" and defiance of the invader:

A grave danger hangs over our country. How could it have happened that our glorious Red Army surrendered a number of our cities and districts to the Fascist armies? . . . History shows that there are no invincible armies, and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was beaten. . . . The fact of the matter is that troops of Germany, as a country at war, were already fully mobilized, and 170 divisions hurled by Germany against the USSR and brought up to the Soviet frontiers were in a state of complete readiness, only awaiting the signal to move into action, whereas Soviet troops had little time to effect mobilization and move up to the frontiers. Of no little importance in this respect is the fact that Fascist Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact she concluded in 1939 with the USSR, disregarding the fact that she would be regarded as an aggressor by the whole world. Naturally, our peace-loving country, not wishing to take the initiative of breaking the pact, could not resort to perfidy.

It may be asked: How could the Soviet Government have consented to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous fiends as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was not this an error on the part of the Soviet Government? Of course not! . . . I think that not a single peace-loving State could decline a peace treaty with a neighboring State even though the latter was headed by such fiends and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. . . . We secured for our country peace for a year and a half and the opportunity of preparing its forces to repulse Fascist Germany should she risk an attack on our country despite the pact. . . .

The enemy is cruel and implacable. He is out to seize our lands watered with our sweat, to seize our grain and soil secured by our labor. He is out to restore the rule of landlords, to restore Tsarism, to destroy national culture. . . . Thus the issue is one of life or death for the Soviet State, for the peoples of the USSR: the issue is whether the peoples of the Soviet Union shall remain free or fall into slavery. The Soviet people must realize this and abandon all heedlessness, they must mobilize themselves and reorganize all their work on new, war-time lines, when there can be no mercy to the enemy. . . .

In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including German people who are enslaved by Hitlerite despots. . . . The State Committee of Defense has entered into its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around the Party of Lenin-Stalin and around the Soviet Government so as self-denyingly to support the Red Army and Navy, demolish the enemy and secure victory.

All our forces for the support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy! All the forces of the people—for the demolition of the enemy! Forward, to our victory!⁹

The flood of fire and blood which swept out of Europe over the steppes, almost to the walls of the Kremlin, unleashed the most murderous and destructive combat in all the long record of man's violence toward man, waged by the two largest and best equipped armies ever hurled against one another. Eastern Poland and the Balticum were lost in less than a fortnight, though there can be little doubt but that Moscow would have fallen had the Blitz been launched from the old Polish-Soviet and Baltic-Soviet frontiers, rather than from the line which Berlin had been obliged to accept in 1939. In the north Finnish-German forces under Mannerheim and Falkenhorst struck toward Leningrad and the White Sea. In the south Antonescu's Rumanian divisions invaded the

Ukraine. Between the two ends of the 2,000 mile front three powerful Blitzkrieg armies under Loeb, Bock, and Rundstedt, supported by Italian, Hungarian, Slovak and other contingents, aimed respectively at Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov. The defenders of Leningrad, led by Voroshilov, were driven back to the southern suburbs of the city, which after September 8 was clutched in the deadly grip of an agonizing siege in which the besiegers were cheated of their prize only by the incredible sacrifices and heroism of the inhabitants. In the center Timoshenko was obliged to quit Smolensk on July 17, but succeeded in temporarily checking the invaders in a series of costly engagements around the headwaters of the Dnieper. Budenny at first held the Ukraine against the foe but suffered disaster in August and September. On October 16 Kiev and Odessa were lost. Kharkov fell on the 24th.

Late in September the *Wehrmacht* opened a colossal and seemingly irresistible offensive aimed at the Soviet capital. On October 3 Hitler spoke to the Reich for the first time since June, claiming the capture of 2,500,000 Russians and the destruction or capture of 22,000 guns, 18,000 tanks and 14,500 planes. "Everything has proceeded according to plan. . . . We have, however, been mistaken about one thing. We had no idea how gigantic the preparations of this enemy were against Germany and Europe. I say it only today because I can say that this enemy is already broken and will never rise again. . . . The German people can be proud today. They have the best political leaders, the best generalissimos, the best engineers and economic organizers and also the best workmen, best peasants and best people." On October 9 Otto Dietrich, Hitler's Press Chief, announced: "The campaign in Russia has virtually been decided. . . . Remnants of the defeated Russian armies are now in headlong retreat. Russia as a military power is finished."

The Nazi leaders said too much too soon. Their best was not enough. Bock and Guderian were checked before Moscow in mid-October. On the 20th many Commissariats and all diplomats and foreign correspondents were moved to Kuibyshev (Samara) on the Volga. But Stalin remained in the Kremlin to reassure the fearful and inspire the brave to fierce defense. On November 6, eve of the 24th anniversary of the Revolution, he spoke to the Moscow Soviet and the Party organization:

. . . In the four months of the war our losses are 350,000 killed; 378,000 missing; and our wounded number 1,020,000 men. In the same period the enemy has lost more than 4,500,000 killed, wounded and prisoners. . . . There can be no doubt that the idea of defense of one's native land—the very idea for which our people are fighting—must breed and actually does breed heroes in our army, who cement the Red Army; whereas the idea of seizure and plunder of a foreign country, for which the Germans are actually waging war, must and actually does breed in the German Army professional plunderers, devoid of any moral principles, who corrupt the German Army. . . .

The German invaders want a war of extermination against the peoples of the USSR. Well then, if the Germans want a war of extermination, they shall have it. From now on our task, the task of the fighters, commanders and political instructors of our army and our navy will consist in the extermination to the last man of all Germans who have penetrated the territory of our native land as invaders. No mercy for the German invaders! Death to the German invaders! . . .

We have not and cannot have such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples—whether it be peoples and territories of Europe or peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our people from the German-Fascist yoke. We have not and cannot have such war aims as the imposition of our will and our regime on the Slavs and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are awaiting our aid. Our aid consists in assisting these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny, and then setting them free to rule their own land as they desire. No intervention whatever in the internal affairs of other nations! But to realize these aims it is necessary to crush the military might of the German invaders. . . . This is now our task. We can and must fulfill this task. Only by fulfilling this task and routing the German invaders can we achieve a lasting and just peace.

Ten days later the Nazi High Command opened its final drive on Moscow. To the south Tula held out against all attacks. But from Kalinin, to the northwest, the Teutonic hosts ultimately pushed to within 13 miles of the capital. Rostov fell to the forces of Reichenau and Rundstedt on November 22. Near the banks of the Moskva and the Don the *Wehrmacht* was to suffer its first major defeats in a tide of conquest which had hitherto rolled invincibly over all obstacles.

The defenders of Moscow were led to victory by a leader who was finally to be recognized, along with Montgomery, Eisen-

hower, and MacArthur, as one of the great commanders of the United Nations: Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov, "Spasitel" or Savior of Red Muscovy, and brightest star in the galaxy of able Soviet strategists. His honors—Marshals' Star, Order of Suvorov, Order of Lenin, Hero of the Soviet Union, Stalingrad Medal, and Order of Victory—were all won in battle against the *Wehrmacht*, though he was already a General at the outbreak of the war, having been one of three officers promoted to this rank upon its restoration in the Red Army in 1940. Zhukov was first of Soviet field commanders to be named Marshal (January, 1943). Born of peasant parents in Central Russia in 1895, he served as a private in World War I. With the Revolution he abandoned the fur business, into which he had been apprenticed, to join the Red Cavalry and the Communist Party. In 1936 he brought Soviet tanks to Madrid and became an observer on the Loyalist side. In the summer of 1939 he smashed the Japanese Sixth Army at Nomonhan. When Stalin ordered a state of siege in the Moscow area on October 19, 1941, he entrusted the supreme command west of the capital to Zhukov, in close collaboration with Stalin and Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov. The new leader organized the final defense, rising like a David to smite Goliath.¹⁰

On November 27 Zhukov ordered the first major counterblows. Far to the south Red Troops retook Rostov on the 28th. Before the capital Soviet tanks and planes, supported by fresh divisions, crushed the spearheads of the invader and then drove him back with heavy losses in a general offensive begun on December 6. Klin and Kalinin were retaken on the 16th, and Mozhaisk, last Nazi stronghold near the metropolis, on January 20. By March the Red Army had regained one-fifth of the vast territory lost to the foe and driven him back 100 miles and more from the Soviet capital. Germans shivered and froze in the bitter cold and clung desperately to "hedge-hog" positions from which their leaders hoped to renew the assault. The Red Army had won a battle but not a war. Yet in avoiding the loss of the war, it had accomplished that which no other army had been able to achieve against the Nazi legions. In retrospect there was no exaggeration in General Douglas MacArthur's anniversary tribute of February 23, 1942:

The hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Russian army. During my lifetime I have participated in a number of wars and have witnessed others, as well as studying in

great detail the campaigns of outstanding leaders of the past. In none have I observed such effective resistance to the heaviest blows of a hitherto undefeated enemy, followed by a smashing counter-attack which is driving the enemy back to his own land. The scale and grandeur of the effort mark it as the greatest military achievement in all history.

4. UNITED NATIONS

The question of why Mikado, Führer and Duce opened war on the United States in the midst of Zhukov's successful counter-offensive before Moscow admits as yet of no definitive answer. The choices of desperate madmen, imbued with fanaticism and megalomania, are less readily explained in terms of diplomacy and strategy than in those of psychopathology. Nazi and Japanese leaders were by no means of one mind as to how they could best realize their ambitions. But this much is clear: the decision which found expression in the attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, December 7, and in the German and Italian declarations of war on December 11 was not a product of any belief that the USSR had been crushed.

Hitler had assumed in June that the conquest of Russia would prove easier than the subjugation of Britain. In December he apparently assumed that the immobilization of the United States would prove easier of accomplishment than the subjugation of Russia. Since September a "shooting war," albeit undeclared and on a small scale, had been under way in the North Atlantic between American and German naval units. Open war and an unlimited U-boat campaign offered promise of cutting the supply lines from America to Britain and the USSR, and thereby isolating each in preparation for the final "kill." By the same logic the men of Tokyo persuaded themselves that the defeat of Chungking and the later seizure of Siberia demanded the destruction of Anglo-American sea power in the Pacific, the conquest of the Indies, and the isolation of China from Anglo-American aid. All these assumptions were to prove erroneous, though only by the narrowest of margins. Insofar as the Triplice decision of December, 1941, had inner logic and outer coordination, it was the fruit not of British, Chinese or Soviet reverses but of successful resistance, calling for a global war of attrition, of communications,

and of supplies with the object of cutting the ocean routes over which London, Chungking, and Moscow hoped to obtain from America the wherewithal of ultimate victory.

The final decision to attack the United States was reached sometime between November 26 and December 3. On the earlier date the ultimate American note was delivered to Nomura and Kurusu. By calling for Japanese evacuation of China and Indo-China, it closed the door, in Tokyo's view, to any negotiated settlement. On the later date Ambassador Toshio Shiratori told Mussolini that his Government had decided to attack America and expected Italy, as well as Germany, to declare war.¹¹ On November 27 the Japanese task force, whose planes were to put out of action five of the eight American battleships at Pearl Harbor, left Etorofu Island on a secret mission across the North Pacific. The decision was thus reached at a time when the Red Army had retaken Rostov and opened the initial phase of its Moscow counter-attack. The stalling of the Nazi Blitzkrieg in September and October had already convinced many of the Emperor's advisers that Hitler could not conquer Russia. As early as October 8 Domei, Japanese news agency, urged the Axis to terminate the Russian war and conserve its resources for new blows at Britain—a view which found a sympathetic echo in Rome. Yoshitaro Shimizu, political commentator of *Hochi*, urged his Government to act to restore “a state of non-aggression” between Germany and the USSR so that the Reich could shift its attack to Suez and the British Middle East. The replacement of Prince Konoye by General Eiki Tojo in the Premiership on October 18 brought measurably closer the Japanese recourse to arms to cripple the American Pacific Fleet and seize the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore and the rich Dutch colonies.

By November it was clear to most Germans, as it was to the Japanese militarists, that Hitler's boast of October was premature. On December 11 Marshal Fedor von Bock was relieved of his command on the central front. Ten days later Hitler ousted Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief and assumed the post himself, explaining that no pains would be spared to smash Soviet resistance “in the spring.” In his Reichstag speech of December 11, announcing war with the United States, he boasted madly that the *Wehrmacht* had taken 3,806,000 Russian prisoners at a cost of 162,314 dead, 477,767 wounded and 33,334

missing, but added: "This forward movement of German troops might well be stopped or hampered by winter conditions, but with the return of summer weather there will be no obstacle." On the same day a new Tripartite Pact was signed, pledging joint war on America and Britain and abstention from any separate peace or armistice. The Triplix decision thus sprang from a common conviction that the Red Army could not be beaten before the summer of 1942 and that Britain and America could meanwhile be driven from the Far East and prevented from giving effective aid to the USSR or to one another.

This abrupt conversion of the Axis war against Britain and Russia, and the Japanese war against China, into a global conflict of Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo against Washington, London, Chungking, and Moscow brought into being, in form as well as in fact, the coalition to be christened by Roosevelt and Churchill "the United Nations." Slovakia, Croatia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria (all save the last already at war with the USSR) declared war on the United States. The planetary lines of battle exhibited three anomalies: Finland, at war with the USSR and Britain (December 6), remained at peace with America; Bulgaria, at war with Britain and the United States, remained at peace with the USSR; Japan, at war with Britain, America and China, remained at peace with the USSR.

Maxim Litvinov, named Ambassador to the United States and Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs on November 6, reached San Francisco on the day before Pearl Harbor after a turbulent 20,000 mile air trip from Kuibyshev by way of Teheran, Calcutta, Singapore, Manila and Honolulu.¹² He was received by Roosevelt in Washington on December 8 and expressed the "best wishes and warm sympathy of the people of the Soviet Union towards the American people in these days of their ordeal." On the 13th he told a press conference that "we naturally would have welcomed the creation, somewhere in Europe, of a second front. We never complained, however, never made any demands upon our ally, England." Without committing himself on the issue of war against Japan, he added: "We are all in the same boat now, and will either perish together or together triumph over the greatest evil of our time."

Foreign Minister Eden and Ambassadors Cripps and Maisky conferred with Stalin and Molotov in Moscow during the second

half of December and reached agreement on "the necessity for the utter defeat of Hitlerite Germany and the adoption of measures to render completely impossible any repetition of German aggression in the future." They also exchanged views "on questions relating to the post-war organization of peace and security." *Izvestia* (December 29) added: "The peoples of the USSR and Great Britain, in alliance with the United States and other freedom-loving peoples, after gaining victory in the war against Hitlerism, will never permit Germany again to plunge the peoples of Europe into the bloody abyss of predatory war, sow death and destruction, or doom whole countries to starvation, ruin and slavery." At the same time Churchill had come to Washington. The result of his conferences was the "Declaration by United Nations" of January 1, 1942, signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, Litvinov, T. V. Soong (Foreign Minister of China) and 22 other signatories, by which they pledged their States to military and economic cooperation and no separate peace or armistice.*

This Grand Alliance was to embrace 50 members at the time of the fall of the Nazi Reich. Through arduous and devoted endeavor, its statesmen, diplomats, strategists and business leaders

* DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS:

A joint declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter.

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

were ultimately to fuse together all the skills and resources of the three Super-Powers, and of most of the lesser participants, into an effective fighting machine for the victorious waging of global war and the anticipated building of global peace. The staunch defenders of Britain, having fought alone for over a year against a seemingly invincible and invulnerable Continental coalition, were to play a decisive part, alongside of the fighters of America and the USSR, in bringing the foe to complete defeat. Superlatives fade into pale prose amid the innumerable miracles of courage and genius wrought by all three peoples in all fields.

Each of Britain's major allies, however, distinguished itself in its own unique way, imposed upon it by geography, strategy and the talents of its people. The war production of American capitalism was without parallel anywhere or precedent anywhen. Lend-Lease assignments to the other United Nations totalled \$39,000,000,000 by VE-Day of 1945. The British Commonwealth received half the total. To the Soviet Union went American goods totalling \$8,410,000,000, including 6,800 tanks, 13,300 planes, 406,000 motor vehicles, 1,000 locomotives, over 2,000,000 tons of steel, 150,000,000 yards of cloth, 11,000,000 pairs of shoes, etc. In terms of heroism and fighting skill, and losses suffered and inflicted upon the European enemy, most of whose forces were directed eastward during most of the war, the accomplishment of the soldiers and civilians of Soviet socialism were equally without parallel or precedent. Each without the other would have fought in vain. Both together, without British aid, would have failed. In so vast and desperate a struggle for survival, no yardstick can measure the separate contributions of the major communities fighting the Triplice. Victory was to come only by their united efforts. How it was planned and won, amid numberless complexities and frictions, cannot here be depicted. But the pattern of Soviet policy can be suggested by reviewing the salient features of inter-Allied relations.

Admiral William H. Standley, who had accompanied Harri-
man to Moscow in the previous autumn, was appointed Amba-
sador to the USSR by President Roosevelt on February 9, 1942,
as successor to Steinhardt who became Ambassador to Turkey.
Litvinov in Washington and Maisky in London worked ener-
getically and spoke eloquently for maximum cooperation, hoping
and pleading for a second front in Europe in 1942 and fearing

that its absence might yet give the *Wehrmacht* victory in a one-front war. Not only did the hope prove impossible of attainment, but supplies via Iran and the dangerous Murmansk run lagged far behind schedule. During the three winter months of 1941-42 less than half of the American war equipment promised in the Moscow protocol was delivered, despite a credit of another billion dollars extended early in the new year. On March 26 the President sharply warned War and Navy officials to lift all barriers and speed shipments. Two months later Secretary Hull submitted to Litvinov the draft of a master Lend-Lease agreement, modelled upon the Anglo-American accord of February 23. Negotiations looking toward its signature coincided with Molotov's first journey to Atlantica in response to invitations from Eden and Roosevelt.

The Commissar of Foreign Affairs reached Britain on a giant Soviet bomber on May 20, accompanied by Arkady Sobolev, two generals and a small staff. After a week of parleys, he flew to the United States, was received by Roosevelt, conferred with Marshall, King, Hull, Hopkins and others, and returned for another two days in England before flying back to Moscow. Not until his arrival were the results of his travels made public on June 11. On May 26, after seven meetings, brief speeches and a glass of wine all around, he signed with Eden, in the presence of Churchill, Attlee, Sinclair, Maisky, et al., a twenty-year Anglo-Soviet alliance treaty * against aggression by Germany or by any Euro-

* His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and British Dominions Beyond Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941, and to replace them by formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on a basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made Aug. 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered;

Desiring finally to provide for mutual assistance in the event of attack upon either high contracting party by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe;

pean States associated with her.¹³ On June 11, a week after Molotov's departure, Hull and Litvinov signed in Washington an American-Soviet accord for the exchange of defense articles and services, subject to the eventual return to the United States of Lend-Lease articles "not destroyed, lost or consumed" and "useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or otherwise of use to the United States of America." By Article 7 the final settlement "shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations." Communiqués issued in both Washington and London declared ambiguously that discussions had taken place on the expediting of war supplies to the

Have decided to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions Beyond Seas, Emperor of India, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M. P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Part One

I. In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

II. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two

III. 1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period.

2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take all measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

IV. Should either of the high contracting parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in

USSR and that "a full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."

The Supreme Soviet, in its first session since the invasion, voted ratification of the Anglo-Soviet alliance on June 18 after hearing Molotov review his journey, thank Churchill and Roosevelt for their cordial reception, and note that the United States had agreed to expand Lend-Lease credits to Moscow to a total of three billion dollars. Molotov echoed Eden's comment that "without the closest understanding between Great Britain and the Soviet Union there can be no security and stability in Europe either for our-

Article III, Section 2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance in his power.

This article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties, by mutual agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by adoption of proposals contemplated in Article III, Section 1. In default of adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until terminated by either high contracting party as provided in Article VIII.

V. The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.

They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

VI. The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

VII. Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

VIII. The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941.

Part One of the present treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace between the high contracting parties and Germany and the powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. Thereafter, unless twelve months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either high contracting party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

In witness whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in London on the twenty-sixth day of May, 1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

selves or for any of our Allies." Both Governments denied the existence of any secret commitments. London was evidently prepared to recognize Soviet claims to the Baltic States and perhaps to all of the frontier of June 22, 1941 but Washington objected. The issue was dropped and not officially mentioned in any of the three capitals. The King ratified the Treaty on June 24. Sir Stafford Cripps said of Molotov, Maisky, Churchill and Eden that "future generations will hail their work as the laying of a great foundation stone of the post-war world."

On the immediate question of a second front, on which all Soviet citizens and many Britishers and Americans became increasingly insistent as Axis forces fought their way toward the Volga, progress was less satisfactory. On the first anniversary of the assault on the USSR Churchill cabled Stalin: "You can count on us to assist you by every means in our power. . . . Our Treaty of Alliance is a pledge that we shall confound our enemies and, when the war is over, build a sure peace for all freedom-loving peoples." But the military prospects of the Atlantic Powers were scarcely propitious after the sweeping Japanese victories of the first half of the year. Despite defeat in the Battle of Midway (June 4-6), Japanese forces occupied Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians later in the month. In Libya Rommel's *Afrika Korps* took Tobruk and 25,000 prisoners on June 21 and invaded Egypt. Churchill visited Washington and, after discussing all possibilities with Roosevelt, insisted that an early invasion of Europe was not feasible. In place of it, plans were concerted for an Anglo-American landing in North Africa in November, a decision which was at once communicated in strictest confidence to Moscow. The communiqué of June 27 asserted that proposed combined operations "will divert German strength from the attack on Russia."

Yet the African enterprise, although of cardinal strategic importance, offered no immediate prospect of relieving the almost overwhelming Nazi pressure on the Red Army. In an effort to alleviate Soviet anxiety and resentment Churchill, accompanied by Brooke, Wavell and Tedder, flew into Moscow via Cairo and Teheran on August 12 for four days of conferences with Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov, Harriman, Standley and others. The chilly atmosphere was not warmed by Churchill's appearance at a formal Kremlin banquet in blue overalls. In his

subsequent report to Commons, Churchill hinted at the friction which had developed:

The Russians do not think we or the Americans have done enough to take the weight off them. . . . It is difficult to make the Russians comprehend all the problems of the sea and of the ocean. We are sea animals and the United States are to a large extent ocean animals. The Russians are land animals. Happily, we are all three air animals. . . . But I am sure that we made their leaders feel confidence in our loyal and sincere resolve to come to her aid as quickly as possible.

Although his first meeting with Stalin was far from smooth, Churchill termed his host "a man of massive outstanding personality, suited to the sombre and stormy times in which his life has been cast; a man of inexhaustible courage and will-power and a man direct and even blunt in speech. . . . Stalin also left upon me the impression of a deep, cool wisdom and a complete absence of illusions of any kind. I believe I made him feel that we were good and faithful comrades in this war—but that, after all, is a matter which deeds not words will prove." ¹⁴

The Dieppe raid of August 19–20, 1942, with its heavy casualties among the mixed forces participating, seemed calculated to demonstrate that the Atlantic Powers could not invade the Continent. The *Wehrmacht* and its motley allies meanwhile drove toward the Nile and the Volga. The Middle East and India were to be saved from invasion only by the defenders of Alexandria and Stalingrad. Wendell Willkie reached Moscow and got on famously with Stalin, to whom he brought a message from Roosevelt. Before his departure he issued a statement that "we can best help Russia by establishing a real second front in Europe with Great Britain at the earliest possible moment our military leaders will approve, and perhaps some of them need some public prodding. Next summer might be too late." The Associated Press urged its chief Moscow representative, Henry C. Cassidy, to try to interview Stalin on a second front or at least secure written answers to questions. On October 3, 1942, Stalin wrote to Cassidy, excusing his inability to grant an interview by "pressure of work," but declaring in response to Cassidy's letter of interrogation, that the USSR placed "prime importance" on a second front, and that "as compared with the aid which the Soviet Union is giving to the Allies by drawing upon itself the main force of the

German-Fascist armies, the aid of the Allies to the Soviet Union has so far been little effective. In order to amplify and improve this aid, only one thing is required: the full and prompt fulfillment by the Allies of their obligations.”¹⁵

The Times of London found this “a disturbing document, intended to disturb.” Numerous Anglo-American groups increased their demands for action to relieve the USSR. Molotov and the Soviet Press brought further pressure in mid-October by demanding (in vain) that Rudolf Hess be tried at once as a war criminal. In his address of November 6, 1942, on the eve of the 25th anniversary of the Revolution, Stalin asserted that the enemy had been able to concentrate 240 divisions on the Russian front, with only 4 German and 11 Italian divisions in Libya and Egypt, because of the absence of any second front in Europe. Such a front, diverting 80 Axis divisions, would mean that the Red Army would be somewhere near Pskov, Minsk, Zhitomir and Odessa instead of on the Volga. “Will there be a second front in Europe, after all? Yes, there will be, sooner or later, there will be one. And it will be not only because we need it, but because above all our allies need it no less than we do. . . . The Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has every chance of vanquishing the Italo-German coalition and certainly will vanquish it.”

As Stalin spoke, Montgomery's Eighth Army had already beaten Rommel's forces at El Alamein and were driving them out of Egypt. On the anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower directed the landing of a sea-borne Anglo-American expedition in Morocco, and Algeria. Stalin hailed the African invasion in another letter to Cassidy on November 13. A week later the second Soviet winter offensive would be launched. The long night of defeat was about to end. With the first light of dawn the major United Nations began to march together into the sunlight—often out of step but always with their faces toward victory.

DEATH TO THE GERMAN INVADERS!

I. MIRACLE ON THE VOLGA

IN ANCIENT DAYS many a conquering host swept over the Kirgiz Steppes from east to west, crossing the Ural, the Volga, the Don, and the Dnieper along the traditional road from Asia into Europe. Not without reason did the Mongols of the Golden Horde, last of the Asiatic invaders, build the capital of their Khanate east of the Volga near the point where its waters flow within 50 miles of the Don. The flat watershed between the rivers commands the communications of a vast region, embracing northern Caucasia, the basin of the Caspian, the easternmost waterways to the Black Sea through the Ukraine, and the immense valley of Europe's mightiest stream, flowing in a giant curve around the heart of Muscovy. Here also, between the two German wars of the 20th Century, the provincial city of Tsaritsin, sprawling along the west bank of the Volga midway between Saratov and Astrakhan, grew into the busy and attractive metropolis of Stalingrad, with half a million inhabitants. In 1942 the Nazi *Wehrmacht* swept from west to east, seeking to batter its way from Europe into Asia. Not without reason did its leaders, having bridged the Dnieper and reached the Don, aim at crossing the watershed and seizing the river city. Here was to be fought the longest, bloodiest, most destructive, and most decisive single combat of World War II.

"The principal objective of the German offensive," said Stalin on November 6, "was to outflank Moscow from the East, to cut

it off." A map found on a German General Staff officer indicated that the enemy planned to be in Stalingrad on July 25, Saratov, August 10; Kuibyshev, August 15; and Baku, September 25. "As a result of hunting after two hares—after oil and after the encirclement of Moscow—the German-Fascist strategists landed in a difficult situation."

Far more difficult and potentially disastrous was the situation of the fighters and civilians of the USSR. Hitler's long-heralded spring onslaught was balked in May and June by Timoshenko's offensive east of Kharkov. The Ukrainian capital was not retaken nor was the power of the invader seriously crippled. But his plans for pushing swiftly eastward were impeded. Another obstacle was Sevastopol where Red soldiers, sailors and marines, blockaded by sea and surrounded by land, fought off attack after attack and inflicted 300,000 casualties on the German and Rumanian forces. By June the assailants were dropping scores of thousands of bombs upon the town and bombarding it with 24" howitzers. The defenders fought on from the ruins. Not until July 3, after 250 days of siege, were the survivors withdrawn by boat from wreckage piled high with enemy dead.¹ This Pyrrhic victory was the first major success of the gigantic Axis offensive which had finally gotten under way on June 25.

A month later the enemy was again in Rostov. Part of his forces pushed southward, took the Maikop oil fields on August 9, and then pressed eastward along the north slope of the Caucasus, finally reaching Mozdok, only a little more than 100 miles from the Caspian. Other armies moved in force up the valley of the Don and were soon driving on Stalingrad. Its defenses were first broken through on August 23, when 80 German heavy tanks and a column of motorized infantry reached the tractor plant as hundreds of bombers dumped death on the city.

What followed was contrary to all rules of war, all reason and all probability. Almost half a million picked Nazi troops, abundantly supplied with all possible weapons, were pressing into a metropolis only a few miles wide and strung out some 50 miles in length on the near side of a broad river without bridges. Lt. Gen. V. I. Chuikov's 62nd army, cut off from aid except by boat, should obviously have been withdrawn to the eastern shore to escape annihilation. Instead it chose, with the armed workers of the factories, to convert each section, each block, each street,

DEATH TO THE GERMAN INVADERS!

I. MIRACLE ON THE VOLGA

IN ANCIENT DAYS many a conquering host swept over the Kirgiz Steppes from east to west, crossing the Ural, the Volga, the Don, and the Dnieper along the traditional road from Asia into Europe. Not without reason did the Mongols of the Golden Horde, last of the Asiatic invaders, build the capital of their Khanate east of the Volga near the point where its waters flow within 50 miles of the Don. The flat watershed between the rivers commands the communications of a vast region, embracing northern Caucasia, the basin of the Caspian, the easternmost waterways to the Black Sea through the Ukraine, and the immense valley of Europe's mightiest stream, flowing in a giant curve around the heart of Muscovy. Here also, between the two German wars of the 20th Century, the provincial city of Tsaritsin, sprawling along the west bank of the Volga midway between Saratov and Astrakhan, grew into the busy and attractive metropolis of Stalingrad, with half a million inhabitants. In 1942 the Nazi *Wehrmacht* swept from west to east, seeking to batter its way from Europe into Asia. Not without reason did its leaders, having bridged the Dnieper and reached the Don, aim at crossing the watershed and seizing the river city. Here was to be fought the longest, bloodiest, most destructive, and most decisive single combat of World War II.

"The principal objective of the German offensive," said Stalin on November 6, "was to outflank Moscow from the East, to cut

it off." A map found on a German General Staff officer indicated that the enemy planned to be in Stalingrad on July 25, Saratov, August 10; Kuibyshev, August 15; and Baku, September 25. "As a result of hunting after two hares—after oil and after the encirclement of Moscow—the German-Fascist strategists landed in a difficult situation."

Far more difficult and potentially disastrous was the situation of the fighters and civilians of the USSR. Hitler's long-heralded spring onslaught was balked in May and June by Timoshenko's offensive east of Kharkov. The Ukrainian capital was not retaken nor was the power of the invader seriously crippled. But his plans for pushing swiftly eastward were impeded. Another obstacle was Sevastopol where Red soldiers, sailors and marines, blockaded by sea and surrounded by land, fought off attack after attack and inflicted 300,000 casualties on the German and Rumanian forces. By June the assailants were dropping scores of thousands of bombs upon the town and bombarding it with 24" howitzers. The defenders fought on from the ruins. Not until July 3, after 250 days of siege, were the survivors withdrawn by boat from wreckage piled high with enemy dead.¹ This Pyrrhic victory was the first major success of the gigantic Axis offensive which had finally gotten under way on June 25.

A month later the enemy was again in Rostov. Part of his forces pushed southward, took the Maikop oil fields on August 9, and then pressed eastward along the north slope of the Caucasus, finally reaching Mozdok, only a little more than 100 miles from the Caspian. Other armies moved in force up the valley of the Don and were soon driving on Stalingrad. Its defenses were first broken through on August 23, when 80 German heavy tanks and a column of motorized infantry reached the tractor plant as hundreds of bombers dumped death on the city.

What followed was contrary to all rules of war, all reason and all probability. Almost half a million picked Nazi troops, abundantly supplied with all possible weapons, were pressing into a metropolis only a few miles wide and strung out some 50 miles in length on the near side of a broad river without bridges. Lt. Gen. V. I. Chuikov's 62nd army, cut off from aid except by boat, should obviously have been withdrawn to the eastern shore to escape annihilation. Instead it chose, with the armed workers of the factories, to convert each section, each block, each street,

each building into a fortress. Men, women and even children resolved to kill as many Germans as possible, to die if need be, but never to surrender or retreat.

The answer of General Friedrich von Paulus and his colleagues, commanding the invaders, was to attempt the piecemeal capture of the city by a number of drives toward the river. The trapped defenders between the spearheads faced an incessant deluge of fire, steel and high explosives. Day after day, week after week, month after month, ruin and death roared over the rubble until no single building was left intact. Mile after mile was reduced to a chaotic jumble of ashes, bricks and corpses. In the words of Konstantin Simonov:

Those who have been here will never forget it. When after the lapse of years we look back and recall the war, the very word will conjure up a vision of Stalingrad illuminated by the flare of rockets and the glow of fire; and once again the incessant thunder of bombardment from land and air will ring in our ears. Again we shall feel the suffocating stench of burning and hear the crackling of overheated sheet iron. . . . In the daytime houses flare up, now here, now there in the city; at night a smoke-bedimmed glow stretches along the horizon. The detonation of bombs and the rumbling of guns go on day and night, causing the very earth to tremble. . . .

The Germans are striving, might and main, to convert this city into an Inferno where it would be impossible to live. Yes, it is difficult to live here, for here the sky overhead is in flames and the earth trembles under one's feet. The sight of the gaping walls and blackened window frames of what were but yesterday peaceful dwellings causes the muscles of one's throat to contract in a spasm of hatred. The charred remains of women and children, burned alive by the Germans on one of the river steamers, strew the sandy beach of the Volga and cry aloud for vengeance. Yes, it is very difficult to live here. Even more: it is impossible to live here as a passive bystander. To live here to fight, to live here to kill Germans—only this is possible here. This we must and will do, staunchly defending the city enveloped in flames and smoke and drenched in blood. And although death hovers over us, glory, our sister, is by our side amidst the ruins and orphans' tears. . . .

The city is fighting grimly, no matter what the cost; and if the price paid be dear, the feats the men accomplish rigorous and stern, and their sufferings almost incredible—these things cannot be helped, for the struggle being waged is for life or death. . . . After Stalingrad we shall give no quarter.²

The city was utterly destroyed. Even its broken bricks were pulverized into dust. Most of its districts were at one time in enemy hands. As early as the end of September, Hitler declared: "We have taken Stalingrad. . . . Nobody will remove us from this spot." But the defenders, reinforced by Major General Alexei Rodimtsev's Guards from across the Volga, not only fought like demons but constantly counter-attacked. Each wrecked house, each pile of shattered masonry, spat fire and lead. Death leered at the invaders from every gutted window and doorway and from behind every broken corner. The grim hulks of the great factories became scenes of ferocious man-hunts in which the defenders allowed the attackers no moment's respite and no space for maneuver. The more fanatical became the assault, the more tenacious was the defense. By November the German "Front Reports," having told first of struggles for sections, for blocks, for streets, and then for particular buildings, were telling of combats with guns, grenades and flame-throwers for single floors and even rooms of houses, amid the gaunt and scorched skeletons of the endless ruins.

Five thousand miles away from the holocaust, on the 25th anniversary of the Revolution, numerous meetings were held throughout the United States to salute the USSR, to honor its defenders, and to pledge enduring cooperation in war and peace. To the Red warriors at Stalingrad and elsewhere along the immense front, voices of gratitude and encouragement came from Underground Europe and from the Atlantic democracies. Russian War Relief, directed by Edward C. Carter, found Americans anxious to contribute generously to the needs of the Soviet people. Their gifts were to total \$46,250,000 by VE-Day. On November 8, proclaimed "Stalingrad Day" by Mayor LaGuardia, 20,000 people gathered in Madison Square Garden in a "Congress of American-Soviet Friendship," with Corliss Lamont as Chairman and Joseph E. Davies as Honorary Chairman. Roosevelt and Eisenhower sent greetings. Among many distinguished speakers, including bankers and labor leaders, Governors and Senators, Generals and writers, Vice-President Henry A. Wallace spoke for a new democracy. Maxim Litvinov declared that the words of admiration and support "will go straight to the hearts of the fighters in the Red Army among the ruins of Stalingrad and on other fronts, and will also be deeply felt by all the Soviet people, work-

ing as one man for the cause of freedom of humanity, amidst hardships which defy description.”³

Strategic genius soon came to the aid of incredible valor. Stalin, Shaposhnikov, Zhukov, and Voronov, Marshal of Artillery, made plans which were entrusted to stocky Col. Gen. N. F. Vatutin, broadfaced Col. Gen. A. I. Yeremenko and tall Col. Gen. Konstantin Rokossovsky. Around the vortex of death on the Volga, a huge trap was set and sprung. On the misty morning of November 19, 1942, while the hell within Stalingrad flamed and thundered without surcease, Rokossovsky's divisions north of the city opened an attack which drove through the German lines to Kalach, near the Don. At the same time Red tanks south of Stalingrad smashed the enemy lines and reached Kalach. On November 23 the forces met amid rejoicing, and proceeded to forge an unbreakable ring around the German Sixth Army still fighting for the city. Hitler ordered Paulus to hold fast while reinforcements from Rostov were rushed to Kotelnikovo. The Soviet High Command, anticipating precisely such a move, threw in sufficient forces to check Mannstein's advance and then to send his troops reeling back toward Rostov under the blows of the Guards Divisions. Zhukov opened other offensives near Leningrad, in the center, in the south, and along the Don.

Hitler's reserves were dissipated. He made lavish promises and sought to relieve the Sixth Army by air. Paulus's troops, betrayed by the Führer's intuition and hoping against hope, rejected an ultimatum to surrender submitted by Voronov and Rokossovsky on January 8. In the end the Soviet troops pounded the 22 surrounded divisions from all sides with irresistible force. First driven out of the Western suburbs and then compressed into two pockets amid the ruins, they were finally slashed and hammered beyond endurance. Paulus surrendered on February 1, 1943. Of the 330,000 Axis troops caught in the trap, over 91,000 were taken prisoner, along with 24 Generals and 2,500 other officers. Most of the rest had been slain. The booty included 750 planes, 1,550 tanks, 6,700 guns, 61,102 motor vehicles.

After Stalingrad the last Nazi hope of victory lay in the disunity of the United Nations. To promote cleavages in the enemy camp by inflating the Bolshevik bogey to terrifying size now became the central purpose of German political and psychological warfare, designed to split the United Nations and promote a

negotiated "peace through fear." Within the Reich the Nazi leaders sought to convert their greatest military defeat into a psychological victory. Hitler made Paulus a Field Marshal on the eve of his surrender. By radio and press Göbbels glorified and heroized the end of the Sixth Army as a "victory" which had saved Europe from the "Asiatic Hordes." Three days of mourning were ordered throughout Germany. Wagnerian grief and masochistic melancholy were utilized to inspire new efforts at "total mobilization" in a spirit of "strength through sorrow."

Radio Berlin (February 8) told America: "If Stalin should ever plant his foot in Western Europe, no power on earth could call a halt to any plan which Soviet Russia's Jewish warlord, Stalin, might care to put into execution. . . . America's Jews would have prepared the way for a Bolshevik revolution. . . . Awake, America, awake, arise! Kick out the Judocrats!" After visiting the front, John Amery, renegade son of the British Secretary for India, broadcast to his countrymen from Berlin: "I have had the sensation of being face to face with wild animals. . . . Like a pack of wolves, Bolshevik soldiers rush forward to kill. . . . The Jewish riffraff of Whitechapel will stab you in the back. . . . Think how amusing it would be to have your wife raped by a drunken Communist or by a Jewish Commissar! . . . All this might happen if it were not for the German Army."

All in vain. Where force had failed, fraud was to prove futile. More than two years of further fighting were needed to bring about the final collapse of the Nazi Reich. But in terms of global strategy, the Triplice lost its war at Midway, El Alamein and Stalingrad. From the decisive victory of Soviet arms between the Volga and the Don, the *Wehrmacht* was never to recover sufficiently to mount another successful offensive in the grand manner. With the surrender of Paulus, much more was lost than the roads to Baku and Saratov. The invaders were forced to quit the entire North Caucasus area. On January 2 Soviet forces retook Velikiye Luki, major Nazi bastion on the old water road south of Lake Ilmen. On February 8 they recaptured Kursk, a week later Rostov and Kharkov, and on March 12 Vyazma. The Ukrainian capital fell once more to the enemy on March 14 in a local counter-offensive, with the stabilized battle line remaining relatively inactive during the spring of 1943. But from now on, despite the fearful cost yet to be paid before VE-Day, the

military initiative in the east lay with the Red Army, and in the south with the Anglo-American forces of Montgomery and Eisenhower.

In the entire course of the winter offensive of 1942-43, Red troops made a westward advance of more than 400 miles in some sectors, liberated almost 200,000 square miles of Soviet soil, captured 343,000 enemy soldiers and killed 850,000, according to the estimates of the Soviet High Command. Said Stalin in his Order of the Day of February 23, 1943, celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Red Army:

Twenty months have passed since the Red Army began to wage its heroic struggle, unexampled in history, against the invasion of the German-Fascist hordes. In view of the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war. Nevertheless the Red Army has not only stood firm against the onslaught, but has also become a menace to the Fascist Army. . . .

The enemy has suffered defeat but he is not yet conquered. . . . The Red Army has before it a severe struggle against the cunning, cruel and as yet strong enemy. . . . Men, commanders and political workers should firmly remember the behest of our teacher, Lenin, that "the first thing is not to be carried away by victory or to swagger, the second thing is to consolidate victories, the third thing is to defeat the enemy completely." . . . Long live the Party of the Bolsheviks, inspirer and organizer of the Red Army's victories! Death to the German invaders!

2. DISUNITED NATIONS

Coalitions fight best when facing disaster. Success dissolves the bonds of common desperation, than which no bonds are stronger. The major United Nations tasted their first fruits of victory between January and September of 1943, after years of almost unrelieved defeat. These were also the months of maximum suspicion, recrimination and all-but-open rupture between the USSR and the Atlantic democracies. Faded flowers of evil, stemming from the roots of the dark past, dropped new seeds of strife into the soil of the future. That immediate tragedy was avoided is a tribute to the statesmanship of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin alike, along with their agents and advisers, and to the vision and devotion of uncounted thousands of Americans, Britons and Russians who helped their countrymen to put first things first, to

repudiate the sowers of disunity and to bring to harvest the delicate plants of confidence and collaboration upon whose fruition victory in war and peace depended.

Since the misunderstandings of 1943 permeated almost every problem of world politics and global strategy, a detailed analysis of their source and scope would require more pages than are here available. The issue of a second front, no less than the perennial Polish question, continued to engender bitter controversy, despite the Anglo-American triumph in Tunisia (May 7), the fall of Mussolini (July 25), the completion of the conquest of Sicily (August 17) and the invasion of southern Italy (September 3), which coincided with the capitulation of the Badoglio régime. These operations still left most of the *Wehrmacht* on the Russian front. The central core of friction, however, was a new phase of old fears. Many Americans and some Britishers suspected that Moscow would either make a separate peace with the Reich, once the Red Army had driven out the invaders, or would seek to communize Europe in a new crusade for World Revolution. Many Russians suspected that London and Washington were quite content to see the USSR bled white, and would eventually make a separate peace with Berlin or would seek to organize all the reactionary forces of a post-Nazi Europe against the "Red Menace." Göbbels and his tools throughout the world exploited every suspicion. Quite apart from their efforts, each fear within the United Nations aggravated its counter-fear to a point which seemed likely at times to bring the Grand Alliance to the brink of dissolution.

Churchill and Roosevelt, being met at Casablanca in mid-January with their military staffs, took cognizance of some of the difficulties in their final communiqué of the 24th: "Premier Stalin was cordially invited to meet the President and Prime Minister, in which case the meeting would have been held very much farther to the east. He was unable to leave Russia at this time on account of the great offensive which he himself, as Commander-in-Chief, is directing. The President and Prime Minister realized up to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much weight as possible off the Russian armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points. Premier Stalin has been fully informed of the

military proposals . . .” The Anglo-American leaders also promised “to dispatch all aid to the Russian front with the objectives of whittling down German man-power and munitions” and sought to meet Soviet suspicions by pledging themselves to a demand of “unconditional surrender” by the foe.

A month later Roosevelt at his White House press conference thought it wise to deny that Stalin’s Order of the Day (asserting that the Red Army was “not created for the purpose of conquest of foreign countries, but to defend the frontiers of the Soviet land”) was intended to imply, as some were arguing, that Soviet forces would cease fighting upon reaching the German frontier. On March 8, 1943, Ambassador William H. Standley provoked a storm by declaring that the Soviet Government was concealing from the Russian people the extent of American aid to the USSR—an allegation at once criticized by Wendell Willkie, denied by Ralph Parker, *New York Times* correspondent in Moscow, and cautiously repudiated by Sumner Welles. Patriotic pride in the Soviet Union forbade excessive emphasis on the dependence of the war effort on Anglo-American supplies. But increased publicity in the Soviet press and radio followed Standley’s statement. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, asserted on April 4 that “the great structure of a reorganized and peaceful world must inevitably rest on the great freedom-loving Powers: the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China.” He denounced the breeders of discord and denied that the Soviet Union had “huge imperial plans” or that the democracies were seeking to create a new *cordon sanitaire* through anti-Soviet “buffer States.” In his May Day Order Stalin paid tribute to the Anglo-American victories in North Africa and to the air war against the Reich: “The blows on the enemy from the east by the Red Army have, for the first time since the beginning of the war, merged with the blows from the west by our allies into one single, common blow.”

In an effort to build more solid foundations for collaboration, Roosevelt decided early in May, two months after the Standley incident and a week after the Soviet rupture of relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile, to send Joseph E. Davies on a second “mission to Moscow” as his special agent, bearing a Presidential message to Stalin. The specific purpose of the journey and the contents of the letter are still “secret” or at least “con-

fidential." Contemporary reports held that the objective was to arrange a Stalin-Roosevelt meeting later in the year.

After arriving in Kuibyshev, Davies flew to the ruins of Stalingrad where he spoke briefly in a simple ceremony:

Here in immortal Stalingrad we stand humbly in the midst of the still charred remains of the brave new city which has been devastated by the Huns. Acting for the President of the United States and for the freedom of the sons of God everywhere on this earth, as a token of our homage and deathless respect, I lay this simple wreath of Russian spring flowers on the grave of the unknown Soviet soldier. Even in death he is gloriously typifying the supreme heroism and devotion to freedom of our unconquerable ally, the Soviet Union, its great leaders, its glorious Red Army and its heroically undaunted Soviet people.

Davies arrived in Moscow on May 19, as Churchill in Washington addressed the American Congress and American troops commenced the reconquest of Attu from the Japanese invaders of the Aleutians. His "sealed letter" to Stalin was delivered the next day.

The dramatic announcement which followed was in no way linked in official statements with the Davies mission. Yet the relationship was scarcely coincidental. On May 22, 1943, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, which had held no Congresses for almost eight years, proposed to its national sections (all of which subsequently approved) the dissolution of the organization once dubbed the "General Staff of World Revolution." The announcement declared:

. . . The whole development of events in the last quarter of a century and the experience accumulated by the Communist International convincingly showed that the organizational form of uniting workers chosen by the First Congress . . . has been outgrown . . . and has even become a drag on the further strengthening of the national working class parties. . . . Already the Seventh Congress . . . emphasized the necessity for the Executive Committee . . . to make a rule of avoiding interference in the internal organizational affairs of the Communist parties.

The same considerations guided the Communist International in considering the resolution of the Communist party of the U.S.A. of November, 1940, on its withdrawal from the ranks of the Communist

International. Guided by the judgment of the founders of Marxism and Leninism, Communists have never been supporters of the conservation of organizational forms that have outlived themselves . . .

The Communist International, as the directing center of the international working class movement, is to be dissolved, thus freeing its sections from their obligations arising from the statutes and resolutions of the Congresses of the Communist International. The Presidium calls on all supporters to concentrate their energies on the wholehearted support of, and active participation in, the war of liberation of the peoples and States of the anti-Hitlerite coalition for the speediest defeat of the deadly enemy of the working class—German Fascism and its associates and vassals.

This step was an effective blow at the “wedge-driving” tactics of Nazi propagandists and a valuable contribution toward inter-allied unity. Under the leadership of Earl Browder, American Communists—always more papist than the Pope—decreed their own dissolution as a political party exactly a year later, though this example was not followed by any other major sections of the Comintern and proved to be temporary.* Göbbels registered confusion and then sought to dismiss the end of the Comintern as a “swindle.” Secretary Hull expressed satisfaction. Martin Dies (prematurely, as it turned out) forecast the early termination of the work of his Red-baiting Committee on “UnAmerican Activities.” Davies spoke of the rebuilding of Stalingrad and made no mention of the Comintern at Stalin’s dinner in his honor in the Kremlin on May 24, attended by Molotov, Standley, Clark Kerr, Mikoyan, Malenkov and Litvinov—who had been called home from Washington on the 10th for “consultation.” But on his return to America Davies, after delivering Stalin’s “reply” to Roosevelt on June 3, hailed the dissolution of the Comintern, which “happened to have been announced when I was in Moscow a few weeks ago,” as “a contribution to post-war reconstruction.”⁴

In a letter of May 28 to Harold King, Reuter correspondent, Stalin asserted that the end of the Comintern was “proper and timely” and “exposes the lie of the Hitlerites that Moscow intends to intervene in the life of other nations and ‘Bolshevize’

* On July 27, 1945, delegates to a national convention of the “Communist Political Association,” under the leadership of William Z. Foster, unanimously resolved to reestablish the party, following the sharp criticism in April of Browder’s so-called “revisionist” line by Jacques Duclos, French Communist leader.

them. . . . It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by Hitlerism, thus clearing the way to the future organization of a companionship of nations based upon their equality."

If the end of the Comintern alleviated the fears of many burghers of Atlantica, the course of Anglo-American policy in the Mediterranean scarcely had a comparably reassuring effect in Muscovy or among European underground leaders who feared that Downing Street and the State Department were determined to put Humpty Dumpty back on the wall. Those conducting Anglo-American political warfare were often more distinguished by great wealth than by great hearts or great minds. The heirs to hereditary fortunes who typically occupy top posts in the diplomatic services of the democracies are not forbidden by birth or by law to exercise their imaginations or to concern themselves with the aspirations of simpler and poorer men. Yet the diplomacy of the Atlantic Powers was preoccupied with discouraging social change and protecting the rights of Kings, the privileges of nobles and plutocrats, and the principles of legitimacy, all rationalized in terms of "military expediency." A liberated Europe reconstructed on such a basis would be controlled by reactionary dynasts, aristocrats and industrial monopolists. Such a Europe would inevitably be an anti-Soviet Europe. Hence the apprehensions of Moscow over what appeared to be the guiding slogan of many of the immediate subordinates of Anthony Eden and Cordell Hull: "Come Weal, Come Woe, My Status Is Quo."

The policies which bred anxiety included the maintenance of friendly relations with clerical and feudal régimes whose leaders were aiding Hitler in his anti-Soviet crusade. The United States courted Vichy until November, 1942. London and Washington blessed Franco whose Fascist "Blue Legion" was fighting the Red Army alongside the *Wehrmacht*. Both cold-shouldered De Gaulle's Free French movement and cooperated in North Africa with Darlan, Peyrouton and Giraud. The State Department maintained diplomatic relations with Finland until June 30, 1944. In Italy, following the capitulation of September, 1943, King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio were kept in power by Allied support. King George and his semi-Fascist supporters were championed as rulers of Greece, while aristocratic chauvinists were favored

as "liberators" of Poland. In Yugoslavia (until February, 1944) Anglo-American support went to King Peter and to Mikhailovich's Chetniks who, it later appeared, were cooperating with Italian and German forces against Tito's partisans. High Washington officials flirted with Otto of Hapsburg and Tibor Eckhardt of Hungary. The Vatican, with its implacably anti-Soviet and anti-liberal orientation, was the object of constant solicitude on the part of the United States and Great Britain.

In each case the best of diplomatic or military reasons were adduced to explain the course pursued. But politics and war cannot be separated. War is a form of politics. The remarkable consistency of the social preferences and political expectations manifested in successive decisions precluded the possibility of unplanned happenstance. Winston Churchill and some of Roosevelt's top advisers—e.g., William Leahy, Robert Murphy, Myron C. Taylor, Carleton J. H. Hayes, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., et al.—were clearly hoping to reconstruct a Europe which was as much anathema to the Kremlin as to the peoples awaiting liberation.

Moscow's efforts to counteract these plans were depicted by Göbbels and by many Anglo-American conservatives as an attempt to "communize Europe." Their actual objectives were to promote the unity of all democratic forces on the Continent—i.e., all anti-Fascist, anti-feudal, anti-clerical and anti-monarchist elements—and to build the liberation of Europe on social foundations offering some assurance against a revival of Fascism. The gravest danger in this situation was the prospect of civil war within the United Nations camp. At various times incipient or open conflict became a reality in Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, France, Belgium and Poland, with Moscow supporting Leftists while London and Washington championed Rightists. In the middle months of 1943 it was an open question as to whether the three Super-Powers would lose the war or the peace or both by virtue of their conflicting political objectives, or would somehow find the means of evolving a common program. The issue came to a head with the establishment in Moscow of the "Free Germany Committee."

This remarkable venture in political warfare, though inspired by doubts regarding Anglo-American motives in dealing with the Reich, was in part a response to Nazi political warfare against the USSR. The latter campaign therefore deserves brief atten-

tion. In the fall of 1941 Berlin named Heinrich Lohse as Reich Commissioner for the "Ostland," with Wilhelm Kube as his subordinate in Byelo-Russia. Erich Koch became Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine. Russian monarchists-in-exile and pro-Nazi Ukrainian Nationalists were both disappointed, the more so when Berlin announced (November 17, 1941) that Alfred Rosenberg had been named "Reich Minister for the East." This German-Baltic émigré, who had fled from the Russian Revolution in 1918, was chief editor of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, Nazi dictator of *Weltanschauung* and one of the most ferocious propagandists of anti-Semitism, anti-Slavism and anti-Bolshevism in the Hitlerian hierarchy. He sought to establish German control of the conquered Russian territories, in the face of the sullen resistance of the population and the daring deeds of the partisans, by championing private property and religion.* The effort was wholly unsuccessful, thanks to the loyalty of the vanquished and to the megalomania of the German victors who undertook the impossible task of winning over the very people whom they sought to reduce to serfdom and against whom they committed the most appalling atrocities.⁵

The Nazi quest for an effective Russian Quisling, though pursued with zeal, was frustrated by the same considerations. Jacob Djughashvili, a Red Army lieutenant and Stalin's son by his first wife, was captured on July 24, 1941. But he staunchly resisted all the blandishments of Göbbels and Göring. More success was had in efforts to recruit various anti-Soviet "volunteer" forces in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine. After the Stalingrad debacle, Berlin made a desperate bid to recruit Russians against Russians. Its tool was Lt. Gen. Andrei A. Vlasov, captured in 1942.⁶ In mid-March, 1943, the Nazi Russian-language paper in Berlin, *Novoye Slovo*, echoed by the Nazi radio, carried an "appeal to the Russian people" from Vlasov, calling for the overthrow of the Soviet régime and for volunteers for the "Russian Army of Liberation." "In the struggle for a new Russian future," said Transocean to North America, March 16, 1943, "he openly and honestly pleads for cooperation with Germany." By the end

* Bishop Polikarp Sikorski, an erstwhile supporter of Petlura (1918-20), was made head of a Ukrainian National Autocephalous Church by the Nazi authorities. He was promptly exposed and denounced (February 5, 1942) by Acting Patriarch Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow. Very few Orthodox priests in the occupied region appear to have become Nazi collaborators.

of March, Vlasov had become head of the "Russian Committee of Liberation," with Major General W. F. Malyshev as Secretary-General. He demanded liquidation of Bolshevism, the dissolution of collective farms, restoration of private property and freedom of religion. His "Army," allegedly recruited from Soviet war prisoners, was "reviewed" by Rosenberg early in April according to Radio Berlin, which also announced the formation of a "Ukrainian Liberation Committee" with a "Ukrainian Liberation Legion," along with other White Armies in the Baltic. A German spokesman, broadcasting in Russian from the Japanese-controlled station at Shanghai, March 30, 1943, predicted the complete defeat of the USSR in 1943 at the hands of Vlasov's "Army."

This belated experiment in the technique of the Fifth Column was an abysmal failure. Vlasov's recruits fought against partisans in Yugoslavia and France, but did nothing on the Russian front after their Nazi sponsors discovered that most of them were disposed to "desert" to the Red Army at the first opportunity. In September, 1944, Himmler and Vlasov were reported "in conference." As late as December, 1944, the Nazi radio was still boasting that Vlasov had converted "30 Russian generals" and "several hundreds of thousands of soldiers. . . . At the clash with the Liberation Army, the Soviets will get a great surprise . . ."

On the principle that attack is the best defense, Moscow countered and even anticipated these efforts in its own way. The Axis invasion of the USSR was followed by outbreaks of terrorism and sabotage all over Nazi Europe, partly because local Communists now assumed leadership in fighting Moscow's foe and partly because all resistance forces now saw hope for the first time of the final defeat of the conqueror. The death-knell of the "New Order" was sounded by German reprisals, of which a typical example was the razing of the Czech town of Lidice and the massacre of its inhabitants in revenge for the murder (June 4, 1942) of Reinhardt Heydrich, "The Hangman." As early as the fall of 1941, Soviet planes showered leaflets on the invading armies, in German, Finnish, Rumanian, Hungarian, Italian and Spanish, designed to divide the Axis allies against one another and to induce surrender. Early in October the "First Conference of German Prisoners of War" was held at "Camp No. 58" where Walter Ulbricht, former Communist member of the Reichstag, was elected to the "Presidium" and 158 prisoners issued a mani-

festos calling upon the German people to assist in the military defeat of Hitler as the only hope for the "freedom and independence of Germany." In January, 1942, Soviet authorities began broadcasting messages to Germans by POW's in the USSR: "Down with Hitler and his gang! Long live Free Germany!" A year later a large-scale propaganda campaign, aided by Erich Weinert, a German Communist-in-exile, was under way to persuade German soldiers to surrender.

Ernst Fischer, another German Communist, broadcast appeals on the Moscow radio in line with the demands of the secret "National Peace Movement Conference," held in the Rhineland in December, 1942, which called for the evacuation of foreign territories, the overthrow of Hitler, and the restoration of German democracy. According to Weinert, who was chairman of the preparatory committee, German prisoners in the USSR, now including some officers, initiated a movement early in 1943 which led to the inaugural session of the "National Committee for Free Germany," held in Moscow, July 12-13, 1943. A Committee of 38 was established, with Weinert as President and Major Karl Hetz and Lt. Count Heinrich von Einsiedel (a great grandson of Bismarck) as Vice-Presidents. On September 11-12, 1943, a "Union of German Officers" emerged from the ranks of the Nazi commanders captured at Stalingrad. Under the chairmanship of General Walter von Seidlitz, it endorsed the program of the Free Germany Committee.

On July 21, 1943, *Pravda*, followed by the entire Soviet press and radio, issued the Manifesto of the Committee, signed by Weinert, Hetz, Einsiedel, Ulbricht, Wilhelm Pieck (former German Communist leader and a secretary of the Comintern) and a number of officers, writers and Reichstag members. Its propaganda line was congruent with earlier statements of Stalin:

It is sometimes irresponsibly stated in the foreign press that the aim of the Red Army is to exterminate the German people and destroy the German State. This is, of course, a stupid lie and a witless slander. . . . It would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German State. History shows that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German State remain (February 23, 1942). . . . It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed. . . .

It is not our aim to destroy all organized military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that that is not only impossible in regard to Germany, as it is in regard to Russia, but also inadvisable from the point of view of the victor. But Hitler's army can and should be destroyed (November 6, 1942).

The Manifesto, far from demanding Communism in Germany, championed democracy, private property and free enterprise.* While the Kremlin was in no way committed, the Committee's program reflected official views as to what was possible and desirable in waging political warfare. In marked contrast to Soviet

* Germans! Events demand of us an immediate solution. The National Committee of Free Germany has been organized at a time of mortal danger hanging over our country and threatening its very existence. . . . The defeats of the last seven months are unparalleled in the history of Germany—Stalingrad, the Don, the Caucasus, Libya and Tunisia. Full responsibility for these defeats rests with Hitler. . . . The war is lost. . . . But Germany must not die! To be or not to be—such is the question today facing our country. . . .

If the German people in good time are courageous enough and prove in deed that they want to be a free people and that they are determined to free Germany from Hitler, they will then win the right to decide their fate themselves, and other nations will take them into consideration. . . . The formation of a genuine national German Government is the most urgent task of our people.

This means a strong democratic power that will have nothing in common with the helpless Weimar régime; a democracy that will be implacable, that will ruthlessly suppress any attempt at new plots against the rights of free people or against European peace.

It means the annulment of all laws based on national and racial hatred; of all orders of the Hitlerite régime that degrade our people; the annulment of all measures of the Hitlerite authorities directed against freedom and human dignity.

It means the restoration and extension of the political rights and social gains of the working people: freedom of speech, press, assembly, conscience and religious beliefs. It means the freedom of economy, trade and handicraft; the guaranteed right to labor and to lawfully acquired property.

It means the restoration of property to their lawful owners, plundered by the Fascist rulers; the confiscation of property of those responsible for the war and of the war profiteers; the exchange of commodities with other countries as a natural basis for insuring national welfare.

It means the immediate release of the victims of Hitlerite terror and material compensation for the damage caused them. It means the just, inexorable trial of those responsible for the war, of its instigators and their ringleaders and accomplices behind the scenes, of those who have hurled Germany into an abyss and branded her with shame.

But at the same time it means amnesty for all Hitler adherents who in good time will renounce him and join the movement for a free Germany.

Forward, Germans, to struggle for a free Germany! . . . For people and Fatherland! Against Hitler and his criminal war! For immediate peace! For the salvation of the German people! For a free and independent Germany!

expectations in 1918, a German proletarian revolution was clearly deemed impossible. An anti-Fascist "People's Front" was favored, although this symbol received no emphasis. The goal was rather a democratic, capitalistic, bourgeois Reich, cleansed of Hitlerism and of those who had given it most ardent support—e.g., the Junkers and great industrialists. The Committee broadcast daily from Moscow and published its own journal, *Freies Deutschland*. Its propaganda featured soldiers, officers, ex-Stormtroop leaders, and theologians rather than labor agitators or Communists. Its themes were never "Communism vs. Fascism" but "Patriotism, Christianity and Democracy vs. Hitlerism." The *leitmotif* at all times was: end the war and overthrow the Nazis, otherwise Germany will suffer a fate far worse than 1918.

As with most war propaganda, the efficacy of the enterprise admits of no conclusive demonstration. Obviously, the German people did not overthrow Hitler nor establish a democratic régime at any time during hostilities—even after Marshal von Paulus, whom Göbbels had heroized in February, 1943, joined the Moscow movement early in 1945. On the other hand the willingness of German troops to surrender in droves during the last year of the war, and the vain attempt of German officers to liquidate the Nazi leadership in July, 1944, bear some relationship, however tenuous, to the persistent propaganda of the Free Germany Committee.

Its immediate significance in the summer of 1943, however, lay less in its impact on the Reich than in its effects on inter-Allied relations. It was widely interpreted in the West as an indication that Moscow would go its own way if London and Washington should refuse to modify the course upon which they were embarked. Eden visited Washington in March, 1943. Churchill followed late in May for further conferences. President and Prime Minister met again in Quebec in August, with T. V. Soong participating. Moscow was "informed" of the decisions. But there was still no second front. The small Anglo-American forces in Italy were balked by a handful of German divisions. It was difficult for the Kremlin to avoid the conclusion that the Atlantic Powers had little desire to deal with the USSR as an equal. Moscow's political moves vis-à-vis Germany and the Balkans constituted a reply which precipitated a major crisis.

3. TEHERAN

A curious chronology is revealed by the public history of the State Department and of American-Soviet relations in the summer of 1943. July 21: *Pravda* announced the Free Germany Committee. August 10: rumors circulated that Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State since 1936, might take a "roving diplomatic post." A day later Roosevelt and Churchill met in Quebec. Their final communiqué of August 24 declared that Anglo-American authorities would "hold another conference before the end of the year, in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Russia." Moscow spokesmen asserted that the USSR had not been invited to Quebec. August 21: the Narkomindel announced that Litvinov would not return to Washington and would be succeeded by Andrei Gromyko. (Maisky had already been recalled from London and succeeded by Fedor Gusev, with both Maisky and Litvinov continuing to serve as Vice-Commissars of Foreign Affairs.) August 24: reports leaked out that Welles had resigned some days previously. Three days later Secretary Hull condemned "some writers" for false statements. August 29: in a letter to M. B. Schnapper of the American Council of Public Affairs, Berle denied that the State Department was aiding reactionaries abroad.

Hull told the press on August 30 that Drew Pearson's charges of anti-Soviet prejudices in the Department were "monstrous and diabolical falsehoods." On the next day Roosevelt asserted that Pearson was "a chronic liar." By this time a decision had been reached to hold a tripartite conference of Foreign Ministers. Hull defended the Department against criticism in a radio address of September 12 and pleaded for Allied unity and international organization to keep peace by force. A week later Molotov and Maisky were reported to be insisting that the proposed conference be held in Moscow, while Washington indicated that Ambassador Standley was returning. He was soon succeeded by W. Averell Harriman, who participated with Hull in the Moscow Conference of October. Welles was replaced by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. who in turn became Secretary of State with Hull's retirement in November, 1944. Berle, Breckinridge Long and G. Howland Shaw resigned at the same time.

The secret history of these developments has not yet been told. No official explanation was offered of Welles' resignation, save the later statement by the President that the Undersecretary had resigned because of the ill-health of his wife. The extraordinary denunciation of Drew Pearson provoked a reply which his syndicate refused to publish:

. . . That the State Department has been consistently needling the Russians may be a secret to the American public but it is no secret to Moscow. . . . While we hold up their fully accredited and official Ambassador (to North Africa), we give a passport to one of Russia's bitterest enemies, ex-President Smetona of Lithuania who played ball with the Nazis when they were using Lithuania as a jumping-off base to attack Russia. Later Smetona took refuge in Berlin, and now Mr. Hull has generously given him freedom to attack Russia from the safety of the United States. Again while refusing Russian Ambassador Bogomolov a passport to North Africa, we extended a passport to Russia's bitterest enemy in Poland—ex-Finance Minister Matuzewski . . . (who) writes violent attacks on Russia in the *Novy Swiat* . . . This is no secret. The Russians can read. . . .

The men upon whom Mr. Hull relies most for advice on Russia are Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle and Leo Pasvolksy. Berle has a long record of anti-Russian activities which Moscow knows all about. Pasvolksy was secretary to the last anti-Soviet Ambassador in Washington and the Russians are quite able to remember his book, *Russia in the Far East*, and the Russian magazine which he published. . . .⁷

Welles and Hull had long been at odds over various issues, including the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers whose recognition as a government was favored by the Undersecretary and opposed by the Secretary. (The joint Anglo-American recognition of August 26 was highly qualified, though Moscow recognized the De Gaulle régime "as representing the State interests of France.") Hull had long resented Welles' practice of discussing questions of high policy directly with Roosevelt, with whom Welles had a common Groton-Harvard background. Following the Argentinian coup of June 4, 1943, moreover, Welles insisted upon diplomatic recognition of the essentially Fascist régime which came to power with Ramirez and Rawson, while Hull—in this instance, at least, expressing the democratic impulses of his Tennessee past—was opposed to trafficking with Axis sympathizers.

The final show-down was precipitated by the Free Germany Committee. Welles held that it foreshadowed a unilateral Soviet policy and an irreparable disruption of Allied unity unless a common program could be evolved through an immediate conference of Foreign Ministers. He urged concessions to Moscow, perhaps including American acceptance of the Soviet frontiers of 1941. Hull dissented and was supported by Berle, James Dunn, Breckinridge Long and William C. Bullitt. The Secretary appears to have suggested the dismissal of Welles to the President and to have threatened his own resignation. Roosevelt proposed that Welles be sent on a special mission to Moscow. Welles tentatively declined on the ground that, having been repudiated, he would have no bargaining power. He resigned in mid-August and conveyed his anxieties to Wallace.

Litvinov's recall was announced after the Narkomindel had learned that Welles was out. When Hull discovered that the American press was almost unanimously favorable to the ex-Undersecretary and critical of the rest of the Department, he took the view that Welles must not be entrusted with any mission. He assumed erroneously that Welles had inspired the criticisms of Drew Pearson, to whom Welles in the past had occasionally "leaked" information without consulting the Secretary. Welles remained silent. In the sequel Hull, in a fortunate access of wisdom, decided to do substantially what Welles had urged—i.e., go to Moscow and work out a common United Nations program. For doing so he merited and received great credit, though Sumner Welles, the actual instigator of the new orientation, lost his post for his pains and was too modest and too diplomatic to complain or claim praise for Hull's achievement.⁸ The aging Secretary, perhaps somewhat to his surprise, was to return from Moscow a hero in the eyes of Congress and the country.

The American decision to seek common ground with the USSR was influenced by political developments in London and by military developments in Russia. In editorials in the *London Times*, E. H. Carr had argued cogently for Anglo-Soviet solidarity in the reordering of Europe. His words were embarrassing, rather than welcome, to Churchill, Eden and the Foreign Office. But they expressed such a widespread sentiment in Britain that they could not be ignored:

To suppose that Britain and the United States, with the aid of some lesser European Powers, could maintain permanent security in Europe through a policy which alienated Russia and induced her to disinterest herself in continental affairs would be sheer madness. . . . Those concerned for future security in Europe, both great and small, have an imperative need of her. . . . British statesmanship must be reinforced by the efforts of American leaders to promote American understanding and appreciation of it (March 10, 1943) . . . Russia's principal allies must make their contribution by allaying Russian apprehensions that they may be unwilling to accord to Russia the rights of full and equal partnership in the future settlement and the same voice in issues vitally affecting her security as they claim for themselves in issues affecting their own (March 23, 1943).

Guns speak louder than words in dealing with allies no less than with enemies. On July 5, 1943, the *Wehrmacht* opened its third summer offensive, seeking to smash the Kursk salient as a prelude to another eastward drive. From Orel and Belgorod, 17 tank divisions, 3 motorized divisions and 18 infantry divisions were hurled against the Soviet line. In the greatest tank and artillery battle of the war, the forces under Rokossovsky, Vatutin and Popov held the invaders to small gains and went over to the offensive on July 12. In the course of a few days of savage fighting, almost 3,000 tanks, over 1,000 guns and 70,000 troops were lost by the enemy. It was now clear to everyone that the Nazi Blitzkriegers had more than met their masters in the art of war.⁹ The Red Army retook Orel and Belgorod on August 5 and stormed Kharkov on August 23. General Ivan S. Konev was awarded the Order of Suvorov, First Class, for these victories and was promoted (February 20, 1944) to the rank of Marshal. The State Department was impressed. Secretary Hull, swallowing his pride, his doubts, and his anxiety regarding his health, decided to go to Moscow.

Between October 19 and 30, 1943, Hull, Eden and Molotov, aided by Harriman, Dunn, Clark Kerr, Strang, Vyshinsky, Litvinov and other advisers, held a dozen meetings in Spiridonovka House in the Soviet capital, aside from numerous informal gatherings with one another and with Stalin and other Soviet leaders. For the first time the three Super-Powers were met as equals for the elaboration of a joint program of victory and peace. At the

conclusion of their deliberations there were issued on November 1 a Joint Communiqué, a Four-Nation Declaration (signed for China by Ambassador Foo Ping-Sheung), a Declaration regarding Italy, a Declaration on Austria, and a Statement on Atrocities signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.* Two joint agencies were established, both on Moscow's suggestion. They were the first political organs of an enduring character to be set up by the three major United Nations. A European Advisory Commission was created in London in January with William Strang and Ambassadors Winant and Gusev as its members. In Naples (and later in Rome) an Advisory Council for Matters relating to Italy was established, with Herbert MacMillan, Robert Murphy, Andrei Vyshinsky and René Massigli as original members.

Anglo-American anxieties regarding Soviet intentions toward the Reich were allayed by a joint pledge of unconditional surrender and disarmament. A new League of Nations, rather than a mere alliance or a world federation, was envisaged in the proclaimed recognition of "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." This formula reappeared in the Connally Resolution, passed by the American Senate, 85-5, on November 5. American isolationists were thus assured against any "surrender of sovereignty." Small States were given at least verbal protection against "domination" by the Big Three, who agreed to act only "on behalf of the community of nations." The non-intervention pledge of the Anglo-Soviet alliance was reiterated in generalized form.

If all of these assurances represented Anglo-American projects accepted by Moscow, the Declaration on Italy was a Soviet project accepted by Washington and London. Its ringing phrases condemning Fascism and championing Italian democracy took cognizance of Soviet criticisms of Anglo-American policy in Italy since the Badoglio armistice of September 3. The pledge of Austrian independence, already anticipated by Churchill in the summer of 1942, was a limited compromise between Western proponents of the dismemberment of the Reich and Soviet champions of German unity. The broader issue was left open, but Austria

* Complete text will be found in Appendix II, pp. 652-6 below.

at least (to which Moscow had been addressing appeals for revolt through a "Free Austria Committee") would be detached from Berlin. The final statement on atrocities, pledging punishment of war criminals in the lands where their crimes were committed, was in intent and even phraseology an Anglo-American acceptance of the Kremlin's views.

The results of the Moscow conference were hailed throughout the United Nations as a heartening assurance of victory and peace. In the United States the only important voices of dissent were those of Senator Burton K. Wheeler, the Hearst Press and the McCormick-Patterson newspapers, all of whom shouted that Hull had "sold out" the Atlantic Charter to Stalin. The ten Bishops and Archbishops of the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference expressed similar doubts but described the accord as "a definite step in the right direction."¹⁰ Secretary Hull told Congress on November 18:

It has never been my fortune to attend an international conference at which there was greater determination on the part of all the participants to move forward in a spirit of mutual understanding and confidence. . . . Mr. Molotov arranged for the business of the conference in a most efficient manner. Both as Chairman and participant he manifested throughout the highest order of ability and a profound grasp of international affairs. . . . I found in Marshal Stalin a remarkable personality, one of the great statesmen and leaders of this age. I was deeply impressed by the people of Russia and by the epic quality of their patriotic fervor. A people who will fight against ruthless aggression, in utter contempt of death, as the men and women of the Soviet Union are fighting, merit the admiration and good will of the people of all countries.

The first meeting of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill soon followed. At Cairo, November 22-25, 1943, the President and Prime Minister met with Chiang Kai-shek to concert plans against Japan, leading to unconditional surrender: "It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. . . . In due course, Korea shall become free and independent." The Anglo-American leaders then proceeded to the capital of Iran, where they con-

ferred with Stalin, November 28–December 1, after which they met President Ismet Inonu and Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu at Cairo, December 4–6, to reaffirm the Anglo-Turkish alliance and proclaim firm friendship between Turkey, the Soviet Union and the United States.

To Teheran, to which all the delegations proceeded by plane, Stalin brought only Molotov and Voroshilov among the top Soviet leaders. Roosevelt was accompanied by Hopkins, Harri-man, General Marshall, Admirals King and Leahy, Generals Arnold and Somervell, and Major General John Deane, Chief of the American Military Mission in Moscow. Churchill arrived with Eden, Clark Kerr, Brooke, Dill, Cunningham, Portal, Ismay and Martel. The planning of war was the prime concern. Preparations were discussed for the Normandy invasion of the following June and for a Soviet offensive to be coordinated with the long-awaited second front. Only two documents were made public. One was a Three-Power Declaration on Iran, promising economic aid and participation in the establishment of post-war peace, security and prosperity “in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to which all four governments have continued to subscribe” and expressing a common “desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.” The second document, signed by the three leaders of the Super-Powers, was less informative than hortatory and prophetic, but was eloquent testimony to the human significance of the gathering for all the world.*

* ROOSEVELT-STALIN-CHURCHILL DECLARATION

We, the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met in these four days past in this capital of our ally, Teheran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in the war and in the peace that will follow.

As to the war, our military staffs have joined in our round-table discussions and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of operations which will be undertaken from the east, west, and south. The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to the peace, we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

Anecdotes regarding the personal relations of the three chief participants are endless. Roosevelt spent his first night in the American Legation, a mile away from the Soviet and British HQ, and then accepted Stalin's invitation to stay, for the sake of safety and convenience, in the yellow brick palace housing the Soviet Embassy. Its outer walls enclosed wide parks and gardens of chrysanthemums, roses and sycamores, interspersed with quiet pools, smiling in the autumn sunshine. Despite the need of interpreters, the Squire of Hyde Park, with his unflagging ebullience, was soon on the most cordial terms with the son of the Georgian cobbler in his stiff Marshal's uniform. The President softened the occasional asperities between Stalin and Churchill.

Although the Marshal brought no relatives, the gathering had at times the atmosphere of a family reunion through the presence of Major Randolph and Sarah Churchill, and of Colonel Elliott Roosevelt and Major John Boettiger, the President's son-in-law. Churchill's birthday was celebrated on November 30 in the British Legation, adjacent to the Soviet Embassy, with 69 candles on the cake and innumerable toasts on all sides. On the preceding day Churchill ceremoniously presented to Stalin a sword of honor from King George VI to the people of Stalingrad. Roosevelt and Stalin reportedly discussed the mutual ignorance of Americans and Russians of one another's customs. The Marshal expressed interest in the details of American federalism, perhaps with an eye to the forthcoming amendments to the Soviet Constitution promulgated in February. The President expounded the Good

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and in mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them as they may choose to come into the world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attacks will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all the peoples of the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose.

Signed at Teheran, December 1, 1943.

Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill.

Neighbor Policy and welcomed Stalin's assurance that he had no desire to "own Europe."¹¹

Cooperation among allies is a continuous process, calling for incessant vigilance and effort, not a problem to be solved at a stroke by verbal formulas. Teheran was a mighty contribution to the success of the process but in no sense a final solution. The crisis of the summer had been met and surmounted. The gathering in Iran, however, was followed by new friction—due in part to delays in carrying out what had been agreed upon, which in turn were partially attributable to the illnesses of both Roosevelt and Churchill after their journey. The Prime Minister's pneumonia obliged him to remain in Morocco until early January. The very success of the conference moved Göbbels to new frenzy. Earlier in the year he had said, accurately, that many Anglo-Americans looked upon the advances of the Red Army "with one rejoicing eye and one weeping eye." Isolationists and Russophobes in both Britain and America now redoubled their efforts to create doubts and fears.

The immediate diplomatic aftermath of Teheran was the conclusion in Moscow on December 12, in the presence of President Eduard Beneš, of a twenty-year treaty of alliance against Germany by the USSR and the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile.*

* AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND POST-WAR COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC.

The President of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic,

In their desire to modify and extend the agreement of mutual assistance existing between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic signed at Prague May 16, 1935, and

In their desire to confirm the terms of the agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic about joint action in the war against Germany, signed at London, July 18, 1941,

In their desire to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of further aggression on the part of Germany, and

To assure permanent friendship and post-war peaceful collaboration amongst themselves,

Have decided to conclude for this purpose an agreement and have appointed with this purpose as their plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.: V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic: Zdenek Fierlinger, Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Republic:

Who, having exchanged their credentials, which have been found in perfect order, have drawn up in appropriate form and have agreed as follows:

1. The high contracting powers agree to unite in a policy of permanent friend-

This project had long been entertained by the Narkomindel as an alternative to the schemes of the Polish Government-in-exile for a Czech-Polish federation which the Kremlin equated with a new anti-Soviet *cordon sanitaire*. London and Washington had indicated opposition. Churchill and Roosevelt were presumably persuaded by Stalin to give their consent. An appended Protocol invited Polish participation. But the unresolved questions of the Polish frontiers and of the status of the London Poles prevented the fulfillment of this intention. Stalin and Molotov at Teheran undoubtedly received assurances that Churchill would not only make a public statement on the second front but would also endorse the Soviet view regarding the future western frontiers of the USSR and the identity of friends and foes within Yugoslavia. When weeks passed with no such statement, Moscow applied pressure not only through diplomatic channels but through various gestures in the press.

On January 5, 1944, David Zaslavsky in *Pravda* harshly assailed Wendell Willkie as "a political gambler" because he had asked "what Russia intended to do about the political integrity of Fin-

ship and friendly post-war collaboration, as well as mutual assistance of all kinds in the present war against Germany and all such states as are bound with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

2. The two high contracting powers undertake for the period of the war not to enter any sort of negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other Government of Germany which does not explicitly renounce all aggressive intentions, and also not to engage in negotiations toward or to conclude without mutual agreement any sort of treaty of peace with Germany or any other state bound with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

3. Reaffirming their pre-war policy of peace and mutual assistance, as expressed in the agreement signed at Prague on May 16, 1935, the high contracting powers undertake that in case one of them finds herself, in the post-war period, involved in hostilities with Germany, renewing her policy of *Drang nach Osten*, or with any other state that may unite with Germany directly or in any other form in such a war, then the other high contracting power will immediately render to the other contracting power thus involved in hostilities every military and other support and assistance within its power.

4. The high contracting powers in the interest of each other's security agree to close and friendly collaboration in the period after the conclusion of peace and to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect of their independence and sovereignty as well as noninterference in the internal affairs of the other State.

They agree to carry out economic relations between each other on the largest possible scale and to render each other all possible economic assistance after the war.

5. Each of the high contracting powers undertakes not to conclude any al-

land, Poland, the Baltic and Balkan States" in an otherwise friendly article ("Don't Stir Distrust of Russia") in *The New York Times Magazine*. When Soviet troops a few days later drove across the old Polish frontier, Moscow spokesmen suggested that comment abroad about the Red Army entering "Poland" was in error, since Poland lay west of the frontier of 1941. Public Anglo-American offers in January to "mediate" the issue were resented. Soviet denunciations of Franco and criticisms of the Pope for alleged Fascist sympathies stirred further resentment in certain western circles. A minor storm burst when *Pravda* on January 17 published a dispatch from Cairo to the effect that "trustworthy Greek and Yugoslav sources" had reported "a secret meeting of two leading British personalities with Ribbentrop not so long ago in one of the coastal towns of the Iberian Peninsula . . . to clarify the conditions of a separate peace with Germany. It is supposed that the meeting was not without results." Downing

liance and not to take in any coalition directed against the other contracting power.

6. The present agreement comes into force immediately after its signature and is subject to ratification at the earliest possible date. The exchange and ratification documents will take place at Moscow as early as possible. The present agreement remains in force for twenty years after signature, whereby if one of the high contracting powers will not make a declaration twelve months before its expiration to the effect that it desires to renounce the agreement, this agreement will continue to remain in force for a further period of five years. And so every time until one of the high contracting powers gives notice twelve months before the expiration of the current five-year period. In testimony whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement and have put their stamps on it. The agreements have been drawn up in the Russian and Czechoslovak languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, 12 December, 1943

The plenipotentiary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
MOLOTOV.

The plenipotentiary of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic FIERLINGER.
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT OF MUTUAL FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND
POST-WAR COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK RE-
PUBLIC, CONCLUDED 12 DECEMBER, 1943.

The high contracting powers are agreed with regard to the conclusion of this present agreement of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that should any third power bordering on the U.S.S.R. or the Czechoslovak Republic, and representing in this war an object of German aggression, express a desire to join the present agreement, the latter will be given the possibility of signing this agreement on the mutual agreement of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic, thus making it a tripartite agreement.

Street and Lord Halifax at once branded the story as a lie. Tass broadcast the denial, but asserted that the Ankara correspondent of the London *Sunday Times* had reported German peace offers to Britain at Russia's expense. *War and the Working Class* (January 19) alleged that plans for a second front were being hindered by Anglo-American defeatists and appeasers.

Matters mended somewhat in February. Eisenhower was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st Class, on the 18th with other high honors granted to many of his fellow officers. On the 26th anniversary of the Red Army, Roosevelt congratulated Stalin "on the great and significant victory of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. . . . The magnificent achievements of the Red Army under your leadership have been an inspiration to all. . . . Together with the collaboration and cooperation which was agreed upon at Moscow and Teheran, they assure our final victory over the Nazi aggressors." Churchill sent an "expression of my profound admiration to you and all ranks. . . . They will go forward to victory and through victory to peace with honor." On February 22 the Prime Minister told Commons that Anglo-American forces would invade Europe "before the leaves fall." He also asserted that British support in Yugoslavia would henceforth go to the partisan forces of the National Committee of liberation under Tito (Josip Broz). As for Poland, "I cannot feel that Russian demands for reassurance about her western frontiers go beyond the limit of what is reasonable and just."

Welcome as were the statements, the Narkomindel continued to oppose the course of Anglo-American policy in liberated Italy where Allied Armies were still stalled south of Rome. Moscow had approved the armistice terms of September 3, 1943, on the basis of which Eisenhower, in the name of the United States, Britain and the USSR, had accepted the surrender of the Victor Emmanuel-Badoglio régime. On October 13 the Monarchy had declared war on Germany and been accepted by the United Nations as a co-belligerent. The Allied Advisory Council, on which Vyshinsky was succeeded as Soviet representative in mid-March by Alexander Bogomolov, had turned over control of Sicily, Sardinia and the southern provinces to the Badoglio cabinet on February 11, 1944. There were few signs, however, of any Anglo-American intention of implementing the pledge of Italian de-

mocracy in the Moscow Conference Declaration. Said Churchill on February 22: "We are working to aid the Government of the King and Badoglio . . . who were and up to the present are the legitimate Government of Italy. . . . Representatives of the various parties (of the Committee of National Liberation) have of course no authority."

Early in March Roosevelt disclosed in his press conference that Stalin, presumably acting on the basis of some clause of the still secret terms of the armistice, or of some understanding reached at Moscow or Teheran, had requested the transfer to the USSR of one-third of the ships of the Italian Navy or their equivalent. The issue was ultimately settled by transferring a number of American and British navy units to the Red Navy, including the cruiser *Milwaukee* and the battleship *Royal Sovereign*. On March 13 Badoglio announced that he and Stalin had agreed upon an exchange of Ambassadors. Secretary Hull asked the Narkomindel for an explanation of this unilateral action, which was widely misinterpreted as constituting Soviet recognition and approval of the House of Savoy. In fact Moscow had simply placed itself on the same footing in Italy as its two allies, not for the purpose of buttressing the Badoglio régime but of working more effectively for its modification.¹²

M. A. Kostilev became Soviet Ambassador. At the end of the month Palmiro Togliatti (Ercoli) returned from his long Moscow exile to assume leadership of the Italian Communist party which urged a United Front of all anti-Fascist forces in a broad coalition government. The same step was urged upon London and Washington by the USSR. Following the King's promise to withdraw from public affairs in favor of Prince Umberto upon the liberation of Rome, Badoglio formed a cabinet on April 21 in which all six of the parties of the Committee of National Liberation were represented. The Narkomindel thus achieved its purpose of effecting a democratization of the Italian régime and of check-mating Churchill's championship of the captain and the king who had served Mussolini so long and faithfully. In Italy, as in Yugoslavia, Poland and elsewhere, much remained to be done before a joint Allied program could emerge. But at least enemy hopes of quarrels and clashes were frustrated as Anglo-American forces prepared to join the Red Army in a final assault upon the Nazi citadel. . . .

4. THE NEW FATHERLAND

War and diplomacy are the chief preoccupations of all belligerents in a global struggle of coalitions for world supremacy. Diplomacy remains the work of specialists even in States where foreign policy is "democratic." War is the work of all when the practitioners of violence require the labor of all for total attack or total defense. In no community in World War II did the entire population give more generously and devotedly of its sweat, tears and blood than in the USSR. Anglo-American readers have little need of new portraits of the Soviet people at war, for many able journalists have painted and repainted the picture.¹³ The major innovations in high politics, however, are worthy of brief review.

Of the various political changes within the USSR during the years of conflict, none aroused greater comment abroad, or gave rise to more misunderstanding, than the constitutional amendments adopted by the 10th session of the Supreme Soviet on February 1, 1944. Art. 18 was revised to give each Union Republic "the right to enter into direct relations with foreign States, to conclude agreements with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them" and to maintain its own "military formation." To §60 were added two sections, authorizing the Supreme Soviet of each Union Republic to "establish the representation of the Union Republic in international relations" and "the method of the creation of the military formations of the Union Republic." Each Union Republic (§83) was granted the right to appoint Commissars of Defense and Foreign Affairs in its own Sovnarkom. Federal authority was redefined by adding to §14 (a), enumerating the powers of the USSR, the phrase "and the establishment of the general character of the relations between Union Republics and foreign States," and by adding to §14 (g) the phrase "the establishment of the guiding principles of the organization of the military formation of the Union Republic." Arts. 77 and 78 were revised to convert the federal Commissariats of Defense and Foreign Affairs from All-Union to Union-Republican Commissariats.

Molotov explained these changes in an address to the Supreme Soviet on February 1:

The meaning of the proposed transformation is perfectly clear. This transformation signifies the great expansion of activities of the Union Republics which has become possible as a result of their political, economic and cultural growth, or, in other words, as a result of their national development. One cannot fail to see in this a new, important step in the practical solution of the national problem in the multi-national Soviet State, one cannot fail to see in this a new victory for our Lenin-Stalin national policy. . . .

The Union Republics have quite a few specific economic and cultural requirements which cannot be covered in full measure by All-Union representation abroad and also by treaties and agreements of the Union with other States. These national requirements of the Republics can be met better by means of direct relations of the Republics with the corresponding States. . . . The realization of measures of this kind at the present time means that the Soviet State has reached a new level in its development, turning into a more complex and virile organism. . . .

The recognition by the Union of the increased requirements of the Republics in their state activities, including foreign activities, and legislative provision for these needs of the Republics, only serve to strengthen the fraternal relations among the peoples of our country and reveal still more fully the historic meaning of the existence of the Soviet Union to the peoples of the East and West. . . .

The Soviet Union and its Allies are already successfully beating Fascism, which imposed this war, hastening the time of its utter military defeat. But we know that matters should not be restricted to the military defeat of the Fascist forces. It is necessary to bring to completion the moral-political defeat of Fascism as well. To this, we are certain, will successfully contribute those State transformations in the Soviet Union which are now submitted for your approval.¹⁴

The amendments provoked fantastic explanations in certain circles in Britain and the United States, some of which resembled Göbbels' specious "interpretations." Stalin was alleged to be seeking "16 seats" at the "Peace Conference," or "16 votes" in any new League of Nations, despite the obvious fact that no Union Republic could have any international status until formally recognized by other States and despite the even more obvious fact that in conferences or leagues of sovereignties no substantive decisions binding on all can be reached by majority vote. The Kremlin, said others, was preparing to annex various States of Europe under a pretense of autonomy. The actual motives of the Politburo were of a wholly different order. Soviet federalists, always aiming at

maximum local autonomy within the centralized framework of Party rule and planned socialist economy, here took cognizance on the one hand of the vastly expanded and complicated foreign relations of the Union and of the huge growth of its military establishment and, on the other hand, of local pride in the contributions to victory of the various Republics, especially notable in the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia which had suffered the agony of invasion and prolonged enemy occupation. To decentralize somewhat the control of diplomatic and military affairs would not only relieve administrative congestion at Moscow but would give to the citizens of each Republic a new sense of collective prestige.

The transformation left the Soviet federal system at a point midway between the arrangements prevailing in the United States and those in the British Commonwealth. In the latter each Dominion, while subject to the King and theoretically under the jurisdiction of the Parliament at Westminster, maintains its own armed forces and conducts its foreign (as well as domestic) affairs as an independent sovereignty. In the American Union the States maintain National Guards and may, with the consent of Congress, enter into compacts and agreements with one another and with foreign States, though they may not maintain their own diplomatic representation abroad. In the USSR the Union Republics may now have their own militias, may exchange diplomatic representatives with such foreign States as desire to do so, and may conclude international "agreements"—which, while not formally requiring the consent of the federal Supreme Soviet, must presumably conform to the terms of federal treaties in order to be deemed constitutional. Within a year after the revision, accords for frontier administration and exchanges of population were signed between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania on the one side and Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine on the other. These Republics, along with Armenia, were the first to establish their own Commissariats of Foreign Affairs. The admission of Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine to the new United Nations organization at San Francisco, in accordance with the understanding reached at Yalta, would seem to foreshadow an international position for these communities somewhat comparable to that of the British Dominions. Imitation is not only the sincerest form of flattery but is here a further advance in the evolution of Soviet federalism toward a

workable reconciliation of local self-rule with effective central authority.

No other changes of comparable scope in the formal structure of Soviet government were initiated during the war. On the contrary, ordinary electoral and legislative procedures were for the most part suspended for the duration, as in Great Britain and many other belligerents. The proliferation of new war agencies was less extensive than in the Western democracies, although the number of federal Commissariats was increased and all existing agencies assumed new functions. Top authority for the planning of military operations and war production remained concentrated in the State Committee of Defense. To its original five members (Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Voroshilov) were added during the course of hostilities Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. On November 22, 1944, the Soviet Press announced that Voroshilov (who remained a member of the Politburo) had been replaced by General Nikolai Bulganin, a former textile worker who had served as Chairman of the Moscow Soviet and had been named Vice-Commissar of Defense immediately before his elevation to the Committee.

The Party remained more than ever during the struggle for survival and victory a consecrated comradeship of disciples, willing to give all to the cause. The democratization of the hierarchy, forecast at Congress XVIII, did not materialize under the conditions imposed by the Axis invasion. No Congresses or Conferences met during hostilities. The number of Party members who died for the Fatherland has not as yet been published, but it was undoubtedly large since the members everywhere assumed tasks involving maximum risks. By way of compensating for casualties, new members were admitted in large numbers, with preference given to soldiers decorated for valor. By 1943 candidates enjoying this distinction were required to serve only three months' probation.

In the year preceding the war, members and candidates totalled 3,400,000, new members admitted each month c. 17,000 and Komsomols c. 7,000,000. By late '43 as many as 100,000 new members were being admitted monthly. Total membership by VE-Day approximated 5,000,000 (including candidates, comprising perhaps a quarter of the total), plus at least 15,000,000 Komsomols.¹⁵ A majority of the Party consisted of young people who were not

pre-war members. The proportion of women members declined and the proportion of peasants (Kolkhoz workers serving in the Red Army) increased. The extent, if any, to which this increase in size and change in composition would modify the outlook and policies of the ruling group obviously depended in the year of victory on the opportunities for self-expression which the Central Committee might afford to the rank and file, and upon the degree to which the new recruits might be disposed to dissent from the guidance of their elders. If the leaders of former days, who had led the Fatherland to victory, should prove as capable of grappling with the problems of peace as with those of war, major alterations of policies and top personnel within the ruling elite would be unlikely to materialize.

Ordeal by battle invariably brings to prominence in every community new leaders, possessed of qualities of command which are susceptible of translation into political influence. Ancient Rome and modern France reveal many instances of such a transition, although public preferences in Britain and the United States have established a negative correlation between military prowess and political success. The possibility of rivalry between the Red Army High Command and the civilian leadership of the Communist Party has often been a source of speculation abroad, particularly among anti-Soviet wishful thinkers.¹⁶ But persuasive evidence of any such tendency or prospect is entirely lacking. In no war on record have military and civilian leaders cooperated more intimately and harmoniously than in the Patriotic War of the USSR. Top political leaders, with few exceptions, held military rank. High military commanders were all members of the Party. In terms of institutional relationships, and in terms of symbols of emotional identification, Army and Party, Government and people, State and country were one.

The war-time transformation of the Red Army and of the diplomatic service is nevertheless significant of new attitudes, values and practices, and marks the emergence of new talent for the "vocation of leadership." Some of the new figures in diplomacy and war were certain to play a large role in civil life in the years to come. Several of the more brilliant career men in both services were casualties. Aging Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov died of illness after being succeeded as Chief of Staff in April, 1943, by Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky. General Nikolai F. Vatutin, com-

mander of the 1st Ukrainian Army, died on April 14, 1944, following a surgical operation. General Ivan D. Cherniakhovsky, brilliant Jewish commander of the 1st Byelo-Russian Army which first invaded German territory, succumbed of wounds on February 18, 1945. Konstantin Oumansky, able Soviet diplomat who as Ambassador to Mexico helped to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, Colombia, Uruguay, Chile, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, was killed in a plane crash near Mexico City on January 25, 1945, while on his way to San José to present his credentials. For their services in promoting inter-allied cooperation Ambassadors Gromyko and Gusev were awarded the Order of Lenin on November 4, 1944.

Prominent among the younger marshals (in addition to Zhukov and Vasilevsky) who won fame against the *Wehrmacht* were Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, victor at Stalingrad, Danzig and Stettin; Ivan S. Konev, liberator of Prague and Zhukov's aide in the capture of Berlin; Rodion Y. Malinovsky, conquerer of Budapest; Fedor I. Tolbukhin, emancipator of Sofia and Vienna; L. A. Govorov, who beat the foe at Leningrad, Tallinn and Viborg; K. A. Meretskov, victor in Lapland and northern Norway; N. N. Voronov, Chief Marshal of Artillery; P. A. Rotmistrov and Y. N. Fedorenko, Marshals of armored troops; N. D. Yakovlev, Marshal of Artillery; and Air Marshals A. E. Golovanov and A. A. Novikov. Scarcely less distinguished were Admirals N. G. Kuznetsov and I. S. Isaakov and Generals A. I. Yeremenko and Ivan Bagramian.

Both warriors and diplomats were raised to new levels of prestige by an impressive array of honors. On June 14, 1943, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet established a system of permanent ranks and promotions in the diplomatic service in order to facilitate recruitment of talent by offering permanent careers.

Ambassadors and Ministers, 1st and 2nd class, are appointed by the Presidium while Counsellors, Secretaries and Attachés are named by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In the summer of 1943 ornate formal uniforms were introduced for all Soviet diplomats of high rank. Military commanders, now restored to ranks and titles comparable to those of the West and of old Russia, were garbed in even more impressive costumes, with epaulettes (pogoni), ribbons, medals and jewelled insignia for top leaders. Political Commissars in the Army, representing the Party and

fulfilling the functions of morale officers, were abolished in August, 1940, but restored as "War Commissars" on July 17, 1941, to act, in Stalin's phrase, as "the father and soul" of their regiments. On October 9, 1942, however, they were transformed into "political instructors," given military rank and subordinated to the regular officers, thus terminating the system of dual command and Party supervision of the armed forces.

The old line proletarian officers of the civil war were satirized for their romanticism and frequent incompetence in *The Front*, a play of 1942 for which the Stalin Prize of 100,000 rubles was awarded to Alexander Korneichuk (husband of Wanda Wasilewska) who became a Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs and the first Foreign Commissar of the Ukrainian Republic. The new officers of the Red Army, rising rapidly from the ranks, became a sharply defined and privileged elite group, with shoulder straps, orderlies, and exacting requirements of dignity and deference from their subordinates. They were also well-paid, a lieutenant, for example, receiving 1,000 rubles a month as compared with only 10 rubles for a private. Officers were generously rewarded for acts of valor through new honors introduced in 1942, including the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Alexander Nevsky. The Order of Bogdan Hmel'nitsky was introduced in 1944 for distinguished guerrilla fighters. Officers and privates alike were eligible for other honors, including the Order of the War for the Fatherland. Holders of many of these medals were entitled to a small monthly pension and often to free travel privileges and reduced rent. Beginning on November 11, 1941, military detachments which won distinction in combat were elevated to the status of "Guards" units whose members were granted double pay and special medals and banners. The first entire army to be so honored was the 62nd Army which defended Stalingrad.

These growing distinctions in income and deference between elite and mass in the armed services were paralleled by increasing differentials in wages and salaries in Soviet economy. The question of whether such inequalities are inconsistent with "socialism" and the ideal of the "classless society" will be considered in the concluding chapter. Soviet war economy and war finance lie outside the purview of the present study and would require a separate volume for an adequate exposition.¹⁷ It is enough to notice that total war in any economic system involves total con-

trol and mobilization of productive resources by public authorities; that the Russian war was more "total" than any other; and that the economy of Soviet socialism was already well adapted to the exigencies of the crisis. Such similarities as may be observed between the war economies of Atlantica and the USSR are attributable less to "capitalistic" innovations in the Soviet Union than to the adoption of "totalitarian" and "socialist" devices in the West.

All the techniques of war-time economic controls familiar to Americans and Britishers were employed in the USSR: astronomical appropriations, bond drives, heavy taxation, wage-freezing, price-fixing, rationing, etc. The outstanding difference was that while the entrepreneurs of other belligerents, despite excess profits taxes and renegotiation of contracts, could and did pile up many private fortunes, no one in the Soviet Union can make private profit through the sale of the products of labor to Government or to other consumers. Amid the bitter sacrifice and impoverishment of most of the Soviet population, many individuals, to be sure, received large prizes, bonuses and other pecuniary rewards, but always in recognition of talent, valor or industry and never in consequence of personal or corporate ownership of productive enterprises employing labor. Rationing at low-fixed prices supplied all citizens with a bare minimum of necessities. By way of draining off excess currency and combatting the black market, many goods were also sold at "open" stores without points and at much higher prices. In pursuit of the same objectives a certain amount of unrationed and competitive buying and selling for gain was permitted at inflation prices, fixed by the scarcity of goods and the abundance of money. War budgets, like peace budgets, were balanced. Tax rates were raised, gifts to the State were encouraged and war bonds were sold to the amount of almost 13 billion rubles in 1942, 20 billions in 1943, 28 billions in 1944, and 25 billions in 1945.¹⁸ Tax revenues and planned profits in industry and agriculture comprised the balance of public income. Soviet war financing on a pay-as-you-go basis drastically reduced living standards, but also prevented any general currency inflation, avoided a huge public debt at the close of hostilities and facilitated capital accumulation for purposes of reconstruction.

Special problems of almost inconceivable magnitude and difficulty were posed by enemy occupation of the richest agricultural

and industrial areas of the west and south and by the appalling devastation of vast provinces, great cities, and thousands of lesser communities. Some 38,000,000 people fled their homes. Probably 13,000,000 soldiers and civilians * died in the struggle, many of them deliberately butchered or starved to death by a foe bent upon extermination of his victims. The United States would have suffered comparable wounds had 9,000,000 Americans been slain and 27,000,000 become refugees, with the enemy in occupation of most of the States south of the Great Lakes and East of the Mississippi plus parts of Louisiana, Arkansas and Oklahoma, and with St. Louis, Memphis, New Orleans, Mobile, Nashville, Pittsburgh, Washington and innumerable smaller towns reduced to ashes and rubble. The miracle of Soviet survival and of the ultimate victory of the Red Army was achieved through the wholesale removal of factories on freight cars to the Urals and to Siberia, where war production was at once resumed and expanded, often with the aid of Anglo-American supplies. This gigantic transfer of entire industries across thousands of miles was not only successfully carried out but led to an even more amazing result: the total industrial capacity of the USSR in 1945, after four years of unprecedented destruction, was undoubtedly greater than in 1941. In the words of Sumner Welles: "The achievements represented by the victorious struggle of the Soviet Union have never been excelled by any other nation. They would not have been possible save through the efforts of a united and selflessly patriotic people." ¹⁹

The most striking phenomenon of the war against the Axis was the emergence of a fierce and exalted patriotism, inspiring all economic and military achievements of the USSR. This faith had far more in common with the Muscovite loyalty of days gone by, albeit differing from it in many respects, than with revolutionary proletarian internationalism. This shift in significant symbols moving the hearts and minds of men did not spring, full blown, from the brow of Mars. Many symptoms of the transition were to be observed in the Soviet prose, poetry, drama and cinema in the middle 1930's. The menace of Fascism and the waning of all prospects of World Revolution combined to call up out of the past a new devotion to the rich and solid earth of the ancient Russian lands and to the heroes and songs and stories of long ago.

* cf. Note 32 of Chapter Twelve, pp. 637-8 below.

The terms "Russia" and "Russian" again became respectable, not as identical with the RSFSR (a usage always respectable) but as symbolic of the entire Soviet Union. The citadel of the embattled workers of the world was slowly transmuted into "*Rodina*"—i.e., native land or birth land. In the May Day slogans of the Party, for example, the frequency of national symbols rose sharply after 1933 and still more sharply after 1939, while "universal-revolutionary" symbols, having suffered a decline after 1919, dropped swiftly after 1933 and almost vanished after 1941.²⁰ The change was not decreed by Politburo or Sovnarkom. It sprang from the inner feelings of a proud people once hopeful of leading mankind, by way of global class war, toward universal brotherhood, but now driven back, not unwillingly, on the spiritual resources of its own localized Fatherland. The "*Rodina*" was dynamic, vast and radiant with the majestic music, folklore and epics of days of old, half forgotten but now vividly recalled with new joy and pride.

From the very day of invasion, the struggle was officially and popularly described as the "Great Patriotic War" or the "Second Patriotic War," in recollection of 1812. *Rodina* was increasingly coupled with the adjective *svyashchennaya*—i.e., holy or sacred. On November 7, 1941, as the fate of Moscow hung in the balance, Stalin invoked the inspiration not of Marx, Engels, the Communards or even the Red Guards of October, but of Mikhail Kutuzov, Alexander Suvorov, Dmitri Pozharsky, Kuzma Minin, Dmitri Donskoy, and Alexander Nevsky. "Memory turns the pages of the centuries," wrote Vladimir Kholodowski. "Listen—and the silence of the times that have gone will bring to your ears the muffled clang of the Veche bell; the whine of the Pecheneg arrows; the ballads of the blind Dulcimer player. Look—and in the mist you will behold the march of Svyatoslav's legions and the magic city on the Dnieper, capital of the first princes . . ." ²¹ In December, 1943, the Sovnarkom, contending that *The International* no longer expressed "the basic changes that have taken place in our country as a result of the victories of the Soviet system," adopted the new *Hymn of the Soviet Union*, whose stirring words praised "Russia" as well as the USSR and glorified the *Otechestvo* or Fatherland.

Everywhere the immortal words of Alexander Nevsky, victor over the Teutonic Knights, were quoted: "Go, and say to all

abroad that Russia lives. Whosoever wishes may come here as a guest without fear. But whosoever comes against us with the sword shall perish by the sword. Such is the law of the Russian land and such it will always be!"

Amid a host of vibrant voices, none was more eloquent than that of Ilya Ehrenburg, addressing the men of the Red Army:

Together with you marches the frail little girl, Zoya, and the stern marines of Sevastopol. Together with you march your ancestors who welded together this land of Russia—the knights of Prince Igor, the legions of Dmitri. Together with you march the soldiers of 1812 who routed the invincible Napoleon. Together with you march Budenny's troops, Chapayev's volunteers, barefooted, hungry and all-conquering. Together with you march your children, your mother, your wife. They bless you! . . . Soldier, together with you marches Russia! She is beside you. Listen to her winged step. In the moment of battle, she will cheer you with a glad word. If you waver, she will uphold you. If you conquer, she will embrace you.²²

As men facing death turn to what is dearest and most sacred among their images of love, protection and hope, a people facing death finds its road to life in the recall of past ordeals bravely faced and surmounted and in the glory of those who gave their lives that others might live. The tradition of the international proletarian revolution is rich in heroes, saints and martyrs. But the Party leadership, knowing the hearts of the masses and striving for unity with the Atlantic democracies, appealed to older and deeper memories. The most popular heroes during the early years of war were not old revolutionists or new Party celebrities or Marshals or airmen, but three hitherto unknown youths. Shura Chekalin, a sixteen-year-old high school boy of Tula who was posthumously named "Hero of the Soviet Union," had become the skillful and fearless scout of a guerrilla band, until he was taken, tormented and hanged by the foe. Liza Chaikina was a young woman in her twenties, locally famous in the heart of the flax country for her inspiring educational work among the Kolkhoz villagers. She was shot by a Nazi firing squad for having organized a partisan brigade which wrought havoc among the invaders. Most revered of all was Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, an eighteen-year-old high school girl who was also a partisan fighter, finally captured, tortured and hanged by the Germans. Such simple figures as these, emerging from the people, shared honors in the

new Soviet hall of fame along with Stalin and Lenin, and with the great Peter, the dread Ivan and other courageous warriors of olden times.

The ingredient of hatred, always an element in the compounds of purely ethnocentric patriotism, had a strange history in Russia's days of agony. At the outset only Hitlerites, Nazis and Fascists were denounced, while sympathy was expressed for German workers, peasants and intellectuals. This attitude, reminiscent of the period of the intervention, soon gave way to horror when word spread of enemy atrocities committed by officers and men and by Nazis and non-Nazis alike. Most Germans of the Third Reich were in truth victims of collective criminal insanity, driving them to demonic frenzy and to deeds of fiendish sadism against the helpless. No people, save the martyred Jews of all Europe, suffered more frightful torments at the hands of the psychopathic monsters of the *Wehrmacht* than the inhabitants of the occupied territories of the USSR.²³ The incredible outrages of Maidanek, Buchenwald, Belsen and other camps, with their torture chambers, gas cells and crematoria, were reproduced on an immense scale all over the *Ostland*, where organized rapists, murderers and wholesale butchers wandered for years over the countryside with their knives, whips, guns, scaffolds and asphyxiation trucks.

Under the impact of this systematic savagery, which is wholly without parallel among preliterate "savages," the distinctions in the Soviet mind between "good" and "bad" Germans, and between Hitlerites and non-Hitlerites, tended to disappear. In the liberated provinces the stories told earlier by the partisans were fully confirmed. The enemy's orgies of suffering and blood spared neither the old nor the children, the women nor the wounded, the infirm nor the babes in arms. In addition to slaughtering the living, the gangsters of the *Herrenvolk* desecrated the dead. The Tchaikovsky Museum, the homes of Rimsky-Korsakov and Chekov, the estate of Leo Tolstoi at Yasna Polyana, and scores of other shrines of art and faith were gutted or demolished only because they were monuments of Slavic culture. All over the land a single cry of rage went up: "Kill the Germans!" Ehrenburg's flaming prose called for vengeance. Sholokhov wrote somberly of "the science of hate." Alexei Tolstoi preached a new gospel: "Kill the beast!"

Not content to wait for the slow wheels of post-war justice,

the Soviet authorities arranged a public trial in Kharkov in mid-December of 1943. Lt. Hans Ritz of the S.S., Gestapo Corporal Reinhardt Retzlau, Captain Wilhelm Langheld and Mikhail Bulanov, a Russian traitor, were found guilty by the military court of crimes which included gassing, flogging, hanging, the butchery of prisoners, the beating of women to death, and the slaughter of sixty sick children, all under twelve years of age. The four criminals were hanged before 50,000 people in the shell-battered marketplace of the Ukrainian metropolis.

Yet Russians not only continued to revere Goethe, Schiller, Bach, Beethoven, Thomas Mann and even Wagner during these years of misery and hatred, but also refrained, for the most part, from mob violence or private vengeance against Germans. There were no outbreaks when 57,000 Nazi prisoners were marched through Moscow on July 17, 1944. In *Pravda* of April 14, 1945, G. Alexandrov reproved Ehrenburg for calling all Germans "a huge gang" and oversimplifying the question of German guilt. The wrath of the Soviet peoples evolved into a stern demand for justice, cleansed of vindictiveness or any indiscriminate racial or national hatred.

Red soldiers in Bucharest, Budapest, Vienna, Berlin and elsewhere, to be sure, appropriated luxury goods and sometimes engaged in wild shooting and rape. But these acts, despite Nazi and Russophobia propaganda, were not manifestations of any thirst for vengeance or of the "horrors of Bolshevism." American and British troops behaved no differently in other enemy cities. There was no organized terrorization of soldiers or civilians in any of the vast and populous areas conquered and occupied by Soviet forces. New attitudes of tolerance and even cordiality toward the German masses echoed once more the fraternalism of the Marxist ethos and the older universalism of Slavic tradition. They also demonstrated the truth of the maxim that enduring hatred is directed only against those whom one has wronged, not against those from whom one has suffered wrong. Whatever the explanation, Soviet patriotism has in it little rancor or xenophobia and no contempt for alien or "inferior" peoples.

This characteristic, among many others, suggests that the new loyalty of Soviet citizens, despite glorification of Muscovite heroes of yesteryear, is radically different from "nationalism" of the familiar Western type. Nationalism in the USSR finds expres-

sion in the cultural accomplishments and political identity of the varied ethnic groups of the Union Republics and of lesser areas. The constitutional amendments of 1944 represented a new advance toward a unity of pluralities. The All-Union patriotism which is the common emotional bond of all transcends and embraces these local nationalisms. It is obviously not a set of parochial symbols and values identified with the linguistic homogeneity, "racial" virtues, or political institutions of any "nationality." It is a synthesis of the older revolutionary internationalism, purged of its subversive and Messianic implications, with a new glory of victory and pride of place, involving shared allegiance to the entire federal fraternity of Soviet nations.

Such a mass faith resembles the patriotism of the diverse peoples of ancient Rome and of other World States of the past rather than the narrower and less tolerant nationalisms of the West. It is the antithesis of the nihilistic megalomania which brought Germans and Japanese to national ruin via attempted world conquest. It could conceivably be extended to embrace all the peoples of a vastly enlarged Eurasian federation. But there is nothing inherent in the psychological imperatives of Soviet patriotism, any more than there is in the economic and political imperatives of Soviet society, which need be expected to drive its disciples to imperialism. The potentially world-shattering class myth has waned. No mythos of race or empire has taken its place in Soviet ideology, nor is this in the least likely in a community striving to give ever richer content to ideals of human dignity, comradeship and equality of rights and opportunities. Those who sing the songs of the steppes, both new and old, will remain loyal in a reasonably well-ordered world to the vision of the brotherhood of man—not in the spirit of the old German proverb, "Be my brother or I'll bash your head in!" but in the Christian and liberal spirit of those who strive for good neighborliness and mutual respect. Again in the words of Ilya Ehrenburg:

In the days of trial our people were conscious of the depths of their love for their native land . . . with its cities old and new, its meadows, its songs, the cries of children beyond the stream, the ash tree on the village boundary—and even the ruts in the roads which we used to curse so fervently. The Russians saw the snows of the Caucasus, the mountain streams, the silvery air of the early morning echoing words of friendship over and over again. The Georgian saw

the white nights of the north, the breadth of the slow-moving rivers, the somnolence of the old trees. And the sons of forty nationalities defended the city of Peter, the city of Pushkin, the city of Lenin. The Siberian, striding along Moskva's embankment, proudly admired the Kremlin, for here was Russia's past and the world's future.

Love for our country did not estrange us from other nations; on the contrary, in those war years we were more keenly aware of the brotherhood that binds the men of toil and the friends of liberty. We know the sufferings of the peoples who fell into the hands of the Fascists, and while our soldier easily understands the language of the Pole or Serb or Czech, he can understand too, without words, the Frenchman, Norwegian or Greek. . . .

Stalingrad was the mountain path from which we began to discern the future through the haze, and to conjecture what life would be like after victory. Our native land is lovelier and dearer to us than ever, for it is watered with the blood of relatives and friends. We know how many wounds this land has suffered; only that inspiration, that fire which helped us defend and save it, will help us heal it. . . . Soon the victors will be returning home. And Victory will enter every Soviet home, will sit down at the table and cut the loaf of bread. Then we shall feel the taste of happiness on our lips.²⁴

5. COUNTER-ATTACK

From Stalingrad to Berlin, as a plane flies, is almost 1,200 miles. Between November, 1942, and May, 1945, the Red Army fought its way forward at the rate of 40 miles a month through scorched fields and ruined towns, across rivers of blood and mountains of dead, until the shadow of defeat in the valley of the Volga was transfigured into the radiance of victory on the banks of the Spree. Not since the Mongols has any army traversed so vast an expanse of land to destroy its enemy at its destination. No army ever since armies began fought so successfully so formidable a foe over so wide an area, stretching almost 2,000 miles from the northern to the southern extremities of the winding front. The telling of the tale of this Herculean achievement is best left to epic poets or, if these be scarce in a prosaic age of motors and machine-guns, to military historians. Here a bare chronicle will be enough to relate the tide of combat on which the United Nations rode toward victory to the ebb and flow of high politics which carved the shape of the peace to come.

With the battle-cry "Westward!" painted on their trucks and

tanks, Soviet divisions north and east of Kharkov hurled themselves against the *Wehrmacht* in mid-July of 1943, taking Orel and Belgorod on August 5 and the Ukrainian capital on the 23rd. What they found in the wreckage spurred them to greater effort. All of the 430 factories of the once handsome Ukrainian metropolis were ruined. Half of its houses were wrecked. Of Kharkov's population of almost a million, only 300,000 remained; 100,000 had been taken to the Reich as slaves; another 100,000 died of hunger and disease; the rest were refugees; all of the 30,000 Jews were slaughtered. In Orel, with 114,000 inhabitants, only 30,000 remained. Some 12,000 had been butchered. The rest were fugitives or deportees. In the north, Smolensk, liberated on September 25, was also a ghost city. Red soldiers, with burning hate in their hearts, cleared the Donbas during September and reached the Dnieper.

Secretary Hull in conference in Moscow heard the guns of the capital booming on October 24 in celebration of the capture of Melitopol, commanding the approach to the Crimea. Here 20,000 Germans were slain in a savage 11-day struggle from house to house. On the next day the ruin of the great dam at Dniepropetrovsk, blown up by the Red Army in September 1941, was retaken. On the day before the anniversary of the Revolution, Holy Kiev was liberated, far less damaged than Kharkov but with only 65,000 of its 900,000 people still in the city and these starving and in rags. The desperate foe, terrified by his incessant and involuntary "disengaging movements," clung fiercely to the iron center of Krivoi Rog in the Dnieper bend. Zhitomir changed hands twice in November in the most ferocious fighting since Stalingrad. By the end of the year the *Wehrmacht* had suffered a defeat in the Kiev bulge comparable to its summer disaster near Kursk. But it hung on to what it could hold of the Ukraine, lest Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, already in panic, should try to quit the conflict. It likewise clung to its threatened siege lines around Leningrad as a means of keeping Finland in the fray. These efforts left no reserves adequate to meet the mounting menace of Anglo-American preparations in the Mediterranean and in England. While the shattered *Luftwaffe* sought to halt the Red advance, American and British bombers destroyed Cologne and Hamburg, began the pulverization of Berlin, and crippled German industry beyond recovery.

During 1944 effective military and diplomatic collaboration within the Grand Alliance made new strides. In the political field the year was primarily one of planning the peace. UNRRA, established November 9, 1943, with Soviet participation, held the second session of its Council in Montreal in September. The USSR also participated in the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, held at Bretton Woods, N. H., in July to devise plans for an International Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. But Moscow declined at the last moment to take part in the Civil Aviation Conference held in Chicago in November, because of the participation of "countries like Switzerland, Portugal and Spain that have for many years conducted a pro-Fascist policy hostile to the Soviet Union" (Tass, October 29, 1944). Ambassador Gromyko led the Soviet delegation, which also included Arkady Sobolev, at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21–September 29, where the Moscow Conference pledge of a general international organization was translated into the concrete plan which was to become the basis of the San Francisco Charter. Soviet observers attended the periodical meetings in London of Allied Ministers of Education, who made plans in April, 1944, for a United Nations Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction.

Conferences at the top level were limited during 1944 to another Churchill-Roosevelt parley in Quebec and Hyde Park in September and a Churchill-Stalin meeting in Moscow in October. Stalin cabled the President and Prime Minister on September 11 that pressing military commitments made it impossible for him to come to Canada. With Harriman participating, Churchill and Eden conferred with Stalin and Molotov, October 9–19. Agreements were reached regarding Bulgaria and Yugoslavia but the vexed Polish problem, to which most of the time was devoted, still defied solution. American-Soviet relations at the top level were less intimate, although Vice-President Wallace made a brief trip to Siberia in the course of his spring mission to China. Much interest was aroused in both countries by the summer journey of Eric Johnston, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who visited the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan and declared that Soviet economic progress since 1928 was "an unexampled achievement in the industrial history of the whole world." He expressed optimism regarding future commercial relations, providing both

communities would refrain from "exporting ideologies and political opinions."

The Red Army had meanwhile continued its westward march, with retribution in the souls of its fighters and victory upon its banners. In January, 1944, a powerful offensive smashed the Nazi lines around Leningrad and liberated the tortured city from its long ordeal. For 30 months its people had worked, fought, starved and died with no aid or supplies save what could be brought by plane in summer and transported in winter by rail and truck over frozen Lake Ladoga. Ancient Novgorod was retaken on January 20. As Soviet troops rolled into Estonia in the north, their comrades in the south retook Rovno and Lutsk in Poland (February 5), occupied Krivoi Rog in mid-February and drove the enemy from the Dnieper bend during March. Rumania was invaded early in April, following the liberation of Cernauti (March 30). Odessa was freed on April 10. During April the forces of Tolbukhin and Yeremenko assaulted the Nazi defenders of the bypassed Crimea, finally taking Sevastopol on May 10 and compelling the last enemy units to surrender two days later. Early in June Govorov's Karelian Army attacked and breached the Mannerheim Line and entered Viborg on the 20th. The inauguration in early June of "shuttle bombing" of enemy bases in the Balkans by American planes flying from Mediterranean to Soviet fields, and the long delayed liberation of Rome (June 5), were soon overshadowed by even more momentous events.

At long last in the dawn of June 6, 1944, Anglo-American forces, in thousands of planes and ships, descended upon the coast of Normandy under the command of General Eisenhower. After effecting a successful landing, they took the Cherbourg Peninsula in less than a month, occupied Brittany, and broke through the German lines in northwestern France. Another invasion force landed on the Riviera in mid-August and drove up the Rhone valley. The decision of the Nazi High Command to evacuate France, which brought the liberating armies to Paris on August 24 and to the German frontier by September, was not unrelated to the need of shifting troops to the eastern front. The coordinated offensive of the Red Army opened on June 22 with the divisions under Bagramian and Cherniakhovsky outflanking and capturing Vitebsk. Between July 1 and August 1 Soviet forces took Minsk, Pinsk, Pskov, Chelm, Lublin, Dvinsk, Lvov, Brest-

Litovsk and Przemyśl. "It is the Russian army," said Churchill on August 2, "that has done the main work of tearing the guts out of the German army." In Central Poland stubborn enemy resistance halted the Soviet drive early in August on the Vistula, across the river from Warsaw. But in the north and south Axis forces crumbled before the onslaught.

Among the fruits of these victories were the capitulations of Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria. The Rumanian politicians around King Michael and General Antonescu, united in their fear of the USSR, sought early in the year to open clandestine peace negotiations with the Western Powers. In order to soften resistance and reassure London and Washington, Molotov announced on April 2, as the Red Army reached the Pruth, that his Government "does not pursue the aim of acquiring Rumanian territory or altering the existing social structure of Rumania." Continued wriggling and wrangling in Bucharest were ended only by the irresistible advance of Soviet troops. On August 25 the King effected the arrest of Antonescu and his Ministers, proclaimed the end of hostilities and acceptance of Allied terms, and named General Constantine Sanatescu Premier. A peace delegation was received in Moscow on August 30 as the Red Army entered the Rumanian capital. Under the agreement signed on September 12 Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were restored to the USSR, which in turn promised to bring about the retrocession of Northern Transylvania from Hungary to Rumania. Provision was made for the payment of reparations in kind. Under the supervision of an Anglo-American-Soviet Control Commission, Rumania became a "co-belligerent" against Budapest and Berlin.

While Moscow had no intention of departing from Molotov's pledge regarding internal Rumanian affairs, it insisted upon a fully cooperative anti-Fascist régime. That the Soviet leaders were not fastidious in their choice of means is shown by their support of such opportunists as Mihail Rallea and George Tatarescu. The Soviet Commissioner in Bucharest, Vyshinsky, encountered obstructionism rather than collaboration from Antonescu's successors. Sanatescu gave way on December 6 to General Nicolae Radescu, but friction continued. In late February, 1945, mobs demonstrated for a "Rumanian Soviet" under the leadership of Anna Pauker, a Rumanian Communist who had assumed Soviet citizenship. Radescu resigned on February 28

and took refuge in the British Embassy. On the first day of March, Peter Groza became Premier at the head of a Left coalition. His régime received Moscow's blessing in the form of the restoration of Northern Transylvania on the 10th. Although including Communists, it was neither "Soviet" in form nor "Communist" in purpose, but was pledged to agrarian reform, the punishment of Axis collaborators, cooperation with the Soviet Union and democracy at home. The Liberal and Peasant parties, however, with their Western and anti-Russian orientation were all but suppressed.

Finland's road to peace was no less tortuous. As early as mid-February, 1944, Juho Paasikivi conferred in Stockholm with Mme. Alexandra Kollontai, Soviet Ambassador. The Narkomindel did not insist upon "unconditional surrender." Helsinki was told that it could have peace by agreeing to a rupture of relations with Germany, internment of German troops and ships, restoration of the 1940 boundaries, release of Allied prisoners, and further negotiations in Moscow regarding demobilization, reparations and the status of Petsamo. Premier Edwin Linkomies, hoping for miracles and confident that inactivity at the front would continue, rejected these terms. He sent Paasikivi to Moscow in March, however, only to terminate discussion by rejecting modified Soviet conditions on April 19. The result was Govorov's offensive in June which drove the Finnish invaders from Petrozavodsk in Soviet Karelia and retook Viborg on the Isthmus. Ribbentrop and Keitel arrived in Helsinki on June 22 and secured a pledge from President Rysto Ryti that Finland would make no separate peace. The United States, which had belatedly expelled Minister Hjalmar Procope on the 16th, severed relations completely on the 30th on the ground that the Helsinki Government was "a puppet of Nazi Germany."

Early in August, as Finnish military prospects darkened, Ryti was forced to resign. Parliament transferred his functions to Baron Mannerheim. Premier Linkomies gave way to Anders W. Hackzell. The reactionary President and conservative Premier still made no haste to conclude peace. Hitler, resorting to flattery in the absence of other available weapons, sent Keitel in mid-August to confer decorations on Mannerheim. But the Baron perceived that the Reich had lost the war. On August 25 Minister George A. Gripenberg in Stockholm requested Mme. Kollontai to ask

Moscow for an armistice. Hostilities ceased on September 4, 1944. German troops resisted expulsion but were driven out of Finland by the end of the year through joint operations of Soviet and Finnish forces.

An armistice agreement was signed in Moscow on September 19 by Foreign Minister Karl Enckell and by Colonel General Andrei Zhdanov, who acted for both Britain and the USSR and became head of the Allied Control Commission in Helsinki. The Soviet Union annexed Petsamo, restored Hanko to Finland, and secured a 50-year lease on the Porkkala Peninsula near the Finnish capital. In other respects the frontiers of 1940 were restored. Reparations were fixed at \$300,000,000 (half of what Moscow had asked in the spring), payable in goods over six years. Finland severed diplomatic relations with Japan and with Germany and its satellites. Paasikivi became Premier in a left-wing cabinet on November 17. In the elections of March 17, 1945, a small majority was won in Parliament by the Social Democrats and the new Popular Democrats, composed of ex-S D's and Communists, at the expense of the Liberals and Rightists.

Bulgaria under its Quisling Cabinet and Regency Council, acting for the boy Tsar Simeon, had never declared war on the USSR. Its war against Yugoslavia, Greece and the Atlantic Powers was opposed by the underground "Fatherland Front," dominated by the pro-Russian "Zveno" group. Desultory peace negotiations early in 1944 bogged down under German pressure and Bulgarian hopes of retaining annexations. On September 1 a new cabinet under Kosta Muraviev sought to extricate the country from its plight by seeking an armistice and proclaiming "neutrality"—a formula which Moscow deemed a cloak for continued aid to Germany. On September 5 the USSR declared war on Bulgaria. In response to pleas from Tolbukhin, the Muraviev régime declared war on the Reich three days later but was overthrown by a coup on the 9th. Kimon Georgiev, conservative pro-Russian Zveno leader, became Premier as Red troops crossed the Danube. Soviet forces entered Sofia on September 16 and occupied the entire country, which, however, was given the status of "co-belligerent," fighting the enemy alongside the Red Army and Tito's partisans. The Bulgarian armistice was signed on October 28 by Marshal Tolbukhin and Lt. Gen. James Gammell

on behalf of the three Super-Powers. The terms were lenient, requiring Bulgarian evacuation of Macedonia and Thrace but permitting retention of Dobrudja.²⁵

During these negotiations Red forces in the Baltic had liberated Tallinn (September 22), Riga (October 13) and invaded East Prussia. Into the central Danubian plain pushed the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian armies under Malinovsky and Petrov. With the aid of Tito's Yugoslav Army of Liberation, Belgrade was cleared of the enemy on October 21. Magyar Regent Horthy dispatched a secret peace mission to Moscow late in September. On October 15 he publicly denounced the Reich and ordered the end of hostilities. But Berlin at once deposed and arrested Horthy and set up Major Ferenc Szalasi, leader of the Nazi "Arrow Cross," as Regent-Premier. Col. Gen. Janos Voeroes, Chief of Staff, and Col. Gen. Bela Miklos de Dalnok, Commander of the 1st Hungarian Army, crossed over to the Soviet line and eventually became Minister of Defense and Premier, respectively, in the Provisional Hungarian Government, established in Debreczen on December 21, 1944.

By this time Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Army had joined Malinovsky's forces in surrounding Budapest, which Nazi fanatics sought to turn into "another Stalingrad." But the enemy capitulated on February 13 after 50 days of siege and street fighting, during which the defenders lost 160,000 killed or captured and the handsome Danubian metropolis suffered heavy damage. Meanwhile the Provisional Government on December 30 declared war on Germany and asked the Allies for an armistice. The document was signed in Moscow by a Magyar delegation and by Voroshilov, acting for London and Washington as well as for the Kremlin. By its terms, amounting to "unconditional surrender," the new Hungary returned to its 1937 boundaries, agreed to pay \$300,000,000 in reparations to Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and the USSR, and placed its armed forces at the disposition of the Allies.²⁶

The final paroxysm of the now mortally wounded *Wehrmacht* had already begun. The dying monster struck two last blows: one in December against American forces in the Ardennes along the Belgian-Luxembourg border; the other in January against Soviet forces encircling Budapest. The first lunged forward beyond Bastogne but was halted east of the Meuse. The second

recovered Esztergom but failed to break the siege of the capital. Amid the thunder of thousands of guns in the east and west, and under the now incessant rain of fire and death from the skies, the *Götterdämmerung* of the Nazi Reich moved toward its frenzied and fearful finale. On the 8th of March the American First Army crossed the Rhine at Remagen. Where Rundstedt had failed, his successor Kesselring could not succeed. By mid-April the American Third Army was in Weimar and the Ninth was across the Elbe, while British forces in the north smashed eastward across the Prussian coastal plain through disintegrating Nazi lines.

The Red Army had opened its fifth and final major offensive on January 12, 1945, with crushing assaults in central Poland delivered by the 1st and 4th Ukrainian and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Byelo-Russian Armies. Under Zhukov's brilliant direction, the Soviet and Polish troops stormed Warsaw on the 17th. By the 19th Lodz, Cracow and Tarnow had fallen, the frontier of German Silesia was reached, and East Prussia was deeply invaded. Both provinces were rapidly overrun as the forces of retribution pushed to the Oder and beyond, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Breslau was by-passed and besieged. By early March Kuestrin had been taken and Danzig was under attack. The Hansa city fell on March 30 as other Soviet units, having liberated Carpatho-Ukraine and most of Slovakia, invaded Austria from the southeast. Vienna capitulated on April 13, with 130,000 prisoners falling into the Red dragnet.

The day of victory in Vienna happened to be the birthday of Thomas Jefferson. An address was to have been broadcast by the President of the United States: "Today this nation which Jefferson helped so greatly to build is playing a tremendous part in the battle for the rights of man all over the world. Today we are part of a vast Allied force which is destroying the makers of war, the breeders of hate, in Europe and in Asia. . . . But the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible. . . . Let us move forward with strong and active faith." The words were never spoken. At Warm Springs, Georgia, on April 12 Franklin D. Roosevelt died. Nowhere abroad was he mourned more deeply than in the Soviet Union. The millions locked in battle against the hate-breeders and war-makers resolved to finish quickly the

bloody task upon the completion of which depended the realization of the hopes of Roosevelt, and of Churchill and Stalin and of all their peoples.

The irresistible fury of Zhukov's forces, leaping forward from the Niesse like an uncoiled spring, was now released against the hated Prussian capital which twice before, in 1760 and 1813, had been entered by Russian armies. Despite the frantic Führer's order that Berlin be held at all costs, every effort of the defenders to counter-attack or to cling to their positions withered under a hail of flame and steel. On the morning of April 22 the artillerymen of the Soviet battery nearest the bombed-out metropolis received the order: "Open fire on the capital of Fascist Germany." Two hours later the first Soviet tank column moved into the outlying streets of the doomed city. Three days later the converging forces of the 1st Byelo-Russian and the 1st Ukrainian Armies made a junction north of Potsdam. Berlin was encircled.

On the same day, April 25, 1945, the 58th Guards Division of Konev's 1st Ukrainian Army met the 69th Division of General Courtney H. Hodges' United States First Army at Torgau on the Elbe. "The victorious Armies of the Allied Powers, waging a war of liberation in Europe," announced Marshal Stalin, "have routed the German troops and linked up on the territory of Germany. Our task and our duty is to finish off the enemy, to compel him to ground arms and surrender unconditionally. The Red Army will fulfill this task and this duty to our people and to all freedom-loving nations. We hail the gallant troops of our Allies now standing on the territory of Germany, shoulder to shoulder with Soviet troops, and filled with determination to discharge their duty to the end." Following the Torgau meeting of Lieuts. Alexander Selvashko and William D. Robertson, in command of patrols, Major General Russakov gave a reception for Major General Emil F. Reinhardt amid fervent celebration and merrymaking. The dismembered Nazi dragon was breathing its last.

Out of the acrid smoke of the final explosions and conflagrations, a new day broke for the United Nations, as a black night of infamy closed over the Third Reich. Munich, birthplace of the Nazi Party, fell to the American Seventh Army on April 30. On May Day Patton's forces took Braunau-am-Inn, birthplace of Hitler. On the same day fighting ceased in Italy with German surrender. The Duce and his mistress were slain by partisans near

Milan on April 28. The Führer disappeared, though his body was never found in the ruined chancellory, which yielded up the charred corpse of Göbbels. The shortlived régime of Admiral Karl Dönitz made a last futile attempt to split the Allies by offering to surrender to the Western Powers while continuing to resist the Red Army. But all resistance was now useless. In Berlin the Reichstag building flamed again. On February 27, 1933, it had been burned by Nazi incendiaries who blamed Communists for the crime. Twelve years later it was burned by Nazi incendiary shells, fired in a futile effort to defend it against Communists who had fought their way from Stalingrad to the Koenigsplatz. As the Red Flag flew over the ruins on the 2nd of May, the last remnants of the *Wehrmacht* in the capital laid down their arms.

In a schoolhouse in Rheims, at 2:41 a.m. of May 7, 1945, General Jodl for the German High Command signed a simple document of unconditional surrender in the presence of representatives of the Soviet High Command and of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. At the same time Breslau capitulated after a siege of 84 days. On the 8th Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Hans Friedeburg and General Hans Stumpff, for the German Army, Navy and Air Force, signed identical documents in Berlin, with Zhukov, Tedder and Spaatz signing for the victors. The handful of Nazi troops who continued to resist near Prague were cut to pieces within a week. On the 9th of May, Moscow's Day of Victory, 1,000 guns fired 30 salvos over the Soviet capital. Said Marshal Stalin:

. . . The age-long struggle of the Slav peoples for their existence and their independence has ended in victory over the German invaders and the German tyranny. Henceforth the great banner of freedom of nations and peace among nations will fly over Europe. . . . Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles against the enemy and gave their lives for the freedom and happiness of our people!

Amid the moving chorus of other voices throughout the world and over the steppes of Eurasia, two gave words, perhaps better than others, to the spirit of the Soviet peoples at the end of their ordeal. On the 24th of June in Red Square, in a great celebration in which the hateful *Hakenkreuz* flags of the foe were dragged in the mire, Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov declared: "After four

years of savage battles, we have entered a period of peaceful growth. The Soviet State has emerged even more mighty from the grim struggle which we waged, and the Red Army has become the most modern and powerful army in the world. But for us Soviet peoples it is unseemly to become conceited—or complacent. In the future too we must strengthen the economic power of our country, unceasingly perfect our military skill, study the rich experience of the Fatherland war, and develop our military science . . .” Ilya Ehrenburg, writing in *Pravda* on the morrow of victory, gave voice to grief, pride and hope:

For long we fought single-handed against Germany’s colossal forces. What would have become of the children of the Canadian farmer or the Paris worker if the Russian soldier who drained the bitter cup on the Don had not marched to the Spree? We not only saved our country, saved human culture, the ancient stones of Europe, its cradles, its working folk, its museums and its books. If England is destined to produce another Shakespeare, if new encyclopedists should appear in France, if our country should confer another Tolstoi on mankind, if the dream of the Golden Age should ever come true, it will be because the soldiers of liberty marched thousands of miles to plant the banner of freedom, brotherhood and light in the city of darkness. . . .

Shoulder to shoulder with us fought our gallant Allies, and fidelity triumphed over perfidy. . . . A new era has begun, an era of plowmen and masons, doctors and architects, of gardeners and schoolteachers, of printers and poets. Washed by the tears of spring, Europe lies wounded. Much labor, persistence, audacity and determination will be required to heal all the wounds, so that the 20th Century—saved from the bloody pit into which the Fascists had cast it—may again stride toward happiness. The boldness, talent and conscience of our people will help the world to rise to its feet.

III

PROMISED LAND

A Book of Prospects

"The church of ancient Rome fell because of the Apollinarian heresy; as to the Second Rome—the church of Constantinople—it has been hewn by the axes of Ishmaelites, but this Third new Rome—the Holy Apostolic Church, under thy mighty rule, shines throughout the entire world more brightly than the sun. All the Orthodox Christian realms have converged in thine own. Thou art the sole Autocrat of the Universe, the only Caesar of the Christians. . . . Two Romes have fallen, but the Third stands, and no fourth can ever be. . . ."

—*Abbott Philotheus of Pskov Monastery to Ivan the Great, c. 1475 A.D.*

WAIT FOR ME*

Wait for me and I'll come back,
But wait with might and main.
Wait throughout the gloom and rack
Of autumn's yellow rain.
Wait when snowstorms fill the way,
Wait in summer's heat,
Wait when, false to yesterday,
Others do not wait.
Wait when from afar at last
No letters come to you.
Wait when all the rest have ceased
To wait, who waited too.

Wait for me and I'll come back.
Do not lightly let
Those, who know so well the knack,
Teach you to forget.
Let my mother and my son
Believe that I have died;
Let my friends, with waiting done,
At the fireside
Lift the wine of grief and clink
To my departed soul.
Wait, and make no haste to drink,
Alone amongst them all.

Wait for me and I'll come back,
Defying death. When he
Who could not wait shall call it luck
Only, let it be.
They cannot know, who did not wait,
How in the midst of fire
Your waiting saved me from my fate,
Your waiting and desire.
Why I still am living, we
Shall know, just I and you:
You knew how to wait for me
As no other knew.

—KONSTANTIN SIMONOV, 1942.

(Translated by Dorothea Prall Radin)

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BEYOND VICTORY

I. POLONAISE

THE FALL of the Third Reich, for which a life of a thousand years was forecast by its megalomaniac Führer, put an end to a thousand years of Germanic aggrandizement at the expense of Slavdom. From the 10th Century to the 20th the Slavic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, always more numerous than their Teutonic, Magyar and Moslem neighbors to the west and south, were repeatedly beaten in war and exploited in peace by Turks, Hungarians and Germans. Slavic weakness was due to economic and cultural backwardness, occasioned in part by the long night of Mongol rule over the largest of the Slavic communities. It was also due to religious and political disunity, precluding (save on rare occasions) any common front against Berlin—or against Vienna, Budapest and Byzantium which often made common cause with the Reich.

The age-old "Polish question," with its heritage of fear and hatred, was the incarnation of Slavic discord in its most poignant and tragic form. Its essence between the World Wars lay in the unbridgeable chasm between the new Poland of Pilsudski and the new Russia of Lenin and Stalin. The Poland of the long armistice was the central bastion of the West's *cordon sanitaire* against Bolshevism. Its rulers, with few exceptions, were aristocrats imbued with the fierce and irrational patriotism of a long-oppressed nationality. For them, as for many of their social inferiors, to be Polish was to be anti-Russian. In the eyes of Pilsudski's Colonels, the Polish mission was to protect Europe against "Asia," to defend feudalism and capitalism against Communism, and to safeguard

Catholicism against the tides of Russian Orthodoxy and Marxist atheism.

Many Polish nobles, moreover, owned ancestral estates in the east beyond the Curzon Line where landlords, merchants, and many town-dwellers were Catholic Poles living among, and often exploiting, the masses of Orthodox Byelo-Russian and Ukrainian peasants. Economic interest and political ambition combined to revive the dream of the Great Poland of old whose Kings ruled the Ukraine and all the non-Polish lands along the water road and even sent troops to Moscow to make or break Tsars. Russian chauvinists saw security in terms of conquering Poland or sharing its pieces with Berlin and Vienna. Once Polish independence was regained through the collapse of the Romanov, Hohenzollern and Hapsburg empires, Polish chauvinists again saw security in terms of weakening Muscovy by detaching the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia and the Baltic provinces, as they sought to do in 1920. As late as 1935-36, Polish officials, in secret parleys with emissaries of Tukhachevsky, offered to take a benevolent view of the traitorous Marshal's conspiracy against the Kremlin if he would agree to the secession of the Ukraine from the USSR.¹ This legacy of mutual suspicion and animosity wrecked the Grand Alliance which London sought halfheartedly to build in 1939. To Poland it brought ruin and the 4th partition. To the Soviet Union it brought later disaster.

How, amid the agony of Nazi persecution, the fire of battle, and repeated paroxysms of hatred and fear in Soviet-Polish relations, a new Poland was born and a durable design for collaboration between Warsaw and Moscow was woven, is a long and complex tale.² Only the salient features of the narrative need here be related. Following the Nazi assault on the USSR, Premier Sikorski of the Polish Government in London sought to place Polish-Soviet relations on a new basis of unity against the common foe. That he failed was due to the refusal of Moscow to commit itself to the restoration of the pre-1939 frontier and to the refusal of most Polish patriots-in-exile to contemplate any revision of the eastern boundary. Many of Sikorski's military and political colleagues represented the feudal past and were quite unable to perceive that Poland had not been, and could never again be, a Great Power. They could neither forget nor forgive the Soviet action of September, 1939. The thought that a reduced and reformed Po-

land must henceforth be a good neighbor of the Muscovite colossus was anathema to them. In their blind and impotent hatred of the USSR, they clung to illusions which finally made many of them men without a country—since their country could be liberated only by the Red Army and could begin a new life only on terms acceptable to Moscow.

The story of Poland's death and resurrection begins with the accord of July 30, 1941, signed in London by Sikorski and Maisky. Moscow, while leaving open the issue of future frontiers, recognized "the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity." Diplomatic relations were restored. Mutual aid against Germany was pledged. Moscow granted amnesty to "all Polish citizens now detained on Soviet territory" and agreed to the establishment of a Polish Army in the USSR, to be recruited from the ranks of the 180,000 Polish war prisoners (including some 15,000 officers) held in Soviet camps since 1939. Gen. Wladyslaw Anders became commander of this force, which received Soviet arms and supplies. Sikorski later visited Moscow and on December 4 signed with Stalin a new declaration promising collaboration for final victory, "good neighborly collaboration, friendship, mutual honest observance" of undertakings, "unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance," and "respect for international law, backed by the collective armed force of all the Allied States."

These high hopes came to grief during 1942. Widespread indignation among Western liberals was evoked by the revelation of February that the NKVD had arrested, secretly tried, and executed two Polish-Jewish Socialist leaders, Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter in December, 1941. They were accused of spreading defeatist propaganda among the troops. Neither man could possibly have had pro-Nazi sympathies. But both were embittered by the partition of September, 1939, and by the fate of the Polish Jews. Both found comfort in the assumption, shared by many members of the London Government (including the chauvinists and anti-Semites who detested all Jews and Socialists), that the USSR would be crushed by the *Wehrmacht*. The wish was father to the thought, which found expression in word and deed. In the midst of the desperate battle for Moscow, Soviet authorities struck swiftly and ruthlessly at all preachers of defeat. If some Socialists and Jews in Polish political circles believed

in, and hoped for, Russia's ruin, such attitudes were widespread among Polish nationalists. Anders indulged in obscure espionage and conspiratorial activities on Soviet soil and refused to permit his Polish troops to proceed to the front to fight the enemy. These divisions were ultimately evacuated to Iran, Iraq and Palestine, where some of their officers indulged in conduct unbecoming to fighters for freedom. Meanwhile Sikorski's London colleagues, including President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, reproved him for his efforts to effect a *rapprochement* with Moscow and repeatedly voiced their resolve that Poland must retain all lands taken from Russia and Lithuania in 1920 and from Czechoslovakia in 1938.

By the time the Red Army had turned the tide of war on the Volga, the London Poles were protesting at Soviet "intervention" in Poland—i.e., appeals for an anti-Nazi uprising on the Kosciusko radio, and alleged dropping of parachutists to organize "Communist cells." Further friction resulted from the Soviet view that many of the deportees from Eastern Poland were not Polish but Soviet citizens, and from the mysterious disappearance of some 10,000 Polish officers formerly held in Soviet camps. The London Cabinet accused Moscow of bad faith. Moscow replied that all officers within its jurisdiction had been released. The missing officers had in fact been lost in the chaos attending the retreat from Smolensk in the summer of 1941, though the Narkomindel did not admit the fact and was perhaps honestly ignorant of what had become of them.

With an eye on the frontiers, Sikorski demanded respect for all Polish "rights" and warned of resistance "to the last man" if any were infringed. Tass accused the London Poles of "imperialistic tendencies." On March 8, 1942, a group of pro-Soviet Poles in Moscow began publication of *Wolna Polska* (Free Poland), which denounced the London Government and called for a "free, independent, democratic Poland," maintaining "relations of good neighborliness with the USSR." Anti-Soviet Poles abroad indulged in ever more strident outcries against what they regarded as the crimes against Poland committed, or about to be committed, by the hereditary oppressors from the East.

It was in this context that Göbbels perpetrated the most clever and gruesome propaganda fraud of the war. On April 15, 1943, the Nazi press and radio announced the "accidental" discovery at Kraznygor, in Katyn Forest near Smolensk, of a camouflaged

mass-grave containing the bodies of 10–12,000 Polish officers, said to have been murdered by the “Jewish executioners of the GPU” in April of 1940. Within a few days Göbbels’ entire staff, which had prepared the drama with meticulous care, was engaged in an all-out extravaganza on the “horror of Katyn” beamed to all audiences and replete with names, circumstantial details, “expert testimony,” and all possible devices to lend credibility to this *Grand Guignol* performance featuring the “Bolshevik assassins.” What actually took place was disclosed, after the liberation of the Smolensk area, by a Special Commission of the Soviet Extraordinary State Committee on German-Fascist Crimes. Its members included Academician Dr. Burdenko (Chairman), Alexei Tolstoi, the Metropolitan Nikolai, and sundry medical authorities. Their report of January 24, 1944, supplemented by eye-witness testimony and documents found on the bodies, revealed that the officers had fallen into German hands during the invasion and were systematically massacred in the autumn of 1941 by a Nazi murder-organization disguised as “HQ of the 537th Engineering Battalion.” Some 500 Russian prisoners who were compelled early in 1943 to prepare the graves for Göbbels’ “sensational revelation” were shot by the invaders after the completion of the work.³

To return to 1943, Göbbels promptly announced that Polish and German Red Cross Organizations had appealed to the International Red Cross in Geneva for aid in the “investigation” and in identification of the bodies. On April 16, Lt. Gen. Marjan Kukiel, Polish Minister of War in London, revealed that his Government had also asked the International Red Cross for an “impartial investigation,” thus registering *prima facie* acceptance of Göbbels story and joining Berlin in its atrocity propaganda against Moscow. On Easter Sunday, April 25, 1943, Molotov informed Ambassador Tadeuz Romer of the severance of Soviet diplomatic relations with the Sikorski Government, which he denounced for its “slandorous campaign,” its connivance with the common enemy, and its designs on the territories of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelo-Russia and Soviet Lithuania. Although the rupture was a major triumph for Göbbels, it would sooner or later have come for other reasons without the Katyn monstrosity.

The slow *dénouement* which followed unrolled as inexorably as a Greek tragedy. The London Poles and their many American sympathizers displayed as little capacity to face reality as their

predecessors of the 18th Century. In their inflexible determination to restore the Poland of 1939, with its landed gentry exploiting a non-Polish peasantry in the eastern provinces and playing irresponsibly at Great Power politics, they continued blindly to hope for the defeat of the USSR by the Axis and the subsequent defeat of the Axis by the Atlantic democracies, which were then expected to "guarantee" an anti-Soviet Poland against Muscovite designs. The Kremlin was equally resolved to recreate a new Poland with which Moscow could live in amity. In a letter of May 5, 1943, to Ralph Parker, Stalin asserted that the USSR desired "to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitler's Germany," committed to good neighborly relations and to a post-war alliance against the Reich, should the Polish people desire one. Vyshinsky accused Anders of obstructionism, espionage and anti-Soviet propaganda.

Moscow announced on May 9 that a Polish "Kosciusko Division," under Col. Zigmund Berling, would join the Red Army. Three days later the "Union of Polish Patriots" was established in Moscow, with Wanda Wassilewska as its leader and *Wolna Polska* as its journal. Foreign Minister Count Raczynski retorted with an announcement that his Government would continue its efforts to establish a post-war Central European (anti-Soviet) Federation. Reports of anti-Semitism, Fascist propaganda, embezzlement, and looting among Anders' troops in the Near East led Premier Sikorski to make a six weeks' inspection tour of their camps. On his way back to London, his plane crashed near Gibraltar on July 4. Sikorski was among the fifteen dead.

Bitterly anti-Soviet President Raczkiewicz proposed that rabidly anti-Soviet Gen. Kasimir Sosnkowski be named as Sikorski's successor. The new Cabinet of July 10, 1943, was a compromise. Sosnkowski became Commander-in-Chief of all Polish armed forces and successor-designate to the Presidency. The Premiership went to Stanislaw Mikolajczyk of the Peasant Party. Kukiel was retained. Romer became Foreign Minister. The Vice-Premier was Jan Kwapinski, a Pilsudski "Socialist." The London Poles henceforth were to prove incapable of coming to terms with Moscow, or of bridging the gap between the two factions headed respectively by President and Premier.

On New Year's Eve of 1943-44 some thirty representatives of peasant groups, trade unions, youth organizations and partisan

units met secretly in Warsaw, repudiated the London Cabinet, and established a "National Council," headed by Boleslaw Berut, leader of the new Polish Workers' (Communist) Party. It was pledged to social reforms, a replacement of the Pilsudski Constitution of 1935 by the democratic Constitution of 1921, and full collaboration with the USSR. A Polish "People's Army" was established under Gen. Michael Rola-Zymierski. Delegates of the Council conferred in Moscow in May with the Union of Polish Patriots. Together they created the "Polish Committee of National Liberation" (PCNL). Churchill said on October 27 that the PCNL would never have been formed "if the Polish Government had taken the advice we tended them at the beginning of the year." That advice—to accept the Curzon Line as the basis of the new Polish-Soviet frontier—was a result of the Teheran discussions and was in part revealed by Churchill in his addresses of February 27 and December 15, 1944. "I cannot feel that Russian demands for reassurance about her western frontiers go beyond the limits of what is reasonable or just." In January, 1944, the London Poles rejected the advice, while the Union of Polish Patriots embraced the Curzon Line, land reform, parliamentary democracy, Polish national unity (with the exclusion of "reactionary émigré elements abroad") and an extension of the new Poland's western frontiers to the Oder. The latter demand, sometimes described as a Machiavellian plot of Stalin to make Poland a puppet of Moscow by making impossible any German-Polish reconciliation, had first been put forward by the Polish National Council in London on December 5, 1942. The Union and the subsequent PCNL, often described as groups of "Communist Quislings" set up by the Kremlin, represented substantial elements of the Polish peasantry, proletariat and lower middle class.

While ultra-nationalist Polish groups in the United States encouraged the intransigence of the London Cabinet by clamoring for American military aid in restoring the Riga frontier, protecting the Atlantic Charter, and safeguarding Europe from the "Asiatic" menace, Gen. Berling became commander of a complete Polish Army Corps on Soviet soil, with the establishment of the Dombrowski and Traugut Divisions. On January 11, 1944, Moscow again championed a "strong and independent Poland," and invited Polish adherence to the Czech-Soviet alliance on the basis of the Curzon Line and Polish compensation at German ex-

pense. The London Cabinet replied by soliciting Anglo-American "mediation," which was offered by Hull and Eden late in January and politely rejected by the Narkomindel.

The deadlock remained unbroken despite repeated efforts from various quarters to effect a change of atmosphere. In May Prof. Oscar Lange, Polish economist at the University of Chicago, visited Moscow on the invitation of the Union of Polish Patriots, interviewed Stalin, and reported that the Soviet leaders desired an alliance with a strong Poland enjoying institutions of her own choosing. For his pains he was denounced by American Russophobes and Polish chauvinists. At the same time Father Stanislaus Orlemanski of Springfield, Mass., interviewed Stalin and Molotov, visited Polish Army HQ, and declared that Moscow desired an independent, democratic Poland and cooperation with the Roman Church. For his pains he was suspended from his parish and ordered to a monastery by Bishop Thomas M. O'Leary. On June 20, Raczkievicz reluctantly replaced Sosnkowski by Tomasz Arciszewski as his successor-designate. But Sosnkowski remained Commander-in-Chief and the aged Arciszewski, another "Socialist" á la Pilsudski, was no less anti-Soviet than his predecessor. Mikolajczyk visited Washington early in June. He was advised by Roosevelt and Hull, as by Churchill and Eden, to seek a compromise with Moscow.

With the liberation of south-central Poland by the Red Army, the PCNL took over, with Edward Boleslaw Osobka-Morawski as its Chairman and Director of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Witos and Wanda Wassilewska as Vice-Chairmen, Gen. Rola-Zymierski (with Berling as his deputy) as Commander-in-Chief and Director of National Defense, and other posts assigned to members of the left-wing opposition groups of the Peasant and Socialist parties and to leaders of the Workers' Party. These figures, who repudiated the Government-in-exile, were denounced by the London Poles as "usurpers, nobodies, turncoats and Communists." Moscow announced on July 25, 1944, that its troops had entered Poland solely "to rout the enemy" and to help the Polish people achieve liberation and restoration of "an independent, strong and democratic Poland" as a "sovereign, friendly and allied State. . . . The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue aims of acquiring any part of Polish territory or of a change in the social structure of Poland." On the next day Molotov and

Osubka-Morawski, in the presence of Stalin and Rola-Zymierski, signed a formal accord for civil administration.

The London Cabinet was now obliged to come to terms or commit suicide. It chose suicide. Early in August Mikolajczyk, Romer and Stanislaw Grabski visited Moscow and conferred with Osubka-Morawski and Berut, after Stalin and Molotov had urged them to reach an agreement with the PCNL for a fusion of the two régimes. Mikolajczyk was offered the Premiership in a new Cabinet. But most of his London colleagues were to be barred. The latter made counter-proposals which were unacceptable. They also replaced Sosnkowski by Tadeuz Komorowski ("Gen. Bor") as Commander-in-Chief on September 29.

Bor had ordered an uprising in Warsaw on August 1 on the part of the underground forces loyal to the London Cabinet. The Red Army was across the Vistula, but was unable as yet to storm or outflank the city. Whether Bor, who had not consulted the Soviet High Command, hoped to take the city before Soviet troops arrived, or assumed that they were on the point of entry, or merely sought to influence the Moscow negotiations is unclear. Soviet spokesmen denounced Bor as an irresponsible adventurer. Moscow at first refused to permit Anglo-American planes, dropping relief supplies to the Warsaw insurgents, to land on Soviet fields. The net result, amid embittered recrimination on both sides, was an appalling tragedy. The rebels were compelled to surrender to Nazi forces on October 3, after suffering 300,000 casualties and the destruction of half the buildings in the capital. This holocaust, added to the frightful death-struggle early in 1943 between the Nazi butchers and the heroic fighters of the Warsaw Ghetto, left Poland's capital a shambles.

Mid-October saw Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski again in Moscow, along with Churchill and Eden. An accord seemed imminent, but on the Premier's return to London his colleagues rejected his proposal for a boundary settlement and for an agrarian program involving partition among the peasants of the estates of the nobles. On November 24, 1944, Mikolajczyk resigned his office, confronted, said Churchill, "with the obstinate, inflexible resistance of his London colleagues and their veto, like the veto which played so great a part in the former ruin of Poland." The new Cabinet of November 29 was headed by Arciszewski and included no representatives of the Peasant party and only one of

Mikolajczyk's Ministers. All of its members were irreconcilable enemies of the USSR. It was the last Cabinet of the exiles.

On New Year's Eve of 1945 the PCNL, now established at Lublin, proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland. Moscow granted recognition on January 5, 1945. London and Washington declined to do likewise. At Yalta, however, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin reached an agreement in principle regarding the Polish future. In the words of the communiqué of February 11:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and will exchange Ambassadors, by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish

Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

Subsequent differences as to the meaning of some of the phrases here employed created a deadlock in the Moscow Commission and delayed formation of a new régime. At the end of February the Christian Labor party withdrew from the Arciszewski Cabinet and President Raczkiewicz named Gen. Anders, then in Italy, as new Commander of Polish forces loyal to London. A Soviet veto on the London Poles, and an Anglo-American veto on the Lublin-Warsaw Poles, left Poland unrepresented at the San Francisco Conference. On April 21, 1945, Stalin and Osobka-Morawski signed in Moscow a 20-year treaty of alliance against any renewal of German aggression, pledging mutual abstention from alliances or coalitions directed against either party and "friendly collaboration" based on "mutual respect for independence and sovereignty as well as non-intervention in internal affairs." ⁴ The signers hailed the pact as marking the end of Polish-Russian conflicts and as insuring Slav solidarity against the German menace.

This step, however, did not alter Anglo-American opposition to Molotov's pleas for representation of the Lublin-Warsaw Government at the Golden Gate and for postponement of the admission of Fascist Argentina until Polish representation should be assured. New hopes of a settlement were engendered by Molotov's declaration early in May that Mikolajczyk, who had endorsed the Yalta formula, had been invited to the Soviet capital for new parleys. But they were soon shattered by the revelation on May 5 that 16 Polish underground leaders, after revealing their identity to the Red Army at Britain's request, had been arrested on March 27. Stettinius and Eden expressed "grave concern" and suspended discussions pending a clarification of the Soviet action.

But the ghosts of the past were not permitted to destroy the hopes of the future. The 16 arrested Poles were headed by Maj. Gen. L. Bronislaw Okulicki, commander of London's underground "Home Army" since the Warsaw uprising, and Jan Jankowski, Deputy Premier of the London Cabinet. They pleaded guilty to anti-Soviet propaganda and to activities which

had contributed to the deaths of Red Army men on Polish soil. On June 21 Okulicki received a ten-year sentence, Jankowski eight years, and ten other defendants lesser terms, with three acquitted and the trial of one postponed because of illness. Meanwhile President Truman had dispatched Harry Hopkins to Moscow and Joseph E. Davies to London to promote inter-Allied unity. On the basis of understandings which these veteran negotiators helped to achieve, various Polish leaders met in Moscow on June 17. Four days later they informed Molotov, Harriman and Clark Kerr that they had reached agreement on the composition of a new government.

The summer solstice of the year of victory thus saw an end of the Polish question which had bedeviled the United Nations for over two years and poisoned relationships among the Slavic peoples for centuries. The ending was a happy one for all concerned, save the members of the Polish feudal aristocracy and the politicians among the London Poles who learned nothing and forgot nothing. Their bitterness was shared by irreconcilable chauvinists, by anti-Semites and quasi-Fascists within Poland who cried tyranny and terrorism against all efforts to curb their disruptive activities, and by insatiable American Russophobes who continued to cry havoc and preach new crusades to "save civilization from Bolshevism."⁵ For the Soviet Union and the United Nations, and for the long-tormented masses of the Polish people, the settlement of June 21, 1945, heralded the morning of a new era of peaceful progress, not without its inevitable frictions and difficulties but more promising for the Polish future than anything which had taken place for many generations.

The new régime in Warsaw was headed by a Presidential triumvirate: Boleslaw Berut, Wincenty Witos, and Stanislaw Grab-ski. Mikolajczyk became Deputy Premier in a Cabinet presided over by Osobka-Morawski. The Ministry of the Interior went to Wladyslaw Kiernik, a Peasant party leader. Other posts were divided equally among members of the PCNL, on the one hand, and Polish leaders from London and the underground on the other. The Cabinet pledged itself to hold democratic elections. London and Washington granted diplomatic recognition, with Arthur Bliss Lane becoming the first American Ambassador to the new State and Oscar Lange becoming Warsaw's representative to the United States. Arciszewski and his London colleagues

had no option but to dissolve their "Government" and retire to private life. By the Potsdam Declaration, Polish title was provisionally acknowledged to East Prussia (except for the Königsberg region which became part of the USSR), to Danzig and the Corridor, to Silesia, and to adjacent areas up to the Niesse and Oder Rivers, including the Baltic port of Stettin. The German residents were to be expelled to the shrunken Reich. A Polish-Soviet treaty of August 16 drew the eastern frontier along the Curzon Line, with several deviations in Poland's favor, and fixed the Polish share of reparations from Germany at 15% of the Soviet portion. An independent Poland thus began a new life which promised to endure and flourish in an Eastern Europe in which German power to break the peace was ended, while Soviet power to keep the peace was beyond challenge for as long as any one could foresee.

In the words of Marshal Zhukov, who visited Warsaw with Rokossovsky in August to accept honors from the new Polish leaders:

For centuries the German invaders deliberately fanned the struggle among the Slav peoples, trying to divide them, to sow discord, to enslave and doom them to death. Now an end has been put to this artificial division of Slavs. A sincere friendship and collaboration, based on equal rights and mutual respect, have taken shape and asserted themselves between the Soviet Union and Poland. . . . Our Soviet people wholeheartedly rejoice at the bright prospect of the flourishing might, culture and welfare opening to the friendly Polish people. . . . We are particularly grateful to you, our friends and comrades in arms, for decorating us with the Orders of Virtuti Militari First Class with Star, and with the Grünewald Cross instituted in memory of the joint great victory of the Russian, Polish, Czech and Lithuanian peoples over the conceited Teutonic warriors. Long live free, strong, independent, democratic Poland! Long live the closely knit family of fraternal Slav peoples and all freedom-loving nations of the world! Long live the eternal friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Poland! ^{5a}

2. MARCHE SLAV

On July 15, 1410, a Teutonic army was crushed at Grünewald, near Tannenberg in southern East Prussia, by a mixed Slavic host. In 1944, on the 534th anniversary of the battle, a celebration was

held in Moscow. Among the speakers were Lt. Gen. Alexander Gundorov, Chairman of the "All-Slav Committee," several other Red Army representatives, Justas Paleckis, Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, and various Czechs, Poles and Yugoslavs. A resolution declared:

Brother Slavs! The Hitlerite fiends, descendants of the robber Knights-Crusaders, are still tormenting the Slav and other oppressed peoples of Europe. But the hour of final reckoning with the mortal enemy has arrived. . . . Forward to the aid of the Slav brothers languishing in German bondage, to the aid of all the oppressed peoples of Europe!

Brother Poles! The Red Army and the army of Polish patriots under the command of General Zygmund Berling are hastening to your assistance. So rally around the Krajowa Rada Narodowa, join the ranks of the People's Army of Poland and the guerrilla detachments set up in free guerrilla districts, prepare for popular uprising!

Peoples of Yugoslavia! Brother Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians! Consolidate and sacredly safeguard the unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia! Clear the country of the Hitlerite agents! . . .

Patriots of Czechoslovakia! Rouse the masses of the people to struggle, form armed guerrilla detachments. . . . Brother Bulgarians! Do not permit the German invaders and their lackeys to drag the Bulgarian people into the disaster toward which Hitlerite Germany is inexorably heading. . . . Exterminate them as mad dogs and rabid enemies of the Bulgarian people! . . .

Long live the fighting unity of the Slav peoples! Death to the German invader! ⁶

The quest for Slav solidarity against the German *Drang nach Osten* is centuries old. The "Pan-Slavism" of Tsarist times was in part an expression of sentiment and in part a weapon of war against Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which long ruled over most of the western and southern Slavs. World War II, like its predecessor, witnessed the subjugation of all the non-Russian Slavs by the Reich. But in the fullness of time all the Slavs were liberated by the Red Army. VE-Day found the Soviet soldiers who had stood unflinchingly on the Neva and the Volga standing victorious on the Elbe, the Moldau and the Adriatic. Within their far-flung lines were all the Slavs of Europe, including Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav allies as well as Bulgarian "enemies," and all the Magyar and Rumanian lands, comprising the major

enclaves of non-Slavic peoples west of a line from Stettin to Trieste.

Soviet policy in the face of the facts of victory was the product of a complex process of balancing what was desired against what was attainable in the light of interests deemed paramount and risks deemed dangerous. To "Bolshevize" Danubia and Balkania by instigating "proletarian revolutions" and incorporating new Soviet Republics into the USSR was never part of Moscow's purpose, despite Göbbels' propaganda and continuing cries of alarm in certain Anglo-American circles. Any such policy would have spelled conflict with Britain and America, a consummation devoutly to be avoided in the view of the Kremlin. These communities, moreover, are peopled, in overwhelming majority, by peasants, committed to, or aspiring toward, privately owned farms and resolutely opposed to nationalization of land or collective farming on the Soviet model. Neither did the Muscovite devotees of the new Pan-Slavism envisage the bonds of language as a proper basis for converting or coercing the lesser Slavic brethren into political union. Any such program would have encountered local resistance and led once more to an ultimate clash with the Atlantic democracies. At the same time considerations of future security required that these areas become henceforth strategic dependencies of Moscow, no longer ruled by Fascist-minded kings and nobles and no longer available to other Great Powers as potential bases against the Soviet Union.

In all power politics the words used to explain purposes, and even the means employed to promote them, must appear to reflect devotion to generally accepted principles of rectitude rather than preoccupation with "selfish" interests. In the broad plains and valleys between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea, home of fifty million Slavs and almost thirty million non-Slavs, Moscow's purposes were couched in terms of Slavic unity, anti-Fascism, promotion of democracy, non-intervention and respect for national sovereignty, none of which *per se* aroused official Anglo-American opposition. The purposes of the Western Powers were expressed in similar terms. But unacknowledged goals behind the verbiage differed at many points. Washington indulged in "noble negatives" and registered solicitude for civil liberties, representative government and property rights. Official London championed monarchy and aristocracy against popular radical-

ism. General principles were therefore given different definitions and applications, in a potentially dangerous atmosphere of suspicion and rivalry.

Two alternative procedures were available for resolving these difficulties. One was to divide the Continent into "spheres" by drawing a line north and east of which Washington and London would recognize Soviet hegemony and south and west of which Moscow would recognize Anglo-American hegemony. The other was to evolve a joint program of liberation and reconstruction, equally acceptable to Soviet Communists and bourgeois democrats. A third possible course—i.e., self-denial, abstention and literal non-intervention by all Powers—was in practice inconceivable because of the exigencies of war-making and peace-making and because the imperatives of power preclude the maintenance of a political vacuum in so vast and vital a region. The actual course of Allied policy represented an uneasy combination of the first and second choices.

At Teheran it was tacitly agreed that Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would be in the Soviet zone, while Greece, Italy, the Mediterranean, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia would lie within the special purview of London and Washington. Soviet leaders displayed their fidelity to this understanding by remaining silent (even though Washington voiced displeasure) when London vetoed Count Sforza as Italian Foreign Minister and in December, 1944, used armed force in support of monarchy and reaction in both Belgium and Greece. At Yalta an effort was made to reformulate general principles acceptable to all three Super-Powers. The formula for Poland has already been noted. The published Report of February 11, 1945 further declared that the three leaders

jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite States of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a

principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated State or former Axis satellite State in Europe, where in their judgment conditions require, (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated State or any former Axis satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations, world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

The Yalta agreement likewise asserted:

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasich that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that agreement. We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare that:

(1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation [AVNOJ] should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament [Skupschina] who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of Na-

tional Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

Allied Control Commissions had already been established in Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest. Pending problems in Belgrade, Prague and Warsaw were made matters of consultation. Anglo-American conservatives continued to allege throughout 1945 that Communists were dominating some or all of these communities. Liberals and radicals continued to argue that Downing Street and the State Department were furthering reaction and discouraging social change. But the enterprise of keeping the United Nations united in dealing with Danubian and Balkan issues nevertheless achieved a heartening measure of success, thanks to the forbearance and will-to-concord displayed on all sides—at least on the top level of policy-making.

Within the framework of this dispensation, the Kremlin evolved a design for security and reconstruction in Eastern and Southeastern Europe embracing the following objectives:

1. Incorporation of predominantly Russian, Byelo-Russian and Ukrainian communities into the USSR, e.g., Bessarabia, Bukovina and the areas east of the Curzon Line. On June 29, 1945, Molotov signed a pact in Moscow with Premier Zdenek Fierlinger and Foreign Secretary Vladimir Clementis of Czechoslovakia by which Carpatho-Ukraine became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.⁷ For the first time in history Muscovite lands reached beyond the Carpathians and all Ukrainians were united under one flag.

2. Negotiation of alliances with all Slav states. Yugoslavia joined Czechoslovakia and Poland as a Soviet ally through another 20-year treaty against German aggression signed in Moscow by Molotov and Marshal Tito on April 11, 1945.

3. Fostering of federalism among the south Slavs. In November, 1944, Moscow hailed the accord between Tito and Dr. Ivan Subasich, Premier of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile, for a "new, democratic, federated Yugoslavia." On March 9, 1945, a fusion régime was established in Belgrade with Tito as Premier and Subasich as Foreign Minister. The reconstituted Kingdom, which seemed certain to become a Republic after the final rupture in August between Tito and Peter, was to be a federation of six provinces: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

vina and Montenegro. Plans were laid for a bicameral Parliament, with a Federal House based on population and a House of Nations, in which (as in the federal Supreme Soviet) each constituent territory would have 25 deputies, with smaller numbers apportioned to lesser areas within the provinces. Only through such a federal structure could an end be put to the internecine strife which had long afflicted the Yugoslavs. The possible inclusion, in the still distant future, of Albania and Bulgaria in the new Union offered promise of enduring peace in the Balkans—if London and Moscow should prove capable of acting together to keep the peace between themselves and between Greece, Turkey and the Slav nations to the north.

4. Support of anti-Fascist régimes based on coalitions of resistance groups, ranging from Center to extreme Left, with Rightists excluded and sometimes suppressed. Communists played a leading role in all instances and pursued a Party line of democracy, social reform and punishment of Axis collaborators. With local variations, these features were characteristic of the régimes of the "Fatherland Front" in Sofia, headed by Kimon Georgiev; the Tito Cabinet in Belgrade; the Left coalition of Peter Groza in Bucharest; the Dalnok Cabinet in Budapest; the fusion government in Warsaw; and the Beneš-Fierlinger administration in Prague.

5. Promotion of economic policies involving nationalization of large-scale industry, expropriation of large estates, and distribution of land among peasant households. Despite Moscow's pledges to refrain from altering the "social structure" of Rumania, Poland and adjacent communities, the result of the programs adopted (with Soviet approval) by the new régimes, in their efforts to win support by meeting popular demands, was to reduce the area of private enterprise in industry and to expand private ownership in agriculture through the liquidation of the age-old feudal pattern. The doom of the great proprietors was implicit in the new agrarian policies. Prussian Junkers, Polish nobles, Rumanian boyars, Magyar magnates and Yugoslav landlords all disappeared as elite groups with the belated advent of the French Revolution in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Red Army. Since the resulting economies displayed in every instance a net expansion, rather than a contraction, of the number of private proprietors, they could not be characterized in any sense as "communist" or "so-

cialist." But political power was wielded by Communist parties out of all proportion to their size, while deference, income and influence were irretrievably lost by significant portions of the former ruling classes. The consequence was thus a limited social revolution, albeit not on the Soviet model.

The logic of *Realpolitik* and the social preferences of those responsible for high policy impelled Washington and London to view most of these developments with alarm and opposition, just as Moscow resisted Anglo-American championship of legitimacy, monarchy, aristocracy, Big Business and the social *status quo* in Western and Southern Europe. Downing Street and the State Department felt obliged to acquiesce in the alteration of frontiers, the conclusion of alliances, and the emergence of Yugoslav federalism. They could not openly demand the preservation of feudalism in Eastern Europe. They therefore concentrated upon the "undemocratic" or "totalitarian" character of some of the new régimes and urged free elections and civil liberties. This attitude, opined Moscow, was due less to abstract solicitude for these altogether desirable goals than to a wish to weaken the political Left, which looked to the USSR for guidance, and to strengthen the Rightists, many of whom made a quick change from collaboration with the Axis to expectations of support from the Atlantic democracies.

The Report of the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, released on August 3, 1945, as the "Potsdam Communiqué," consisted in part of a series of verbal compromises between these divergent orientations. The new Poland was welcomed, following consultations in Berlin with Mikolajczyk and other leaders, and assurances of religious liberty, free elections, and the withdrawal of all Soviet forces save those necessary to maintain communications with the troops in the Reich. Britain and America announced "the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. . . . The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government . . . has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections." Formal peace

treaties were urged with "recognized democratic governments" in Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Allied journalists should "enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland." Membership in the United Nations was contemplated for these States, but not for "the present Spanish Government which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership."

With the coming of the atomic bomb and the surrender of Japan, Anglo-American conservatives in high office felt free to bring further pressures to bear upon Moscow. The victory of the Labor Party in the British elections of July 5, replacing Churchill and Eden by Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin, led naïve observers to expect a radical change in foreign policy. Longer memories would have suggested that Communists are hated more bitterly by Socialists than by Tories, and that co-operation with Bolsheviks is easier for Conservatives than for Mensheviks. Laborite Ministers had fully concurred in Churchill's bloody suppression of the Greek EAM. "I am sure," said Churchill of Bevin, "that he will do his best to preserve the high causes for which we have long fought together." At the outset Laborite diplomacy was dedicated to objectives indistinguishable, even under a microscope, from those of the preceding Cabinet. The transition in Washington from Roosevelt to Truman, and from Stettinius to James F. Byrnes, likewise foreshadowed more, rather than less, opposition to Soviet purposes in Eastern Europe.

On August 18, 1945, Secretary Byrnes announced that the United States Government was not satisfied "that the existing provisional Bulgarian government is adequately representative of the important elements of democratic opinion or that the existing government has arranged for the scheduled elections (set for August 26) to take place under conditions which will allow and insure the effective participation therein, free from the fear of force and intimidation, of all democratic elements. In the opinion of the United States Government, the effective participation of all important democratic elements in the forthcoming election is essential to facilitate the conclusion of a peace treaty with a recognized democratic government." On August 20 Foreign Secre-

tary Bevin, in his first speech to Commons, declared that people in the liberated countries

. . . have been taught to disobey. . . . The result has been lawlessness. . . . There will be much that goes on in this period ahead of us which we do not like. One thing, however, we must aim at resolutely, even at the beginning, and that is to prevent the substitution of one form of totalitarianism for another. . . . The Government adheres to the policy which we publicly supported when Greece was liberated. . . . We supported the restoration of law and order. . . . The Voulgaris Government should carry on, pending the decision of the Greek people . . .

(But in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary) the Governments which have been set up do not in our view represent the majority of the people and the impression we get from recent developments is that one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another. That is not what we understand by that very much over-worked word "democracy," which appears to need definition. The forms of government which have been set up do not impress us as being sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic relations. . . . The (Bulgarian) electoral law in accordance with which the election will take place is not in our view consistent with the principles of liberty. We shall not, therefore, be able to regard as representative any Government resulting from such elections. . . . The question of secret police in Poland . . . has still got to be cleared up. . . .

(But) the question of the regime in Spain is one for the Spanish people to decide. I am satisfied that any intervention by a foreign Power would have the effect of strengthening Gen. Franco's position. . . . H.M. Government is not prepared to take any step which would permit or encourage civil war in that country. . . . I am sure that Hong Kong . . . will be returned to us. . . .

The best that could be said of the Anglo-American declarations is that they voiced a desire, in Woodrow Wilson's famous phrase, to "make the world safe for democracy." With Soviet acquiescence, the Bulgarian election (in which a single list of candidates was to have been presented by the four parties of the Fatherland Front) were postponed, as were proposed elections in Hungary. In Rumania, following Groza's refusal to resign, King Michael appealed for Allied aid in establishing a government deemed worthy of recognition. In all the countries liberated by the Red Army there were sporadic acts of terrorism, systematic suppression of those accused (sometimes unjustly) of having been Fas-

cists, and few approximations to Anglo-American standards of representative institutions. Byrnes and Bevin, however, appeared to be returning to the unworkable and discredited Wilsonian doctrine that diplomatic recognition should be denied to governments not conforming to British and American definitions of constitutional democracy. No formula more dangerous to Anglo-American-Soviet unity could be imagined.

Soviet spokesmen wisely refrained from retorting with an obvious *tu quoque*.⁸ An America which disfranchised most of its Southern Negroes, including those in Secretary Byrnes' South Carolina, and retained a Congressman Rankin and a Senator Bilbo in its national legislature, lacked clean hands for carrying democracy undefiled to the Balkans. A Britain which sanctioned a reign of White Terror in Greece (where Moscow declined to participate in "supervising" elections on the ground that any such action infringed local sovereignty) could not with good grace preach tolerance to Bulgaria and Rumania. India, moreover (enjoying general diplomatic recognition and membership in the United Nations) could not be described as having a Government representative of the majority of the people or consistent with the principles of liberty by any definition of the terms. Neither could China, nor Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and Argentina, with all of whose dictatorships Washington and London maintained diplomatic relations. The USSR itself was far less "democratic" (by the Anglo-American definition) than any of the new régimes in the Balkans, since all of the latter tolerated a multiplicity of parties and a wider measure of criticism of leaders than Moscow permitted.

The Byrnes-Bevin Doctrine, while beyond reproach as a general expression of democratic ideals, threatened to produce grave difficulties in the area to which it was addressed. That area was and will remain a Soviet "sphere of influence," a circumstance viewed by most Britons and Americans—save for the crypto-Fascists and Russophobes, e.g., Hearst, McCormick, Lindbergh, Clare Luce, et al.—as wholly compatible with Anglo-American interests. Any future effort, whether by diplomacy, intervention or arms, to put an end to Soviet hegemony in Danubia and Balkania, involves risks of promoting World War III, since the Soviet leaders, now and forever, regard the unity of Slavic Europe under Moscow's leadership as a *sine qua non* of Soviet safety. The Krem-

lin's policy in this region inevitably reflects Soviet political experience at home. That experience bears little resemblance to the political folkways and mores of Washington and Westminster.

What is surprising is not that so-called "totalitarian" methods of winning friends and influencing people were displayed in these lands during and after their liberation, but that dictatorial devices were not employed more extensively. Moscow had the power (at the risk, to be sure, of a rupture with the Atlantic Powers) to give unqualified support to Communist groups and to Sovietize this whole vast region. With judicious moderation, it refrained from so doing. In no case did its program precipitate civil war within the lands freed by the Red Army, despite widespread resentment at requisitions by Soviet troops, who lived off the land. In Greece, on the contrary, British intervention in the name of "democracy" unleashed a savage internal conflict. The difference was not due to the disparity of might between the Red Army and the British expeditionary force. It was rather due to the fact that Moscow's program was welcomed by most peasants, workers and lower middle class elements, comprising a majority of the inhabitants, whereas the same groups in Greece bitterly resisted British efforts to restore the rule of a small minority of Royalist politicians, landowners and industrialists. For Downing Street and the State Department to quibble and quarrel because Simon-pure democracy was not attained along the Danube at one fell swoop was to run risks of unrealism disproportionate to any probable benefits to be achieved thereby.

The center of the difficulty is quite obvious, and therefore most readily overlooked. Democracy, by any definition, presupposes a high level of literacy, civic responsibility, tolerance and economic well-being throughout the community. Except for Czechoslovakia, the lands between the Vistula, the Dalmatian coast and the Delta of the Danube are the homes of miserably poor peasants, more often than not illiterate, torn by ancient feuds among diverse sects and tribes, and long ruthlessly exploited by their own rulers no less than by alien conquerors. Like the dark peoples of India, China, the Near East, Africa and much of Latin America, they have never known democracy because its preconditions are wholly absent. The prerequisites of emancipation and self-government include an end of feudal vestiges in agri-

culture, a cessation of domestic and international violence, and a growth of industry which will raise living standards, facilitate education, and create a flourishing middle-income skill group in both town and country, possessed of economic security and independence and therefore capable of cultivating the civic virtues of free communities. In the absence of such developments, all talk of Balkan democracy, whether sincerely meant or motivated by Anti-Sovietism, is nonsense.

The Balkan problem in the years to come will revolve around the alternatives here suggested. Will Soviet influence be exerted in ways making for a flourishing agriculture and industry, for social stability and cultural advance, and for that progressive self-realization of the individual in society which is the only safe foundation for the democratic way of life? If not, there is no basis for assuming that Anglo-American pressures can or will be effective in promoting these purposes. If so, will London and Washington welcome such an evolution or seek to oppose it out of fear of Soviet power and solicitude for old elites of piety, property and privilege? The latter course spells rivalry and potential war, with new tragedies ahead for the Balkan peoples and for all peoples. The former course spells hope.

These questions remained to be answered in the fall of 1945. Soviet strategic and political hegemony, if unchallenged by the Western Powers, promises freedom from fear of new wars in Eastern Europe. The end of feudalism and the emergence of a mixed industry, with public and private sectors, promises ultimate freedom from want, which is the best guarantee of freedom of speech and religion. The entire area, while trading with the West and furnishing a limited field for private investment, will inevitably be integrated with Soviet economy, not in the sense of being "Sovietized" but in the sense of having available the Soviet sixth of the world as a market area for the buying and selling of commodities and for the large-scale import of capital for economic expansion. Poland and, more slowly, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria will experience rapid industrialization during coming decades. Small-scale private agriculture, however, may prove less productive than the old feudal pattern. For peasant peoples, collective farming offers the richest promise of high productivity and urban standards of life. Should it be ultimately

achieved in Poland, Danubia and Balkania, it can come only voluntarily and not through the brutal "class war in the villages" which marked the transition in Russia. More probably, a mixed private and cooperative agriculture will gradually emerge, with public resources devoted to supplying seeds, fertilizers and machinery and to fostering community enterprise.⁹

Not least among the gains accruing from such a future—which is by no means Utopian, given intelligent understanding in Moscow, London and Washington—will be its impact on the USSR itself. Having liberated all Slavdom from the *Furor Teutonicus*, the Soviet Union can learn much from the social problems and experiments of the other Slavic peoples. After centuries of exploitation and strife, eastern Europeans are acquiring from the new Russia a novel and creative vision of national equality, racial tolerance and economic democracy. If their fortunes prosper and their freedoms flourish under Western standards of personal liberty and representative government, they can in turn furnish a new example of political democracy to the USSR and contribute to that progressive democratization of the Soviet State which will assuredly take place in a stable and peaceful world.

For these hopes to be fulfilled, London and Washington must concede to Moscow prime responsibility for keeping Balkan peace. It will be equally essential that Moscow discharge its obligation with a minimum of dictation to its western neighbors and with no intent of using them to strengthen Soviet fighting capacity in relation to the Atlantic Powers. No less indispensable to the success of the venture is full and honest information regarding Balkan developments, freely available to all the world. Anglo-American efforts toward this goal will help rather than hinder. They will be welcomed by Moscow if Western spokesmen demonstrate that they are honestly concerned with the promotion of democracy.

The broad Slavic border zones may under these circumstances become not a barrier nor a "*cordon sanitaire-in-reverse*" nor yet an object of contention between East and West, but a cultural bridge between Muscovy and the Atlantic communities, enriching each, as well as their own peoples, with the best of two worlds. To realize this goal, statesmanship of the highest order will be called for on all sides.

Such statesmanship was, unhappily, conspicuous by its absence during the autumn after victory. The State Department and Foreign Office displayed increasing determination to challenge Soviet economic and political hegemony in the Balkans: by refusing recognition to "undemocratic" governments; insisting on French and Chinese participation in treaty-drafting; welcoming the resignation of Subasich from Tito's Cabinet as an evidence of "tyranny" in Yugoslavia; fostering the anti-Groza "Liberal" and "Peasant" parties in Bucharest and the enemies of the Fatherland Front in Sofia; and protesting against Soviet economic accords with Hungary and Rumania whereby control of key industries was to be vested in mixed companies with the USSR supplying half of the new capital.

This dangerous game could bring only tragedy, since the USSR was quite prepared to risk a rupture with the Atlantic democracies before permitting the restoration of Rightist and anti-Soviet régimes in the Balkans. There can be no peace without Anglo-American acceptance of Soviet ascendancy in Danubia and Balkania. If Bevin, Byrnes and their colleagues are indeed resolved to challenge that ascendancy, the result will be not the "democratization" of the Balkan lands nor their inclusion in a "Western Bloc," but rather implacable rivalry and ultimate war between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The Anglo-American leaders had no such intent or desire. Yet they persisted in a course which was certain, if unmodified, to produce this outcome.

The Danubian and Balkan communities have only three possible destinies: (1) intimate collaboration with the USSR; (2) subordination anew to Teutonic and Magyar domination; or (3) chronic strife, both domestic and international, engendered by rivalry for power between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. The second and third possibilities spell World War III, since the USSR will fight, as the United States would fight in the Caribbean or Britain in the Red Sea, before it will permit other Powers to control a region deemed vital to national security. Whether the leaders and people of Britain and America were capable of grasping these simple but stark realities was unclear as the bright dawn of liberation and victory faded into the somber dusk of old feuds and new conflicts toward the close of the year which opened in hope and ended in doubt.

3. GOLDEN GATE

The indivisibility of peace, vainly preached through many squandered years by Maxim Litvinov, impressed itself vividly upon all the leaders and many of the peoples of the Grand Alliance whose armies, after infinite agony, finally took Rome, Berlin and Tokyo. Long before victory was won, the organization of enduring peace became an earnest preoccupation of rulers and ruled alike throughout the United Nations. All citizens of One World were of one mind as to the desirability and urgency of the goal. But as to the means, many voices clashed in discord. The passing of World War II revealed once more the impossibility of unifying the world society by the sword of conquest. The coming of conflict had demonstrated anew the impossibility of keeping peace through military alliances or global leagues of sovereignties. Yet the United Nations, once pregnant with the promise of a new age, were fated to bring forth nothing more than a facsimile of the League of Nations.

This tragedy, alleviated by certain unprecedented and possibly hopeful features of the new pattern of world power, was due to the refusal of all peoples and governments to limit their sacred sovereignty in the interest of a World State. The anatomy of frustration cannot here be dissected. The proceedings of the San Francisco Conference alone, when published by the United Nations Information Center, will comprise 8 volumes totalling 12,000 pages. A brief chronology of the conception and birth of the new League will suggest the shape of Soviet policy toward the latest effort at achieving global order.

In rejecting the possibility of a World Federation, that policy was unrealistic and disruptive. Yet it was realistic and constructive in insisting, once this dream was broken on the rocks of inertia and prejudice, that the new union of sovereignties could preserve peace only through united action by the Super-Powers. Moscow's unrealism was fully shared, and indeed anticipated and almost dictated, by official Washington and London. On a day of despair (June 16, 1940), Churchill had vainly proposed Federal Union to France. But no British spokesman ever mentioned the matter thereafter, until Harold J. Laski revived it in the summer of 1945—only to be repudiated by the Labor Party leaders. With all their

political talents, Roosevelt and Hull were incapable of seeing the vision or persuading their fellow-citizens of its need. Other Americans tried and failed, among them Wendell Willkie, Harold E. Stassen, Owen Roberts, Robert Lee Humber, Clarence K. Streit, Mortimer Adler, and Ely Culbertson. In 1946, as in 1939, most voters of Atlantica, despite their own extensive experience with federalism, had no clear grasp of what it meant, or why its application to the problem of world order had become an urgent necessity even before the great cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki vanished in a cosmic holocaust of all-consuming fire.

Stalin and Roosevelt discussed federalism at Teheran, but not as a basis of world organization. In this respect the Soviet leaders, though revolutionary rulers of the greatest federation of nations on the planet, displayed no more imagination than their "bourgeois" colleagues. Soviet citizens manifested even less interest in a federated world than their British and American brothers-in-arms. That which was quickly dismissed as "visionary" was in reality the only solid foundation upon which enduring world peace could be built. All mankind may yet bitterly rue the day when, almost without discussion, it repudiated as impossible a global political revolution which was desperately imperative for the survival of civilization.

The premises of these judgments admit of no exposition in these pages.¹⁶ It is enough to say, at the risk of appearing dogmatic, that international violence stems from international anarchy; that the root of international anarchy is national sovereignty; that there can be no assurance of global peace without global government; and that effective world government requires the transfer from national sovereignties to the agencies of a World State of responsibility for keeping the peace. In an age so enamoured of tribal feuds and so bent upon collective suicide that it dismisses as "impracticable" all forms of planetary governance, the only conceivable design for a World State is a federation vested with limited authority to make global law and enforce it on individuals through national and international courts. Anything short of this is but a ramshackle half-way house between anarchy and order. And in such a house peace can live only on sufferance and precariously—until the structure is refashioned or is consumed in new fires lit by the gods of war.

In 1919 the Allied and Associated Powers, with Russia ex-

cluded and America abstaining, sought to base peace on a League of equal sovereignties, with each and all pledged to the collective coercion of any sovereignty taking the sword. The effort inevitably failed, despite later American sympathy and active Soviet support. Sovereignties are by nature irresponsible and incapable of effective joint action save in the immediate presence of common disaster. After being killed by appeasers and isolationists in the face of persistent Soviet effort to halt the murder and even to breathe life into the corpse, the League was carried to the grave in December, 1939, by the pall-bearers of Geneva—amid songs of celebration over the expulsion of the USSR. In 1945 the United Nations, with the Soviet Union and the United States fully participating, sought once more to base peace on a League of equal sovereignties and on obligations of collective coercion of aggressor states. The infant may perhaps be said to have died of senility before its birth. For atomic power, in its impact upon the political prospects of the race, reduced a thousand years to a few split seconds of indivisible unity or universal annihilation. Statesmen, like other men, are creatures of habit and must needs pretend that life can be given to their artifacts, however obsolete they may have become. If anything lives in the new League, this result will flow from the fact that sovereignties are in truth no longer equal and that the three Super-Powers are jointly and severally resolved that the peace shall be kept.

This timid adventure in global engineering, bespeaking failure but yet offering opportunities for creative endeavor if governments and peoples would dare to break with ancient ways, began with the Moscow Conference of 1943, with its promise of Allied unity and its formula for perpetuating international anarchy. Various Soviet publicists asserted at the outset that the USSR would have nothing to do with any revival of the "defunct" Geneva League nor with any new organization patterned upon it.¹¹ They likewise voiced their conviction that the "general international organization" envisaged at Moscow must depend for its efficacy on the unanimity of the Great Powers.¹² Ambassador Gromyko with a staff of aides participated in the Anglo-American-Sino-Soviet conference at Dumbarton Oaks Mansion in Washington, under the chairmanship of Stettinius, then Undersecretary of State.¹³ The proposals submitted on October 7, 1944, became the basis of the San Francisco Conference. They con-

templated a United Nations Organization (UNO) embracing a Security Council, a General Assembly, an Economic and Social Council and an International Court of Justice, all based on the principle of "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states." The result was similar in principle and structure to the League of Nations. Moscow nevertheless endorsed it, though insisting on unanimity in all votes to apply sanctions against aggressors by the Security Council—on which the USSR, Britain, United States, China, and France were to have permanent seats, along with six non-permanent members to be elected for two-year terms by the Assembly, with three retiring annually. Moscow's allies dissented. The result (Chap. VI, Sec. C) was agreement to disagree: "The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration."

The question, stripped of double-talk, was crucial since the whole meaning of the proposed UNO hinged upon it. Moscow was depicted by many Western critics as selfishly insisting that it must enjoy a right to veto any measures against itself in the event of its being accused of "aggression." The Anglo-American champions of law, order and righteousness were represented as favoring an arrangement by which all States, great and small, would agree to be coerced if a majority of the Security Council should find them guilty of violating their commitments to keep the peace. In reality there was never the remotest prospect that the American Senate (or the British Parliament) would approve such a scheme. The premise of Moscow's critics, moreover, was fallacious. There is no basis in logic, in experience, or in the principle of "sovereign equality," to support the belief that peace can be assured through the coercion of States by States. Any program for the armed policing of Great Powers by other Great Powers could only mean another great war. The Narkomindel, mindful of Versailles, Munich and Geneva, was determined to preclude the possibility that the USSR might find itself accused of aggression in the Security Council and subjected to collective attack by new anti-Soviet coalitions. The Kremlin accordingly championed the principle that coercion of alleged aggressors should be permissible only when the Big Five were in unanimous agreement.

The issue was reopened by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in mid-winter of the final year of war. In the palace of the Tsars at Livadia, on the warm Crimean coast near devastated Yalta, the

three leaders met together for the second (and last) time accompanied by Stettinius, Leahy, Hopkins, Byrnes, Marshall, King, Somervell, and Harriman; by Eden, Clark Kerr, Cadogan, Brooke, Portal, Cunningham, Ismay, and Alexander; and by Molotov, Kuznetsov, Antonov, Vyshinsky, Gusev, and Gromyko. The communiqué of February 11, 1945, dealt primarily with the planned defeat of the Nazi Reich against which "powerful blows from the east, west, north and south have been fully agreed." A program for occupation and control was outlined. Accords were announced on Poland, Yugoslavia and liberated Europe. A secret agreement pledged the USSR to enter the war against Japan three months after Nazi capitulation. Another confidential understanding committed London and Washington to support the membership of Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine in the UNO. A general conference was convoked, to meet in San Francisco on April 25 to prepare a charter of the new League. Agreement was recorded on voting procedure in the Security Council, to be published after consultation with France.

This accord was released on March 5 as part of the announcement of the invitation to all the United Nations to foregather in California. It provided that the Council in all "procedural" matters relating to pacific settlement of disputes should act by an affirmative vote of any seven members, with parties to a dispute abstaining from voting. But in decisions to apply coercion, there would be no such abstention and the requisite vote of seven must include the concurring vote of the five permanent members. Hence no police measures would be possible save with the unanimous approval of the Big Five, plus two of the six non-permanent members.

The final Charter preserved this principle (cf. Art. 27). The document of 111 articles was the work of delegations representing 50 states, met together in the Pacific metropolis between April 25 and June 26, 1945, at the invitation of Washington, London, Moscow and Chungking, with Paris participating but not sponsoring the invitation.¹⁴ From beginning to end the USSR was the focal point of all controversies. Molotov had not originally planned to come, but after Roosevelt's death Stalin, in response to a plea from President Truman, agreed that the Soviet delegation should be headed by the Foreign Commissar. Once arrived, he objected to Secretary of State Stettinius acting as permanent

chairman and insisted successfully on a joint chairmanship by the heads of delegations of the sponsoring Powers. In his address of April 26, Molotov declared:

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the International Conference in San Francisco. . . . The country of Soviets which has saved European civilization in bloody battles against German Fascism now, with good reason, reminds the governments of their responsibility for the future of peace-loving nations after the termination of this war. This is all the more necessary because before this war the warning voice of the Soviet Republics was not heard with due attention. . . .

It is obvious that no one wishes to restore a League of Nations which had no rights or power, which did not interfere with any aggressor preparing for war against peace-loving nations and which sometimes even lulled the nations' vigilance with regard to impending aggression. . . .

The Soviet Government is a sincere and firm champion of the establishment of a strong international organization of security. Whatever may depend upon it and its efforts in the common cause of the creation of such a postwar organization for the peace and security of nations, will readily be done by the Soviet Government. . . . This great cause is resolutely backed by our peace-loving people, by the Soviet Government and the Red Army, and by our great Marshal Stalin. It is a most important task of the delegation of the Soviet Government to express these sentiments and thoughts of the Soviet people.

Amid recurring crises, Stettinius appeared at times to be leading an anti-Soviet bloc consisting of the 20 Latin American Republics, the States of the new Arab League, and occasionally the French and the 5 British delegations. At Mexico City in March, Stettinius and Nelson A. Rockefeller had virtually pledged Washington to support the admission of Argentina to the San Francisco Conference and the UNO. The Latin Americans reluctantly approved separate representation for Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine, but joined Britain and the United States in rejecting Molotov's pleas for representation of the Lublin Poles. When Molotov, adroitly quoting Hull and Roosevelt on the Fascist character of the Argentine régime, asked delay in admitting the delegation from Buenos Aires, he was voted down. On this, as on other issues, he championed democracy more consistently than the spokesmen of the democracies. He impressed the gathering and the public

with his vigorous initiative and earnest determination that the Conference should succeed, as did Gromyko, following Molotov's return to Moscow early in May.

Controversy over the scope of the "veto" of the Big Five was protracted. The USSR interpreted the Yalta formula to mean that permanent members of the Council should have the right to bar discussion of alleged aggression as well as action against it. The "Little 45," led by Dr. Herbert V. Evatt of Australia, fought for an unqualified right of discussion. The Soviet delegates held that the Council should not be a debating forum but an executive agency to carry out joint decisions of the major Powers. While accepting the principle of unanimity for sanctions, the Anglo-American representatives urged free discussion of any issue in both Council and Assembly. On June 7, Stalin finally yielded. A joint statement of the 8th asserted that "no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation" brought to its attention by any State. With this interpretation, the Yalta formula was incorporated in the Charter.

The problem of the relationship between general or global obligations of collective security and specific or regional commitments of joint defense (e.g., the Soviet alliance treaties and the Act of Chapultepec) was resolved by providing (Art. 107) that "nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action in relation to any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action." It was further stipulated (Art. 53) that regional security pledges against former enemy States could be employed "against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such State" during a transitional period, pending voluntary transfer of this responsibility to the UNO. Nothing in the Charter, moreover, shall "impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" (Art. 51).¹⁵

Official Soviet attitudes toward the enterprise are suggested by the following comments:

Izvestia, June 27, 1945: It is not the objective of the new organization to establish perpetual peace among nations and immediately to eradicate the causes of conflicts and wars. Its aims are more realistic. It is intended to be an organization capable of averting aggression or of curbing an aggressor by the united efforts of the peaceful nations. . . . The indispensable requisite for the effectiveness of this organization is unanimous and concerted action of the Great Powers who are most responsible for the maintenance of peace. . . . The heart and soul of the new organization is the Security Council of which the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, China, and France are the permanent members. These countries represent nearly half the population of the world, as well as the overwhelming military and economic potential. It is with them that the chief responsibility for maintaining the peace lies. The powers with which they are invested under the Charter correspond to their actual weight and significance in safeguarding the security of all the United Nations. Their powers are duties rather than privileges. They arise from the obligation of the Great Powers to uphold peace in the interests of all peace-loving nations, with their confidence, cooperation and support.

N. Ananyev in *Izvestia*, July 11, 1945: The peoples of the USSR are sincere in their desire that the UNO . . . should speedily become a really effective organization. . . . The Soviet Union has never threatened anyone. It has always respected the rights and liberties of other nations, a policy which stems from the very essence of the Soviet State. In the USSR there are no classes or groups that could have an interest in enmity among nations or in the acquisition of foreign territory. That is why the USSR, which came forward as the main force in the struggle against Hitler Germany, is also the mightiest bulwark for the freedom, peace and independence of nations and their universal progress.

War and the Working Class (now renamed *New Times*), July 1, 1945: Unanimity among the Great Powers is the cardinal factor which creates the possibility for making the UNO an effective organization of international security. . . . Under what conditions will the actions of the new organization be sufficiently effective? The answer to this question was given by Comrade Stalin, as far back as November 6, 1944 when he said, "They will be effective if the Great Powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated."

Having rejected everything remotely resembling a World State, the United Nations established, behind complex mecha-

nisms of collaboration, a Concert of Powers to keep the peace. The mechanisms would acquire such vitality and usefulness to the peoples of the world as the concerted Powers would be able and willing to give them. As Walter Lippmann put it (June 26, 1945): "This association will be a union of the Powers. . . . It does not establish a system of 'collective security' if by that ambiguous phrase we mean a system under which all nations undertake to police all other nations. Under the new Charter there is no undertaking to police any one of the five Great Powers. In fact, since every smaller State is intimately associated with at least one of the five Great Powers which as a matter of its own vital interest is bound to protect it, the police function of the new organization cannot be its basic principle. Its basic principle is union."

The union thus established, however, has nothing in common with federal unions in which States create central agencies with power to legislate for individuals and with independent force at their disposal to prevent lawlessness and violence. The new concert, like the Quintuple Alliance of the 1820's, is no more than a union of major sovereignties. The dimensions of its prospective achievements are not a centimeter more nor less than the measure of unity for common purposes which Moscow, London, Washington, Paris, and Nanking may display. To expect more than this from the UNO is to expect more than is politically possible within the unaltered context of a system of sovereign States. To expect less is to assume that available opportunities will again be wasted as they were between Mukden and Munich.

Soviet leaders perceived and expressed more clearly than others this basic characteristic of the new design for peace. Idealists argued that a world government had been born. But the UNO lacked the distinguishing attribute of government—i.e., powers superior to that of any other group in the community to enact and enforce rules of conduct. Cynics contended that the United Nations was merely a coalition to prevent the last war. The victorious Powers, both in the Charter and in the Soviet alliance treaties, were in truth definitely pledged to act together only against the vanquished, who were powerless, and not against one another. No major war in the years ahead is imaginable save through a clash among the victors. But such a clash cannot be averted by agreement among them to coerce each other. Such an arrangement spells not peace but Armageddon. The great Le-

viathans and Behemoths of the mid-20th Century have above them no masters. Peace will continue only so long as they practice mutual cooperation and individual self-restraint. Once any of the giants takes the sword against another, the whole venture is lost. Hence the reasonableness of Soviet insistence that the Super-Powers must act together.

That global peace should rest on so fragile a basis is no cause for despair. The truly Great Powers of the planet are now reduced to three. No fourth can be so long as the three are one. China and India may ultimately become Powers, but only in the next century. The problem of peace is no longer one of reducing the anarchy of a multiplicity of equal sovereignties to some ephemeral semblance of delicately balanced order. It has been starkly simplified. Americans, Britons and Russians need only keep the peace among themselves and act jointly to see that it is kept among others. Their disunity means war, no matter what others may do. Their united and irresistible power means peace no matter what others may do. Given this, the new Trinity can preserve and enrich One World. The alternative in the atomic age is: No World.

The crisis of September, 1945, demonstrated that these realities were by no means fully appreciated by the new Anglo-American leaders and that prevailing conceptions of peace-making were widely at variance in the USSR and the Atlantic communities. The Executive Committee of the UNO, meeting in the British capital, made heartening progress in its plans to bring the organization into being during the winter. But the simultaneous first meeting in Lancaster House of the new Council of Foreign Ministers ended in a deadlock which augured ill for the future—not because the procedural problems at issue were insoluble but because positions were taken on questions of “principle” which seemed irreconcilable in the absence of a major change either in Anglo-American or Soviet policies.

The Council had been charged at Potsdam (cf. pp. 522 ff. *supra* and 550 ff. *infra*) “to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland,” through consultation among “the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned” (i.e., Britain and the USSR for Finland, both plus the United States and France for Italy, and the three Super-Powers for

Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria), subject to invitation to others to participate "when matters directly concerning them are under discussion" (Potsdam Declaration, August 2, 1945). The Ministers met without adequate prior agreement as to agenda or procedure, thanks in part to the recent arrival of Bevin and Byrnes at their respective posts and their relative unfamiliarity with diplomacy in general or with the traditional attitude in particular of the permanent staffs of the Foreign Office and the State Department. The Byrnes-Bevin doctrine of non-recognition of "undemocratic" governments in the Balkans (cf. pp. 523ff. *supra*), cast its shadow over the meeting from the outset. But Molotov, in a conciliatory and hopeful spirit, agreed at the first session (September 11) to Anglo-American proposals that France and China should participate in all discussions of all the treaties, even though they had no right to do so under the Potsdam agreement and the USSR had no obligation to agree to their doing so, since they had never been at war with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria and had no part in the armistice accords.

Precisely what followed is still obscure, for the Ministers met in secret and were unable when they adjourned (October 3) to agree either on the language of a protocol recording their discussions or of a communiqué stating wherein they had agreed or disagreed. But it is certain that Molotov's original assent to the Bevin-Byrnes suggestion was based on a false premise. He assumed that Georges Bidault, with whom he had negotiated the French-Soviet alliance, which DeGaulle had signed in Moscow nine months before (cf. pp. 547ff. *infra*), would take a position, at least on some questions, in harmony with that of the USSR, despite De Gaulle's talk of a "Western Bloc" on the eve of the meeting. Molotov further assumed that Wang Shih-chieh, with whom he had concluded a generous and comprehensive Soviet-Chinese settlement less than a month previously (cf. pp. 568ff. *infra*), would likewise give some support to Moscow on Balkan issues, in which China had no direct concern. In fact the French and Chinese Ministers appear to have sided consistently with Bevin and Byrnes, who in turn apparently opposed Molotov on every crucial point and made it quite clear that they had no wish to abide either by the procedure agreed upon at Potsdam or by the informal understandings regarding the Soviet security zone arrived at long before by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.

The issue beyond the verbiage was substantive, not procedural. Moscow envisaged the making and maintenance of world peace as the prime responsibility of the three Super-Powers, upon whose leadership and protection the small and the weak must rely and upon whose unity all hope of success for the UNO depended. Moscow further took it for granted that Soviet acceptance of American hegemony in Latin America, the Pacific, Japan and Central China, and of British hegemony in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Near East, Africa and southeastern Asia, would be reciprocated by Anglo-American acceptance of Soviet hegemony in the lands north of Greece and east of the Stettin-Trieste line. For reasons set forth elsewhere in these pages, the opinion may be ventured that this Soviet conception represents, in the absence of world government, the only workable design for global peace during the years ahead. It is only in this wise that the Super-Powers, which alone have power to make or break the peace, can maintain equilibrium and unity among themselves. During the war years Roosevelt, Hull, Churchill and Eden had all accepted this view with few qualifications. At London Bevin and Byrnes, supported by Bidault and Wang, repudiated it. They evidently insisted, even as they opposed all Soviet "interference," in British or American spheres, that London and Washington, supported by as many lesser States as they could rally to their cause, must pass judgment on Balkan "democracy" and were free to use this formula, despite denials, to influence treaty terms in such a way as to attenuate or terminate Soviet influence in southeastern Europe.

Soviet alarm was enhanced by the very vagueness of Anglo-American purposes, here more than ever befogged in the noble verbiage of abstract principles having no demonstrable relationship either to the social facts of Balkan life or to the political realities of global peace. The picture of Britain and America standing together against the USSR was by itself calculated to recall to Moscow all the old unhappy memories of bitter and wasted years. Apprehension was not lessened by knowledge that Britain was a suppliant for credits in Washington and was therefore under economic pressure to support American initiative. The Anglo-American monopoly of the atomic bomb had the effect of a silent threat. Events elsewhere—e.g., Bavaria, Greece, Palestine, India, Indo-China, Korea, and Java—were not calculated

to impress the Kremlin with the sincerity of Anglo-American solicitude for "democracy" and "freedom." Why the Atlantic Charter should be applied in the Balkans and not in Asia and Indonesia was beyond Russian understanding. Soviet fears of "capitalist encirclement" were inevitably revived by the spectacle of France, ousted from Syria by British troops, and China, deprived anew of Hong Kong by British diplomacy, each aspiring to a "Great Power" role wholly beyond its means and both supporting Britain and the United States against the USSR in Eastern Europe. Such suspicions were no less vivid for being, as yet, unjustified and for promising to aggravate, rather than reduce, the danger which produced them. Unwittingly or willfully, Byrnes, Bevin, Bidault and Wang acted in a fashion perfectly designed to arouse anxieties deeply rooted in past Soviet experience.

Molotov responded by denouncing the British-supported White Terror in Greece, raising anew the question of the Straits, opposing Greek annexation of the Dodecanese Islands, championing Yugoslav claims to Trieste, pressing claims to reparations from Italy, proposing a Soviet trusteeship for Tripolitania, and urging a Four-Power Control Commission for Japan. Finally, on September 22, he announced that he could no longer acquiesce in the departure from the Potsdam procedure which he had approved on the 11th, and that henceforth China and France must be excluded from the discussion of the Balkan treaty drafts. At this point the evil-tempered, loud-mouthed, small-minded Bevin hotly accused Molotov of "Hitlerite" methods. Only when the Soviet Commissar threatened to leave the Conference did Bevin withdraw his offensive epithet. Molotov's position was legally correct, since the action of September 11 was not a "decision" and could not supersede the decisions of the heads of States incorporated in the Potsdam Declaration. Byrnes and Bevin, still supported by Bidault and Wang, nevertheless contended that Molotov was bound by his initial view. An Anglo-American appeal to Stalin to alter Molotov's instruction brought a prompt refusal. The Council broke up in confusion and recrimination, following Soviet rejection of Byrnes' proposals for a procedural compromise and Anglo-American-French-Chinese rejection of alternative proposals by Molotov. Zhukov's proposed visit to the United States was abruptly cancelled because of "illness."

Whether this fiasco of the first effort of the major United Na-

tions at peace-making would spell potential tragedy or an early resumption of cooperative endeavor was to depend upon the ability and willingness of Stalin, Attlee and Truman to begin the effort anew on a basis promising unity. Amid expressions of hope on all sides, Molotov blamed Bevin and Byrnes for the breakdown and said, anent the original Potsdam agreement: "It is not the habit of the Soviet Union to violate its obligations and I don't recommend that others do it." Added *Izvestia* (October 5, 1945): "If the American and British Governments in the future insist upon their position, which in no way can be brought into accord with loyalty to the already concluded tripartite agreements, then this will shake the very basis of collaboration among the three Powers."

In his radio address of October 6 Byrnes conceded that "experience demonstrates that a certain degree of understanding among the major Powers is essential to secure general agreement among many nations," that "the peace of Europe depends upon the existence of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and its European neighbors," and that "had it not been for the difficulties experienced by the Allied Governments in agreeing upon a common policy in regard to the recognition of the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, a more conciliatory spirit might possibly have prevailed." Yet he referred to the action of September 11 as a "decision" and spoke fervently of his compromise proposal: If France and China would permit the Big Three to undertake the "preparatory and exploratory work for the peace settlements," then "a truly representative peace conference should be convoked before the end of the year," to include all five permanent members of the UNO Security Council, all European members of the United Nations, and all non-European members "which supplied substantial military contingents in the war against the European members of the Axis. . . . Peace cannot be the concern of a few presently powerful States. . . . This has been a people's war and it must be a people's peace."

Such language, however honestly intended, seemed fatuous in Muscovite eyes. Peace can be made and preserved only by the powerful and not by the powerless. There is no democracy in the rule of one State = one vote, since democracy by any definition presupposes the equality of peoples which is the antithesis of the equality of States. This reality cannot be altered by unctuous talk

of "principle" vs. "expediency" nor by idealistic professions of moral virtue. In a world of sovereignties, moreover, international democracy is a delusion and no Power, large or small, can be bound by the vote of other sovereignties, whether it is outvoted 2 to 1, 4 to 1 or 40 to 1. Any "peace conference" outside the UNO would inevitably weaken the new organization which London and Washington were ostensibly championing. Any conference constituted on the Byrnes formula would merely add to the Anglo-American bloc against the USSR the votes of the other satellite States: The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Turkey, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, etc.—all to no purpose save to isolate the Soviet Union and compel it to resort to unilateral decisions and bilateral bargains. Peace-making by a general conference of dozens of States, all enjoying "sovereign equality," is either a formula for anarchic irresponsibility on the model of the Geneva League, or a formula for uniting all the non-Soviet world against the USSR. That such proposals could be seriously put forward in the autumn of the year of victory by the responsible spokesmen of America and Britain was melancholy evidence either of their conviction that a continued concert of the Super-Powers was impossible or of their profound ignorance of the interests of the Soviet Union which, in the view of its leaders and people, could not be compromised.

The United States will fight before it will permit any other Great Power to dominate Latin America, the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean, or the mid-Pacific islands. Britain will fight before it will permit any other Great Power to dominate the Low Countries, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea or the approaches to India. The USSR will fight before it will permit any other Great Power to dominate Danubia, Balkania, the Black Sea, Iran or Northern China. World peace after World War II will either rest upon these facts of world politics, or there will be no peace. Those who formulate top decisions in Washington, London and Moscow will either understand and act upon these facts, or there will be no peace. Whether, and to what degree, they would be understood and acted upon was uncertain in the immediate aftermath of the London debacle.

All that was clear was that the rulers of the Soviet Union would

cling with stubborn tenacity to what they regarded as the prerequisites of safety for their Motherland; that some British and American leaders would continue to dream up schemes for thwarting and weakening Soviet power; and that all in high places would continue to play the age-old game of power-politics as if atomic power had never been heard of, or could somehow be controlled by treaties of renunciation among sovereignties. From these certainties flowed no assurance of creative concord serving the needs of men. Neither, happily, was there any necessary assurance of conflict. A beneficent Fortune might yet achieve the miracle of peace without wisdom, even should wisdom as the means to peace prove impossible of attainment.

Yet a grisly specter rose from the grave in the first autumn of peace, to mutter imprecations and to echo "ancestral voices, prophesying war." Its name was Nemesis and its shape was long known in Muscovy and Atlantica alike. Ever since October, 1917, it had repeatedly condemned all the world to bloodshed and chaos. To lay this ghost for good, and to prevent the "post-war" from reverting to a "pre-war" epoch, would require more wisdom, tolerance and imagination than any of the rulers of men had yet displayed in the wake of victory.

4. GERMANIC ENIGMA

In all politics men are prone to speak and act in terms of what is emotionally satisfying rather than in terms of what is rationally relevant to their objectives. The USSR, Britain and the United States, along with all other victims of the Nazi assault on civilization, were necessarily preoccupied in 1945-46 with de-Nazifying Germany, punishing war criminals, collecting reparations, and rendering the Reich militarily impotent. The pursuit of these purposes was imperative. Yet the central problem upon which future peace depended was of a different order. No settlement for the Reich or for Japan, whether "hard" or "soft," punitive or indulgent, unjust or just, could by itself assure peace, since peace would henceforth depend exclusively upon Anglo-American-Soviet unity. The German community was destined for many years to be an object, not a subject, of diplomacy. By itself it could not again become a threat, save insofar as a sane and pros-

perous life for other Europeans might be rendered impossible by gaunt hunger and continued madness in the heart of the Continent. Germany could become a matrix of war only as Moscow might seek to use its people and resources against the West or as the Atlantic Powers might try to employ them against the USSR. Germany could become a harbinger of peace in the measure to which the major United Nations should avail themselves of German problems and opportunities to enrich their joint skill and will to reorder the world.

Only dimly, in a blur of mingled anger, sympathy, horror and vindictiveness, were these persistent realities seen by the Allied leaders and peoples on the morrow of the German collapse. Full perception would have led to a decision to institute a joint international administration for all the Reich, perhaps on the basis of the chapters of the San Francisco Charter envisaging international trusteeships for non-self-governing territories.¹⁶ Such a course would have presupposed that Germans will long remain incapable of self-government on the national level, that their best hope of ultimate redemption lies in genuinely international guidance, and that tasks of joint administration can bind the USSR, Britain, America and France into an ever more intimate unity of shared experiences. But this enterprise, like that of building a World State, proved beyond the imaginations and talents of the victors. Their actual decisions were based neither on lofty principle nor on united purposes, but on convenience, expediency, postponement of controversy, and a parsimonious economy of time and effort, all emotionally suffused with a negative, albeit comprehensible, desire to punish, to cripple, and to prevent rather than to cure, to reconstruct, and to create.

The central objective of Soviet policy toward the Reich, like that of all of Germany's neighbors, was security against future aggression. Initial reliance was placed on the time-honored device of diplomatic and military encirclement. The establishment of a Slavic bloc, through pacts with Warsaw, Prague and Belgrade, supplemented the original Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942 (cf. pp. 438f. above). Germany's most populous western neighbor, though no longer a Power of top rank, remained Muscovy's logical ally on the other side of the Reich. The alignment of 1756, 1891, and 1935 was revived in 1944 with the liberation of France and the autumn visit to the USSR of Gen. Charles de Gaulle and Foreign

Minister Georges Bidault. On December 10 Molotov and De Gaulle signed a 20-year treaty of alliance.*

* The Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Resolved to pursue together, and until the end, the war against Germany;

Convinced that, once victory has been achieved, the re-establishment of peace on a stable basis and its maintenance for a lasting future require the existence of close collaboration between them and with all the United Nations;

Resolved to collaborate with a view to creating an international system of security, making possible an effective maintenance of general peace and guaranteeing the harmonious development of relations between nations;

Desirous of confirming reciprocal commitments resulting from an exchange of letters on September 20, 1941, relating to joint action in the war against Germany;

Certain of meeting, through the conclusion of an alliance between France and the USSR, the feelings as well as the interests of the two nations, the demands of war as well as the requirements of peace and of economic reconstruction in full conformity with the aims adopted by the United Nations;

Have resolved to conclude a treaty and to this effect have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Provisional Government of the French Republic, M. Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, M. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Their appointments having been recognized as being fully valid, they have agreed on the following provisions:

1. Each of the high contracting parties will continue to fight by the side of the other and of the United Nations until final victory over Germany. Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to afford to the other help and assistance in this struggle by all the means at its disposal.

2. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Germany or to conclude, without mutual consent, an armistice or a treaty of peace with either the Hitlerite government or any government or authority set up in Germany with the aim of prolonging or maintaining the German policy of aggression.

3. The high contracting parties undertake to adopt in complete agreement, at the end of the present conflict with Germany, all measures necessary to eliminate any new threat on the part of Germany and to oppose any initiative of a nature capable of making possible a new attempt at aggression on her part.

4. If one of the high contracting parties should find itself involved in hostilities with Germany either as the result of an aggression committed by Germany or as the result of the provisions of the above Article 3, the other high contracting power will immediately give the contracting power so involved all the help and assistance in its power.

5. The high contracting parties undertake not to conclude alliances and not to participate in any coalition directed against one of them.

6. The high contracting parties agree to give each other all possible economic assistance after the war in order to facilitate and hasten the reconstruction of the two countries and in order to contribute to the prosperity of the world.

7. The present treaty in no way affects the commitments previously undertaken by the high contracting parties toward third parties by virtue of published treaties.

8. The present treaty, of which the French and Russian texts are equally valid, will be ratified and instruments of ratification thereof will be exchanged in Paris

Wrote Ilya Ehrenburg in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (December 20):

Long before a treaty was solemnly signed between our two countries, there was an unwritten treaty between our two peoples. It was an invisible treaty, written not in ink, but in tears—tears of grief and wrath; in the ashes of Novgorod and Rouen, in the woe of Paris and Leningrad. It was written in bile, in that hatred which burns but is not consumed—hatred of the vile, cruel, doltish and arrogant invaders of that country—where corpulent *Valkyries*, belching, say to glassy-eyed *Nibelungs*: “Put me on a mattress made of the hair of the vanquished and cover me with peonies grown in Maidanek.” That unwritten treaty was written in blood, the blood of the heroes of Stalingrad and the blood of Bir Hakeim, the blood of the Smolensk guerrillas and the Savoy *Francs Tireurs* . . .

Between us lies Germany—breeding ground of criminals, den of child-assassins, country of evil. Our two people live at two different ends of Europe. And the one-eyed predatory German eagle is a menace to both. The two peoples have one will—the will to protect that profound midsummer day of peace, when ears ripen and bees hum, when little children frolic, carefree—yet when on the banks of the Seine, as on the banks of the Volga, the heart may suddenly be frozen by the vile tread of the German jackboot. . . .

The French people have put their hand to a treaty. I see millions of hands, the hands of Paris workers, Burgundy winegrowers, Breton fishermen, the hands of guerrillas, the hands of little hopeful children, the hands of mothers raised in blessing. And if I were asked who sent the representatives to Moscow to conclude a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, I would answer: the French people . . . Together with the French, together with all our Allies, we shall see the victory. Together with them we shall cut the first loaf of happiness and swallow the first glass of peace.

Another means of weakening the German war potential was the territorial reduction of the Reich. The project, favored by

as soon as possible. It will take effect immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and will remain in force for twenty years. If this treaty is not denounced by one of the high contracting parties at least one year before the expiration of this period, it will remain in force without limitation as to its duration, each one of the high contracting parties being then able to terminate it by means of declaration to this effect subject to one year's notice.

The plenipotentiaries above named have hereunto set their hands and seals.

Made in Moscow in duplicate on December 10, 1944.

BIDAULT
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
MOLOTOV
Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Sumner Welles and others, of splitting Germany into three or more separate states, did not commend itself to the Narkomindel, nor to Downing Street and the State Department. Soviet policy, as mirrored in numerous statements and in the propaganda of the Free Germany Committee, was to maintain German unity. The Quai d'Orsay favored partition, particularly in the form of separation and possible French annexation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr. But it received no more support for such a program from Moscow than from London or Washington. On the other hand the men of the Kremlin insisted upon the detachment of peripheral areas which had become part of the Reich through the *Drang nach Osten*.

The restoration of the independence of Austria (the "*Ostmark*") was agreed upon at the Moscow Conference of October, 1943. Soviet troops took Vienna in mid-April, 1945 with the aid of the anti-Nazi underground. Anglo-American forces occupied western Austria in May. On August 8 an Allied Control Commission was established in the *Innere Stadt* of Vienna, while the rest of the city and the entire country were partitioned into four zones of military administration.

Marshal Tolbukhin had meanwhile approved the creation on April 29 of a new government headed by 75-year-old Karl Renner, Social Democratic Chancellor in late 1918. His "Cabinet" embraced 4 Socialists, 4 men of the People's Party (formerly Christian Socialists), 3 Communists and 2 independents. The Communists were Franz Hönnner, Minister of the Interior, who led Austrian partisans fighting under Tito; Colon Kopleniz, Minister without Portfolio; and Ernst Fischer, Minister of Education, who, like Kopleniz, had been in exile in Moscow. The Renner régime, however, was a genuine coalition which seemed to enjoy the respect and support of all groups and classes.¹⁷ But since it was set up as a result of a misunderstanding of Allied policy by its members and without prior consultation among Moscow, London and Washington, the victors withheld diplomatic recognition until October 20, by which time the Vienna administration had been "broadened" by the inclusion of provincial representatives. The fine slicing of the hungry and war-torn little country into separate military zones threatened to aggravate economic difficulties. A common administration under Allied supervision was a prerequisite of Austrian reconstruction and independence.

To the north the Government of restored Czechoslovakia proposed, with Soviet approval, to deport many Magyars to Hungary and to expel to Germany most or all of the 3,250,000 *Sudeten-deutschen* of the Bohemian borderlands where Konrad Henlein had recruited the Nazi Trojan Horsemen who played so sinister a role in destroying the Republic in 1938-39. Between the Sudeten Mountains and the Baltic, the new Poland, with Soviet approval, began the expulsion to the Reich of the 10,000,000 German-speaking inhabitants of the provinces east of the Oder-Niesse line. Prague and Warsaw, having suffered betrayal and savage oppression at the hands of Nazified Germans within their borders, had no intention of tolerating Teutonic minorities within their new frontiers, even though these groups had lived on their lands since the Middle Ages. Many Anglo-American sentimentalists, whose knowledge of Nazi horrors in Slavdom was derived from casual reading, protested vehemently at the "injustice" of this compulsory mass migration, even though the liberated people, unlike their erstwhile conquerors, refrained from converting the populations involved into slaves, fertilizer or soap.

This problem, along with many others, was grappled with at Potsdam three months after victory. On June 5 Zhukov, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and De Tassigny signed a Declaration in Berlin under which the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by a German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal, or local government or authority." Provision was made for the disarmament and internment of all German armed forces, release of all Allied prisoners and nationals, surrender of war criminals, etc. The four Allied Supreme Commanders were made members of a Control Council, acting by unanimous vote. Under its direction an inter-Allied governing authority (Kommandatura) of four commanders was set up for the area of Greater Berlin.¹⁸ The rest of the Reich was apportioned into an eastern zone of Soviet occupation, a northwestern British zone, a southwestern American zone, and a western French zone. With the object of perfecting and supplementing these provisional arrangements, a major Tripartite Conference met in the Cecilienhof in Potsdam between July 17 and August 2, 1945.

Marshal Stalin was accompanied by Molotov, Admiral Kuznet-

sov, Antonov, Vyshinsky, Kavtaradze, Maisky, Gusev, Gromyko, et al.; President Harry S. Truman by Byrnes, Leahy, Joseph E. Davies, Edwin Pauley, Murphy, Harriman, Marshall, King, Arnold, Freeman Mathews, Benjamin Cohen, and others; and Prime Minister Churchill (replaced on July 28 by Clement R. Attlee) by Eden and Bevin and, among others, by Cadogan, Clark Kerr, Strang, Brooke, Portal, Cunningham, Ismay, and Alexander. The accord registered in the Potsdam Communiqué * included provisions relating to frontiers and deportees. "Pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement," northern East Prussia, including Königsberg, was transferred to the USSR, with President and Prime Minister agreeing to support Soviet claims to this area. The regions east of the Oder and Niesse "shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany." The three Powers, moreover,

recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above, and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

The Potsdam Conference further agreed to speed the trial of the top Nazi war criminals (24 of whom were indicted for trial at

* For agreements reached on Poland, cf. p. 522 above.

Nürnberg by Allied prosecutors in London on August 30¹⁹), to dissolve the European Advisory Commission, and to set up a Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China to meet in London for the purpose of proposing territorial settlements and drafting peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. "The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established." Meanwhile:

Agreement has been reached at this conference on the political and economic principles of a coordinated Allied policy toward defeated Germany during the period of Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.

The detailed statement of announced political principles specified that supreme authority would be exercised by the four Commanders-in-Chief, "each in his own zone of occupation and also jointly" through the Control Council, for the purposes of (1) effecting "complete disarmament and demilitarization and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production"; (2) convincing the German people "that they have suffered a total military defeat and cannot escape responsibility"; (3) destroying the Nazi Party and its affiliates and preventing "all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda"; and (4) preparing "the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany." "For the time being no central German Government shall be established," apart from certain administrative departments, headed by State secretaries,

under the Control Council. But democratic self-government was to be introduced in localities, regions, provinces and *Länder*, with freedom of assembly, discussion, and political activity for "all democratic political parties."

This statement of purposes represented a hopeful consensus of views between East and West. Moscow had already permitted fraternization, political activities, and trade unions within the Soviet zone, all of which practices were now gradually introduced into the American, British, and French zones. The USSR at the same time endorsed the view, which indeed it was the first to sponsor, that the new Germany was to be a democracy on the Atlantic, rather than on the Soviet, model. No use was made by Moscow of the Free Germany Committee. The German Communist Party was revived, along with the Social Democrats, Centrists, and Democrats, but its spokesman, Wilhelm Pieck, asserted in a manifesto of June 25 that the Reich was unfit for a Soviet régime and must aim at a parliamentary coalition and an economy of free enterprise and private profit. The twin bogies of an anti-democratic Red Reich manipulated from Moscow, and of an anti-Soviet White Reich controlled by London and Washington, were thus dissipated, at least for the present.*

The "Economic Principles" propounded at Potsdam forbade all German manufacturing of arms, munitions, aircraft and sea-going ships and pledged the control and restriction "to Germany's approved post-war peace-time needs" of the production of metals, chemicals, machinery, etc. The Reich would be "treated as a single economic unit" through common policies regarding wages, prices, rationing, currency, banking, taxation, foreign trade, reparations, communications, mining, industry, agriculture, fishing, and forestry. But "at the earliest possible date the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the pres-

* At the end of August German State Secretaries were chosen to serve under the 12 Red Army officers, headed by Marshal Zhukov, who directed Soviet Military Government in the Russian zone. Zhukov's German deputy was Leo Skrzypczinsky, a German factory-owner without party affiliations who had spent four years in a concentration camp. The State Secretaries comprised 5 Communists (among them Paul Wandel, Willi Schroeder, Edwin Hörnle), 3 Social Democrats, 2 Christian Democrats (Centrists), 1 Liberal Democrat and 1 independent. This group was misleadingly described in part of the British and American press as a Soviet sponsored "Government" for all of Germany. Its appointment actually conformed in every respect to the program agreed to at Potsdam.

ent excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts, and other monopolistic arrangements." Steps were recommended "to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standard of living of European countries," other than Britain and the USSR.

Reparations were planned not through cash payment, as in 1919, but by removal of equipment in the occupied zones and seizure of German assets abroad. The USSR, which was to meet Polish claims from its own share, would receive, as a supplement to removals from its own zone, 15% of such industrial capital equipment in the western zones "as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed," in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, timber, potash, etc. An additional 10% from the same source was allocated to Moscow without payment or exchange, with the total of 25% to be garnered in the first instance from "unnecessary" metallurgical, chemical and machine-tool establishments. The amount to be removed as reparations from the western zones was to be determined within six months, with removals to be completed within two years. Soviet counter-deliveries in agreed installments were to be completed within five years. The USSR renounced all claim to captured German gold and "all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the western zone, as well as German foreign assets in all countries," save Finland, Eastern Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, where (as in the Soviet zone of the Reich) Britain and America reciprocally renounced claims to German assets or shares in enterprises.

The Potsdam program was enthusiastically hailed by numerous meetings throughout the USSR and by the press, which followed the lead of *Izvestia* (August 3) in hailing the result as "a fresh assurance that the Governments and peoples of the three great democratic Powers jointly with the other United Nations will maintain a stable and equitable peace." The reparations plan on its face resembled an "expropriation of the bourgeoisie" of Germany (though no Soviet spokesman hinted at the fact), since most of the equipment to be seized was privately owned and no provision was announced for compensation. Possible promises of reimbursement by future German régimes might avoid the appearance, but scarcely the reality, of confiscation. Should the Gov-

ernments of the Western Powers take over shares of German private businesses, a novel type of expropriation and international socialism would be brought into being. In any event, a significant segment of the German industrial plutocracy was faced with liquidation, barring some belated Anglo-American effort at rescue. The older ruling class of the Junkers, which had played a comparable role in delivering the Reich to the Nazis, was more certainly destined for the junk-heap, since most of its estates lay in the lands east of the Oder and were already in process of partition among Polish peasants. By common consent the new Nazi elite would be cast down for all time.

These impending changes in the structure of the German social hierarchy, constituting an externally imposed social revolution, may well be regarded as essential for any later rebirth of German democracy. The demilitarization of the Reich and its reduction to a relatively small and impoverished State offered reasonable assurance against any renewal of German aggression. The familiar liberal thesis that "injustice" breeds new wars is irrelevant. Any peace settlement in the wake of defeat would be regarded by most Germans as "unjust." The bitterness of the vanquished can lead to new conflicts only if they are permitted by the victors to recover their power to make war. There is no reason for assuming that the Soviet Union will ever permit a recovery of German military might. Within less than a decade, moreover, the shrunk Reich will be so hopelessly outmatched in population and industrial production by Slavic Europe that not even a new madman, leading a maddened people to the shambles, can renew the ancient challenge. At long last and for all time to come the *Drang nach Osten* was ended. Germany was forever broken and would never rise again as a military Power.

Whether the mass of Germans could ever recover their sanity and become creative participants in the life of a free and flourishing world was far less certain under the Potsdam dispensation. Next to Great Russians, Germans will long remain the most numerous of Continental peoples. The reduced Reich will still have at least 65,000,000 inhabitants, including deportees from the lost provinces. Before the war only 20,000,000 Germans supported themselves by agriculture. Industry, transport, and trade had supported about 35,000,000, of whom 25,000,000 lived by manufacturing. The breakdown of this economy in the World Depres-

sion had driven the *Kleinbürgertum*, the plutocracy, and the aristocracy into the criminal insanity of Hitlerism, which restored full employment and production by preparing for war and undertaking the conquest of the globe. In defeat the German economy was again prostrate, with its expanded manufacturing facilities paralyzed, its Silesian mining and industrial centers lost, its food-producing lands reduced by a fifth, its hungry mouths increased by millions of refugees, and all its means of production and distribution crippled and cramped.

The new riddle of the Reich remained without an answer during the months following the débâcle. Whether the urbanized societies of victorious Britain and America could provide for themselves tolerably full employment and production after the removal of the stimulus of total war appeared doubtful to many observers. There was no doubt that in shattered Germany, under the best imaginable conditions of capitalist production, thousands of factories would be empty and idle while millions of wage-earners subsisted on foreign relief and the still demented *Kleinbürgertum* sank into an ever-deeper slough of despond. How many Germans could find work and food in reconstructing Russia's devastated provinces was uncertain, since the issue of reparations through manpower was left unresolved at Potsdam. There is no way for the German community to support itself, even on the most meagre of rations, by farming and small-scale manufacturing, unless the Reich's population is halved—a result unlikely to be attained even by widespread famine and a general and prolonged wave of suicides. There is no way of reducing the war potential of a highly industrialized nation without depriving millions of its people of their means of livelihood. There is no way by which collective dementia can be cured, re-education can be effected, and a viable democracy can be restored under conditions of mass penury and despair.

To restore, or permit the restoration of, German science, technology and industry would spell German and European prosperity but, in the absence of a protracted trusteeship over the Reich, would create theoretical dangers of rearmament and *revanche* which the victors were unwilling to risk. To destroy or drastically reduce Germany's capacity for industry and commerce, as contemplated at Potsdam, would mean starvation in the Reich and prolonged impoverishment throughout Central

and Western Europe. Here as elsewhere in the Atlantic world the means of producing sustenance, wealth and welfare seemed somehow to defy full utilization and social direction by human intelligence, save for purposes of destruction and death. In the broken Reich men seemed bent upon removing or smashing the machines by which millions of other men lived because madmen had used them for deadly ends and because sane men could devise no means of using them to enrich life.

Whether the United Nations could meet this challenge was quite unclear as these words were written. To establish in the near future a national German Government, with all the attributes of "sovereignty," and to impose upon it a punitive peace treaty, would absolve Moscow, Paris, London, and Washington from the need of developing a workable joint program for the Reich. It would also prove disastrous to Allied unity and to any prospect of German democracy, and make of Middle Europe a festering slum of appalling want, haunting fear and impotent rage, spreading its infection to all the neighboring lands. The perpetuation of military zones in an occupation régime of indefinite duration, dedicated primarily to keeping Germany weak, would leave the problem unsolved. Anglo-American efforts to revive German industry under the control of private corporations and cartels were certain to be resented and resisted by Moscow. Soviet efforts to socialize German economy were equally certain to be resented and resisted by London and Washington. The only hope on the horizon appeared to lie in a genuinely collective trusteeship and an international civil administration of long duration, capable of evolving a viable and ultimately prosperous mixed German economy, combining in a new synthesis some of the elements of both Soviet Socialism and Western private enterprise. Even this, which was not in prospect by the dawn of 1946, would prove futile unless all of Europe and the world could find the way toward a polity free of anarchy and power politics, and an economy free of attempts at autarchy and recurrent cataclysms of collapse and stagnation.

Now more than ever the German problem has become inseparable from the political and economic dilemma of the entire world community of the 20th Century. If it is to be resolved in a life-giving adventure of fruitful labor and a new renaissance of human self-respect and hope, rather than in mass misery, frustra-

tion, and fresh rivalries making for chaos and death, it will call for creative statesmanship of unprecedented magnitude and for the most intimate unity of purpose and achievement on the part of the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Powers. Whether these will be forthcoming in a measure adequate to the tasks in hand was, perhaps mercifully, not disclosed during the first half year of peace.

5. CIPANGU AND CATHAY

Three-quarters of the Soviet land frontiers lie in Asia. In majestic immensity they extend from Transcaucasia across the towering ranges and dry plateaus which bisect the largest of the continents, down the valley of the Amur and up the Usuri to the hills of Vladivostok ("Lord of the East"), looking out upon the Japan Sea. South of this border lives half the human race. The line itself was long ago drawn by Muscovy through vast migrations and recurrent wars against Tartars, Turks and Japanese. From Soviet Asia came many of the weapons which beat back the *Wehrmacht*. Across Middle Asia came much of the flow of Anglo-American supplies to the Red Army. In Far Asia, World War II came to its end, with Russia reclaiming what Nippon had seized a dozen years before October.

From the perspective of the Narkomindel, the Far, Middle and Near East, with their varied provinces and peoples, have only one characteristic in common (albeit one of major diplomatic and strategic import) with the southern Balkans, Upper Danubia, Central Germany, and the lands of the Baltic: all are regions where the interests of the USSR and the Atlantic Powers impinge upon one another, interpenetrate, and inevitably create twilight zones of future collaboration or conflict. Here, in a gigantic semicircle, are the widely scattered landways and seaways connecting the two vast regions which students of Geopolitics fittingly label the "Heartland" and the "Rimlands" of Eurasia.²⁰ Despite the early formulas of Sir Halford T. Mackinder, the masters of the Heartland, even in the age of the Great Khans, have never controlled all of the "World Island," nor even all the Rimlands. Neither have the Rimland Powers ever been able, singly or together, to conquer all the Heartland. But much of world politics has revolved for centuries around the thrust-and-parry of Central Eurasian States

pushing outward toward the oceans and coastal States pushing inward toward the Urals.

This ancient pattern reflects the timeless geographical and political realities which determine Soviet policies in the Orient. Most of the Heartland is Russian. Its rulers, from Ogdai Khan to the last Romanov, have never conquered Europe, Islam, Hindustan, or China, though they have often struck out toward the warm seas and sometimes won temporary and local triumphs. More frequently the Powers of the coastal plains and islands have assailed Muscovy and fought battles with its defenders which greatly shaped the destinies of all the world—e.g., 1709, 1812, 1905, 1915–16, 1918–19, 1941–42. In the War of the Revolution, Japan was the active ally of the Western interventionists. In the Axis assault, Japan was a passive partner of the Reich, vainly hoping to break the Atlantic Powers before subduing the USSR, as Hitler had vainly hoped to conquer the USSR before smashing the Atlantic Powers. Had Nazi and Nipponese forces effected a junction in India in 1942, the defense of Russia and Britain, and prospectively of America, would have become all but impossible. If common rivalry with Britain brought Russia and America together in the mid-19th Century and helped to cement the French-Russian alliance of the 1890's, the need of collective defense against the most dangerous Continental Power brought Russia into alliance with Britain in 1812, with France and Britain in 1907, with both plus America in 1917, and with all four plus China in 1945. Russia has long required the support of peripheral, insular or transoceanic States in the Rimland and beyond it against the most menacing Rimland States, just as the Atlantic Powers and China have required Russian support against the same foes.

This design is now shattered. Over the ruins of the German and Japanese realms, the new Russia of the Heartland confronts the America, Britain, and China of the ocean shores, in joint victory yesterday, in concord today, in conceivable discord tomorrow. The USSR dares not permit the exclusive control of the Reich, of Turkey and Iran, of China, or of Korea and Japan by the Atlantic Powers for purposes of encircling and perhaps ultimately assaulting the Soviet Union. Neither can the Atlantic Powers tolerate exclusive Soviet control of these regions for possible purposes of threatening Anglo-American positions in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, India, southeastern

Asia and the Pacific. Such purposes are righteously disclaimed by all responsible persons on both sides. They are nevertheless inherent in the very nature of power politics and must therefore be reckoned with. And they are constantly attributed to the other side by the mischief-makers interested in arousing suspicion, fear and belligerence.²¹ The decisions of 1942-45 fortunately reveal self-restraint on both sides and a shared will to attain a workable equilibrium, maintain unity, and achieve effective collaboration in the interests of minimizing new rivalries for power in the intermediate zones of friction. The promise held out by the accords already reached can be realized only through continued determination to pursue these mutual purposes. The global problems here involved constitute the background and the ultimate determinants of Soviet-Allied relations throughout Asia, and of Soviet relations with all Asiatic States.

With none of its Oriental neighbors did the old Russia have so long a tradition of hatred and violence as with Turkey. Recent controversies are not to be explained in the manner of some current commentators, by reference to an imaginary Soviet revival of Tsarist designs upon Byzantium and the Straits. Ill-will flows rather from old memories and new distrusts on both sides. Christian Slav and Moslem Turk have fought one another bitterly for centuries from the Adriatic to the Caspian during the rise, ascendancy and decline of the Ottoman Empire, the emergence and extension of Muscovy, and the long struggle of the Balkan peoples for emancipation. By the time the glories of Suleiman the Magnificent and the early Murads and Ahmets had given way to the corruptions and cruelties symbolized by Sultan Abdul Hamid, Turkey, as the "sick man of Europe," had become the pawn of the Powers. London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin all sought in turn to keep the Straits closed to Russian ships and to "protect" Turkey against St. Petersburg. The Russian and Turkish Revolutions effected a *rapprochement* between Moscow and Ankara, united during the 1920's in resistance to the "imperialism" of the Western Powers. But they did not alter the enduring facts of space and power which led to new crises in Soviet-Turkish relations during World War II.

Control of communications between Europe and Asia and between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean gives unique influence to those who rule Thrace and Asia Minor. Like other weak States

on Russia's borders, Turkey can play only one of three possible roles: that of a bastion of other Powers against the USSR; that of an ally and strategic dependency of Moscow against other Powers; or that of a neutral buffer poised at dead-center of a stable balance. The Western Powers in 1939-40 and the Axis Powers throughout the war sought to convert the Turks to the first role. The Narkomindel favored the second. Ankara endeavored to maintain the third, reject the second, and toy with the first. Although formally allied with Britain, Turkey did not sever diplomatic relations or halt chrome exports to the Reich until May, 1944, and did not declare war until eleven months later when no risks were involved. Soviet spokesmen repeatedly alleged that Turkish neutrality was a help to the Axis. London and Washington apparently advised President Ismet Inonu after the Teheran Conference that Turkey should come to terms with Moscow and not expect Anglo-American support. Yet the close of hostilities found Turkey definitely within the British sphere in the Near East. Moscow was prepared to accept this status, but only on condition that old grievances be reconsidered and existing arrangements respecting the Straits be modified in Russia's favor.

On March 20, 1945, the Narkomindel gave notice of termination of the Soviet-Turkish pact of 1925 (cf. p. 231 above) on the ground that new times called for a revised accord. On June 22 Moscow initiated negotiations with proposals which were not publicized but were said to include suggestions for changes in the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier and for the retrocession to the USSR of the districts of Kars and Ardahan (lost at Brest-Litovsk and formally yielded to Turkey by the treaty of 1921), and for a new régime for the Straits, possibly including Soviet bases at least in time of war. The Turkish press breathed defiance on the principle that those who howl before they are hurt are less likely to be hurt. These problems were secretly discussed at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, but not resolved. The issues at stake could clearly be settled in an orderly way only by agreement among the USSR, the Western Powers, and Turkey to revise the Montreux Convention of 1936. The Truman-Byrnes proposals for the internationalization of all major European waterways offered a possible basis of a new status for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles which would seem to serve the needs of all Powers without jeopardizing Turkish security and independence. Turkey can enjoy both these

blessings only to the degree to which Moscow, London, and Washington are in substantial accord regarding their own interests and purposes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Iran, like its western neighbor, also lies athwart over-lapping British and Soviet areas of influence. Only an Anglo-Soviet agreement, approved by the United States and China, can save the Iranians from becoming objects of rivalry among the giants and thereby losing all prospect of controlling their own destinies. The understanding announced at the Teheran Conference (cf. p. 468 above) foreshadowed a common program. Iranian economy benefited little, and in some respects suffered loss, from the movement of 5,000,000 tons of Anglo-American war supplies through the country en route to the USSR. In view of the large concession in the south held since 1909 by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Moscow sought an oil concession in the north in 1944. When Iranian authorities insisted upon postponing all new concessions until after the war, the Soviet press criticized the Government while the local pro-Soviet Tudeh party organized a demonstration and forced Premier Sa'ed to resign in November. London and Washington, however, supported Teheran in its attitude.²² In mid-July, 1945, London proposed to Moscow the withdrawal of British and Soviet troops, promised by the Anglo-Soviet Iranian treaty of January 29, 1942, within six months after the end of hostilities "against Germany and her associates." Foreign troops were withdrawn from the capital, but evacuation of the entire country hung fire in the autumn pending consideration of Iranian problems by the new Council of Foreign Ministers.

Far more complex and difficult were the issues of inter-Allied relations raised by the war and the peace in the vast reaches of the Asiatic Continent between Afghanistan and Kamchatka. The primitive Afghan buffer State remained neutral and gave rise to no Anglo-Soviet frictions. During the painful developments in India which assumed acute form in the summer of 1942 and thereafter, the Narkomindel and Soviet press maintained a scrupulously correct attitude. The remarkable economic and cultural progress of the Moslem and Mongol peoples of the Soviet Republics of Central Asia and Siberia constituted a challenge to the native and alien ruling groups of the lands to the south and the east, where Moslem, Hindu, and Chinese masses continued to live

in appalling poverty and illiteracy. But inter-Allied diplomacy was more immediately concerned in the year of victory with the problems posed by Chungking, Yen-an and Tokyo.

The prelude to the Soviet Union's six-day war with Japan is a long story best made short. On April 13, 1942, first anniversary of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (cf. p. 408 above), *Pravda* reproved Tokyo for its renewal of the Anti-Comintern accord on November 25, 1941, its aggression against the United States and Great Britain, and its signature of the new Tripartite pact of December 11, 1941: "For continuation of the neutrality pact, it is necessary that Japan show the same attitude toward treaties as that displayed by the Soviet Union." But constant pleas from Chungking for a Soviet attack on Japan met with no formal response from Moscow. The annual Japanese-Soviet fisheries agreements were renewed in 1942, 1943, and 1944. Soviet officials were withdrawn early in 1943 from the huge province of Sinkiang, which reverted to Chungking's authority, but Moscow sharply warned China (April 2, 1944) to prevent its Sinkiang troops from violating the frontiers of Outer Mongolia. The Soviet press (e.g., *War and the Working Class*, July 18, 1944, and *Izvestia*, December 2, 1944) likewise criticized "reactionaries" at Chungking and assailed Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the Communist-held provinces of the north.

The full scope of confidential discussions at Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta regarding Soviet entry into the Far Eastern conflict had not yet been revealed in the immediate aftermath of victory. But it is clear that the decision was not reached unilaterally by the USSR nor at the last possible moment, but was a result of a secret Anglo-American-Soviet accord specifying that Moscow would open war on Japan three months after the capitulation of Germany. The actions of the United States in continuing lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Far East after the German collapse, in transferring 60 Liberty ships to the USSR, and in bombing Japanese installations in Korea, Manchuria and Sakhalin were all results of this agreement. By the terms of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, its renewal would be automatic for another five years unless a one-year notice of termination should be given before April 24, 1945. On April 5, 1945, Molotov informed Ambassador Naotake Sato of the decision of the Soviet Government to de-

nounce the pact which, he said, had "lost its meaning" and become "impossible" of continuance because "the situation has radically changed" since its signature. "Germany attacked the USSR, and Japan—Germany's ally—helped the latter in her war against the USSR. In addition Japan is fighting against the United States of America and Great Britain, which are the Allies of the Soviet Union." The Cabinet of Premier Kuniaki Koiso resigned the same day and was succeeded by a new Ministry headed by Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki.

Punctually and precisely three months to the day after the German capitulation, the USSR declared war on Japan.²³ The Tokyo warlords, already facing defeat in consequence of the Reich's collapse and the overwhelming American power hurled against them, had long since sought to attain a negotiated peace via Soviet mediation. In June Ambassador Sato, in an obvious bid for continued Soviet neutrality, assured the Narkomindel that his Government was willing to give up Manchuria and North China. There was no answer. Early in July Tokyo indicated its desire to send a special envoy to Moscow to arrange Soviet mediation with London and Washington. There was again no answer, though Moscow communicated the fact to the Western Powers whose spokesmen were still anticipating many more months of fighting.

On July 26, 1945, at Potsdam, Truman, Churchill and Attlee, with the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek and in the presence of Stalin, published a 13-point proposal for ending the war. It threatened "the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland" unless Japan, "brought to the threshold of annihilation" would "follow the path of reason." The terms demanded the elimination "for all time" of the "authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest. . . . Points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objective we are here setting forth. . . . We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals" and "just reparations" would be exacted. Under the Cairo Declaration (cf. p. 467 above), Japanese sover-

eignty would be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku "and such minor islands as we determine." Japanese forces would be disarmed. Civil liberties and democracy must be established. Allied troops would be withdrawn with the attainment of these objectives and the establishment "in accordance with the freely expressed wish of the Japanese people, of a peacefully inclined and responsible Government. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."

Japanese rejection of these demands was followed by developments of bewildering rapidity which led to speedy capitulation and to consequences which, in their ultimate implications, far transcended Soviet entry into the war, the end of the war, or, indeed, the fact of the war itself.

July 28: Ratification of the Charter of the UNO is approved by the U. S. Senate, 89-2, with William Langer and Henryk Shipstead in the negative, and aging Hiram Johnson sending word from his sick-bed of his irreconcilable opposition.

July 16: A dozen days previously, unknown to the Senators or the world, an event at Alamogordo Bombing Range in the New Mexican Desert, 120 miles southeast of Albuquerque, renders obsolete the UNO and all the political habits and artifacts of the 20th Century: \$2,000,000,000 and a handful of physicists produce, for the first time on the planet, a man-made facsimile of the all-consuming cosmic flame which lights the sun and burns in the farthest stars.

Aug. 6: An epoch ends as Hiram Johnson dies, as he had lived, in his sleep, while the Superfortress "Enola Gay" releases over Hiroshima the first atomic bomb. Results: "Good." Floating gently down by parachute to a point over the rooftops, it vaporizes instantly 60% of the city, incinerating in a flash 78,000 people, condemning other thousands more to death from incurable burns, and leaving 14,000 missing and 118,000 wounded.

Aug. 8: The USSR declares war on Japan.

Aug. 9: The second atomic bomb, dropped by the Superfortress "Great Artiste," converts half of Nagasaki into another gigantic column of boiling fumes, twelve miles high; 40,000 die; scores of

thousands are injured, many of them beyond medical aid; 18,000 buildings vanish; all of the remaining 32,000 are damaged or wrecked.

Aug. 10: Tokyo offers to accept the terms of July 26 on the understanding that the sovereign prerogatives of the Emperor are not prejudiced.

Aug. 11: Washington replies that the Emperor will be retained but will be subject to the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur.

Aug. 14: Tokyo surrenders.

Aug. 20: The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet unanimously ratifies the Charter of the UNO.

All the words and acts of the kings and captains of all lands were suddenly inadequate and empty. The Science which stole the flame of heaven to light the fires of hell lived in the brain of a puny and devilish species, habit-ridden, ape-like, frustrated and hate-filled, inevitably doomed in a frightening world of tomorrow to play the ancient game of power by the rules of yesterday. In the long destiny of Man, time stopped for a terrifying instant in August of 1945—and then leaped a millennium forward, leaving men worried and lost. But in the short and uncertain fortunes of the sovereign nation-states, patriots and diplomats followed their well-worn paths in pursuit of ends which were old when Abraham died and forgotten Pharaohs built the Sphinx. Only slightly sobered by dangerous thoughts, the Governments now achieved no more than the end of a war which, in the manner of its ending, made all the old ways of peace and war as relevant to the future as the armor and weapons of the flesh-eating dinosaurs.

On August 8 Molotov delivered to Ambassador Sato, and released to the world, a curt declaration of war.* In a week's cam-

* After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan remained the only Great Power which still stands for the continuation of the war. The demand of the three Powers, the United States, Great Britain, and China, of July 26 for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan. Thus the proposal made by the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union for mediation in the Far East has lost all foundation. Taking into account the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies approached the Soviet Government with a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of casualties, and contribute toward the most speedy restoration of peace. True to its obligation as an Ally, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declara-

paign, Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky directed three army groups, commanded respectively by Marshal Meretskov, General Purkayev and Marshal Malinovsky, in invasions of Manchuria from the southeast, northeast, and northwest. The People's Republic of Outer Mongolia joined the war. In far-away Moscow General Eisenhower joined Stalin, Antonov, and the members of the Politburo on the stand above Lenin's tomb to review a parade of youth in Red Square. Soviet troops speedily overran Manchuria, crushing the Kwantung Army, capturing Henry Pu-yi among half a million prisoners, and occupying southern Sakhalin, northern Korea and the Kurile Islands.

Peace came on swift wings. On the morrow of surrender, Hirohito broadcast grief to his people: "The enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would lead to total destruction of human civilization. . . . Cultivate the ways of rectitude." The Emperor named his cousin, General-Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni as new Premier. Moscow, along with other Allied capitals, entrusted the immediate settlement to America which had borne the major burden and beaten the foe. Following parleys in Manila, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and General Yoshijiro Umezaki affixed their signatures to articles of surrender in Tokyo Bay aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri*. General MacArthur signed for all the United Nations, along with representatives of the United States, China, Britain, the USSR, Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, and New Zealand. The day was the first of September, 1945—six years precisely since the Nazi invasion of Poland, eight years plus 55 days since the clash on Marco Polo Bridge, and fourteen years minus 18 days since the bomb explosion south of Mukden on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway. On September 2 Stalin spoke over the Moscow radio:

tion of the Allied Powers of July 26. The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only means able to bring peace nearer, to free the people from further sacrifice and suffering, and to give the Japanese people the opportunity of avoiding the danger of destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to accept unconditional surrender. In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from August 9, the Soviet Union will consider herself in a state of war against Japan.

Comrades, Compatriots, Men and Women: . . . Two hotbeds of world Fascism and world aggression formed on the eve of this World War—Germany in the west, and Japan in the east. It was they who unleashed the Second World War. . . . The Second World War has come to an end. Now we can say that conditions necessary for the peace of the world have already been won. . . .

We have a special account of our own to settle with Japan. Japan began her aggression against our country as far back as 1904. . . . Unexpectedly and treacherously, without declaring war, Japan attacked our country and assaulted the Russian squadron in the Port Arthur area. . . . Thirty-seven years later, Japan repeated exactly the same treacherous device against the United States when in 1941 she attacked the United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. . . . As is well known, Russia suffered defeat in the war with Japan, and Japan took advantage of Tsarist Russia's defeat to wrest southern Sakhalin from Russia, to strengthen her hold over the Kurile Islands, thus locking all outlets to the ocean in the east and consequently also the outlet for our country to the ports of Soviet Kamchatka and the Soviet Sea of Okhotsk. . . .

For forty years have we, men of the older generation, waited for this generation, waited for this day. . . . Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will pass to the Soviet Union, and from now on will not serve as the means for isolating the Soviet Union from the Ocean and as a base for Japanese attacks on our Far East. They will serve instead as a means of direct communication of the Soviet Union with the Ocean and as a base for the defense of our country against Japanese aggression. . . .

We have lived through hard years. But now every one of us can say: we have won. . . . Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles for the honor and victory of our Motherland! May our Motherland thrive and prosper!

On the day of the Japanese surrender, August 14, 1945, an event of even more far-reaching importance in its promise for the future took place in Moscow: the signature of six Soviet-Chinese agreements by Molotov and Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh, in the presence of Stalin and Premier T. V. Soong.* They were the fruit of several weeks of negotiation, both before and after the Potsdam Conference. They gave the lie to Western prophets who had forecast Muscovite intervention on behalf of the Chinese Communists, Soviet seizure of Manchuria and Korea, an inevitable

* Full text in Appendix, pp. 657ff. below.

clash between Moscow and Chungking, and the ensuing involvement of America and Britain in war with Russia over mastery of China. Agents of the two largest and most populous independent sovereignties of the world here made a peace which promised to endure for generations if its terms and presuppositions should be loyally fulfilled on all sides.

The pacts included a military alliance against Japanese aggression. Unlike Moscow's 20-year accords in Europe against the Reich, the obligations assumed in the Far East were to run for 30 years and indefinitely thereafter, unless denounced. They could be terminated, however, through one year's notice by either side, while the commitments of military cooperation would run until the parties might agree to transfer them to the UNO. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity was pledged, as well as non-interference in internal affairs. Moscow promised moral and material support to the National Government as the Central Government of China and recognized its title to Sinkiang and Manchuria, with the latter to be evacuated by Soviet troops within three months under an appended declaration. China in turn agreed to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if its people should confirm this desire by plebiscite; accepted arrangements for converting Port Arthur for 30 years into a joint Sino-Soviet naval base, to be defended by the USSR, with civil administration in Chinese hands; agreed to make Darien a free port for a similar period; and approved joint ownership and management of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian lines, consolidated into the "Chinese Changchun Railway."

These terms offered no iron-clad guarantee against further disunity in China or against new friction between the USSR and the Western Powers. But they came as close to such a guarantee as was humanly possible. By registering Moscow's non-support of Yen-an against Chungking, they removed all rational basis for the pursuit of an anti-Soviet policy in Asia by China, Britain, or America. Soviet leaders perceived that in the Orient, as in the Occident, the peace which their people so insistently desired could be disturbed only if the USSR should seek to Sovietize its neighbors or use them against the West—or if the Atlantic Powers should strive to build new barriers and bases against the Soviet Union in preparation for another crusade against Bolshevism. In

Asia, as in Europe, the Kremlin championed non-intervention, national sovereignty, democracy, and friendly régimes within a constellation of allies and good neighbors.

Whether these hopes could be realized would depend as much upon others as upon the USSR. Peace for China abroad required peace among Chinese at home. The Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen had achieved emancipation from the heavy yoke of alien imperialisms, but in 1937 it was still far from having built an effective State based on a stable society and a flourishing economy. The promise of unity and people's welfare had been shattered in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek led the Kuomintang to break with its Communist allies and converted it into a quasi-Fascist instrument of landlords, bankers, and industrialists for the suppression of unrest among urban coolies and impoverished tenant-farmers. Those whose observations and judgments are entitled to respect are agreed that in recent years the Chinese Soviets in the valley of the Yellow River, pursuing a program of dividing large estates, creating an independent and debt-free peasantry, and fostering cooperative effort in agriculture and industry, have achieved more toward bringing the gifts of literacy, social security, and economic betterment to the Chinese masses than the Chungking dictatorship of the wealthy and the well-born.

The end of war with Japan brought new threats of civil war. The Moscow agreements and three appeals from Chiang brought Communist leader Mao Tse-tung from Yen-an to Chungking at the end of August. He travelled by plane (for the first time in his life), escorted by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. His conferences with Chiang, participated in by Red General Chou En-lai, offered hope of peace after 18 years of intermittent and bitter conflict. But peace demanded more than Communist insistence on a democratic coalition government, or Kuomintang insistence that the Communist troops must be disarmed or absorbed into the National Army. A more progressive economic and social program for the whole nation was called for, and a new compromise of class interests, offering promise of light to the dark millions. Short of this, peace might be had through autonomy for the Communist provinces. Any new war would be, as before, a class war in which those bent upon suppressing the Chinese Soviets would inevitably be driven toward a Chinese Fascism. Washington and London could ill-afford to support any such development, how-

ever much some of their investors, traders, and diplomats might be tempted to champion classes against masses in China. In the interest of security, Moscow could not permit a Fascist China to establish its unchallenged control along the Soviet frontiers. Such a Power would ultimately be a greater peril to Muscovy than Japan had been. The open intervention in October of American military, naval and air forces in support of Chungking in its efforts to wrest control of north China from the Communists precipitated a new civil war which, if continued, would invalidate all the assumptions of the August agreements and compel the USSR to undertake counter-intervention. Here were the seeds of the problems of the future, and of possible tragedy.

But optimism flowered in the autumn of the year of victory. China and Russia were allies and friends, and would remain so if wise and moderate counsels continued to prevail among those with power. In Asia as in Europe, man's hope depended upon a fragile fabric of cooperation to promote the good life for all. Man's fate hinged upon peace between Heartland and Rimland, between East and West, between Eurasia and America, and, above all, between the Atlantic Powers and the USSR all along the far-flung shadow lands from the Elbe, the Adriatic, and the Aegean to Korea and the China Sea. Without this peace, nothing was possible save the suicide of the race. Given this peace, all was possible in the building of a new temple of concord and creative endeavor.

AFTER OCTOBER

I. THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH

I SHOULD LIKE to drink the health of the people of whom few hold ranks and whose titles are not envied, people who are considered to be cogs in the wheels of the great State apparatus, but without whom all of us—marshals, front and army commanders—are, to put it crudely, not worth a tinker's damn. One of the cogs goes out of commission—and the whole thing is done for. I propose a toast for simple, ordinary, modest people, for those cogs who keep our great State machine going in all the branches of science, national economy and military affairs. There are very many of them, their name is legion—they are tens of millions of people. They are modest people. Nobody writes anything about them. They have no titles and few of them hold ranks. But they are the people who support us, as the base supports the summit. I drink to the health of these people—our respected comrades.

So spoke Generalissimo Stalin at the Kremlin reception of June 25, 1945, for participants in yesterday's Victory Parade. His words spanned the growing distance in Soviet society between elite and mass. They also echoed the fixed resolve of the leaders of Party and State to use the opportunities of peace to achieve a more abundant life for the multitudes.

The immediate goals of this effort found expression in the preliminary Demobilization Law passed by the 12th Session of the federal Supreme Soviet at the end of June. As proposed by the Sovnarkom and submitted to the deputies by Chief of Staff, General Alexei I. Antonov,¹ it provided for demobilization of 13 older-aged classes, all of whose members would receive clothing

and shoes, travel facilities and rations en route to their homes, living quarters and fuel, loans for home-building in devastated districts, one year's pay for each year's service for enlisted men (scaled down to two months' pay for one year of service for officers), and a guarantee of work within one month of arrival at their places of residence. Jobs for veterans were to be "not inferior to their occupations prior to Army service" and appropriate to experience and special training. "All articles of the law, from first to last," wrote Kalinin (*Pravda*, July 6, 1945), "speak of the solicitude of the State for the demobilized, a solicitude so amply deserved. . . . The Article (guaranteeing employment) is perhaps the only one of its kind in world legislation. Nor is this surprising, for its provision is possible only in a Socialist State."

In its 29th year the October Revolution had evolved a design for living which seemed to most of its participants and apologists a substantial fulfillment of the Marxist dream of the classless society. To ex-lovers, new haters and varied groups of disillusioned, embittered and fearful, it appeared to be either a horrendous realization of the Communist Manifesto or else a betrayal of the Gospel, a travesty on the Vision, and a reversion to the foul ways of old. That it could not be both failed to disturb the demagogues of Right and Left who made common cause against the Red menace. To detached observers, if any, it seemed none of these things but rather a progeny *de novo*, born of the marriage of Marxist theory with the stubborn facts of Russian life at home and abroad. October's child was nurtured on soaring aspirations and reared to a tough and efficient manhood amid the squalor of poverty, the excitement of vast adventures, and the grim necessities of a brutal fight for life.

If the result does not lend itself to any description and analysis to which all informed and reasonable persons can subscribe, the difficulty scarcely lies in the complexity of the society observed. It is rather attributable to the absence among observers of any generally accepted norms and techniques for depicting the social dynamics of any contemporary community. Marxism has its uses in the enterprise, but even here many terms, including the basic concept of "social class," are lacking in precision. Marxists, and still more anti-Marxists, have contributed more confusion than clarification to the problems. Soviet and Western economists and political scientists, with rare exceptions, have left the anatomy

and physiology of Soviet socialism in a state of muddled mystery. Sociologists have done better. The monumental work of the late Sydney and Beatrice Webb, for all its sins of omission and commission, illuminated the moving forces of a new civilization. An application to the USSR of the tools employed by Robert and Helen Lynd in analyzing "Middletown" yields valuable results. Still more light might be had if the devices of the cultural anthropologists—e.g., Robert Redfield or the late Bronislaw Malinovsky—were made use of in the study of Russia. But these tasks remain to be undertaken.

Pending much needed voyages of fresh exploration, it may be pertinent to recall that Stalin, when asked "Do you really expect to change the world?", replied, "Not very much." All human societies display more similarities than differences. To emphasize this circumstance is not to detract from the world-shaking import of the Russian Revolution, nor to dismiss the fact that men forever dispute and do battle not over resemblances but over variations, real or imagined, in their sundry patterns of social experience. Yet in all civilized cultures Family, Church and State are universal folkways for the fulfillment of the needs of man in society. Every community, moreover, viewed in terms of who gets what, is a pyramidal hierarchy of income, prestige, and influence. A favored few receive most of what is judged worth having. The members of the mass get least. Middle groups enjoy intermediate amounts. More often than not, it is true that to those that have shall be given and from those that have not shall be taken away. Differences occur only in definitions of what entitles individuals to high or low place in the social scale, in the bases of distribution of indulgences and deprivations, and in the ease or difficulty with which the lowly can rise when they demonstrate merit and the lofty can sink when they cease to deserve their privileges. Only in terms of these issues can meaningful comparisons be attempted between Soviet socialism and Western capitalism and useful forecasts be made of trends within and between two worlds.

Confusion can be reduced at the outset by recognizing that the Soviet disciples of the true faith according to Marx, Engels, and Lenin have not achieved, and have never hoped or intended to achieve during the present historical epoch, a society in which all wealth would be shared equally or pecuniary incentives would

be abolished, or all incomes would be identical.² The principle of "socialism" has ever been: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." The far-off divine event of "communism" is expected to replace "work" by "needs" in the formula. But this is admittedly remote and, while sufficiently shadowy to admit of many meanings, likewise does not postulate "equality" of compensation, save in terms of a common minimum of necessities. Beyond these, the "needs" of poets and plumbers, philosophers and farmers, photographers and factory foremen, physicists and fishermen, are obviously different. Meanwhile, during the protracted socialist "transition" to communism, equality of incomes is not, and never was, contemplated, since men and women differ markedly in their capacities to contribute to the welfare of the commonwealth. Lenin (cf. p. 78 above) toyed for a time, to be sure, with the notion of a moderate levelling of incomes. Under "War Communism," and to a lesser extent under the NEP, wage and salary scales were influenced by this idea. Once the building of socialism was embarked upon in earnest, however, the gap between the best paid and the worst paid grew ever greater.

This was precisely what was insisted upon by Marx himself:

Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the State can be nothing but the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat* . . . (During this period) the right of the producers is *proportional* to the labor they supply . . . but one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time. . . . This *equal* right (to have income determined by work) is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences . . . but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges. *It is therefore a right of inequality in its content, like every right.*³

And thus Stalin, half a century later:

The consequence of wage equalization is that the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement; as a result he feels himself a "sojourner" in the factory, working only temporarily so as to earn a little and then go off to "seek his fortune" elsewhere. . . . Hence the heavy turnover of labor power. In order to put an end to this evil

we must abolish wage equalization. . . . We cannot tolerate a situation where a rolling-mill hand in a steel mill earns no more than a sweeper. We cannot tolerate a situation where a railway locomotive driver earns only as much as a copying clerk. Marx and Lenin said that the difference between skilled labor and unskilled labor would exist even under socialism, even after classes had been abolished; that only under communism would this difference disappear and that, therefore, even under socialism "wages" must be paid according to work performed and not according to needs. But the equalitarians among our business executives and trade union officials do not agree with this and believe that under our Soviet system this difference has already disappeared. Who is right, Marx and Lenin, or the equalitarians? We must take it that it is Marx and Lenin who are right. . . . We now need hundreds of thousands and even millions of skilled workers. But in order to get skilled workers we must give the unskilled worker a stimulus and prospect of advancement, of rising to a higher position. And the more boldly we do this the better; for this is the principal means of putting an end to the heavy labor turnover. To economize in this matter would be criminal, it would be going against the interests of our socialist industry.⁴

A generation after the socialist revolution which elevated the poor and cast down princes and noblemen, pastors, officials and merchants, Soviet society is as much a pyramid as pre-Soviet and non-Soviet societies—but with a wholly different base and summit. Rapid industrialization has been accompanied by the most ingenious practices of piece-work, overtime pay, bonuses, prizes, steeply graduated salary differentials and all manner of financial inducements to master technique and increase output.⁵ The result has been high income for managers, technicians, engineers, scientists, talented artists, successful military leaders, skilled workers, etc., and low incomes for the slothful, the stupid, the ignorant and those declassed for political heresy. A few enterprising and efficient administrators, sharing in the profits of their establishments, have in recent years even become "millionaires" (in rubles) beginning with Comrade Berdyedekov, director of a Kazak State Farm.⁶

Yet the oft-repeated statements in the Western press (sometimes intended as an indictment, and sometimes as a eulogy) that the gap between the best-paid and the worst-paid is greater under socialism than capitalism admits of no verification and would almost certainly prove to be untrue if the necessary data were avail-

able for a fair comparison.⁷ Satisfactory statistics on the distribution of incomes are difficult to come by. In normal years in the United States, corporation salaries of over a quarter of a million dollars go to a few dozen movie stars, cinema magnates, and executives in the fields of luxury goods having mass distribution. Recipients of incomes of a million dollars and more (from all sources) have ranged in number from 513 in 1929 to 20 in 1932, with much larger figures probable for the recent years of war prosperity. In 1929 the 36,000 wealthiest American families received as much of the national income as the 11,000,000 poorest families, of whom over half (21% of all families) had incomes of less than \$1,000 a year.⁸ In Great Britain in 1943-44, 8,600 persons at the top of the income scale had a total income of £180,000,000 or £21,000 per capita, while 1,855,000 persons in the lowest bracket earned £2,355,000,000 or less than £250 per capita.⁹

These patterns have no counterpart in the USSR. The Soviet fiscal system, to be sure, does not embrace the current Anglo-American practice of penalizing high incomes through virtually confiscatory taxes. Well-paid executives, moreover, are furnished with comfortable homes, cars and sometimes even yachts at no cost to themselves. In the Soviet wage structure the disparity of compensation between skilled and unskilled, and between efficient and inefficient, is far greater than in Britain or the United States. But there is no group of well-to-do employers, owners, investors and speculators who regularly receive 1,000 times the money income of the poorest paid worker.

This fact, however, is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, save in the eyes of the naïve who regard private wealth as an end in itself or as an evil *per se*. Nor does it disclose the significant differences between the two systems. Comparisons of money wages are misleading because the mass of Soviet workers receive a variety of social services and special benefits (including free medical and dental care, comprehensive insurance, vacations with pay, low rentals, low-price factory restaurants, etc.) which are still in process of inauguration in the Atlantic democracies.¹⁰ At the same time Soviet producers in the mass are much poorer than Western workers, since their productivity is still inferior. In 1937, according to Molotov, Soviet iron-workers produced 86 kilograms of pig-iron per capita, as compared with 183 in Britain, 189 in France, 234 in Germany, and 292 in the United States. Soviet

coal miners mined 757 kilograms per capita as compared with 1,065 in France, 3,313 in Germany, 3,429 in the United States, and 5,165 in Britain.¹¹ Soviet workers will enjoy Western living standards when their individual productivity attains Western levels. Their relative inefficiency is only partly explicable in terms of Lord Balfour's famous comment that "Bolshevism is an admirable method of making rich men poor but a doubtful one of making poor men rich." The backwardness of Soviet workers stems from a long heritage of ignorance and slovenliness aggravated by the appalling wastes of revolution and war. That they can and will equal the West in per capita production and consumption, probably within the span of another three Five Year Plans, is assured by their record of accomplishment thus far.

What distinguishes Soviet society from all others, past and present, is not the allocation of income but the distribution and form of ownership of property. Feudal aristocrats live by private ownership of land, tilled by unfree peasants and originally held in exchange for military duty. The democratic and patriotic plutocracies of the age of capitalism live by private ownership of industrial, financial and commercial enterprises, operated by employees paid out of proceeds of the sale of goods and services in a competitive market, and held in return for entrepreneurial and bargaining skills. No one in the USSR owns corporate stocks or bonds, or possesses tangible property (save houses and gardens and objects of personal use), or leases real estate for private rentals, or employs labor to produce services or goods exclusively for personal profit. If a "ruling class" be defined as a group at the peak of the social hierarchy, possessed of maximum deference, income, and power by virtue of private ownership of productive property, then the USSR has none and is already a truly "classless" society. The socialization of the means of production signifies the end of the propertied classes which, in their various forms, have controlled all hitherto existing societies.

Whether this is deemed a curse or a blessing depends a good deal upon whether the Western observer is himself blessed with property or cursed by the lack of it. The correlation is imperfect, however, since conscience-stricken sons of riches are often imbued with indignation at the evils of great fortunes, while children of poverty not infrequently grow up to become ardent advocates of the advantages of private ownership. In any event the lack of a

propertied class in the Soviet Union, though constituting the essence of the Revolution and the unique feature of Soviet society, does not make the new order either a Utopia (save in the eyes of wholly blind devotees) or an Inferno (save in the eyes of those whose property was appropriated, whether it took the form of visible wealth or of emotional fixations on symbols alleged to have been debased). The crucial question is not: Who has lost his property?—but rather: What has replaced the former feudal and pecuniary elite at the apex of the hierarchy?

Who rules with old rulers gone? The best answer is not “The Proletariat,” or “Workers and Peasants,” or even “The Communist Party,” but “The Soviet Intelligentsia.” In Stalin’s formulation: “No ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia. There are no grounds for believing that the working class of the USSR can manage without its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.”¹² In official Soviet theory, the “liquidation” of the “exploiting classes” leaves only two classes, workers and peasants, and one group never envisaged as a “class”—i.e., the Intelligentsia. The population of Russia in 1913, according to Vyshinsky, comprised 65.1% individual peasants and artisans, 16.7% workers and State employees, 15.9% “bourgeoisie” (including land owners and kulaks, with the latter constituting 12.3%) and 2.3% soldiers, students and others. In 1937 the corresponding figures were 55.5% collectivized peasants and cooperative artisans, 34.7% workers and State employees, 5.6% individual peasants and artisans, and 4.2% students, soldiers and others. The Intelligentsia, says Vyshinsky, can never be a class but is “an organic, compact part of socialistic society.”¹³

According to Molotov, the Soviet Intelligentsia in 1937 numbered 9,591,000 persons, comprising among its largest segments 550,000 university and college students; 1,617,000 bookkeepers and accountants; 882,000 economists and statisticians; 382,000 feldshers, midwives and nurses; 132,000 physicians; 159,000 art workers; 297,000 journalists, librarians, etc.; 969,000 teachers; 80,000 scientific workers; 176,000 agronomists and other agricultural scientists; 810,000 intermediate technicians; 250,000 engineers and architects; and 1,751,000 directors and executives, including 582,000 chairmen and vice-chairmen of collective farms, and 310,000 store and restaurant managers.¹⁴

Comparable figures for recent years are not available, but these

suggest the composition of the new elite. Army officers and war heroes were obviously members during the years of battle and will remain so for years to come. From the invasion to the close of 1943, Soviet higher schools graduated 200,000 more specialists, with a further major expansion of the ranks of the Intelligentsia contemplated during the first post-war Five Year Plan. The Intelligentsia embraces, but is broader than, the "bureaucracy," which term is lacking in precise meaning in a socialist State. The Intelligentsia is not co-terminus with the Communist Party, though many directors, executives, officers, and outstanding leaders in the arts, sciences, and professions are Party members. The growth of the Party rolls during the war years has doubtless meant that industrial workers are again a majority of the members, though figures on the social composition of the new cadres are not yet available.¹⁵

The familiar question of whether the Intelligentsia, which enjoy income, prestige, and numerous privileges far beyond those of the mass of the Soviet people, is in process of becoming a new "ruling class" or "aristocracy," would appear to be based upon a misunderstanding of Soviet economics and politics. This elite receives large pecuniary rewards, in some cases amounting to prizes up to 100,000 rubles for distinguished achievement, though such awards are sometimes donated forthwith to some public purpose, particularly during the war. Its members can transmit savings, including tangible property and interest-bearing State bonds, to their children through inheritance. Children of the well-to-do enjoy obvious advantages, some of which (i.e., access to higher education on a tuition basis) have become institutionalized. On the other hand, bonds, like prizes, are often donated to the Government or public organizations, not because of pressure but because private accumulation is frowned upon and is unnecessary for personal and family security.

But what is impossible for the Soviet Intelligentsia is to become a propertied class or a leisure class living on unearned income. These are the earmarks of every landed aristocracy. To live without labor is the dream of every Western businessman, and indeed the secret hope of almost all men and women everywhere, since the species is allergic to work, craves luxuries, preferably on a silver platter, and prefers a horizontal to a vertical position whenever possible. The pecuniary elites of the West consist in part of

hard-working and hard-driving executives and managers, and in part of idle rich. The latter indulge in conspicuous consumption and live without work by virtue of astute selection of ancestors, schools, colleges, fraternity brothers, wives and/or business associates, affording access to (or skill in acquiring) adequate quantities of unearned increments.¹⁶ The leisure thus enjoyed is not wholly a social waste since in some cases a combination of talent and boredom drives idlers to notable achievements in sport, art, science, or the professions. In the USSR, for better or for worse, leisure is all too scarce and no such group exists, or can come into being, so long as productive property may not be privately bought and sold, and so long as industrial capital is not raised by selling shares to individuals with private savings from which they hope to derive income without effort. These prohibitions, for better or for worse, may confidently be expected to endure as long as Soviet socialism, which (it may be said with equal confidence) will endure indefinitely.

Not only is the Soviet Intelligentsia a functional elite of diligent and desperately busy experts, but it is lacking in both the virtues and the vices inculcated by an acquisitive culture which places premiums on private possessions and pride of ancestry. Its privileges are strictly contingent upon performance. Advancement is extraordinarily rapid and rewarding for the capable. Demotion is equally speedy for the failures. Circulation up and down the social scale is swift and easy. Most intellectuals are children of peasants and workers. If more in the future are children of intellectuals, a tendency already manifesting itself, this will be less a result of any self-perpetuation of a new caste than of the circumstance that manual laborers and farmers constitute a diminishing proportion of the total population with further advances of technology and productivity. "Striking it rich" is impossible. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is bad form. Excelling the Ivanoviches in socialist competition to cut production costs, increase output, and raise profits beyond the Plan is always the order of the day. Conspicuous success in such endeavors means prizes, bonuses, honors, and fame.

This elite bears little resemblance to any known aristocracy, plutocracy, or theocracy. It is not a nobility of knights, nor a caste of Samurai, nor does it suggest Plato's "guardians" or "philosopher-kings." It works with, and lives by, special skills in

manipulating mind and matter. Its stock-in-trade consists of symbols and techniques. Its activities are creatively integrated with all aspects of Soviet life. Ancient labels are inapplicable. Newer labels are misleading. Yet the Soviet Intelligentsia may fairly be said to possess some of the attributes implied by the term "technocracy" or "managerial elite."¹⁷

2. WHAT MAN CAN MAKE OF MAN

In Soviet socialism men have found a way (one among several) to achieve fruitful utilization of men, machines and material for the enrichment of the common wealth under the conditions imposed, and the opportunities offered, by contemporary science and technology. The Russian adventure marks a long forward stride toward human mastery of man's fate through the deliberate mobilization of collective intelligence for the definition of community goals and the planned application, on a vast scale, of scientific knowledge for social betterment. The blind, plant-like growth of folk cultures, and the dynamic but uncontrollable automatism of the laissez-faire economies of the early machine age, here give way to the purposeful guidance of all activities of production and distribution. Despite the blundering and cruelty which are constant companions of all pioneers, the adventure has led to two interdependent results which are pearls without price amid the self-stultifications and social schizophrenia of other industrial societies.

One is the cure of the mass neuroses of our time through the reintegration of personality around community values and purposes which afford escape from loneliness and, ultimately, from the class snobberies and mass envies characteristic of deeply divided societies. The other is the cure of economic paralysis and stagnation, with their concomitants of wholesale insecurity, frustration, and aggression, through the building of an institutional framework wherein all who are able and willing to work may find productive employment in a constantly expanding economy.

These fruits of socialism have been bought at a price which few citizens of the Atlantic democracies would be prepared to pay. Among Western elites, and the sub-elites whose members aspire to propertied leisure, the unpardonable sin of the Russian Revolution has been the liquidation of the old leisure class and

the imposition of limitations on ownership which make the emergence of a new leisure class all but impossible. This crime, however, is seldom emphasized in the indictment because prosecutors themselves are torn by doubts and guilt-feelings. The early and persisting bourgeois virtues of frugality and industry engender anxiety among the conspicuous idlers of acquisitive societies. The impassioned hatred with which many such persons view Bolshevism is less a product of an objective threat to their own privileges than of an internal compulsion to justify a mode of life with which its beneficiaries are secretly dissatisfied.

On the level of public verbalizing, Western denunciations of the USSR are therefore more commonly couched in terms of the wickedness of sacrificing economic and political "freedom" (as conventionally defined in the West) in the service of other values which are possible of attainment only in a "planned" or "regimented" economy, directed by a "totalitarian" State. The charge is cogent and substantial. If "socialism" be equated with the pattern of Soviet economy, and "democracy" with that of Western politics, then "democratic socialism" is still an abstraction, nowhere achieved as yet anywhere on earth. The dictatorship of the Communist Party, moreover, is not an accidental feature of socialism in the USSR but a pre-condition of its success.

Soviet experience, and indeed much experience elsewhere, particularly in war-time, suggests that in the current stage of interpersonal relations and the industrial arts, some equivalent of "dictatorship" is indispensable for the effective performance of those functions of centralized planning and distribution without which there can be no total utilization of land, labor and capital for community purposes. The abrupt transplantation into Soviet society of the premises and practices of Western parliamentary democracy (assuming that such a cultural miracle were conceivable) would almost inevitably generate political groups or factions representing the differing demands and expectations of collective farmers, urban workers, and Soviet technocrats and managers. Communist insistence that the three strata have completely identical interests must be taken *cum grano salis*, unless "interests" be defined so broadly as to be meaningless in motivating action other than that of all the members of the whole community acting as one. Even here, the members of all three segments of the social hierarchy would have gained more (from a short-run and short-

sighted perspective) if the savings provided for in successive Plans had been invested in the production of consumers' goods rather than in heavy industry. Such a decision, which would obviously have led to fatal consequences in 1941-42, might very well have emerged from the free interplay of popular wishes and pressures during the preceding years. It was the task and duty of the Party to persuade and force all strata of the population into accepting and carrying out a program of industrialization rendered imperative by military exigencies and future hopes of plenty.

As among the strata, it is as true in the USSR as elsewhere that farmers can be expected (other things being equal) to desire high prices for crops and low prices for manufactures, while urban workers prefer the reverse. The "scissors crisis" of Soviet economy in 1922-23 is a partial illustration. Both groups, moreover, would scarcely be human if they did not favor a division of total income affording small profits and modest compensation to management, with correspondingly larger returns to the men and women at the bench and on the tractor. By the same logic the Intelligentsia values its own services highly and is tempted to define the common good in terms of small incomes for the unskilled in order that the skilled may prosper while leading the lowly toward the more abundant life. Within the Intelligentsia, furthermore, the executives of defense industries, railroads, airlines, foreign trade, luxury goods, etc. will all have different views as to what proportion of accumulated capital should be invested in their own enterprises.

These issues are not to be resolved by contending that "human nature" has been changed, or by arguing that profits in Soviet economy are socialized savings and that "surplus value" produced by labor, over and above wages received, goes not to an "exploiting class" but to the whole community for allocation in the form of social services, new investment, and pecuniary reward for the skillful and the efficient.¹⁸ Soviet "human nature" is as sensitive as any other to material emoluments. Difficult problems of distribution remain not only as between elite and mass, but also as between current consumption and long-term investment, domestic use and export trade, urban expansion and rural prosperity, etc. Under capitalism these apportionments are largely made through bargaining in a competitive market where variable prices, reflecting uncontrolled buying and selling by millions of bidders, influence the decisions of other millions as to what lines of in-

vestment, production, and vocational activity will prove most lucrative. Under socialism, most such decisions must be made by the planners. In the Soviet practice of "political economy," the displacement of the free market by the Gosplan means the displacement of "economics" by "politics."

In the present phase of Soviet economy, it may be doubted whether such decisions could be made and executed wisely or well in a bourgeois-democratic context of competing politicians, parties, factions, lobbies, pressure groups, and rival propagandists appealing against one another for public favor. That these devices are satisfactory in the Western democracies or even conducive to the commonweal under current conditions is questioned by many reflective observers who are free of all taint of Marxism. Such procedures would be wholly unworkable in the USSR. The Party has the function of reflecting in its own composition and activity the various interests and expectations which must be reconciled, and translating the resulting consensus into programs for action which, once adopted, are for the most part beyond the possibility of further challenge or discussion. "Dictatorship" in Soviet society is not a means (save in isolated instances, flowing from abuses of power) whereby a privileged and parasitic oligarchy exploits the community to its own advantage. Neither is it a formula for "tyranny," nor an institutionalization of the corruption which often goes with absolute power. It is rather the means of integrating elite and mass, preserving the true faith, promoting high morale and group purpose, maintaining discipline and *élan*, and evolving and administering the broad All-Union directives for serving the general welfare and the common defense. Soviet planning involves cooperation and collaboration by millions at all levels and stages of the process. But the necessary continuity, crusading fervor, and coordination from a common center are supplied, and at present can only be supplied, by maintaining the Party's monopoly of legality and leadership.

Only those observers who are invincibly ignorant, or blinded by irrational fear and hatred, will deny that the Soviet system of business and power has, for all its abuses and crudities, promoted the liberation of men from impoverishment, exploitation, illiteracy, and prejudice and served the cause of human dignity and self-respect on an immense scale. These purposes are of the essence of the democratic dream. In this sense the USSR is a

democratic polity—in its ends and in its achievements, if not always in its means.¹⁹ Lincoln Steffens doubtless spoke too soon when, on his return from Moscow in the grim winter of 1919, he said: "I have seen the future and it works!" Yet progress toward a free future has marked the first quarter century of Soviet life. A richer fulfillment of the Vision of emancipation requires that individual property rights (already recognized in an ever-expanding area of personal ownership) be further enlarged, that fuller content be given to civil liberties, that intolerance toward heretics be minimized, and that a new intellectual freedom and new adventures in representation and persuasion in a freer market for talk become part of Soviet experience.

These good things will come—if the world society of the atomic age is organized for global security and welfare rather than for the competitive pursuit of martial power. If a hopeful, rather than a dismal, prognosis be admissible, the forecast may be ventured that the USSR will move rapidly from its long and grievous task of healing the wounds of war toward a period of growing productivity and prosperity for all its peoples. The Party will continue to expand its membership and resume Conferences and Congresses in accordance with the redefinition of "democratic centralism" embodied in the rules of 1939. Members will include increasing numbers of collective farmers and wage-earners. This will be essential to reduce the danger of the brotherhood of leaders becoming primarily an instrument of the Intelligentsia—a condition which might in the end threaten both the political and economic foundations of the Soviet State. Such a development would tend to promote pecuniary emulation, invidious distinctions of status, and the award to the elite of so large a share of income as to jeopardize mass purchasing power and living standards. The Party must exercise unceasing vigilance to see to it that Mikoyan's statement to Congress XVIII does not become a chronic complaint: "Business executives in our country are very much spoiled." Soviet technocrats and managers will be called upon to remember always that "He that will be first among you, let him become a servant."

Whether these developments (always contingent upon the condition specified) will eventually lead to full political and civil freedom in the Western sense, and to a multiplicity of parties offering to the electorate a free choice among various roads toward

the good life, cannot now be predicted with any measure of certainty. Soviet election practices may be expected sooner or later to admit of rival candidates. The promise of truly responsible parliamentary government will slowly approach realization. Early in October, after victory, the State Committee of Defense was abolished and February 10, 1946, was set as the day for the election of a new Supreme Soviet. What can be anticipated beyond this is less clear. Much will depend on the extent to which real or imagined external threats disappear. Much will depend upon the further perfection of planning techniques, upon future relationships among intellectuals, workers and peasants, and upon the transformation of the Vision and the Gospel into a mass faith so deep as to shape all social motives and acts, and so secure as to welcome dissent.

The Soviet State will not under any circumstances "wither away," for the Marxist view of the role of the State takes cognizance only of its coercive features and not of its necessary and useful service functions which insure its perpetuation for millennia to come. But the Soviet State, like all other human artifacts, will change with time. Liberty, which in its various definitions is the common heritage of all freemen, will take on new and more abundant meanings in Soviet society. The traditional party systems of Atlantica, however, may perhaps be judged by posterity as earmarks of a temporary, transitional phase of political experience, unique to the epoch of the rise of the bourgeoisie and the competition for income and influence between competing economic interests and between those with, and those without, property. New designs for democracy, and for government with the free participation of the governed, may well emerge in the USSR as in the West, though their shape cannot now be foreseen. In a Free World the Soviet peoples will enjoy an ever-increasing measure of freedom. Their own innovations in the quest for solidarity, security, and sustenance are not fatal to freedom, but are capable of aiding its rebirth.

3. THE END OF THE PROLETARIAT

In the slow march of human fortunes, as in all evolution, nothing is immutable. Like all other living things, social classes are gradually and subtly transformed by the interaction of inner drives

and outer pressures. The change which may well be deemed more momentous than any other for the contemporary societies of the machine age is one common to the Soviet Union and the Atlantic democracies. Thanks to men's reluctance to see the obvious, this heartening fact has not yet been fully recognized by the political and business leaders of either Soviet socialism or Western capitalism.

In Soviet experience, the transmutation consists partly of the conversion of peasants into collective farmers, working by methods of mechanized mass-production and swiftly assuming many ways of urbanities. It consists, further, of the progressive initiation of both peasants and workers into a mode of life which is far removed from the norms of the past. Soviet producers share in the profits of socialized business. They are tending to become a body of skilled employees. They are proudly "cultured" and hungry for more "culture." In town and country, they are wedded to their means of production through a new sense of collective ownership. They are increasingly efficient, albeit still behind Western standards. As compared with the *muzhik* and *rabotnik* of old, they are neat, cleanly, punctual, ambitious, and eager for better food, clothing, housing, education, and entertainment. In short, they are no longer "proletarians."

In the early days after October, proletarian vices were often heroized into virtues, while a clean shirt or a collar-and-tie were marks of the hated bourgeoisie. Some of the old prejudices still persist. In Stalin's words of 1939, certain comrades "assert that workers and peasants sent to the universities to be educated thereby cease to be real people and become second-rate people. . . . The possibility is not precluded that these queer comrades may in time sink to the position of extolling backwardness, ignorance, benightedness and obscurantism."²⁰ On an earlier occasion, at the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites, Stalin observed:

Some people think that socialism can be consolidated by a certain equalization of people's material condition, based on a poor man's standard of living. That is not true. That is a petty-bourgeois conception of socialism. In point of fact, socialism can succeed only on the basis of high productivity of labor, higher than under capitalism, on the basis of an abundance of products and of articles of consump-

tion of all kinds, on the basis of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society. . . . Some people think that the elimination of the distinction between mental labor and manual labor can be achieved by means of a certain cultural and technical equalization of mental and manual workers by lowering the cultural and technical level of engineers and technicians, of mental workers, to the level of average skilled workers. That is absolutely incorrect. Only petty-bourgeois windbags can conceive communism in this way. In reality the elimination of the distinction between mental labor and manual labor can be brought about only by raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineers and technical workers. It would be absurd to think that this is unfeasible. It is entirely feasible under the Soviet system.²¹

Those Soviet workers who have attained the status of well-paid technicians are still a minority. But many millions have risen from poverty to comparative affluence. To raise the rest rapidly is the aim of Politburo, Sovnarkom and Gosplan, and the goal of all the activities of the Soviet trade unions. These bodies, organized not by crafts but by industries, have over 25,000,000 members, comprising nine-tenths of all workers. Membership is optional, but its privileges are tempting. Strikes and lockouts are unknown. The unions are nevertheless bargaining agencies which negotiate contracts with management. They also draft labor legislation; appoint health and safety inspectors; administer most forms of social insurance; participate in economic planning and the fixing of wage-rates; campaign for increased production; operate truck-farms, dining-halls, vacation resorts and rest homes; and perform numerous other welfare functions seldom undertaken by unionists in the West.

The familiar allegation that Soviet Unions are "unfree" and "dominated" by Government reflects ignorance of the Soviet social order—as was properly pointed out by Vassily V. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, who headed a delegation to the United States (at the invitation of the CIO) in the spring of 1945, in preparation for the establishment in Paris in September of the new World Federation of Trade Unions.²² It would perhaps be nearer the mark to contend that Government in the USSR is dominated by unions. Their members perform many public tasks, serve in all Soviet

bodies, and comprise a large proportion of the ranks of the Party. Their ultimate social function is to contribute to the withering away of the proletariat.

The transformation of Russian wage-earners into a social stratum sharing the attitudes of "white-collar" employees and the managerial elite is not a phenomenon unique to Soviet socialism. On the contrary, the process is farther advanced in the Western industrial communities, and for identical reasons which have little to do with the distinction between socialism and capitalism. Management, whether activated by competition or by the directives of the Gosplan, is under constant pressure to reduce unit costs of production by increasing per capita output. Rationalization and technological progress ("Stakhanovism" in the USSR) furnish means to the end through the substitution of machinery for men. Primitive industry employs few machines and many workers. Mature industry employs many machines and few workers. The result is a steady rise in real per capita earnings and a steady decline in the number of workers at the bench and on the assembly line, in relation to the number of office employees, technicians, engineers, managers, salesmen, professional consultants, etc.

The number of salaried employees for each 1,000 manual workers increased in Germany, for example, between 1907 and 1925, from 82 to 154 in industry, from 41 to 75 in mining and from 252 to 994 in transportation.²³ Between 1925 and 1935 the index of total annual labor hours worked in German industry declined from 92 to 73, while production per hour increased from 90 to 131. In Britain the index of annual output per worker rose from 97 in 1931 to 113 in 1935, and in Japan from 80 in 1927 to 130 in 1936. Hourly labor output in American large-scale industry rose from 81 in 1920 to 138 in 1936. The Soviet index of per capita labor output (1928=100) rose from 137 in 1932 to 190 in 1935. The absolute number of workers (in millions) employed in manufacturing industries declined in Germany from 9.5 in 1925 to 7.0 in 1934; in England from 9.6 in 1911 to 8.6 in 1931; and in the United States from 9.0 in 1919 to 8.8 in 1929 and 6.0 in 1933.²⁴ Even at the height of the American total war effort, which more than doubled the output of 1929, factory workers numbered only 15,000,000, out of 55,000,000 gainfully employed. Should the current American goal of "sixty million jobs" be attained, only a quarter of the total will consist of factory workers.

Rapid industrialization in the USSR has greatly increased the number of wage-earners in factories. But the drive toward larger output with fewer manual workers is inexorable in all industrial societies employing a progressive technology. Under these conditions the "proletariat" constitutes an ever-smaller proportion of the population. With rising living standards for the skilled, moreover, many proletarians adopt an outlook approximating that of office-workers and semi-professional employees, who strive in turn to emulate the economic and social elite. In the Atlantic democracies, organized workers are primarily concerned with raising wages and shortening hours, an endeavor which promotes the trend toward rationalization and mechanization of production. Anglo-American wage-earners have long been assimilating the manners, fashions, and values of the salaried and business classes (in Marxist terminology, the "bourgeoisie"), even while they compete for a larger share of income with those they imitate. In the USSR the same generalization holds true, with the "bourgeoisie" replaced by the "Soviet Intelligentsia."

Marx and Engels insisted rightly that political attitudes are functionally related to economic and social status, as fixed by position in the process of production. They likewise foresaw that capitalist production would experience successive crises of increasing severity, and that the emancipation of the proletariat was a prerequisite of a truly free society. But they were wholly wrong in assuming that the evolution of capitalism would impoverish and proletarianize most of the population. In fact, the larger part of the miserable and multitudinous proletariat of early capitalism has become "bourgeois" in orientation. Far from having "nothing to lose but its chains," it has everything to lose that makes life meaningful and hopeful. The prognosis of inevitable proletarian revolution herewith falls to the ground. No such revolution is possible in a society in which the proletariat is outnumbered by the *Kleinbürgertum* and is successful in its quest for more income, property and leisure.

"Proletarian" politics in the United States is a mirror of the inability of the self-appointed saviors of the proletariat to grasp these elementary, if startling, facts of life. The Communist Party, once dramatized as a formidable menace by the Dies Committee and still viewed with alarm by Clare Boothe Luce, polled 1/10th of 1% (33,361) of the total vote in the national election of 1924;

slightly more (48,770) in 1928; and much less (46,251) in 1940. In the depression years of 1932 and 1936 it obtained, respectively, 102,991 and 80,159 votes—roughly 1/5th of 1% of all ballots cast. Earl Browder's sensible effort in 1944 to face facts by abandoning the class war and converting the Party into the "Communist Political Association" was repudiated in 1945 by the orthodox faithful under William Z. Foster—who may confidently be expected to poll less than 1/10th of 1% of all votes cast in 1948.

Since the death of Eugene Debs, the Socialist Party has never been accused of standing for the revolutionary expropriation of the "bourgeoisie," even though its ancient and stereotyped vocabulary has died of inanition rather than of any conscious change of course. Most of its energies in recent years have been devoted to denouncing American Communists, whom Socialists accuse of demanding socialism, and defaming the USSR, which is held guilty of achieving socialism by anti-social methods obnoxious to Socialists. The political bankruptcy of American Socialists is almost as complete as that of the Communist comrades. Their perennial presidential candidate, Norman Thomas (who preached internationalism before and after the war, isolationism in 1939-41, and a negotiated peace in 1942-45), polled 267,000 votes in 1928; 884,000 in 1932; 187,000 in 1936; 99,500 in 1940; and 80,500 in 1944. In the latter year his vote was less than double the vote of the altogether obscure "Socialist Labor Party," and little larger than that of the Prohibitionist candidate. Lenin long ago perceived the ineptitude and fecklessness of the "revisionist" Social Democrats, and raged against their "treachery." But even he failed to see clearly that their conduct was a product of economic and social forces which doomed the whole Marxist dream of world-wide proletarian revolution to inevitable frustration.

The recent political triumphs of the European Left confirm, rather than refute, the thesis here advanced. Continental Communists have won converts not in proportion as they have championed proletarian social revolution (officially abandoned in 1935), but only in the degree to which they have embraced capitalist democracy and patriotic unity against Fascism. Socialist parties have gained supporters through popular revulsion against conservatives who made war inevitable by appeasing Fascism. Despite the eloquence of Harold J. Laski, the British Labor Party of Attlee, Bevin and Morrison will not, and cannot, build "so-

cialism" in the old sense of the term. The reason has little to do with the resistance of the propertied classes and nothing to do with any "betrayal" of the workers. It stems from the fact that Labor's victory was won by middle class votes and that British trade unionists, almost to a man, have a middle class outlook. They respect their social superiors, abjure all thoughts of revolution as works of the Devil, and seek a larger share of the good things of life within the framework of the established order. The post-war utterances of Léon Blum, who abandoned the Spanish Republic to the Axis in 1936 rather than precipitate class war in France, are further evidence that Continental Socialists are leaders of followers who want to be prosperous and patriotic burghers, not revolutionary proletarian internationalists. The entire record of German and Italian Marxism points to the same conclusion. The European Left in the advanced industrial nations consists of people who are no longer proletarians and who seek salvation not through a worker's revolution (whatever lip-service they may pay to old slogans) but through hopes of security and plenty within the context of a fuller democracy and a reformed capitalism.

This means, quite simply, that the Russian Revolution will never be re-enacted in the Western lands. The Marxist-Leninist program of a global insurrection of "wage-slave" against "bosses" is forever dead and buried. The leisure classes of the West will continue to fear Bolshevism, but the fear will have no rational relationship to anything within the realm of social reality or political possibility. The fear stems rather from inner doubts as to the capacity of the Western elites to solve their own problems and to build a viable peace-time economy which can assure tolerably full production and employment.

These doubts are deeply rooted in past experience. The best efforts of the American "New Dealers," whose attempt to rescue capitalism was bitterly denounced by most capitalists, failed to restore any reasonable facsimile of prosperity during the 1930's. A national income of \$83 billions in 1929 had fallen to \$42 in 1933. It rose to \$71 in 1937, declined to \$64 in 1938, and by 1939, when it stood at \$71 billions, was still far below pre-depression levels. Only the stimulus of total war proved capable of raising the figure to \$97 billions in 1941, \$121 in 1942, \$148 in 1943 and \$198 in 1944. War produced acquiescence in public economic planning

and compulsion. War created an insatiable market for agriculture and industry, with profits guaranteed. War evoked community controls of production, distribution, and consumption in the service of common purposes.²⁵ In peace the necessary moral, economic and political equivalents of war appear to be lacking.²⁶ But a civilization which can give its people work, bread, circuses, and a sense of solidarity only through the waging of war is foredoomed to self-destruction.

Recognition of this fact by leaders in business, politics, and intellectual life offers hope of a remedy, but no assurance that a remedy will be found or, if found, will prove emotionally acceptable. In the words of Beardsley Ruml:

Today what people want when they demand freedom is a condition under which they can realize with reasonable completeness the potentialities as persons that inhere in their capacities as individuals. Accordingly, human freedom is unattainable without productive employment under proper conditions of work, and the right to freedom is meaningless without the opportunity for such productive employment.²⁷

In the words of Charles E. Merriam:

"Freedom from authority" was captured and used as a slogan in the form of "laissez-faire" for exploitation by special groups, but it was rescued and turned to the service of the personality of all men and the whole community. . . . Economics, however, is itself a means to an end, and that broader end is obviously more important than the means. The end is the emancipation of the personality for the good life which modern science and organization can produce if permitted the full use of their operative strength.²⁸

But while the voices of wise men urge public action to convert the chaotic disintegration of late capitalism into some semblance of order and some hope of plenty, many business executives and people of property remain addicted to archaic slogans and habits which make for further frustration and breakdown. The American upper classes still accord an enthusiastic welcome to publicists who contend that all planning is power, that all power is tyranny, that "collectivism" is a "new road to serfdom," and that "freedom" can be had only by returning to the 18th Century. How this miracle is to be achieved, deponents say not. Innumerable other symptoms of cultural lag are visible on every hand.

Amid the arduous and imperative tasks of a new time, salvation will not flow from futile nostalgia, from suspicion of all who display imagination, or from refusal to adjust outworn ways to novel problems.

The Atlantic communities are not faced with new variations in an old cycle of "good times" and bad, nor with purely fortuitous waves of insecurity, poverty and violence. To envisage the crisis in such terms is to misconceive completely its nature, scope, and prospects. Western civilization is in the midst of a prolonged and catastrophic process of dissolution, driving millions to despair, fear and rage, breeding war and revolution, and threatening, if unchecked, to produce even more appalling disasters in the years to come.

That Marx was wrong as to the nature of the débâcle he predicted does not make it any less a débâcle. The Russian Revolution was at once a product of this breakdown and a means of arresting it (within the territorial confines of the Soviet power) through the building of a new and dynamic design for life, creative and capable of facing the future without fear. But this pattern of adjustment and reconstruction, with its new highway for the resumption for the march of man toward mastery of his fate, cannot under any imaginable circumstances be extended to the highly developed capitalisms of the West, nor can it furnish to the Atlantic communities the means of escape from disorder and further disintegration.

Only in the poorest and most backward neighborhoods of the world is proletarian revolution still within the realm of the possible. Here, in colonial and semi-colonial depressed areas, nascent industrial capitalisms vie with obsolete feudalisms in creating masses of impoverished workers from the ranks of an already impoverished peasantry. The middle class is small and politically helpless. Landlords and factory owners confront ignorant and disgruntled multitudes who are often ruthlessly exploited and live on the edge of famine. Under such conditions, economic and social breakdown may well be the matrix on the Marxist model for a class war of workers and peasants against the propertied elites. Russia was such a community in 1917. Until recently many of the nations between the Baltic and the Aegean conformed to this pattern. It persists in southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, much of Latin America, and parts of Africa and the Near and Middle

East. The festering mass misery of the millions in China, India and southeastern Asia is the base of a primitive economic and social pyramid, capped by small but opulent oligarchies of potentates, priests, landowners, merchants and foreign investors.

In such societies something comparable to the October Revolution is still possible—not by virtue of “Moscow gold” or “Communist propaganda,” but by virtue of the penury and bitterness of masses, the greed and blindness of classes, the absence of any prosperous intermediate stratum, and the inertias and resistances which thwart farmers and wage-earners in their quest for security. If native elites and Western empire-builders cling stubbornly to the *status quo*, new explosions of class conflict and colonial rebellion will be inevitable. Two decades ago the men of Muscovy saw in this prospect an opportunity to recapture, in a strange context, the Marxist image of the world-revolutionary millennium. But the picture has long since faded. The Kremlin holds aloof from the groping struggles of the colonial slum peoples for a place in the sun. These problems are for the Atlantic Powers to grapple with. Only if they seek solutions through new anti-Soviet crusades will Moscow unfurl the old banners of the workers’ and peasants’ revolution.

These banners can no longer win converts in significant numbers in the lands where industrial capitalism is already old. The crowded bourgeois societies which have grown up along the shores of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific in the wake of the diffusion of machine technology are beyond destruction or redemption at the hands of proletarian revolutionists. Their inner disorders are in no case attributable (all fables to the contrary notwithstanding) to any wish by their farmers or wage-earners to smash the temples of property, piety, and patriotism or to dispossess the owning classes. Agitators of social revolt gyrate in a vacuum when millions share in ownership and adopt the outlook of owners. Wherever the preachers of revolution seem to mean the words they use, they have no followers. Wherever they have followers, their words are understood by all to be innocuous.

In these communities the chronic crisis of our times has often been resolved, and may again be resolved, in a wholly different fashion. Frustrated and frightened burghers never embrace Marxism but frequently embrace anti-Marxism when their insecurities impel them to do battle with bogies. The rage of neurotics, like

that of savages, is often vented on scapegoats. Intolerant cults of pseudo-salvation find followers among the fear-stricken. Solace from worry is sought in fanaticism. Mighty men of money and land, desperately anxious over their own privileges, subsidize the fanatics and deliver the State to the frenzied madmen of the middle class. The new potentates of fear and hate smash the unions, often with the aid of the labor aristocracy, and abolish democracy, often with the aid of demented democrats. They restore full employment and production by the simple device of building colossal war machines which, once built, must be used lest the economy again collapse for lack of markets.

No market is so inexhaustible and so immediately lucrative as the market of Mars. This primrose path to plenty is paved with arms. The weapons which keep men and machines at work become tools of conquest and plunder, enriching elites and masses alike in predatory economies which can live only by violence and theft. Ever more machines and men are consumed, and all the survivors rejoice (so long as the process continues) that they have found the magic formula for employing the jobless, enriching the oligarchs, and fattening farmers, factory owners, and merchants.

This solution is called Fascism. It is not an Italian or German disease, but a cure of universal applicability for the sickness of mature industrial capitalism. Should it again be resorted to, it will be given a different name, but its poisonous seeds, its flowers of evil, and its lethal fruits will be the same. The medication is uniformly successful. But the patient invariably dies. The remedy is a formula for violent death, preceded by high fever, delirium tremens, and paroxysms of homicidal and suicidal insanity.

The basic question upon which hangs the future of war, and the alternatives of salvation or self-destruction for the contemporary world society, is the question of whether the industrial communities of Atlantica can find some other means of keeping men and machines at work. The Soviet way can never be the way of the West. The ways of the past are beyond recapture. The way of Fascist Caesarism has at its destination the organized construction of murder-factories and the scientific conversion of once thriving regions into stinking and rubble-strewn deserts. A new way, combining in its design as much of public planning as is needful for stability, and as much of private property and competitive enter-

prise as is possible of preservation, must be found if modern man is to escape self-inflicted annihilation. Any contention that such a union of public and private activities is impossible is a threat of a death sentence upon Western culture.

The Soviet Union's gravest problem during the decades ahead will be the future of capitalism. A successful Western quest for the road to plenty will mean the end of the proletariat everywhere and the possibility of the progressive enrichment and self-fulfillment of all producers and consumers throughout the world. Victory in this most difficult and decisive of all battles will promote a global synthesis of all that is conducive to freedom and creative of abundance in both the USSR and the Atlantic societies. It will thereby lay the necessary foundations for the World State of the coming time. Nothing less than this will make possible the constructive use of atomic power for the final conquest of poverty and drudgery all over the globe. Soviet Muscovy will contribute what it can to the success of the enterprise, since its leaders and people know that failure means more Fascism, war and death. In dissolving the Comintern, and championing democracy, property rights, and private enterprise, the men of the Kremlin have taken cognizance of new realities and new opportunities. Western Marxists can best make their contribution by discarding what has become fictional in their creed and applying what is true and hopeful to the common task of building a new society. The indispensable contribution of the Western propertied classes can be made only if their members prove capable of conquering their fear of change and participate actively in the creation of novel patterns of cooperation between business and government.

Herein lies the last hope of Western man and the final alternative to the cycle of decline and disintegration which is carrying the world community toward the shadows of a long night. If this fails, all fails. And if failure comes, there will assuredly be "false prophets among the people. . . . And through covetousness shall they with feigned words make merchandise of you. . . . Them that walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness, and despise government—presumptuous are they, self-willed. . . . While they promise them liberty, they themselves are the servants of corruption. . . . There shall come in the last days scoffers, walking after their own lusts. . . . But one day is with the Lord

as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. . . . The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up. . . . All these things shall be dissolved. . . . Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." ²⁹

4. ONE WORLD AND THE THIRD ROME

The platitudes of peace merit constant repetition, since they are far more easily forgotten than made guides to action. For the peoples of the USSR, of the Atlantic democracies and of all the earth, World War III means the decline of modern man into a new Dark Age and the descent of the survivors to a life of troglodytes. World War III is possible only if America and Russia become antagonists in the age-old game of power. Peace will be secure so long as Moscow, Washington, and London, with the aid of Paris and Nanking, act together to keep it among themselves and to prevent its rupture by others. Since the UNO is an alliance and a league, and not a union or a World State, it can keep peace as long as, but no longer than, the Super-Powers are united to keep it. In the words of Cordell Hull:

Without an enduring understanding (among them) upon their fundamental purposes, interests and obligations to one another, all organizations to preserve peace are creations on paper and the path is wide open again for the rise of a new aggressor. . . . For these Powers to become divided in their aims, and fail to recognize and harmonize their basic interests, can produce only disaster, and no machinery, as such, can produce this essential harmony and unity.³⁰

Exhortation seldom moves men to change deep-seated habits and prejudices, even when persistence in them can clearly be shown to spell catastrophe. "Lessons of history" are a comfort only to the naïve. Two generalizations may nevertheless be usefully drawn from the course of world politics since October, for both bear decisively upon events that lie ahead. One is that in a world of separate sovereignties there can be no escape from anarchy save on the basis of unity between Russia and the Atlantic democracies. The other is that in time of peace such unity

cannot be effective on the political level unless its economic, social and moral foundations are solidly built and firmly buttressed.

The first proposition is self-evident. The settlement at Versailles broke down because America and Russia were not responsible partners in its making and enforcement. Discord among Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and Nanking enabled the Nipponese and Nazi aggressors to build the war machines with which they overran Europe and Asia, ravished Nanking, took Paris, bombed London, attacked Moscow, and waged war on Washington. Unity, belatedly recaptured, brought victory in a war which need never have been fought had the victors joined forces in 1932 instead of 1942. Discord in the future will not produce new efforts at global conquest from Berlin or Tokyo, nor yet from other foci of hurt pride or over-weening ambition in Western Europe or Eastern Asia. All who are ambitious or proud in these wastelands are powerless. But disunity spells anarchy among the only decisive centers of power left on the planet: the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, and the United States. Anarchy means war.

The second proposition is less obvious but no less crucial. The schism after October between the Powers of East and West sprang from Communist efforts, by propaganda and revolution, to destroy the established order in the bourgeois world, and from the efforts of the democracies, by blockade, invasion and insurrection, to destroy the new order of Soviet socialism. Both enterprises failed. But the stalemate brought no fruitful peace. Fanatics in both camps were slow to abandon their hopes. Internal insecurities in both worlds nourished mutual suspicions and tempted each side to renew its crusade. In the absence of specific conflicts over decisive components of power (and there were few in this instance), populous and powerful communities do not plot war against one another, nor concoct counter-plots against one another's plots, if they enjoy economic prosperity and social stability at home. The necessary condition was lacking during the decades between wars. Soviet society was impoverished, unstable, and uncertain of its ultimate shape during the years of the NEP and the early ordeals of collectivization and socialist construction. The Western democracies, having contrived no enduring design for welfare during the 1920's, experienced economic collapse

and incipient social disintegration in the sequel. Under such circumstances, effective collaboration was beyond achievement.

This cleavage led to almost fatal results because of the spread of the cancer of Fascism. The danger of tomorrow lies in the possibility that the Nemesis of yesterday may rise from the grave in new garments. A survival or rebirth of Fascism in Italy, Germany or Japan will be discouraging evidence of the incapacity of the Super-Powers to reorder the world. But it will not create new dangers of war—unless the victors become so divided and irresponsible as to allow a restoration of formidable military might in the realms of the vanquished. In this unlikely event, all promise of world order is mortgaged to the worms. The more probable danger lies in the rise of a crypto-Fascism or neo-Fascism in Britain or America or both. In this case also, all hope of peace and plenty must be abandoned.

If the assumption be made, however, that *Atlantica*, as well as *Muscovy*, is capable of giving its people bread and opportunity and the dignity of creative work, then the further problem of keeping the peace and building the world community on foundations likely to endure assumes a more auspicious form. Yet the hope will remain in jeopardy so long as the Powers of East and West are still trapped in a State System based upon national sovereignty and engendering competitive quests for power. The half-hidden imperatives of *Realpolitik*, always identified in their sundry rationalizations with the most urgent emotional fixations of ethnocentrism and xenophobia, are far older than capitalism or socialism. Like the secret fires of sex, they move few to talk but move all to action. Strategists, diplomats and patriots enjoy a sense of potency, and avoid confusion and frustration, only when they act in conformity with the rules of power politics. This ancient and fateful pattern for anarchy, with implications for the future far more tragic than those of the past, has neither been abolished nor transcended nor significantly modified by the global war and the global peace of the 1940's.

National security will still be sought by the Great Powers of tomorrow either through the maintenance of a balance among rivals, or through coalitions and concerts, or through new quests for supremacy. But all these means to safety have become futile or fatal under the circumstances of a new era. The game of power can no longer be played by fifty sovereignties, nor even by eight

or five or three. Only two remain of whom it may be said that no others can stand against them. In Max Lerner's formulation:

Nothing is clearer than that Russia and America stand now, in mid-20th Century, as the two towering World Powers, and that the world's destiny is summed up in the anodes and cathodes of their relations. . . . By manpower and resources and their skilled use, by geographical position in relation to land-mass in one case and sea lanes in the other and airways in both, by armed might and economic power and war potential, by ideology and prestige, by the gusto and assurance of their people, these two promise to be the colossi in whose striding shadow the world's future will be enacted for better or for worse.³¹

No practical chance remains for either of the giants to checkmate the other by supporting third Powers against it. Pseudo-Machiavellis in the Narkomindel and the State Department may toy with the thought of using London, Paris, Nanking—or even Rome, Berlin, or Tokyo—against one another. But the game will be false and will fail. Only Britain is still a Power—and British power is too vulnerable ever to risk war with either America or Russia. The rest are but shadow-powers of the twilight, like aged men or adolescent boys whose dreams of passion are memories of a past forever lost or anticipations of a future not yet attainable. The alternatives of high politics left to America and Russia are limited to security-by-coalition or security-by-supremacy. All the coalitions and concerts of yesterday have had vitality and endurance only when directed against formidable enemies, threatening the partners with destruction. With the fall of the Reich and Japan, Moscow and Washington have no common foes against whom they can combine. The British Commonwealth threatens neither, nor does China. An invasion by Martians, bent upon crushing all the Powers of earth, would supply the missing link. This eventuality, however, appears difficult to arrange.

All the human habits of centuries gone by, and all the blind automatism of competition for influence in a disorderly congeries of sovereignties, impels the power-holders of America and Muscovy to indulge in rivalry for global supremacy—with each fearfully seeking safety through efforts to checkmate and ruin the other in accordance with the dictates of a game of chance older than Rome and Carthage, or Athens and Sparta. Should either of the new monsters suffer that acute indigestion of internal

economy which is most readily relieved by partaking of the tonic of armaments and war, the pressures making for combat would become irresistible. Even without this incentive, the danger will still be grievous, for no two Titans of past time have ever confronted one another from such dizzy pinnacles as those upon which the United States and the USSR are now perched. Anxious and ambitious leaders, fearing those upon the opposite summit and hoping for their downfall, can see from the heights all the kingdoms of the earth and can lend willing ears to the voice which says: "All this power will I give thee, and the glory of them. . . . If thou therefore wilt worship me, all shall be thine."

To resist the tempter in the wilderness of a world without government may prove beyond the will of men still deeply entangled in traditional ways. The preachers of an "American Century" know that Russia has suffered appalling losses,³² and that new billions of credits for reconstruction and trade will unavoidably strengthen Soviet power. They also know that the United States possesses the greatest navy and air fleet, the greatest merchant marine, and the greatest industrial establishment of all time, all capable of dominating the earth and—perhaps—of smashing Red Muscovy.

Habit-ridden patriots and politicians, bursting with tribal pride and prejudice, give no heed to pleas for world federation, and view with jaundiced eyes all appeals for solidarity with Powers abroad. All backward-looking men will endorse the paleolithic opinions of Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, director of the "Manhattan Engineering District," regarding the atomic bomb: "This weapon must be kept under the control of the United States until all of the other nations of the world are as anxious for peace as we are."³³ Never was clearer voice given to the tragic fallacy which has led all the world-conquerors of the past to seek peace by the sword. All Americans want peace. But in the days to come, as in those gone by, they will want some things more than peace. Given fear in their hearts and overwhelming power in their hands, their wants may lead to war.

The sons and daughters of those who dreamed once of a "World Republic of Soviets" have no less impressive and tempting components of power at their disposal: enormous space, a vast and gifted population, the mightiest of armies, the best tanks and artillery, a productive and widely dispersed industry—and a

new faith moving all their people, and many elsewhere among the disinherited, to a strange dynamism. This fervor, though it can never realize the pristine vision of proletarian revolution, is still a force of incalculable potency in a world in which ideas are weapons.³⁴ The masters of the Heartland likewise have no lack of uranium and of able physicists, including Peter Kapitza and many others. Science knows no country. No State or Church has ever succeeded in hiding scientific secrets for more than a few years from alien peoples skilled in scientific techniques. The USSR, which pioneered in giant planes, air-borne infantry, self-propelled artillery, welded tanks, and rocket guns, will without doubt be producing atomic bombs long before most Americans suspect that their conspiracy of silence has failed.³⁵

In future wars, as in past ones, the Red Army will strike blows as heavy as those of any foe. All Russians have immense respect for American technology and productivity. All Russians want peace. But they too value other things more than peace. After crushing the invincible *Wehrmacht*, their definitions of their own interests will not be changed by any assumption of American invincibility. Suspicion and vast power, here as in America, may combine to produce policies leading to a clash between the colossi.

None can now say that World War III is inevitable, or that it will be avoided. What can be said with certainty is that neither America nor Russia can conquer the other or build a World State by force. In any such contest the old imperatives of survival will operate anew to cheat the prospective victor of the fruits of victory. Other sovereignties will rally against whichever belligerent appears at the outset most formidable. None of the peoples of the Rimlands has any wish to be ruled from Moscow, or from Washington. In the class conflict which will inevitably spread over the earth, cutting across the lines of the coalitions, America will find allies among nobles, priests, and plutocrats, while the USSR summons proletarians, peasants, and colonial subjects to its cause. This trial of strength will be won by the United States in the Atlantic countries. Russia will win in China and India, and much of the Near East and Africa. While lesser Powers tremble at the monstrous onslaughts of the Great Beasts and seek to strike down the one which seems most likely to slay the other and devour all, America will fight for "democracy," "freedom" and

the true faith against godlessness, "totalitarianism" and "Bolshevism." Russia will fight with equal energy for the true faith, "freedom" and "democracy" against capitalism, neo-Fascism and clericalism. Yet each herewith will lose all faith and all freedom and perhaps all possibility of ever recapturing either . . .

But the inquiry need not be pressed. The outcome of such a combat would be meaningless—i.e., "historyless," in the Spenglerian sense. This result is certain beyond a doubt because of the weapons and strategies with which such a war would be waged. The Nazi madmen spoke too soon in the 1930's when they proclaimed, over and over again, that in the next war there would be neither victors nor vanquished, but only survivors and annihilated. In the immolation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, the hopes of the nihilists for total destruction have come to fruition. In assuming what President Truman called the "awful responsibility" of discovering and applying to the purposes of war the cosmic power of nuclear fission, civilization has at last found "the means to commit suicide at will."³⁶ "This revelation of the secrets of Nature, long mercifully withheld from man," said Churchill, "should arouse the most solemn reflections in the mind and conscience of every human being capable of comprehension. We must indeed pray that these awful agencies will be made to conduce to peace among the nations instead of wreaking measureless havoc upon the entire globe."³⁷ Here in fact is created what Max Lerner terms "an entirely new landscape of politics and power."³⁸

Although professional specialists in the military art are often slow to recognize the implications of new techniques and weapons, laymen may be permitted to draw the unquestionably correct conclusion that atomic power renders obsolete almost all the hitherto formidable devices of death and destruction employed in World War II. If World War III is permitted to come, its conduct and consequences will bear no resemblance to anything in past experience. Its principal weapons will be stratospheric jet-planes and atomic-propelled rockets, carrying atomic explosives through thousands of miles of the upper air and guided to their target by ingenious and infallible electronic mechanisms.

Any future war between the United States and the Soviet Union will be waged by diabolical agents of flying death across

the Arctic ice-cap. Control of Western Europe, the British Isles, or Eastern Asia will have little strategic significance. Great Britain, with its densely crowded population and industries, will be the most vulnerable of all targets. Five hundred atomic bombs, properly placed, can annihilate most of its population. The larger giants, hideously wounded but not at once slain, will battle for control of Alaska, the Canadian northern islands, Greenland, Iceland, Scandinavia, Spitzbergen, Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, and the tundra and taiga shores of the Polar Sea. From these bases American atomic squadrons and rocket batteries can launch weapons which will be capable of destroying, quite completely and in the twinkling of an eye, the cities of Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Kirov, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Moscow, Leningrad and Minsk. And from these bases, Soviet rocket batteries and atomic squadrons can annihilate Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, Denver, Seattle and San Francisco.

The advantage enjoyed by the USSR in possibly superior strategy and diplomacy, in fuller knowledge of the Arctic, and in the greater dispersal of its population and industries will be offset by American control of Canada (a military necessity in such a conflict) and by American superiority in technology and production. Military casualties will be negligible, since land armies and naval units will never meet in force. Most amphibious operations will be impossible, since fleets and landing parties will be vaporized. Civilian casualties will be numbered not in thousands but in tens of millions. Bases and launching sites will not be located in populated areas. Hence neither belligerent will avoid the destruction of his own cities by first destroying those of the other. All urban centers within range of the new weapons—i.e., all cities save those in the American and Soviet southlands—will be in constant danger of being suddenly transformed into soaring towers of flame and smoke. There will be no survival by fleeing to the woods or burrowing in caves. Then will future reporters file their dispatches:

According to a statement released today by Osoaviakhim, the four supersonic atomic rockets which penetrated the electronic barrage and fell in the central Moscow area yesterday morning came from a northwesterly direction and were probably launched from American carriers off the coast of Greenland. The region of the Kremlin and

Red Square is now a deep water-filled depression. Except for the skeletons of the Telegraph Building and the Palace of Labor, all structures within the circle of boulevards and far up Gorky Street were leveled, with most other buildings demolished within a radius of a mile beyond the boulevards. The collapse of most of the subway and the flooding of the rest killed thousands who had taken refuge in its stations. The majority of those who fled these death-traps are expected to die of atomic burns. By a grotesque freak of the detonations, the massive debris of the Palace of Soviets was blown into the Moskva River, resulting in the inundation of the Khamovniki District and other neighborhoods in the western part of the metropolis. Casualties cannot yet be estimated, but the appearance of the site of the former city, viewed through binoculars from the Moscow Hills, renders it doubtful whether as many as half the inhabitants survived. . . .

Or, conversely and perhaps simultaneously:

The War Department reports that all but one of the Soviet stratojet bombers, apparently based on the Gulf of Anadyr, were intercepted and destroyed over the Alcan Highway. But the single plane which reached Chicago and, before crashing near the Adler Planetarium, succeeded in dropping its cargo around the Loop district at the height of the noon rush-hour, has reduced the city to a shambles. While the rubble of a few small structures is still visible, including the Public Library, the Art Institute, and Field Museum, every edifice more than five stories high, from the Palmolive Building and the Tribune Tower to the Merchandise Mart, the Civic Opera House, the Board of Trade and the Stevens Hotel, was vaporized. The downtown district resembles a flat plain of sand-like dust, partially fused and composed of iron, silica, organic ash and radio-active salts. The one bomb which fell in Lake Michigan off Grant Park produced a tidal wave which drowned an estimated 80,000 people in Waukegan, South Chicago, Gary, Michigan City, St. Joseph, Grand Haven, and intermediate points. In Chicago windows were shattered and some buildings damaged as far away from the center of the explosions as Oak Park, Ravenswood, and Hyde Park Boulevard. The dead are tentatively estimated at 750,000, exclusive of an indeterminate number who perished in the conflagration which swept the Black Belt and the near North Side. A Governor's Commission from Springfield is still investigating the extent of the destruction. . . .

These are no alarmist fantasies but the sober shape of the war to come, if Americans and Russians permit its coming. Should

such days dawn in fear and die in horror, many will recall, in vain lamentation, the words of the Prophet: "The earth is defiled under the inhabitants thereof; because they have transgressed the laws, changed the ordinance, broken the everlasting covenant. Therefore hath the curse devoured the earth, and they that dwell therein are desolate; therefore the inhabitants of the earth are burned and few men left. . . . Fear, and the pit, and the snare, are upon thee, O inhabitant of the earth. . . . The earth shall reel to and fro like a drunkard, and shall be removed like a cottage; and the transgression thereof shall be heavy upon it; and it shall fall and not rise again. . . . Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed. . . ." ³⁹

Fear of new weapons is no safeguard against doom, for men are less often cowardly than daring, blind and mad. Neither is it enough to say: "There shall not, there must not be, a Third World War. The piled-up corpses of those who died in this war already reach the sky. Of ruins we have enough. Of misery we have more than one generation can endure." ⁴⁰ Nor will it suffice for forward-looking Americans to tell their countrymen that "the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union conflict at no point on the earth's surface. . . . There is no necessary reason in the logic of geography, or in the logic of economics, or in the logic of national objectives, why the United States and the Soviet Union should ever find themselves in conflict with each other, let alone in the kind of conflict reckless and irresponsible men have begun now to suggest." ⁴¹

Wars are not a result of logic, nor is peace a product of wishes and hopes. War is a result of anarchy. Peace is a result of government. The world, as it enters the atomic age, is still without government. And neither Russians nor Americans have as yet contributed to the cause of world government anything remotely adequate to the needs of the new time. What is now needed is plain beyond dispute to all reasonable beings. What is doubtful is whether men will do what is needed. In the words of Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago: "The alternatives are clear. One alternative is world suicide. Another is agreement among sovereign States to refrain from using the bomb. This, in my judgment, will not be effective. Only through monopoly of atomic force by a world organization can we hope to abolish war." ⁴² In the words of Edgar Ansel Mowrer:

The atomic bomb demands permanent peace. It asks for a new type of political organization. It shrieks for fruitful cooperation that atomic power be released, not to blow civilization to smithereens, but to give material comfort to all. . . . Since July 16 (1945) this planet is no longer the happy hunting-ground of three Super-Powers but of one superweapon. . . . The military science of World War II—mass armies, battle fleets, networks of far-flung bases and fortifications—has gone to join that of the Babylonians. . . . Admittedly the UNO now in process of creation cannot prevent war between the Great Powers. It was conceived either as a “first step” or as a final demonstration that nothing based on the “sovereign equality of peace-loving nations” can work. . . . Now, therefore, before the atomic bomb becomes common property, is the time to start transforming the San Francisco organization into a real supernational administration.⁴³

This will not come at once. It can come eventually only if American and Soviet statesmanship proves equal to keeping the peace and laying the foundations of world government during the years immediately ahead. A major obstacle to the enterprise is the disposition of Soviet diplomacy to pursue democratic ends by undemocratic means in the border zones, and in the propensity of Anglo-American leaders to employ democratic slogans to promote undemocratic purposes in the same areas. Joint trusteeships are urgently called for in as many intermediate regions as possible. For the rest, lines of demarcation, agreed upon, clearly drawn and scrupulously respected, are required, for without them there can be no escape from friction, rivalry, and eventual conflict. Nothing but tragedy can come from any Soviet effort to Bolshevize Central Europe, or from any Anglo-American attempt either to dominate southeastern Europe or “protect” it from Russian hegemony. A typical formula for war is the statement of Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington: “I am very worried about the Balkans. With the United States curtailing its military influence in Europe, there is nothing to prevent Russia from becoming master of that area.”⁴⁴ If London and Washington are unable to accept Soviet “mastery” of the Balkan and Danubian lands, or if Moscow is unable to accept Anglo-American mastery of the Western and Mediterranean regions, there will be no peace.

Ultimately, beyond the necessary transitional stage of zones and spheres, common norms of purpose and policy must emerge among the Super-Powers. The goal can easily be lost by fearful

and small-minded leaders reaching out from the West for control of the lands of Magyars, Rumanians, Mongols or Manchus—or reaching out from the East for control of Oman, Eritrea, Tripoli, or Timbuktu. From such an uneasy jostling of rival ambitions, no peace can come. Equally fatal are all projects for “Western blocs,” “Soviet blocs,” “Anglo-American Unions,” or other regional coalitions directed against counter-coalitions. Yet the task is not hopeless if (as Vera Dean puts it) agreement can be had that “democracy means in essence a way of life that makes it possible for human beings of all races, creeds, and economic conditions to work together with as little deference to economic or political privilege as it is humanly possible to achieve.”⁴⁵ The Soviet Union and the Atlantic democracies have each contributed in their divergent ways to the realization of this ideal. Their common mission of saving civilization from self-annihilation demands that their ways converge in growing concord and in global service to the needs and aspirations of the common man, rather than of Commissars or capitalists, Communists or concession-hunters.

The cooperative building of security is the only test of the worthiness of both the Soviet and bourgeois elites to survive and of their capacity to do what is essential for the survival of all. Contemporary man is still clinging, more precariously than ever, to the slope down which he has been stumbling and sliding for the past half century. His descent toward the chasm of Gehenna which has swallowed many earlier civilizations will, within the present generation, either be accelerated beyond hope of any halt or else arrested and changed to a slow and painful climb to sanity. The bough to which man must needs cling is the olive-branch of peace between America and Muscovy. If it breaks, nothing stands between the climber and the abyss.

The past pattern of Anglo-American relations offers a model and a hope. Having fought two wars, Americans and Britishers long ago abandoned the game of power in their dealings with one another and built a peace that has never since been broken and cannot again be broken. Frictions and recriminations have been endless and bitter. Never yet have the British Commonwealth and the American Republic displayed the wisdom and foresight to combine their strength to keep peace everywhere. But the Pax within Anglo-Saxony is inviolate, and all men dedicated to order and freedom have fared the better for it.

The time is gone when American and British power combined might suffice to keep peace among all nations. The time has come when global order demands the building of an inviolable peace between the United States and the USSR, in partnership with Britain, France, and China, with all sworn to the keeping of the peace everywhere through the combined strength of the united giants. From all Americans and Russians who see its urgency, this task requires unflinching resolve to dispel the suspicions and fears which make for enmity. Since the bond of common language and a common political heritage is lacking, redoubled efforts are called for to achieve mutual understanding among the peoples of both realms. This priceless plant cannot be cultivated as a hothouse flower. It can grow, blossom, and bear fruit only in the air and sunlight which attend a free and untrammelled sharing of experiences all across the broad horizons of science and art, business and government, study and travel, reporting and research.

The Kremlin commits a disservice to the cause when it fails to encourage maximum freedom in study, travel, and trade, or bars from the areas under its control unfriendly foreign critics. "Freedom for the thought that we hate" is a pre-condition of reciprocal and enduring appreciation. Western apostles of the USSR commit a similar disservice when they speak and act on the principle of "My country, right or wrong!"—and leave no doubt as to the country to which they feel primary allegiance. In the absence of the dual citizenship and double loyalty which are necessary features of World Federation, local minorities whose first love is not their own land but an alien Power are not a help but a hindrance to the efforts of their countrymen to achieve sympathetic understanding across frontiers.⁴⁶ The USSR, as yet, tolerates no such groups. Pro-Soviet enthusiasts in the West who enjoy the tolerance of liberal régimes have an even greater responsibility than their more skeptical or hostile fellow-citizens in the enterprise of building trust and mutual respect.

The adventure is an arduous journey along a rough and broken road on which at some mid-point, two groups of travellers, pushing forward from widely sundered sources, must meet at a common destination and join forces to save the future. The barriers across the highway are many and formidable. In the light of the fears and hatreds of the past, Americans cannot expect Soviet leaders in one swift sweep to open all gates, remove all road-

blocks, and put a sudden end to secretiveness, suspicion, and restraints on trade in ideas. They can and should expect the men of Moscow to move in this direction as quickly as is warranted by growing signs of confidence and honesty of purpose on the part of the Atlantic Powers. Russians cannot expect Americans to bar the road to their own preachers of doubt and discord, who insist on turning back. They can and should expect an ever-increasing number of Americans to controvert obstructionists, to build new bridges of collaboration, and to smooth the way with a solid pavement of good-will and knowledge and determination to follow the road steadfastly.

The ultimate task of Soviet Muscovy and the Atlantic communities—and one which is no longer a nebulous aspiration but a grimly practical necessity—is to translate into political terms on a world scale the timeless vision of the unity of man. Without this, the common bonds in the Grand Alliance of the United Nations will be ropes of sand. Marxist dreamers of world revolution, while wholly incapable of uniting the global society of our time, could yet shatter the hope of unity beyond repair, if their dream should ever again become a guide to Soviet policy. Fortunately no such development is probable. The men of the Kremlin are “realists.” Their realism has served, and can serve anew on a broader stage, the hopes of all men for liberation and security, and for opportunity and freedom in a world made secure. Insistence everywhere upon unqualified “Soviet democracy” will not suffice, any more than will Anglo-American insistence everywhere upon “bourgeois democracy,” pure and undefiled. All power is most impressive when exercised with tolerance and self-restraint. Two designs for freedom and security must long co-exist. Only through creative collaboration can they slowly grow into one.

The seeds of unity cannot be found in mutual fear of the Inferno of further war, nor yet in the unique values of the socialist or the capitalist way of life. The mind of the race which has split the atom faces madness and death unless it can reunite men and all the tribes of men. Unity must be sought in the cultural catalysts which do not separate but combine the elements upon which they operate—i.e., in the eternal social goals which all European peoples have inherited from their forebears. To ancient Israel, to early Greece, to pristine Christianity, and to the first Rome and

the second, all modern mankind owes a common debt, shared by Russians and Americans and by Britons and all peoples touched by the faiths of the West. At the heart of the legacy is the concept of the dignity of each man and the brotherhood of all men, lifted above bestiality by the moral law and raised to godhood by the pursuit of truth.

The Russian mission has never been expressed more eloquently than in the words of Feodor Dostoevsky, a year before his death, at the dedication of the Pushkin Memorial:

Not in a spirit of enmity but in friendliness and perfect love, we received into our soul the genius of foreign nations, all alike without preference of race, able by instinct from almost the very first step to discern, to discount distinctions, to excuse and reconcile them, and therein we already showed our readiness and inclination, which had only just become manifest to ourselves, for a common and universal union with all races. . . . To become a true Russian, to become a Russian fully . . . means only to become the brother of all men, to become, if you will, a universal man. . . . And in course of time I believe that we—not we, of course, but our children to come—will all without exception understand that to be a true Russian does indeed mean to aspire to reconcile finally the contradictions of Europe, to find a way out for the yearning for Europe in our Russian soul, pan-human and all-uniting, to include within our soul by brotherly love all our brethren, and at last, it may be, to pronounce the final word of the great general harmony, of the final brotherly communion of all nations in accordance with the law of the gospel of Christ! I know, I know too well, that my words may appear ecstatic, exaggerated and fantastic. Let them be so, I do not repent having uttered them.⁴⁷

Echoing across time and space comes the answering voice of America's good, grey poet, Walt Whitman:

You, whoever you are! You daughter or son of England! You of the mighty Slavic tribes and empires! You Russ in Russia! . . . All you continentals of Asia, Africa, Europe, Australia, indifferent of place! All you on the numberless islands of the archipelagoes of the sea! And you of centuries hence, when you listen to me! And you, each and everywhere, whom I specify not, but include just the same! Health to you! Good will to you all—from me and America sent. Each of us inevitable; each of us limitless—each of us with his or her right upon the earth; each of us allow'd the eternal purports of the earth; each of us here as divinely as any is here. . . . I have looked for brothers, sisters, lovers, and found them ready for me in all lands.

. . . What cities the light or warmth penetrates, I penetrate those cities myself; all islands to which birds wing their way, I wing my way myself. I find my home wherever there are homes of men. . . .⁴⁸

No two peoples have more to contribute toward the quest of mankind for a new fulfillment of ancient hopes than Americans and Russians. Having triumphed together over the powers of darkness, they can together, if they will, realize the bright promise of their separate pasts and remake the world into a fit dwelling-place for freemen. But only if they will. If they will not, no others can. Paramount power rests only with those who dwell on the great plains of America and on the broad steppes of Eurasia. In unison, but only in unison, they have the means to give all men a new and infinitely hopeful destiny.

NOTES

N.B. Place of publication New York, except where otherwise indicated. NYT = *The New York Times*. IBEW = Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D. C.

I · APOCALYPSE

I. HOME-COMING

1. No texts of these speeches are available. The quotations, which appear to be accurate in substance even if not verbally exact, are taken from the account of N. Sukhanov: *Zapiski O Revoliutsii*, 7 vols. (Z. Grezhebin, Berlin and Petrograd, 1919-22), as summarized by Edmund Wilson: *To the Finland Station* (Harcourt, Brace, 1940), pp. 471-6.
2. Cf. *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin* (International Publishers), Vol. XX, *The Revolution of 1917*, Book I, pp. 19-63.
3. For the relevant documents, cf. *ibid.* vol. XX, Book I, pp. 91-4 and Book II, pp. 381-6. Cf. also G. R. Treviranus: *Revolutions in Russia* (Harper, 1944), p. 92. For the full story of how the State Department came to endorse the view that Lenin was a paid German agent, cf. Edgar Sisson: *One Hundred Red Days* (Yale U. Press, New Haven, 1931), containing in the appendices the "Sisson Documents," purporting to show that the Bolshevik leaders were subsidized by Berlin. Sisson was the victim of a fraud perpetrated by skillful forgers anxious to discredit the Soviet regime. The documents were published under the title of "The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy," War Information Series, No. 20, 1918, The Committee on Public Information, George Creel, Chairman. Cf. also Samuel N. Harper: *The Russia I Believe In* (U. of Chicago Press, 1945), pp. 111-12.
4. Cf. Leon Trotsky: *My Life* (Scribner's, 1930), pp. 270-86.

2. THE VISION

5. V. Adoratsky (ed.): *Karl Marx—Selected Works* (Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow), Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1935, Vol. I, pp. 16-18. Among the biographies of Marx, cf. Franz Mehring: *Karl Marx* (Covici-Friede, 1935) and Otto Rühle: *Karl Marx* (Viking, 1929). Cf. also Oscar Mayer: *Friedrich Engels* (Knopf, 1936).
6. Written by Lenin in 1914, quoted from *Karl Marx—Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 23.

3. THE GOSPEL

7. Cf. Harold D. Lasswell: *Psychopathology and Politics* (U. of Chicago Press, 1930), and *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (McGraw-Hill, 1935).

8. For a further discussion of this point, cf. Arthur Rosenberg: *Democracy and Socialism* (Knopf, 1939) and Part II of Edmund Wilson: *To the Finland Station* (Harcourt, Brace, 1940). Cf. also the present writer's "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered" in *The Southern Review*, Autumn, 1937, pp. 326-38.
9. Sir John Maynard: *The Russian Peasant and Other Studies* (Victor Gollancz, London, 1942), pp. 452-3.
10. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Freudian conception of personality is also dialectical. Cf. Vernon Venable: *Human Nature: The Marxian View* (Knopf, 1945).
11. Cf. Goetz Briefs: *The Proletariat* (McGraw-Hill, 1937); J. E. Le Rossignol: *From Marx to Stalin* (Crowell, 1940), especially Chapters 18 and 19; and F. L. Schuman: *The Nazi Dictatorship* (Knopf, 1935).

II · RED OCTOBER

I. THE APOSTLES

1. Letter to Friedrich Sorge, Sept. 27, 1877, p. 669 of Vol. II, *Karl Marx—Selected Works*, Moscow, 1936.
2. "On Social Conditions in Russia," by Friedrich Engels, *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 669-85.
3. Drafts of letters to Vera Zasulich, 1881, cited in Edmund Wilson: *To the Finland Station*, pp. 350-1.
4. Sir John Maynard: *Russia in Flux* (Victor Gollancz, London, 1941), p. 193. This volume is an admirable survey of the intellectual ferment in pre-revolutionary Russia.
5. *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin* (International Publishers), Vol. IV, *The Iskra Period*, 1900-1902, Book II, "What Is To Be Done?", pp. 159-60, 161, 162, 164.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-8, 194.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 198, 212.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
9. Officially sponsored accounts of the history of the Party available in English, all issued by International Publishers, include: *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, 1939, edited by a Commission of, and authorized by, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B); N. Popov: *Outline History of the CPSU*, 2 vols. (an older official history, since "revised"); N. K. Krupskaya: *Memories of Lenin*, 2 vols.; and Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute: *Vladimir Lenin—A Political Biography* (1943).

2. THE CONSPIRATORS

10. *The Letters of Lenin*, translated and edited by Elizabeth Hill and Doris Mudie (Harcourt, Brace, 1937), pp. 248-9.
11. Precisely who plotted what with whom in connection with the Tiflis incident is still far from clear. There is no mention of the matter in the official *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (International Publishers, 1939). Fuller, but not consistent, accounts of these events are set forth in Arthur Upham Pope: *Maxim Litvinoff* (Fischer, 1943), pp. 84-97, and Boris Souvarine: *Stalin—A Critical Survey of Bolshevism* (Alliance, Longmans, Green, 1939), pp. 83-106. The latter work, which unfortunately contains no documentation in its English translation from the French original, is less a biography than an indictment which is at once anti-Stalinist and anti-Trotskyite. It is based upon a wholly erroneous analysis of political and social dynamics in the USSR as shown, for example, in the last two chapters which, read in the perspective of 1946, are absurd. The data in the earlier chapters, however, appear to be partially reliable.
12. Cf. English edition, *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. XIII (International Publishers, 1927). In 1914-15 Lenin compiled excerpts from Hegel, Feuerbach, Aristotle

et al., which were later published, with his commentaries, as *Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks*.

13. Leon Trotsky: *My Life*, p. 162.
14. *Letters of Lenin*, p. 214.
15. "Our Political Tasks," by Leon Trotsky, quoted in Souvarine: *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5.
16. *My Life*, pp. 184-5.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
18. *History of the CPSU (B)*, p. 136.
19. Both quoted in Souvarine: *op. cit.*, pp. 131-2.
20. *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. XVIII, *The Imperialist War* (International Publishers, 1930), pp. 84-9.
21. F. Borkenau: *World Communism—A History of the Communist International* (Nor-ton, 1939), p. 57.
22. Cf. the extremely valuable and fully documented account, replete with a chronology, a 40-page annotated bibliography in many languages, and biographical sketches of most of the leading participants, in Olga H. Gankin and H. H. Fisher: *The Bolsheviks and the World War—The Origin of the Third International* (The Hoover Library, Stanford U. Press, 1940), 856 pp. Cf. also the useful notes, documents and chronologies in the *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, edited by Alexander Trachtenberg, Vols. XVIII and XIX (International Publishers, 1930, 1931).
23. *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 39, March 3, 1915.
24. *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1915; *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 478-80.
25. *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 2, Dec., 1916, in Gankin and Fisher: *op. cit.*, pp. 493-500.
26. Letter of Feb. 17, 1917 to A. M. Kollontai, *Letters of Lenin*, p. 410.
27. This early statement of "Socialism in One Country" is implied, rather than stated, in Lenin's *Imperialism*, 1916. The actual quotation is from an article of Aug. 23, 1915, "The United States of Europe Slogan." Cf. *Selected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. V, 1914-1917 (International Publishers), pp. 138-41.

3. "ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!"

28. Cf. The extensive bibliography of works in Russian in William Henry Chamberlin: *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (MacMillan, 1935), 2 vols.
29. *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. XX, *The Revolution of 1917*, Book I, pp. 93-157.
30. For full text, cf. *ibid.*, Book II, pp. 396-412.
31. *Ibid.*, Book I, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," pp. 154-7. Cf. also pp. 325-43 of the same volume.

4. PEACE, LAND AND BREAD

32. On the relations of the new Russia and the Western Allies during 1917, cf. F. L. Schuman: *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917* (International Publishers, 1928), pp. 30-54; C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit (eds.): *Russian-American Relations, March, 1917—March, 1920, Documents and Papers* (Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920, for the League of Free Nations Association), pp. 1-40; and U. S. Department of State: *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russian Series.
33. Full text of resolution and manifesto in *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. XXI, *Toward the Seizure of Power*, Book II, pp. 301-17.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-247.

5. INSURRECTION

35. Cf. John Reed: *Ten Days That Shook the World* (International Publishers, 1926, with an introduction by Lenin; also Boni & Liveright, 1919, and The Modern Library);

- William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (MacMillan, 1935), Vol. I, pp. 277-334; and Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (trans. by Max Eastman), (Simon & Schuster, 1937), Vol. III, *passim* and especially the brilliant chapters on "The Art of Insurrection," pp. 167-99 and "The October Insurrection," pp. 276-301.
36. Leon Trotsky, *My Life*, pp. 337-8.

III • BEFORE OCTOBER

I. RIVER AND STEPPE

1. Cf. Nikolai Mikhailov: *Soviet Geography* (Methuen, London, 1935) and *Land of the Soviets* (Lee Furman, 1939); George B. Cressey: *Asia's Lands and Peoples* (McGraw-Hill, 1944) and *The Basis of Soviet Strength* (McGraw-Hill, 1945); George Goodall (ed.): *Soviet Russia in Maps* (George Philip & Son, Ltd., 1943, Denoyer-Geppert, Chicago); Ales Hrdlicka: *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 1942); Anna Louise Strong: *Peoples of the USSR* (MacMillan, 1944); David Tutaeff: *The Soviet Caucasus* (Harrop, London, 1942); William Mandel: *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia* (Institute of Pacific Relations and Dial, 1944) and *The Union of Soviet Republics* (Dial, 1946); John Stuart Martin (ed.): *A Picture History of Russia* (Crown, 1945).

2. THE VIKINGS AT KIEV

2. On the period before the Kiev State, cf. George Vernadsky: *Ancient Russia* (Yale U. Press, New Haven, 1943). Cf. also Emily Grace Kazakevich, "The Study of Ancient History in the Soviet Union," *The American Review on the Soviet Union* (Feb., 1945), pp. 39-58. For a short sketch of Russian history, cf. Nikolai Mikhailov: *The Russian Story* (Sheridan House, 1945).
3. *Ancient Russia*, p. 273.

3. THE GHOST OF JENGHIS KHAN

4. For a lively biography, cf. Harold Lamb: *Genghis Khan, The Emperor of All Men* (McBride, 1928).

4. GREAT MUSCOVY

5. The most famous Russian history is Vasily O. Klyuchevsky: *Course of Russian History*, 5 vols., Moscow, 1904-21, issued in 3 vols. by J. M. Dent and Sons, London and E. P. Dutton & Co., 1911 ff., in an abridged and inadequate translation. Klyuchevsky neglects foreign affairs and the Mongol conquest and concentrates on economic and social developments. The best general one-volume surveys are Sir Bernard Pares: *A History of Russia* (Knopf, 4th ed., 1944), including a bibliography of sources in Russian and other languages; George Vernadsky: *A History of Russia* (New Home Library, 2nd ed., 1944); and B. H. Sumner: *A Short History of Russia* (Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943), organized in terms of Frontier, State, Land, Church, Slavs, Sea, and West, with Bibliography. Cf. also Stephen Graham: *Ivan the Terrible* (Yale U. Press, 1933); Oscar Halecki: *A History of Poland* (Roy, 1943); Helen Pratt: *Russia: from Czarist Empire to Socialism* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1937); and G. R. Treviranus: *Revolutions in Russia* (Harper, 1944). One of the most valuable studies of economic and social life under the Romanovs is Geroid Tanquary Robinson: *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime* (Longmans, 1932).
6. Sir Bernard Pares: *op. cit.*, p. 113.
7. Quoted by B. H. Sumner: *op. cit.*, p. 184. Perhaps the best brief account of the development of the Russian Church is Paul Miliukov: *Religion and the Church*, Part I of *Outlines of Russian Culture*, ed. by Michael Karpovich (U. of Pa. Press, 1943).

5. THE TWILIGHT OF THE TSARDOM

8. Cf. Leon Trotsky: *History of the Russian Revolution*, Vol. I, pp. 52-63. For a detailed account of the last months, cf. Sir Bernard Pares: *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy* (Knopf, 1939).

IV · THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

I. PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

1. Cf. pp. 184-231 of *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (Hoover War Library Publication, No. 3), by James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher (Stanford U. Press, 1934).
2. *Izvestia*, Jan. 20, 1918. A full account of the Constituent Assembly is given in Bunyan and Fisher: *op. cit.*, p. 338-99.

2. PRUSSIAN DIKTAT

3. Cf. Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute: *Vladimir I. Lenin: A Political Biography* (International Publishers, 1943), pp. 197ff. Cf. also Vol. XXIII (1918-1919) of *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, issued in 1945 by International Publishers, ed. by Alexander Trachtenberg.
4. On the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, cf. the stenographic record, ed. by A. A. Joffe with an introduction by Trotsky, *The Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference* (Moscow, 1920); Judah L. Magnes: *Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk* (New York, 1919); Bunyan and Fisher: *op. cit.*, pp. 232-75 and 476-540; Louis Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs* (Cape & Smith, 1930), Vol. I, pp. 15-78; W. H. Chamberlin: *The Russian Revolution*, Vol. I, pp. 389-427; John W. Wheeler-Bennett: *The Forgotten Peace* (Morrow, 1939); and *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, I, *passim*.
5. P. 798, Verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, *Report of Court Proceedings in the case of the ANTI-SOVIET "BLOC OF RIGHTS AND TROTSKYITES"*, March 2-13, 1938 (People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Moscow, 1938).
6. *My Life*, pp. 383-90.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 383.
8. Bunyan and Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 531.
9. Sir George Buchanan: *My Mission to Russia* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1923), II, pp. 225ff.
10. William Hard: *Raymond Robins' Own Story* (Harper, 1920), p. 123.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-3. The final vote was 261 against, and 784 for. In his autobiography, Trotsky does not discuss this episode but refers to similar discussions of possible Allied aid with the French Ambassador Noulens in the event of the rejection of the treaty. Cf. also G. Chicherin: *Two Years of Foreign Policy* (The Russian Soviet Government Bureau, New York, 1920); Alfred L. P. Dennis: *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia* (Dutton, 1924); Leon Trotsky: *From October to Brest-Litovsk* (The Socialist Publication Society, New York, 1919); and David R. Francis: *Russia from the American Embassy* (Scribner's, 1921).

3. WHITE ATTACK

12. *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, II, pp. 67-8.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 609-15. The Anglo-French agreement dividing southern Russia into British and French zones was signed by Lord Milner and Clemenceau in Paris on December 23, 1917. Its text is reproduced in Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 836. Cf. also Bunyan and Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-8.

14. Cf. Supplementary German-Soviet Treaty of August 27, 1918, in *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, I, p. 605 and Chicherin's Report to the Seventh Congress of Soviets, Nov. 6, 1919, *Izvestia*, Nov. 6, 1919, p. 2, reproduced in part in James Bunyan: *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, April-December, 1918* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1936), pp. 127-31.
15. Bukharin's role as the secret villain in the attempt on Lenin is depicted in the remarkable Soviet film, "Lenin in 1918." Cf. The Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute: *V. I. Lenin: A Political Biography*, p. 213: "As subsequently proved at the trials of the Right-Trotskyite enemies of the people, Trotsky, Bukharin and their hangers-on, took part in this villainous attempt on Lenin's life." Fania Kaplan-Roid received the gun intended to kill Lenin from the notorious SR terrorist, Boris Savinkov, who worked for years against the Soviets in cooperation with the British spy, Captain Sidney George Reilly, to whom Savinkov was introduced by Winston Churchill. In trying to carry out a new plot, Savinkov crossed the Soviet border and was trapped and arrested in August, 1924. He was tried in Moscow and condemned to death, but because of his full confession and his professed desire to work for the Soviets the sentence was commuted to ten years' imprisonment. He committed suicide in jail in the spring of 1925. For the details of the conspiracy and the fantastic life and death of Reilly, cf. Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn: *The Great Conspiracy* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1945).
16. *V. I. Lenin: A Political Biography*, p. 210.
17. Text of resolution in *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, II, pp. 245-6.
18. Text of communication in *ibid.*, pp. 288-9.
19. Text in F. L. Schuman: *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, pp. 340-1, cf. also pp. 92-106. This announcement differed in a number of important respects from the secret communication to the Allies of July 17 (*U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, II, pp. 288-9). The differences reflect little credit on the wisdom, candor or honesty of the President, the Secretary of State and their advisors who approved the decision.
20. David R. Francis: *Russia from the American Embassy*, pp. 269-70.
21. William S. Graves: *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920* (Cape & Smith, 1931).
22. W. H. Chamberlin: *The Russian Revolution*, II, p. 263.
23. Cf. Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz (later chief editor of NYT): "A Test of the News," *The New Republic*, Vol. 23, Part II, 43 pp. This exposé played its part in the decision of the Times to send Walter Duranty to Moscow, where he filed the first news dispatches to the American press which bore more than a purely coincidental resemblance to Soviet realities.
24. Winston Churchill: *The World Crisis: The Aftermath* (Butterworth, London, 1929), pp. 246, 250.

4. RED DEFENSE

25. Cf. *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, I, pp. 683-715.
26. *My Life*, p. 411.
27. *Bednota*, Aug. 8, 1919, quoted in W. H. Chamberlin: *op. cit.*, II, pp. 270-1.
28. *Ibid.*, II, p. 34, quoting Leon Trotsky: *How the Revolution Armed Itself*, Vol. II, Book II, p. 7. Cf. also Leon Trotsky: *My Life*, pp. 395-461.
29. *My Life*, p. 446.
30. Sergei N. Kournakoff: *Russia's Fighting Forces* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1942), p. 52.
31. On the military aspects of the civil war and intervention, cf. W. H. Chamberlin: *op. cit.*, II, containing an extensive bibliography of Russian sources; George Stewart: *The White Armies of Russia* (MacMillan, 1933); Leonid I. Strakhovsky: *Intervention at Archangel* (Princeton U. Press, 1944); D. Fedotoff-White: *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton U. Press, 1944); J. Hodgson: *With Denikin's Armies* (Lin-

- coln Williams, London, 1932); Boris Savinkov: *Memoirs of a Terrorist* (Boni, 1931). On the political and economic developments of the period, cf. R. H. Bruce Lockhart: *British Agent* (Putnam, 1933); *The Bullitt Mission to Russia* (Huebsch, 1919); James Bunyan: *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, April-December, 1918*; H. H. Fisher and Elena Varneck (eds.): *The Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials*, Hoover War Library (Stanford U. Press); Louis Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs*, I, pp. 79-279.
32. Ralph Albertson: *Fighting Without a War* (Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920), pp. 71-3.
 33. Boris Sokolov, "The Fall of the Northern Territory," in *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii*, IX, quoted in W. H. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, II, p. 403.

5. SECURITY BY SUPREMACY

34. U. S. Department of State: *Recognition of Russia* (Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 68th Congress, 1924), p. 207.
35. William Hard: *Raymond Robins' Own Story*, pp. 84-8.
36. N. Bukharin and E. Preobrashensky: *A.B.C. of Communism* (1921), pp. 120-1.
37. Cf. R. W. Postgate: *The Bolshevik Theory* (1920), containing the text of the new Communist Manifesto in the Appendix.
38. *Village Commune*, July 18, 1920, quoted in U. S. Department of State: *The Second Congress of the Communist International* (1920), pp. 111-12.

6. PEACE BY DEFEAT

39. On the Martens episode, cf. Louis F. Post: *The Deportations Delirium of 1920* (Kerr, Chicago, 1923); Charles Recht (Martens's attorney): *In the Matter of Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, an Alleged Alien* (1920); New York Legislature Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities: *Revolutionary Radicalism*, II, pp. 1836-41 and files of the magazine, *Soviet Russia*, 1919-1921.
40. W. H. Chamberlin: *op. cit.*, II, p. 301.
41. *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1920, Vol. III.
42. Text in F. L. Schuman: *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, pp. 345-9; also in International Conciliation Pamphlets, Oct., 1920, No. 155 and *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1920.

V · THE DYNAMICS OF BOLSHEVISM

I. THE LEGACY OF LENIN

1. Quoted from Gorky by Edmund Wilson: *To the Finland Station*, p. 386.
2. *V. I. Lenin: A Political Biography*, p. 234.
3. On Soviet economic development under the NEP, cf. Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn and Rexford Guy Tugwell: *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade* (Day, 1928); Maurice Dobb: *Russian Economic Development Since the Revolution* (Rutledge, London, 1929); Maurice Hindus: *Humanity Uprooted* (Cape & Smith, 1929); Anna Rochester: *Lenin on the Agrarian Question* (International Publishers, 1942); and Simon Liberman: *Building Lenin's Russia* (U. of Chicago Press, 1945).
4. Cf. chart on p. 36 of 68th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 50, *Recognition of Russia*, 1924.
5. Quoted by W. P. and Zelda K. Coates: *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations* (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1943), p. 26. This admirably detailed and documented volume, unfortunately not yet published in the United States, is very close to a definitive history of Anglo-Soviet relations from 1921 to 1942.

6. For details, cf. Coates: *op. cit.*, pp. 71-102; F. L. Schuman: *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, pp. 207-23; Louis Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs*, I, pp. 300-54; Raymond L. Buell: *The Washington Conference* (Appleton, 1922); Alfred L. P. Dennis: *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia* (Dutton, 1924); Henry K. Norton: *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1923); and J. Saxon Mills: *The Genoa Conference* (Hutchinson, London, 1922).
7. V. I. Lenin: *A Political Biography*, p. 202.
8. Quoted by D. S. Mirsky: *Lenin* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1931), pp. 185-7.
9. V. I. Lenin: *A Political Biography*, p. 269.
10. Sir John Maynard: *The Russian Peasant*, p. 12.
11. V. I. Lenin: *A Political Biography*, pp. 276-7.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 278-9.
13. For example, Arthur Upham Pope: *Maxim Litvinoff*, p. 498.

2. THE LEADERSHIP OF STALIN

14. *My Life*, p. 498.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 509.
17. For a discussion of these two personality types, cf. Chapters VI, VII and VIII of *Psychopathology and Politics* by Harold D. Lasswell (U. of Chicago Press, 1930).
18. *My Life*, pp. 531-2.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 558-62.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 562.
21. Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute: *Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1943), p. 53.

3. THE SECOND REVOLUTION

22. Cf. Stanislas Strumilin: "The 75th Anniversary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin," in IBEW, April 22, 1945.
23. On the technique of Soviet economic planning, cf. Abram Bergson: *The Structure of Soviet Wages* (Harvard U. Press, 1944); Gregory Bienstock, S. Schwarz and M. Yugow: *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture* (Oxford, 1944); Maurice Dobb: *Soviet Planning and Labor in Peace and War* (International Publishers, 1943); Leonard E. Hubbard: *Soviet Labor and Industry, Soviet Trade and Distribution, Soviet Money and Finance* (MacMillan, London, 1942, 1938, 1936); V. V. Kuibyshev: *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five Year Plan* (Gosplan, Moscow, 1933); and J. Stalin, V. Molotov, L. Kaganovich, et al: *From the First to the Second Five Year Plan* (International Publishers, 1933). On the impact of the Plans on the Soviet People, cf. Maurice Hindus: *Red Bread and The Great Offensive* (Smith & Hass, 1933); Walter Duranty: *Duranty Reports Russia* (Viking, 1934) and *I Write as I Please* (Simon & Schuster, 1936); Louis Fischer: *Men and Politics* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1941); Markoosha Fischer: *My Lives in Russia* (Harper, 1944); and John Scott: *Behind the Urals* (Houghton Mifflin, 1942). Cf. also Maurice Parmelee: *Bolshevism, Fascism and the Liberal-Democratic State* (Wiley, 1934).
24. Lenin: *Selected Works* (in Russian), Vol. IX, p. 151, quoted in *History of the CPSU (B)*, p. 287.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
26. Text in Joseph Stalin: *Leninism: Selected Writings* (International Publishers, 1942), pp. 165-8.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 169-74; cf. also Stalin's "Reply to Collective Farm Comrades," pp. 175-93, from *Pravda*, No. 92, April, 1930.
28. Cf. Walter Duranty: *USSR* (Lippincott, 1944), pp. 188-99.

29. Bukharin's statement is quoted by Eugene Lyons in his *Stalin: Czar of All the Russias* (Lippincott, 1940), not for what it is—i.e., evidence of the early disposition of the Right deviationists and Trotskyites to make common cause against the Party leadership and of their complete misunderstanding of what was going on about them—but as evidence of Stalin's alleged cruelty and craftiness and of the hatred and fear which he inspired among allegedly "faithful" Bolsheviks. To what they were faithful, Mr. Lyons does not make clear.

4. SECURITY BY BALANCE

30. In addition to the works of Fischer, Coates, Pope and Dennis, cf. Victor A. Yakhontoff: *USSR Foreign Policy* (Coward McCann, 1945).
31. Cf. W. P. and Zelda K. Coates: *op. cit.*, pp. 153-402.
32. Cf. F. L. Schuman: *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, pp. 230-338.
33. Cf. F. L. Schuman: *Europe on the Eve* (Knopf, 1939), pp. 28-54 and Arthur Upham Pope: *Maxim Litvinoff* (Fischer, 1943), pp. 223-55.
34. League of Nations: *Treaty Series*, Vol. LIII, 1926, pp. 392-6.

VI · THE SHADOW OF FASCISM

I. BETWEEN HIROHITO AND HITLER

1. Note of March 7, 1933, *Soviet Union Review*, 1933, p. 34.
2. Harriet Moore: *A Record of Soviet Far Eastern Relations, 1931-1942* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), p. 29. Cf. also her *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945* (Princeton U. Press, 1945).
3. P. 305 of *Litvinoff* by Arthur Upham Pope. Cf. pp. 288-312 for a lively and detailed account of the mission. Cf. also Foster Rhea Dulles: *The Road to Teheran* (Princeton U. Press, 1944), pp. 188-203.
4. Cf. p. 27 of *Europe on the Eve*.

2. SECURITY BY COALITION

5. For detailed diplomatic history of these years, see the present writer's *Europe on the Eve: The Crises of Diplomacy, 1933-1939* (Knopf, 1939) and *Night Over Europe: The Diplomacy of Nemesis, 1939-1940* (Knopf, 1941). For a brief popular treatment of the foreign policies of the Powers, cf. F. L. Schuman and George D. Brodsky: *Design for Power: The Struggle for the World* (Knopf, 1942), illustrated with maps.
6. Maxim Litvinov: *Against Aggression* (International Publishers, 1939), pp. 76ff.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 105ff.

3. THE YEARS OF FEAR

8. P. 580 of *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the ANTI-SOVIET TROTSKYITE CENTER*, Verbatim Report (People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Moscow, 1937); cf. also *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the ANTI-SOVIET "BLOC OF RIGHTS AND TROTSKYITES"*, Verbatim Report, *ibid.*, 1938.
9. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937, Vol. I, pp. 11-22 (Oxford U. Press, 1938).
10. Among the voluminous literature devoted to the exposition of this version of the purge, cf. *The Case of Leon Trotsky* (Harper, 1937), a 600-page transcript of the hearings held at Cayoacan, Mexico, April 10-17, 1937 by the "Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky," consisting of John Dewey (Chairman), Otto Ruehle, Benjamin Stolberg, Suzanne LaFollette (Sec'y.), and Carleton Beals, who resigned in protest during the proceedings. Cf. also Leon Trotsky, "I Stake My Life!" (Pioneer Publishers, 1937), an address read to a mass meeting in

the New York Hippodrome, Feb. 9, 1937 and Max Schachtman: *Behind the Moscow Trial: The Greatest Frame-up in History* (Pioneer Publishers, 1936). Some of the issues involved are discussed in *The Southern Review*, Summer, 1937 by the present writer, whose interpretations are for the most part endorsed by Carleton Beals and Malcolm Cowley and hotly denounced by Max Eastman and James T. Farrell. The invectives of these gentlemen are continued in the Autumn, 1937 issue and supplemented by Sidney Hook who, as an ex-radical now committed to his own special brand of "liberalism," specializes in damning as "Communists" many of those whom he once regarded as "liberals."

11. Arthur Koestler's novel, *Darkness At Noon* (MacMillan, 1941) ably depicts some aspects of the psychology of the accused, though it presupposes the "frame-up" theory of the trials and is less revealing of motives than the actual testimony of Bukharin, Radek, Pyatakov and others before the Court. Cf. Joseph E. Davies: *Mission to Moscow* (Simon & Schuster, 1941), pp. 39-52. For a vivid and detailed account, based on an analysis of the trial records, cf. Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn: *The Great Conspiracy* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1945).
12. *My Life*, p. 562.
13. "An Open Letter to the CEC of the USSR," printed abroad in the "Bulletin of the Russian Opposition" and in various Trotskyite papers, quoted in Schachtman, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
14. *The Defense of Terrorism* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1921), p. 60.
15. *History of the CPSU (B)*, p. 328.

4. GRAND ALLIANCE AND PEOPLE'S FRONT

16. Cf. W. P. and Zelda K. Coates: *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, pp. 532-44.
17. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 167, pp. 404ff, No. 3881; text reproduced in *Europe on the Eve*, pp. 561-5.
18. Cf. Georgi Dimitroff: *The United Front: The Struggle Against Fascism and War* (International Publishers, 1938).

5. THE GREAT BETRAYAL

19. For a detailed summation of the evidence regarding the motives of the Anglo-French appeasers, cf. *Europe on the Eve* and *Night Over Europe* by the present writer, who predicted the Peace of Munich in *The New Republic* of April 20, 1938 ("The Perfidy of Albion").

VII • THE SOVIET STATE

I. UNITED REPUBLICS

1. Quoted by Boris Souvarine, *Stalin*, pp. 54-5.
2. Text in Walter R. Batsell: *Soviet Rule in Russia* (MacMillan, 1929), pp. 303-20. Cf. also Chapters V & VI. This work, despite its somewhat pedantic character and occasional quibbling, is still a valuable commentary on Soviet Government in the 1920's. It contains translations of many documents, including various Constitutions of Union Republics and Autonomous Republics. An urbane, suggestive, albeit not always critical discussion of the same problems will be found in Chapters I, II, V and VI of *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (Scribner's, 1936) by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Cf. also Bertram W. Maxwell: *The Soviet State* (Steves & Wayburn, Topeka, Kansas), 1934; Samuel N. Harper: *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* (U. of Chicago Press, 1929), *Making Bolsheviki*, *ibid.*, 1931 and *The Government of the Soviet Union* (Van Nostrand, 1938).

2. THE STALIN CONSTITUTION

3. Joseph Stalin: *Leninism: Selected Writings* (International Publishers, 1942), pp. 379-405.
4. P. 855 of *Governments of Continental Europe* (MacMillan, 1940), ed. by James T. Shotwell. This section was also published as a separate book under the title of *Toward an Understanding of the USSR* (MacMillan, 1939). This work, while useful for factual data, is unfortunately distinguished, particularly in its treatment of the economic and social aspects of the Soviet community, by qualities which belie the promise of its title.

3. THE WAY OF FEDERALISM

5. Cf. the Collection of his articles and speeches in Joseph Stalin: *Marxism and the National Question* (International Publishers, 1942).
6. For accounts of the practical operation of Soviet nationality policy, cf. Anna Louise Strong: *Peoples of the USSR* (MacMillan, 1944); Hans Kohn: *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (Columbia U. Press, 1933); R. A. Davies and A. J. Steiger: *Soviet Asia: Democracy's First Line of Defense* (Dial, 1942); Joshua Kunitz: *Dawn over Samarcand* (Covici-Friede, 1935); and Carol Jacobson: "The Jews in the USSR," and Marjorie White: "The Uzbek Republic," both in *The American Review on the Soviet Union*, August, 1945.
7. Adapted from Corlis Lamont: "Union Republics and Subdivisions," *Soviet Russia Today*, July, 1944, pp. 26-7, where the predominant ethnic strain, the principal nationalities in percentages, and the location of each district are also indicated. The estimates of population are for July 1, 1941.
8. Cf. "The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers" by the present writer in *The American Political Science Review*, Feb., 1945.
9. Vyshinsky's *Soviet State Law* is available only in Russian at the time of writing, but is being translated into English by the American Council of Learned Societies.
10. John A. Morrison: "The Evolution of the Territorial-Administrative Systems of the USSR," *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, Oct., 1938, pp. 25-46, with maps.

4. THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

11. Cf. A. Y. Vyshinsky: *Soviet State Law* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1938), pp. 275-8 and, for a review of the earlier Soviet law of citizenship, T. A. Taracouzio: *The Soviet Union and International Law* (MacMillan, 1935), pp. 80-163.
12. Cf. Rose Somerville: "The New Soviet Elections," *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, Oct., 1938, pp. 59-79. This article contains much illuminating material not readily available elsewhere on Soviet election practices.
13. On Soviet election laws and procedure, cf. A. Y. Vyshinsky: *op. cit.*, pp. 595-644, from which many of the details and figures in the text have been taken.
14. Cf. *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, Dec. 1-12, 1937.
15. Cf. A. Y. Vyshinsky: *op. cit.*, pp. 326-32.
16. Sir John Maynard: *The Russian Peasant and Other Studies* (Gollancz, London, 1942), p. 453.

5. HOW MANY FREEDOMS?

17. Quoted by Prof. A. Trainin in *Izvestia*, Dec. 8, 1936.
18. The available literature in English on religion in the USSR is voluminous. Among the more useful contributions are Paul B. Anderson: *People, Church and State in Modern Russia* (MacMillan, 1944); N. S. Timasheff: *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1942* (Sheed & Ward, 1942); Matthew Spinka: *The Church and the Russian Revolution* (MacMillan, 1927); William H. Melish: "Religious Developments in the Soviet

- Union," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1944, pp. 279-86; and N. S. Timasheff: "Religion in Russia," *Current History*, Feb., 1945, pp. 105-10.
19. Among the more suggestive treatments in English of Soviet arts and sciences are Nicolas Slonimsky: "Dimitri Shostakovich," *Musical Quarterly*, Oct., 1942, pp. 415-43; Hans Blumenfeld: "Architecture and City Planning in Soviet Russia," *Task*, Oct., 1942 and "Soviet City Planning," *The American Review on the Soviet Union*, Nov., 1944; A. F. Joffe: *Development of the Exact Sciences in the USSR*, American-Russian Institute; Kurt London: *The Seven Soviet Arts* (Yale U. Press, 1938); and John Somerville: "Soviet Science and Dialectical Materialism," *Philosophy of Science*, Jan., 1945, pp. 23-9.
 20. Cf. Vladimir D. Kazakevich, "Social Sciences in the Soviet Union," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1944, pp. 312-18.
 21. Cf. "The Soviet Budget for 1945," in *IBEW*, May 22, 1945.
 22. Figures from Dr. Henry E. Sigerist: "The Organization of Soviet Medicine," *Soviet Culture in Wartime* (American-Russian Institute of San Francisco, 1944), pp. 24-9; cf. also the bi-monthly *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, ed. by Dr. Sigerist, and his book, *Socialized Medicine in the Soviet Union* (Norton, 1937) as well as Rose Maurer: *Soviet Health Care in Peace and War* (American-Russian Institute of New York, 1943) and Dr. Horsley W. Gantt: *Russian Medicine* (Hoeber, 1937).
 23. Cf. Eugene Medynsky: "Schools and Education in the USSR," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1944, pp. 287-95; Beatrice King, "New Trends in Soviet Education," *Soviet Culture in Wartime*, pp. 9-12; and *Changing Man* (Viking, 1937).
 24. English text of decree of July 8, 1944 in *The American Review on the Soviet Union* (quarterly publication of the American-Russian Institute of New York), Nov., 1944, pp. 69-76.
 25. Cf. Rose Maurer: "Recent Trends in the Soviet Family," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1944, pp. 242-9 and Fannina Halle, *Women in the Soviet East* (Dutton, 1938).
 26. The structural and procedural details of Soviet justice cannot be discussed within the confines of the present work, although they are all too little known to Anglo-Americans. For readers of Russian, much relevant material will be found in A. Y. Vyshinsky: *Soviet State Law* (Moscow, 1938). John N. Hazard is the outstanding American authority on Soviet jurisprudence. Among his numerous articles, cf. *The Lawyer's Guild Review*, No. 6, 1943, pp. 1-16; *Columbia Law Review*, Dec. 1936, pp. 1236-66; and *American Sociological Review*, June, 1944, pp. 250-6. Cf. also his book, *Soviet Housing Law* (Yale U. Press, 1940). The most complete survey of the Soviet court system and legal procedure, valuable alike for its analyses of Soviet legislation and descriptions of actual cases, is *Law and Jurisprudence in the Soviet State* by J. Maurice Richman, a doctoral dissertation at Fordham University, 1937, unfortunately not published as yet in book form. For useful insights, cf. also Charles Prince: "Legal and Economic Factors Affecting Soviet Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Aug. and Oct., 1944 and Mary S. Calcott, *Russian Justice* (MacMillan, 1935).
 27. *U. S. War Aims* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1944), pp. 145-54.
 28. Quoted by Sir John Maynard: *The Russian Peasants and Other Studies*, p. 207. Cf. also Maynard's suggestive evaluation of the problem of freedom, pp. 466-7 and Maurice Hindus: *Humanity Uprooted* (Cape & Smith, 1929) and *The Great Offensive* (Smith & Haas, 1933).

VIII • THE BALANCING OF POWER

I. CONGRESS XVIII

1. The full text of speeches, reports and resolutions are available in English in *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, 488 pp. (Foreign Languages Publishing House,

Moscow, 1939). This volume merits careful study as a comprehensive public review of Party, Government, defense, industry, agriculture and foreign policy on the eve of World War II.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 64, and 95-6.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-97.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 447-84; Zhdanov's exposition, pp. 173-234.
5. All names listed in *ibid.*, pp. 484-7.
6. Thumb-nail sketches of some of these leaders are to be found in Edgar Snow: *The Pattern of Soviet Power* (Random House, 1945), pp. 167-81. The data in the text, however, are taken primarily from the *Soviet Desk Calendar*, published annually by the State Publishing House, Moscow (in Russian).
7. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 3-6.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-71.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 4, 5, 153, 156.
10. In the United States the most widely-read work on Soviet diplomacy in recent years has been David J. Dallin: *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942* (Trans. by Leon Dennen, Yale U. Press, 1942), hailed by William Henry Chamberlin, Eugene Lyons, Max Eastman and others as "scholarly," "authoritative," "impartial" etc. This work of 452 pp. not only fails to quote Stalin's speech of March 10 (aside from six words on p. xv, unidentified as to source) but neglects even to mention this most important single public statement of Soviet foreign policy during the period covered by the book. Dallin is actually David Yulievich Levin, originally a Right Menshevik and, during World War I, a Menshevik Internationalist. He became an émigré in 1921 and a businessman in Germany thereafter. In 1940-41 he lectured before various Russian groups in the United States and became a contributor to various anti-Soviet publications. In a full-page ad in *The Nation* (Sept. 29, 1945) and *The New Republic* (Oct. 1, 1945), the American "Socialist" Journal, *The New Leader*, calling itself "America's Leading Labor-Liberal Weekly," announced the appointment as Associate Editors of William Henry Chamberlin and David J. Dallin.
11. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 8-34. Stalin added, anent foreign comment on the purges: "In case of war, the rear and front of our army, by reason of their homogeneity and inherent unity, will be stronger than those of any other country, a fact which people beyond our borders who love military conflicts would do well to remember. Certain foreign pressmen have been talking drivel to the effect that the purging of the Soviet organizations of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin and other fiends has 'shaken' the Soviet system and caused its 'demoralization.' One can only laugh at such cheap drivel. How can the purging of Soviet organizations of noxious and hostile elements shake and demoralize the Soviet system? . . . To listen to these foreign drivellers one would think that if the spies, murderers and wreckers had been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without let or hindrance, the Soviet organizations would have been far sounder and stronger. . . . What, for instance, do the events at Lake Hassan show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet organizations?"

2. THE ALLIANCE THAT FAILED

12. A detailed and documented account of the diplomacy of 1939-1940 will be found in the present writer's *Night Over Europe* (Knopf, 1941), where ample evidence in support of the generalizations in this and the following chapter is available. The general character of David J. Dallin's *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942* is indicated by his treatment of the March crisis. Thus, p. 16: "Beginning with March 15 the diplomacy of the Western Powers, particularly of Great Britain, had made a sharp turn. . . . England made up her mind to guarantee the Polish borders against aggres-

sion . . ." In fact, March 15 was precisely the date on which Chamberlain reaffirmed the old policy. At no time whatever did the British government guarantee the borders of Poland. Again, p. 24: "On May 1 the entire hopelessness of the situation (in respect to Anglo-Soviet negotiations) became clear at once. Portugal, for instance, threatened to oppose England in case of an Anglo-Soviet military alliance. Spain now joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. There was some apprehension as to the reaction of the Vatican . . ." In fact, Spain signed the Anti-Comintern Pact on March 27, a decision announced by Berlin and Burgos on April 8, before the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were begun. British diplomacy was not in any degree influenced by "threats" from Portugal. Dallin's treatment of many other aspects of British, French and Soviet diplomacy is on a par with these statements in respect to accuracy, relevance and cogency. Cf. also T. A. Taracouzio: *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy* (MacMillan, 1940); John Scott: *Duel for Europe* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1942); Foster Rhea Dulles: *The Road to Teheran* (Princeton U. Press, 1944) and Henry C. Wolfe: *The Imperial Soviets* (Doubleday Doran, Garden City, 1940).

3. THE NAZI-SOVIET TRUCE

13. *The Diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano*, published posthumously, copyrighted by *The Chicago Daily News*, NYT, June 25, 1945.
14. For details of Bonnet's efforts at desertion, cf. *Night Over Europe*, pp. 353-76.
15. Full text in *ibid.*, pp. 366-8.
16. Dallin's account of the Nazi-Soviet pact (*op. cit.*, pp. 55-62) is misleading on three counts. (1) He alleges that "all previous pacts signed by Soviet Russia," unlike the Nazi-Soviet pact, contained an "escape clause" releasing each signatory from its obligation of neutrality in case of aggression against third States by the other. This is untrue. Many earlier non-aggression pacts contained no such clause. Obviously the new pact could contain none if Moscow knew that Berlin had already decided to attack Poland. The time of the Nazi decision, however, was unknown to Dallin when he wrote his book. (2) He alleges that in "all other agreements signed by Soviet Russia, without exception," the Narkomindel had made the accord binding only upon ratification and not upon signature, as in the pact of August 23. This is also untrue. Under Soviet law the only treaties requiring ratification as a condition of their execution are treaties of peace, of alliance and those affecting boundaries. All others, including neutrality and non-aggression pacts, go into effect upon signature. Cf. T. A. Taracouzio: *The Soviet Union and International Law* (MacMillan, 1935), pp. 241-6. (3) Dallin publishes, on the basis of pure rumor and conjecture, numbered articles of a "Secret Agreement" signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop for the partition of Poland and for Soviet control of the Baltic States. There is no documentary evidence whatever of any written "secret agreement." Had there been one, Ribbentrop would scarcely have gone to Moscow again at the end of September to fix demarcation lines. It is clear that there was an understanding that the USSR would not permit German conquest of all of Poland and that Berlin would acquiesce in Soviet control of Eastern Poland and the Baltic. But there is no indication that when the *Wehrmacht* invaded Poland on September 1, the Wilhelmstrasse and the Narkomindel had concluded any formal written compact for the partition of Poland. According to the formal indictment of the major Nazi war criminals (NYT, Oct. 19, 1945), the Nazi decision to invade Poland was reached on May 23, 1939, the day after the signature of the German-Italian alliance treaty.

4. THE WESTERN FRONTIERS

17. Jan Karski: *The Story of a Secret State* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1944), p. 7.^a
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-13.

19. Cf. Gregory Meiksins: *The Baltic Riddle* (Fischer, 1943) for a detailed account of Baltic developments from the point of view of a Latvian liberal and anti-Fascist who has no doubt but that the best interests of the Baltic peoples are to be served only through union with the USSR.
20. For details of these negotiations and their results, cf. *Night Over Europe*, pp. 387-96 and David J. Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-100.
21. Cf. Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-98; *Night Over Europe*, pp. 397-428; *The Finnish Blue and White Book*, Helsinki, 1939; *The USSR and Finland* (Soviet Russia Today, 1939); *Official Journal* of the League of Nations, Proceedings of the 20th Ordinary Assembly; *German White Book No. 6*, 1940; and H. B. Elliston: *Finland Fights* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1940).
22. Cf., however, "Was the Soviet Union Expelled from the League of Nations?" by Leo Gross, *The American Journal of International Law*, Jan., 1945.

5. FACING THE TRIPLICE

23. No precise figures on this trade seem to be available as yet. Estimates are to be found in John Scott: *Duel for Europe*, pp. 238ff. and in David J. Dallin: *op. cit.*, pp. 419-29.
24. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby had written on August 10, 1920: "The United States feels that friendship and honor require that Russia's interests must be generously protected, and that, as far as possible, all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance. By this feeling of friendship and honorable obligation to the great nation whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice contributed so much to the successful termination of the war, the Government of the United States was guided in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council on October 15, 1919, and in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia. . . . No final decision should or can be made without the consent of Russia. . . . The territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian State." Evan Young, U. S. Commissioner at Riga, reported July 23, 1920, exactly twenty years before Sumner Welles' statement, that "with an orderly, well-established government in Russia, the Baltic provinces will in time again become a part of what will probably be a federated Russia." On the larger problem of Soviet policy in the Baltic region, cf. *The Baltic Soviet Republics* (a condensation of Meiksins' book), with an introduction by the present writer, published by *Soviet Russia Today*, 1944, and John Scott, *Duel for Europe*, pp. 59-80.

IX · THE PATRIOTIC WAR

I. PRELUDE TO COMBAT

1. Moscow Radio, March 30, 1944, as recorded by the U. S. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, NYT, Apr. 1, 1944.
2. David J. Dallin concludes (*Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942*, p. 351) that "Relations between Russia and Japan during 1940-41, particularly so far as the neutrality pact was concerned, had not been to Soviet advantage. . . . All in all, Russia had not been a gainer by this policy." This judgment, in the opinion of the present writer, is wholly unwarranted. Any rift between Berlin and Tokyo was a gain to the USSR as well as to Britain and America. The pact was a clear expression of such a rift, despite vehement denials in Berlin and Tokyo and other denials, with tongue in cheek, in the Soviet press. When he wrote, Dallin of course could not know the full price which the Narkomindel had charged Tokyo.

2. AXIS ASSAULT

3. Cf. Waverly Root: *The Secret History of the War* (Scribner's, 1945), I, pp. 515ff. This highly interesting work is full of shrewd evaluations and useful "inside stories," but its value is largely vitiated by the fact that it is undocumented and makes no distinctions between established facts, hypotheses, rumors, and allegations from anonymous informers.
4. Sumner Welles: *The Time for Decision* (Harper, 1944), pp. 170-1.
5. Texts of communiqués from *Moscow News* in John Scott: *Duel for Europe*, pp. 341-6.
6. Max Werner: *The Great Offensive: The Strategy of Coalition Warfare* (Gollancz, London, 1943), p. 20. This work still remains the most illuminating analysis of the Russian military campaigns of 1941 and early 1942.
7. Cf. Sergei N. Kournakoff: *Russia's Fighting Forces* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1942), pp. 192ff and Max Werner; *op. cit.*, pp. 89ff. Despite the simple and obvious facts of the nature and power of the coalition which assaulted Russia in 1941, so well informed a writer as Ellsworth Huntington: *Mainsprings of Civilization* (Wiley, 1945), p. 410 can still say, absurdly, that "the Russians were (erroneously) acclaimed as more competent than the Germans, regardless of the fact that for years seventy million Germans fought Russia, held off Britain and the United States, and kept many subjugated countries under control." And Arthur Koestler can write, equally absurdly (*The Yogi and the Commissar*, p. 132), that "the population of Soviet Russia is more than twice that of Germany; her industrial potential in 1939 was, according to Soviet statistics, equal to Germany's. . . . *A priori*, there was no earthly reason why the Russians should be defeated by the Germans," etc. Again, Alexander Barmine: *One Who Survived* (Intro. by Max Eastman, Putnam, 1945), pp. 321-2: Stalin "had twice the population (that Hitler had). He had ten times the resources. He lacked no raw materials. . . . He was, as a matter of fact, in aviation and ammunition, just about equal, and in number of tanks and cannon superior," etc. According to Barmine, Tukhachevsky (who is one of his heroes) would have invaded Czechoslovakia and Germany in 1941. "This is not the place to prove this assertion, but it is obvious." These and other falsehoods in Barmine's book are exposed by the present writer in *Soviet Russia Today*, Aug. 1945: "The Resurrection of Dr. Goebbels: Reflections on Barmine's *Kampf* and the Science of the Lie."

3. THE RAMPARTS OF MOSCOW

8. Some of these developments are related, on the basis of information not generally available at the time, by Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley: *How War Came: An American White Paper from the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor* (Simon & Schuster, 1942).
9. Text in *Soviet War Documents*, June, 1941-Nov., 1943, Special Supplement to IBEW. This publication also contains other addresses, statements and Orders of the Day by Stalin, Molotov and the Extraordinary State Committee on Nazi Atrocities. Cf. also Joseph Stalin: *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (International Publishers, 1945).
10. On the organization, leadership and campaigns of the Red Army in World War II, cf., in addition to the books and articles of Max Werner and Sergei N. Kournakoff, Albert Parry: *Russian Calvalcade: A Military Record* (Ives Washburn, 1944).

4. UNITED NATIONS

11. *The Diary of Count Ciano*, Dec. 3, 1941, *The Chicago Daily News*, July 13, 1945. According to Captain Mitsue Fuchida (*New York Herald Tribune*, Oct. 17, 1945), the task force left the Chi Shima Islands on Nov. 26, 1941, ostensibly on a training

cruise. It consisted of 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 4 destroyer flotillas of 4 ships each, 8 tankers and the carriers Akagi, Kanga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku. On Dec. 3 the fleet personnel was told that Japan might enter the war.

12. Cf. Arthur Upham Pope: *Litvinoff*, pp. 469-74.
13. Text in British White Paper, "Russia No. 1 (1942)," reproduced in NYT, June 12, 1944, along with messages of King George VI, Kalinin, Eden's and Molotov's speeches of May 26 and Eden's address to Commons of June 11.
14. Churchill to Commons, Sept. 8, 1942. Cf. W. P. and Zelda K. Coates: *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, pp. 726ff.
15. Cf. Henry C. Cassidy, *Moscow Dateline* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1943), pp. 269-83.

X • DEATH TO THE GERMAN INVADERS!

I. MIRACLE ON THE VOLGA

1. Cf. *The Heroic Defense of Sevastopol* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1942), Illus. Cf. also Boris Voyetkhov: *The Last Days of Sevastopol*, trans. by Ralph Parker and V. M. Genne (Knopf, 1943).
2. "Days and Nights" by Konstantin Simonov, dated Sept. 25, 1942, in *Stalingrad* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1943), Illus., pp. 55-64.
3. For full text of all addresses at the Congress of American-Soviet Friendship, organized by the American Council on Soviet Relations, the American-Russian Institute, and *Soviet Russia Today*, cf. *Salute to Our Russian Ally* (Congress of American-Soviet Friendship, 1942).

2. DISUNITED NATIONS

4. NYT, Aug. 1, 1943.
5. On the purposes and techniques of Nazi war propaganda in general, cf. the incisive and brilliant study of Ernst Kris and Hans Speier: *German Radio Propaganda* (Oxford U. Press, 1944).
6. In *Journey Among Warriors* (Doubleday, Doran, Garden City, 1943), pp. 180-4, Eve Curie tells of her interview with Maj. Gen. A. A. Vlasov in January, 1942, in Volokolamsk, carefully noting (footnote, p. 180): "Not to be confused with Lt. Gen. Andrei A. Vlasov, who was captured by the Germans in the Volkhov sector." Despite this unequivocal statement, David J. Dallin in *The Real Soviet Russia* (Yale U. Press, 1944), pp. 33-5 describes the renegade Vlasov, "who was taken prisoner in 1941 (!)" as identical with the Vlasov interviewed by Eve Curie, whom he quotes for evidence of "Vlasov's" former loyalty to the USSR.

3. TEHERAN

7. PM, Sept. 12, 1943.
8. There is no hint of any of this in Welles' *The Time For Decision*, apart from frequent eulogies of Roosevelt and conspicuous silence regarding Hull. The principal actors are not yet free to speak.
9. Cf. *Orel: The July Battle, 1943* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1943) containing pictures, orders of the day and accounts of the operations by Vasily Grossman, Konstantin Simonov, Ilya Ehrenburg and others.
10. Cf. Max Lerner's trenchant comment "*The Way of the Bishops*," PM, Nov. 15, 1943.
11. Cf. Edward Angly's account, PM, Dec. 7, 1943, and "What Really Happened at Teheran," by Forrest Davis, *Saturday Evening Post*, May 13, 1944.
12. Cf. The present writer's letter on this question in NYT, Mar. 26, 1944.

4. THE NEW FATHERLAND

13. Among the more illuminating books in this category are: Henry C. Cassidy: *Moscow Dateline 1941-1943* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1943); Eve Curie: *Journey Among Warriors* (Doubleday, Doran, Garden City, 1943); Maurice Hindus: *Mother Russia* (Doubleday, Doran, Garden City, 1944); Richard E. Lauterbach: *These are the Russians* (Harper, 1944); Larry Lesueur: *Twelve Months that Changed the World* (Knopf, 1943); Edgar Snow: *The Pattern of Soviet Power* (Random House, 1945) and *People on Our Side*, (1944); Edmund Stevens: *Russia Is No Riddle* (Greenberg, 1945); Alexander Werth: *Moscow War Diary* (Knopf, 1942); William L. White: *Report on the Russians* (Harcourt, Brace, 1945); Albert Rhys Williams: *The Russians: The Land, The People and Why They Fight* (Harcourt, Brace, 1943). The White book, by the son of the late William Allen White, whom the present writer met in Moscow in 1933, was denounced by David Zaslavsky in *Prauda*, Dec. 9, 1944, as the "usual standard production of a Fascist kitchen, with all of its smells, calumny, unpardonable ignorance and ill-conceived fury." The book was repudiated by Eric Johnston, of whose party White was a member. Francis Hackett in NYT, March 15, 1945, declared: "Mr. White fires no guns for Fascism, but he rolls ammunition for it." For a detailed exposé of White's errors of fact and judgment, and comments by other correspondents, cf. "The Truth About the Book The Nazis Like," National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, 1945. In the opinion of the present writer, however, Mr. White's book is not a result of malice, but only of ignorance and of perpetual and uncomprehending astonishment that the USSR does not resemble Kansas and therefore deserves to be damned.
14. IBEW, Feb. 5, 1944; also in NYT, Feb. 2, 1944.
15. No official figures on Party membership during and since the war have been published up to the time of writing, so far as the present writer can discover. But cf. Richard E. Lauterbach: *op. cit.*, pp. 265-71 (also published in *The Russian Review*, Spring, 1945, pp. 11-17) and C. L. Sulzberger in NYT, June 3-4, 1945.
16. A prospective conflict between the Red Army and the CPSU (B) is a consummation devotedly to be wished (and therefore predicted) by David J. Dallin. In his *The Real Soviet Russia* (1944), he goes so far as to forecast a conflict between the Red Army and the NKVD—"the incomparable, majestic, unique monolith resting upon inhumanity, slavery, abomination and death" (p. 244). In his *Russia and Postwar Europe* (Yale U. Press, 1943), pp. 18-48, he seeks to suggest the inevitability of conflict between the Party and the Red Army. Needless to say, none of these conflicts has materialized, and all such predictions are significant for understanding the predictor, but not the realities of political life in the USSR.
17. Cf. S. Gersberg: *Soviet Economy on a War Footing* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1943); Robert J. Kerner (ed.): *USSR Economy and the War* (Russian Economic Institute, Polygon Press, 1943); Maurice Dobb: *Soviet Planning and Labor in War and Peace* (International Publishers, 1943); and *The USSR in Reconstruction* (American-Russian Institute, 1944), especially articles by William Mandel, Lazar Volin and Sylvia Goodstein, Andrew Steiger, Professor A. Grajdanzev, E. C. Ropes and Vladimir D. Kazakevich.
18. Cf. "The Fourth State War Loan," by Arseni Zverev, Commissar of Finance of the USSR, in IBEW, May 8, 1945.
19. *The Time For Decision*, p. 326.
20. A chart of the frequency of such symbols in May Day slogans, 1918-1944, has been prepared by Harold D. Lasswell, in collaboration with Dr. Sergei Yakobson and Joseph M. Goldsen, and appears on p. 37 of Lasswell's monograph (mimeographed), "World Politics, Employment and Enterprise; With Special Reference to the Future Relations of the United States and Russia."

21. Quoted in Maurice Hindus: *Mother Russia*, p. 99. This is perhaps the most illuminating, as certainly it is the most intimate and vivid, portrait of the Soviet people at war and of the impact of war upon their ways, beliefs and values.
22. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 107. See also Ilya Ehrenburg's articles in *Red Star* and other journals, translated by Alexander Kaun in *The Tempering of Russia* (Knopf, 1944).
23. Cf. documentary details in IBEW, Oct. 17, 1942, Dec. 28, 1943 (on the Kharkov trial), May 29, 1945 (on the systematic murder of 4 million people in the Oswiecim Death Camp), etc. Cf. also D. Zaslavsky: *The Face of Hitler's Army* (1943); Elena Kononenko: *Baby-Killers* (1942) and D. Manuilsky: *Hitler's So-Called "New Order" in Europe* (1943), all pamphlets issued by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow. One of the most vivid accounts of a Jewish death camp in Poland is to be found in Jan Karski: *The Story of a Secret State*, pp. 339-54.
24. *Pravda*, June 23, 1945; IBEW, July 3, 1945.

5. COUNTER-ATTACK

25. For full texts of the armistice agreements with Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria, cf. *The American Review on the Soviet Union*, Feb., 1945, pp. 62-74.
26. Text in *ibid.*, May, 1945, pp. 50-5.

XI · BEYOND VICTORY

I. POLONAISE

1. Cf. Pertinax's revelations in NYT, Feb. 16, 1944.
2. The most useful single book on Poland between wars is Raymond Leslie Buell: *Poland: Key to Europe* (Knopf, 1939). For a detailed account of the crucial developments of 1944, see the present writer's article, "Poland," in *The New International Year Book* (Funk & Wagnalls, 1945). An anti-Soviet account of Soviet-Polish relations is to be found in Ann Su Cardwell: *Poland and Russia: The Last Quarter Century* (Sheed & Ward, 1944). Cf. also S. Kononov: *Russo-Polish Relations* (Princeton U. Press, 1945).
3. The 16-page text of this report is reproduced as a special supplement to IBEW, March 23, 1944.
4. The text of the Soviet-Polish pact, which follows the model of the other Soviet treaties of alliance with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and France, will be found in IBEW, Apr. 26, 1945, along with the speeches of Stalin and Osobka-Morawski.
5. On official American policy toward the new Poland, see exchange of letters between Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew (July 9 and 17, 1945) in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 22, 1945.
- 5a. IBEW, Aug. 18, 1945.

2. MARCHE SLAV

6. Full text in IBEW, July 25, 1944.
7. Text in NYT, June 30, 1945. This agreement permitted Soviet and Czechoslovak nationals on both sides of the new frontier to opt for Soviet or Czechoslovak citizenship and to move across the border with their goods and with compensation for immobile property. This settlement appears to have been due not to any Soviet desire for territorial aggrandizement but to the actual preferences of most of the 700,000 Russian-speaking inhabitants. Ivan Petrushchak, a member of the Czechoslovak National Rada, who had been sent from London to Carpatho-Ukraine, presented to Beneš late in 1944 a resolution of a Congress held in Uzhorod, on the basis of a plebiscite, calling for the annexation of the territory to the Soviet Ukraine. Petrushchak had originally declared that the Carpatho-Ukrainians wished to remain within Czechoslovakia, but once on the scene he changed his mind and signed the resolution. Most Carpatho-Ukrainians in the United States also seemed to have favored this solution. They pre-

sented a memorial to this effect to Molotov at San Francisco, which he made known to the British and American delegates. Cf. *Carpathian-Russia* (a weekly published in Russian in Yonkers, New York), Jan. 16, 1945, and "Memorandum Concerning the Russian People of Russia Rubra," published in English in 1945 by the American League of Russian and Carpatho-Russians, Philadelphia. Cf. also IBEW, July 7, 1945, and "Soviet-Czechoslovak Economic Relations" by Zdenek Fierlinger, *The American Review on the Soviet Union*, Aug., 1945.

8. Cf. I. F. Stone's editorial in *PM*, Aug. 22, 1945, "The Morning-After for British Labor."
9. A brief but informative sketch of Balkan developments in the wake of the Red Army is contained in Edgar Snow: *The Pattern of Soviet Power* (Random House, 1945).

3. GOLDEN GATE

10. Cf. "The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers," *The American Political Science Review*, Feb., 1945; Mortimer J. Adler: *How to Think About War and Peace* (Simon & Schuster, 1943); Emery Reeves: *The Anatomy of Peace* (Harper, 1945); and the writings of Ely Culbertson and Clarence K. Streit.
11. Cf. Vladimir Potemkin in *War and the Working Class*, Sept. 15, 1943, and Oct. 1, 1943; B. Shatrov, *ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1943; and Boris Shtein, *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1944.
12. Cf. *ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1944, and Dec. 15, 1944; *Izvestia*, Oct. 10, 1944; and *INOSTRAN-NAYA POLITIKA SOVIETSKOGO SOYUZA V OTCHESHESTVENNOI VOINE* (Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War), A Collection of Documents, June 22, 1941-Dec. 31, 1943, State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1944. Cf. also Joseph Barnes: "The Soviet Union at San Francisco," *The American Review on the Soviet Union*, Aug., 1945.
13. Cf. Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization, Department of State Publication 2192, Conference Series 56, 1944. Cf. also NYT, Oct. 10 and Nov. 21, 1944, and Senator Vandenberg's proposed amendments, *ibid.*, April 2, 1945.
14. French refusal to join the sponsoring powers was due to anxiety lest the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, in the preparation of which France had had no voice, might result in an organization which would supersede or hamper such special commitments to act against aggressors as were contained in the French-Soviet alliance treaty. This fear proved unfounded. For the Soviet view, cf. "France and the San Francisco Conference" by M. Nikolayev, *War and the Working Class*, translated in IBEW, Apr. 3, 1945.
15. For a brief but incisive analysis of these and other aspects of the Charter, cf. Vera Micheles Dean, "The San Francisco Conference," *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 15, 1945, Foreign Policy Association.

4. GERMANIC ENIGMA

16. Cf. the author's letter in NYT, Aug. 12, 1945 and "Regionalism and Spheres of Influence" in *The United Nations and the Organization of Peace and Security*, Harris Foundation Lectures (U. of Chicago Press, 1945).
17. Cf. Edgar Snow: "Behind Russian Lines in Austria," *Saturday Evening Post*, Aug. 11, 1945.
18. Full texts in IBEW, June 16, 1945 and NYT, June 6, 1945.
19. The twenty-four indicted Nazis were as follows: Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Wilhelm von Keitel, Walther Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Erich Raeder, Karl Doenitz, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Albert Speer, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Alfred Jodl, Constantine von Neurath, Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Hans Fritzsche. On the general position of the Soviet Government, see *Ugolovnaya Otvetstvennost Gilerovitssev* (Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites) by Prof. A. N. Trainin, Moscow: Institute

of Law, 1944, reviewed by Dr. Charles Prince in the *American Bar Association Journal*, Feb., 1945.

5. CIPANGU AND CATHAY

20. See especially the last book of the late Nicholas Spykman: *The Geography of the Peace* (Harcourt, Brace, 1944).
21. Moscow's decisions have repeatedly discredited alarmists and dispensers of fear and hate, just as Anglo-American decisions have discredited comparable (if less vocal) extremists in the USSR. Max Eastman and J. B. Powell in *Reader's Digest*, June, 1945 ("The Fate of the World is at Stake in China") wrote "The Chinese Communist Party is the darling of Moscow," predicted that the USSR would seek to set up a Red puppet State in Manchuria, and demanded an end of "appeasing Moscow" and staunch resistance in the name of "democracy" to "totalitarian strangulation." Employing more subtly the same technique, David J. Dallin in *The Big Three*, published by Yale University Press in July, 1945, forecast hopefully and at length Soviet efforts to destroy the regime of Chiang Kai-shek and predicted a partition of China, a Soviet-American clash in the Far East, etc. (Cf. pp. 208-34). Thus: "In 1945 the only possible rival to Soviet Russia in Asia appeared to be the United States with its ally Chiang Kai-shek. The new task (of Moscow) was to weaken the ties between Washington and Chungking, to isolate Chiang and to supply arms to the Chinese Red Army" (p. 226). Again: "The Chinese Soviet forces will be supported, of course, by the Russian Soviet Government." At no time has the Soviet Government supported the Chinese Red Army nor indicated any intention of ever doing so. Several weeks after these predictions were made, Moscow concluded its agreements (Aug. 14, 1945) with Chungking, renouncing all intervention in China, concluding an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek and pledging aid to his regime. Cf. Appendix III, *infra*.
22. Cf. "Iran: A Test of Relations between Great and Small Nations," by Christina Phelps Grant, *Foreign Policy Reports*, Apr. 15, 1945.
23. Legalists may contest the "legality" of the Soviet action, since the neutrality pact denounced by Moscow on April 5, 1945, would not have expired, under its own terms, until April 24, 1946. On the other hand it can be argued, though the Narkomindel did not advance the argument, that the pact itself was a corollary of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, to which both the USSR and Japan were signatories, and that Japanese violation of the earlier instrument in declaring war on the United States and Great Britain in December, 1941, violated the treaty rights of the USSR and released it from the obligations of both instruments. The earlier Japanese assault on China, under way when the Soviet-Japanese pact was signed, was never accompanied by a declaration of war and was therefore not incompatible with the technical obligations of the Kellogg Pact.

XII · AFTER OCTOBER

I. THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH

1. For text of Antonov's report, cf. IBEW, June 28, 1945.
2. This delusion has been remarkably persistent in the Atlantic communities. According to a 1945 survey by Elmo Roper, more than half of all Americans still believe that all Russians receive the same income. The same confusion of socialism with egalitarianism is reflected in the books of L. E. Hubbard, Abram Bergson and in the labored demonstrations that Soviet socialism is no longer "socialism" by Max Eastman, Arthur Koestler, Edmund Wilson, Alexander Barmine and various contributors to *The New Leader*, American "Socialist" organ and long a catch-basin for all varieties of both anti-Soviet and anti-socialist publicists.
3. *Critique of the Gotha Program*, 1875.

4. Stalin's address at a conference of business executives, June 23, 1931, in *Leninism*, pp. 206-7.
5. Cf. Harry F. Ward: *The Soviet Spirit* (International Publishers, 1945) and Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz and Aaron Jugow: *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture* (Oxford U. Press, 1944).
6. For illuminating accounts of the mode of life of well-paid Soviet executives, see John Scott: *Behind the Urals* and "Soviet Business Executive" (Nikolai D. Puzirev of the Kirov plant in Leningrad) by John Hersey, *Life*, Jan. 15, 1945.
7. Thus Manya Gordon in *Workers Before and After Lenin* (Dutton, 1941) seeks to show, by omitting or minimizing the imponderables and completely ignoring the danger of the war which came to Russia four months after her book appeared, that Russian workers enjoyed a better living standard under the Tsars than under the Soviets. Hubbard (p. 164 of *Soviet Labor and Industry*) devises an index of "real wages" according to which the figure of average real wages in 1929 was 154 (with 1913 as 100) and only 68 in 1937. F. Forest in *The New Internationalist*, Jan.-Feb., 1943, quoted by Koestler in *The Yogi and the Commissar* (p. 158), arrived at "real wage" indices of 100 for 1913, 125 for 1928 and 62 for 1940. All such attempts, even when honestly intentioned, are all but meaningless since the various components of living standards, apart from money wages and commodity price levels, are not adequately weighted and render incomparable the situations sought to be compared.
8. Robert H. Jackson, then Counsel to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, before the Senate Finance Committee, summarizing "America's Capacity to Consume," prepared by the Brookings Institution, *The New Republic*, Aug. 28, 1935.
9. Report of the International Federation of Trade Unions, quoted in NYT, Sept. 3, 1945.
10. Peter F. Drucker, "Stalin Pay 'em What They're Worth," in *The Saturday Evening Post*, July 21, 1945, writes that "the difference between the money income of the boss and that of the worker was just twice as great in Russia as in this country," assuming average pre-war annual wages for the unskilled in factories at 1,500 rubles in the USSR and \$1,200 in the USA, and salaries of plant managers at 24-36,000 rubles (including bonuses and shares of profits) and \$10-15,000. This ignores (a) non-monetary income, which is vastly more important in the Soviet Union than in the West; (b) the fact that many American plant managers also receive bonuses, shares of profit and often additional income from stocks and bonds greatly in excess of their salaries; and (c) the enormously greater salaries, sometimes ten times those paid to plant managers, which are paid to the officers of large American corporations. These have no counterparts in the USSR, since heads of Commissariats, Glavks and Trusts seldom receive more remuneration than plant managers. Drucker, however, makes the valid points that Soviet income taxes are far less burdensome on those in the upper brackets than the American equivalent and that American industry can learn much from Soviet methods of rewarding foremen and skilled workers as a means of increasing productivity.
11. Molotov in *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow* (Report of Congress XVIII), pp. 113-14.
12. Stalin: *Leninism*, pp. 212-13.
13. A. Y. Vyshinsky: *Soviet State Law* (Russian edition of 1938), pp. 115 and 133-7.
14. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 148-9, citing figures of the Central Board of National Economic Statistics of the Gosplan.
15. For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between Party, Proletariat and Managerial Elite, see "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 1928-1944, A Study in Elite Formation and Function," by B. Moore, Jr., in *The American Sociological Review*, June, 1944.
16. The best social analysis of such groups is still Thorstein B. Veblen's classic, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 1899.

17. Cf. James Burnham: *The Managerial Revolution* (Day, 1941) and Thorstein Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921) which was the point of departure for Harold Scott's "Technocracy."

2. WHAT MAN CAN MAKE OF MAN

18. Cf. "Political Economy in the Soviet Union," trans. by Emily G. and Vladimir D. Kazakevich (International Publishers, 1944). This memorable article, entitled "Some Problems of the Teaching of Political Economy," first appeared in *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* (*Under the Banner of Marxism*), No. 7-8, July-Aug., 1943 as a commentary on the resumption of the teaching of political economy in Soviet higher schools, after several years' interruption due to sundry defects pointed out by the Central Committee of the Party. The article was widely misinterpreted in the West as a "basic revision" of Marxism. Cf. Will Lissner in NYT, April 2, 1944, editorial comment Apr. 2, 3 and 4, counter-commentary in a letter from Henry F. Mins, and further comment by Will Lissner, July 2, 3, 1944.
19. For a critique of Western critiques of Soviet policy in the Balkans, cf. A. Sokolov: "Democracy" in *War and the Working Class*, IBEW, May 10, 1945.

3. THE END OF THE PROLETARIAT

20. Report to Congress XVIII, Mar. 10, 1939, *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, p. 53.
21. *Leninism*, pp. 367-8.
22. On the unsuccessful efforts of Molotov, Kuznetsov and others to secure the admission of the World Trade Union Organization to the San Francisco Conference in a consultative capacity, cf. the article by I. Nikolayev, IBEW, June 21, 1945.
23. Cf. Hans Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern Society," *Social Research*, Feb., 1934, and additional references on p. 101 of *The Nazi Dictatorship* (Knopf, 1935).
24. All figures from Eugene Varga: *Two Systems: Socialist Economy and Capitalist Economy* (International Publishers, 1939), pp. 58-86. This Soviet economist, of Hungarian origin, seeks to show that socialism means more jobs in industry while capitalism means fewer jobs. He fails to see that in both systems technological advance steadily reduces the relative number of necessary workers per unit of output and per number of salaried employees, professional experts and executives.
25. For a brief but suggestive statement of these realities, cf. I. F. Stone, "How to do in Peace what we did in War," *PM*, Aug. 17, 1945.
26. For analyses of these issues, cf. E. H. Carr: *Conditions of Peace* (MacMillan, 1942) and Lawrence Dennis: *The Dynamics of War and Revolution* (The Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940).
27. Testimony on the Wagner-Murray Full-Employment Bill, NYT, Aug. 25, 1945; cf. also Beardsley Ruml: *Tomorrow's Business* (Farrar & Rinehart, 1945).
28. C. E. Merriam: *Systematic Politics* (U. of Chicago Press, 1945), p. 323; cf. also his *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (McGraw-Hill, 1939).
29. The Second Epistle of Peter, II and III.

4. ONE WORLD AND THE THIRD ROME

30. Radio Broadcast of Apr. 9, 1944. On the general problems of Anglo-American-Soviet relations, see Pitirim A. Sorokin: *Russia and the United States* (Dutton, 1944); David J. Dallin: *The Big Three* (1945) and William T. R. Fox: *The Super-Powers* (Harcourt, Brace, 1944).
31. Max Lerner: "Russia and America: A Critical Partnership," *Free World*, July, 1945.
32. In a report submitted to the Reparations Commission (cf. NYT, Sept. 14, 1945), Soviet experts estimated that the USSR sustained damages totalling 679,000,000,000

rubles from direct destruction of property, including the wrecking of 1,700 towns, 70,000 villages, 6,000,000 buildings, 84,000 schools, 43,000 libraries, 31,000 factories, 13,000 bridges, 40,000 miles of railway tracks, etc. in addition to the loss of 7,000,000 horses, 17,000,000 cattle, 20,000,000 pigs and 27,000,000 sheep and goats. No official figures have been released on casualties. But it seems probable that not less than 5,000,000 Red Army men and guerrillas died in battle or succumbed of wounds, 1941-1945. Enemy-occupied territories had an original population of c. 88,000,000. Some estimates of civilian deaths reach a figure of above 20,000,000. Maurice Hindus's estimate of 15,000,000 civilian dead is probably nearer the actual figure. All such estimates, however, are guesses in the absence of detailed statistical analyses, including normal birth rates and death rates and the effect of war upon both. They would seem to include not merely net deaths over normal but the loss of net births under normal. Assuming a normal average birthrate of 45 per thousand and a death rate of 30 per thousand for the whole population within the Soviet frontiers of June, 1941, there would have been in the absence of war something like 36,000,000 births and 24,000,000 deaths between June and June, 1941-1945. If one assumes arbitrarily, in the absence of data, that the war reduced the number of births and increased the number of deaths by one-third, a normal four-year net increase in population of 12,000,000 would have been replaced by an actual loss of 8,000,000, constituting a net loss of 20,000,000. In any case, material and human losses from "the malice of wild swine gone mad" were appalling and wholly without precedent in any previous war. Cf. editorial in *Pravda*, Sept. 13, 1945, IBEW, Sept. 18, 1945. Cf. also IBEW, Oct. 11, 1945.

33. NYT, Sept. 22, 1945.
34. Cf. Harold J. Laski: *Faith, Reason and Civilization* (Gollancz, London, 1944), wherein the brilliant dean of British political scientists compares the creative power of the Soviet idea to early Christianity.
35. Cf. M. Rubinstein in *New Times* (formerly *War and the Working Class*), Sept. 3, 1945, quoted in NYT, Sept. 4, 1945.
36. Cf. Henry D. Smyth: *Atomic Energy For Military Purposes* (Princeton U. Press, 1945). Professor Smyth is here referring to the possibility that means may be found of "converting to energy even as much as a few per cent of the matter of some common material," but even should the process be limited to uranium, the results would scarcely be different.
37. Cf. J. D. Bernal: "Everybody's Atom," *The Nation*, Sept. 1, 1945.
38. Max Lerner: "The Politics of the Atomic Bomb," *PM*, Aug. 19, 1945.
39. Isaiah, XXIV.
40. David J. Dallin: *The Big Three*, Foreword, p. v.
41. Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish, Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1945, p. 951.
42. U. of C. Round Table Broadcast, Aug. 12, 1945.
43. *The Chicago Sun*, in a series of articles through Aug. 1945. Cf. also Ely Culbertson: "How to Control the Atomic Threat," published by Fight For Total Peace, Inc.
44. NYT, Sept. 23, 1945.
45. Foreign Policy *Bulletin*, Aug. 31, 1945. For a liberal Catholic view of Soviet-American relations, cf. Waldemar Gurian: "Russia and the Peace," *The Review of Politics*, Apr., 1945, and "The Soviet Union: Apocalyptic Nightmare or Political Reality?" in *The Commonweal*, June 29, 1945.
46. For useful discussions of various aspects of these problems, cf. Sir Bernard Pares: *Russia and the Peace* (MacMillan, 1944); John L. Childs and George S. Counts: *America, Russia and the Communist Party* (Day, 1943); Graduate School of Education, Harvard University: *Meet the Soviet Russians: A Study Guide to the Soviet Union for Teachers in Secondary Schools*, 1944; Warren D. Walsh: "What the American People

Think of Russia," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter, 1944-45; Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems, "Post-War Relations with the Soviet Union," Apr., 1944; and "The Study of Russia in the United States," issued as a pamphlet by *The New York Herald Tribune* and comprising articles by Joseph Barnes, Ernest C. Ropes, Sir Bernard Pares and Ernest J. Simmons in the issues of Dec. 27, 28, 29, 30, 1944 plus an editorial of the last date.

47. From Boris B. Bogoslovsky: "The Genius of the Russian Language," *The Russian Review*, Autumn, 1944, p. 29. On the theme of universalism in Russian literature, cf. Ernest J. Simmons, *An Outline of Modern Russian Literature, 1880-1940* (Cornell U. Press, 1943) and his brilliant biographies of *Pushkin* (Harvard U. Press, 1937), *Dostoevski* (Oxford U. Press, 1940) and *Tolstoi* (Atlantic Monthly, Aug. and following issues, 1945, to be published in book form in 1946).
48. *Salut Au Mondel*, 1856.

APPENDIX I

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR

CHAPTER I. THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

ARTICLE 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

ARTICLE 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies, which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the landlords and capitalists and the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, constitute the political foundation of the USSR.

ARTICLE 3. In the USSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

ARTICLE 4. The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, constitute the economic foundation of the USSR.

ARTICLE 5. Socialist property in the USSR exists either in the form of state property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of cooperative and collective-farm property (property of a collective farm or property of a cooperative association).

ARTICLE 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, post, telegraph and telephones, large state-organized agricultural enterprises (state farms, machine and tractor stations and the like) as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial localities, are state property, that is, belong to the whole people.

ARTICLE 7. Public enterprises in collective farms and cooperative organizations, with their livestock and implements, the products of the collective farms and cooperative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the public, collective-farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of land attached to the dwelling and, as its personal property, a subsidiary establishment on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements—in accordance with the statutes of the agricultural artel.

ARTICLE 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for their use free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

ARTICLE 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the predominant form of economy in the USSR, the law permits the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their personal labor and precluding the exploitation of the labor of others.

ARTICLE 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

ARTICLE 11. The economic life of the USSR is determined and directed by the state national economic plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions of the working people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the USSR and strengthening its defensive capacity.

ARTICLE 12. In the USSR work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the USSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

CHAPTER II. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE

ARTICLE 13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Azerbaidjan Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic
 The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 14. The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its highest organs of state authority and organs of government, covers:

- a) Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states, and the establishment of the general character of the relations between the Union Republics and foreign states;
- b) Questions of war and peace;
- c) Admission of new republics into the USSR;
- d) Control over the observance of the Constitution of the USSR and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the USSR.
- e) Confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics;
- f) Confirmation of the formation of new Territories and Regions and also of new Autonomous Republics within Union Republics;
- g) Organization of the defense of the USSR and direction of all the armed forces of the USSR; the establishment of the guiding principles of the organization of the military formations of the Union Republics;
- h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly;
- i) Safeguarding the security of the state;
- j) Establishment of the national economic plans of the USSR;
- k) Approval of the single state budget of the USSR as well as of the taxes and revenues which go to the all-Union, Republican and local budgets;

- l) Administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and enterprises and trading enterprises of all-Union importance;
- m) Administration of transport and communications;
- n) Direction of the monetary and credit system;
- o) Organization of state insurance;
- p) Raising and granting of loans;
- q) Establishment of the basic principles for the use of land as well as for the use of natural deposits, forests and waters;
- r) Establishment of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health;
- s) Organization of a uniform system of national economic statistics;
- t) Establishment of the principles of labor legislation;
- u) Legislation on the judicial system and judicial procedure; criminal and civil codes;
- v) Laws on citizenship of the Union; laws on the rights of foreigners;
- w) Issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty.

ARTICLE 15. The sovereignty of the Union Republics is limited only within the provisions set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR. Outside of these provisions, each Union Republic exercises state authority independently. The USSR protects the sovereign rights of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 16. Each Union Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the USSR.

ARTICLE 17. To every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the USSR.

ARTICLE 18. The territory of a Union Republic may not be altered without its consent.

(a) Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

(b) Each Union Republic has its republican military formation.

ARTICLE 19. The laws of the USSR have the same force within the territory of every Union Republic.

ARTICLE 20. In the event of a discrepancy between a law of a Union Republic and an all-Union law, the all-Union law prevails.

ARTICLE 21. A single Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the USSR. Every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the USSR.

ARTICLE 22. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic consists of the Altai, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Ordjonikidze, Maritime and Khabarovsk Territories; the Archangel, Vologda, Voronezh, Gorky, Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kalinin, Kirov, Kuibyshev, Kursk, Leningrad, Molotov, Moscow, Murmansk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orel, Penza, Rostov, Ryazan, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Tambov, Tula, Chelyabinsk, Chita, Chkalov, Yaroslavl, Ulianov, Kemerevo and Kurgan Regions; the Tatar, Bashkir, Daghestan, Buryat-Mongolian, Kabardino-Balkarian, Kalmyk, Komi, Crimean, Mari, Mordovian, North Ossetian, Udmurt, Checheno-Ingush, Chuvash and Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics; and the Adygei, Jewish, Karachai, Oirot, Khakass and Cherkess Autonomous Regions.

ARTICLE 23. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Vinnitsa, Volynsk, Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Drogobych, Zhitomir, Zaporozhe, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolaev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumy, Tarnopol, Kharkov, Chernigov and Chernovitsy Regions.

ARTICLE 24. The Azerbaidjan Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE 25. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Adjar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE 26. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Bokhara, Samarkand,

Tashkent, Ferghana, and Khorezm Regions, and the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 27. The Tadjik Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Garm, Kuliab, Leninabad and Stalinabad Regions, and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE 28. The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Akmolinsk, Aktyubinsk, Alma-Ata, East Kazakhstan, Guryev, Djambul, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kzyl-Orda, Kustanai, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk, and South Kazakhstan Regions.

ARTICLE 29. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Baranovichi, Byelostok, Brest, Vileika, Vitebsk, Gomel, Minsk, Moghilev, Pinsk and Polesseye Regions.

ARTICLE 29-A. The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Ashkhabad, Krasnovodsk, Mari, Tashauz and Chardzhou Regions.

ARTICLE 29-B. The Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Dzhahal-Abad, Issyk-Kul, Osh, Tian-Shan and Frunze Regions.

CHAPTER III. THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 30. The highest organ of state authority of the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 31. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR exercises all rights vested in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, in so far as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the USSR that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissariats of the USSR.

ARTICLE 32. The legislative power of the USSR is exercised exclusively by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 33. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR consists of two Chambers: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.

ARTICLE 34. The Soviet of the Union is elected by the citizens of the USSR according to electoral areas on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population.

ARTICLE 35. The Soviet of Nationalities is elected by the citizens of the USSR according to Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions and national areas on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic, eleven deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous Region and one deputy from each national area.

ARTICLE 36. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is elected for a term of four years.

ARTICLE 37. Both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, have equal rights.

ARTICLE 38. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities have an equal right to initiate legislation.

ARTICLE 39. A law is considered adopted if passed by both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by a simple majority vote in each.

ARTICLE 40. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are published in the languages of the Union Republics over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 41. Sessions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities begin and terminate simultaneously.

ARTICLE 42. The Soviet of the Union elects a Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 43. The Soviet of Nationalities elects a Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 44. The Chairmen of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities preside over the sittings of the respective Chambers and direct the procedure of these bodies.

ARTICLE 45. Joint sittings of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are presided over alternately by the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.

ARTICLE 46. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR twice a year.

Special sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its discretion or on the demand of one of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 47. In the event of disagreement between the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the question is referred for settlement to a conciliation commission formed on a parity basis. If the conciliation commission fails to arrive at an agreement, or if its decision fails to satisfy one of the Chambers, the question is considered for a second time by the Chambers. Failing agreement between the two Chambers, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and orders new elections.

ARTICLE 48. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR at a joint sitting of both Chambers elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting of a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, sixteen Vice-Presidents, a Secretary of the Presidium and twenty-four members of the Presidium.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for all its activities.

ARTICLE 49. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

- a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
- b) Interprets laws of the USSR in operation, issues decrees;
- c) Dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in conformity with Article 47 of the Constitution of the USSR and orders new elections;
- d) Conducts referendums on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union Republics;
- e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and of the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics in case they do not conform to law;
- f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, relieves of their posts and appoints People's Commissars of the USSR on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
- g) Awards decorations and confers titles of honor of the USSR;
- h) Exercises the right of pardon;
- i) Appoints and removes the higher commands of the armed forces of the USSR;
- j) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, proclaims a state of war in the event of armed attack on the USSR, or whenever necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression;
- k) Orders general or partial mobilization;
- l) Ratifies international treaties;
- m) Appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR to foreign states;
- n) Receives the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states;
- o) Proclaims martial law in separate localities or throughout the USSR in the interests of the defense of the USSR or for the purpose of ensuring public order and state security.

ARTICLE 50. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities elect Credentials Commissions which verify the credentials of the members of the respective Chambers.

On the recommendation of the Credentials Commissions, the Chambers decide either to endorse the credentials or to annul the election of the deputies concerned.

ARTICLE 51. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of inquiry and investigation on any matter.

It is the duty of all institutions and public servants to comply with the demands of these commissions and to submit to them the necessary materials and documents.

ARTICLE 52. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and during the period when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 53. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, or after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet prior to the expiration of its term of office, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR retains its powers until the formation of a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 54. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, or in the event of its dissolution prior to the expiration of its term of office, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office or dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 55. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR not later than one month after the elections.

ARTICLE 56. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR at a joint sitting of both Chambers, appoints the Government of the USSR, namely, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

CHAPTER IV. THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE UNION REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 57. The highest organ of state authority of a Union Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 58. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic for a term of four years.

The basis of representation is established by the Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 59. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Republic.

ARTICLE 60. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic:

- a) Adopts the Constitution of the Republic and amends it in conformity with Article 16 of the Constitution of the USSR;
- b) Confirms the Constitutions of the Autonomous Republics forming part of it and defines the boundaries of their territories;
- c) Approves the national economic plan and also the budget of the Republic;
- d) Exercises the right of amnesty and pardon of citizens sentenced by the judicial organs of the Union Republic;
- e) Establishes the representation of the Union Republics in international relations;
- f) Establishes the method of the creation of military formations of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 61. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, consisting of a Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary of the Presidium and members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.

The powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic are defined by the Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 62. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects a Chairman and Vice-Chairmen to conduct its sittings.

ARTICLE 63. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic appoints the Government of the Union Republic, namely, the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

CHAPTER V. THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 64. The highest executive and administrative organ of state authority of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

ARTICLE 65. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and accountable to it; and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet it is responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 66. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and supervises their execution.

ARTICLE 67. Decisions and Orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR are binding throughout the territory of the USSR.

ARTICLE 68. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the All-Union and Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the USSR and of other institutions, economic and cultural, under its administration;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national economic plan and the state budget, and to strengthen the credit and monetary system;

c) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

d) Exercises general guidance in respect of relations with foreign states;

e) Fixes the annual contingent of citizens to be called up for military service and directs the general organization and development of the armed forces of the country;

f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special committees and Central Administrations under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for matters concerning economic, cultural and defense organization and development.

ARTICLE 69. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR has the right, in respect of those branches of administration and economy which come within the jurisdiction of the USSR, to suspend decisions and orders of the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics and to annul orders and instructions of People's Commissars of the USSR.

ARTICLE 70. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR;

The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR;

The Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the USSR;

The People's Commissars of the USSR;

The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;

The Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education;

The Chairman of the Board of the State Bank.

ARTICLE 71. The Government of the USSR or a People's Commissar of the USSR to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the respective Chamber within a period not exceeding three days.

ARTICLE 72. The People's Commissars of the USSR direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the USSR.

ARTICLE 73. The People's Commissars of the USSR issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the respective People's Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and also of decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and supervise their execution.

ARTICLE 74. The People's Commissariats of the USSR are either All-Union or Union-Republican Commissariats.

ARTICLE 75. The All-Union People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the USSR either directly or through bodies appointed by them.

ARTICLE 76. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats, as a rule, direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them through the corresponding People's Commissariats of the Union Republics; they administer directly only a definite and limited number of enterprises according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 77. The following People's Commissariats are All-Union People's Commissariats:

Foreign Trade, Railways, Post and Telegraph and Telephones, Maritime Transport, River Transport, Coal Industry, Oil Industry, Power Stations, Electrical Industry, Iron and Steel Industry, Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, Chemical Industry, Aviation Industry, Shipbuilding Industry, Munitions, Armaments, Heavy Machine-Building, Tank Industry, Mortar Armament, Navy, Agricultural Procurement, Construction, Paper and Cellulose Industry, Machine-Tool Industry and Rubber Industry.

ARTICLE 78. The following People's Commissariats are Union-Republican People's Commissariats:

Defense, Foreign Affairs, Food Industry, Fish Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Light Industry, Textile Industry, Timber Industry, Agriculture, State Grain and Livestock Farms, Finance, Trade, Internal Affairs, Justice, Public Health, Building Materials Industry, State Control.

CHAPTER VI. THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 79. The highest executive and administrative organ of state authority of a Union Republic is the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 80. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic is responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic and accountable to it; and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic it is responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the respective Union Republic.

ARTICLE 81. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and of the Union Republic, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and supervises their execution.

ARTICLE 82. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic has the right to suspend decisions and orders of Councils of People's Commissars of Autonomous Republics, and to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Territories, Regions and Autonomous Regions.

ARTICLE 83. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic;

The Vice-Chairmen;

The Chairman of the State Planning Commission;

The People's Commissars of:

Defense, Foreign Affairs, Food Industry, Fish Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Light Industry, Textile Industry, Timber Industry, Building Materials Industry, Agriculture, State Grain and Livestock Farms, Finance, Trade, Internal Affairs, Justice, Public Health, State Control, Education, Local Industry, Municipal Economy, Social Maintenance, Automobile

Transport, The Chief of the Arts Administration, The Representatives of the All-Union People's Commissariats.

ARTICLE 84. The People's Commissars of a Union Republic direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 85. The People's Commissars of a Union Republic issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective People's Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws of the USSR and of the Union Republic, of the decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and that of the Union Republic, and of the orders and instructions of the Union Republican People's Commissariats of the USSR.

ARTICLE 86. The People's Commissariats of a Union Republic are either Union-Republican or Republican Commissariats.

ARTICLE 87. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them, and are subordinate both to the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic and to the corresponding Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the USSR.

ARTICLE 88. The Republican People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them and are directly subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

CHAPTER VII. THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE AUTONOMOUS SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 89. The highest organ of state authority of an Autonomous Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the respective Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 90. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic for a term of four years on the basis of representation established by the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic.

ARTICLE 91. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 92. Each Autonomous Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Autonomous Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 93. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic and appoints the Council of People's Commissars of the Autonomous Republic, in accordance with its Constitution.

CHAPTER VIII. THE LOCAL ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY

ARTICLE 94. The organs of state authority in territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

ARTICLE 95. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are elected by the working people of the respective territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities or rural localities for a term of two years.

ARTICLE 96. The basis of representation for Soviets of Working People's Deputies is defined by the Constitutions of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 97. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies direct the work of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens, direct local economic and cultural organization and development and draw up the local budgets.

ARTICLE 98. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies adopt decisions and issue

orders within the limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of the USSR and of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 99. The executive and administrative organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities are the Executive Committees elected by them, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary and members.

ARTICLE 100. The executive and administrative organ of rural Soviets of Working People's Deputies in small localities, in accordance with the Constitutions of the Union Republics, is the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the Secretary elected by them.

ARTICLE 101. The executive organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies which elected them and to the executive organ of the superior Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

CHAPTER IX. THE COURTS AND THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE

ARTICLE 102. In the USSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the Territorial and the Regional courts, the courts of the Autonomous Republics and the Autonomous Regions, the Area courts, the special courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

ARTICLE 103. In all courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

ARTICLE 104. The Supreme Court of the USSR is the highest judicial organ. The Supreme Court of the USSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the USSR and of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 105. The Supreme Court of the USSR and the special courts of the USSR are elected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 106. The Supreme Courts of the Union Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 107. The Supreme Courts of the Autonomous Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 108. The Territorial and the Regional courts, the courts of the Autonomous Regions and the Area courts are elected by the Territorial, Regional or Area Soviets of Working People's Deputies or by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Autonomous Regions for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 109. People's Courts are elected by the citizens of the district on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

ARTICLE 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the Union Republic, Autonomous Republic or Autonomous Region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

ARTICLE 111. In all courts of the USSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by Counsel.

ARTICLE 112. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

ARTICLE 113. Supreme supervisory power over the strict execution of the laws by all People's Commissariats and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by public servants and citizens of the USSR, is vested in the Procurator of the USSR.

ARTICLE 114. The Procurator of the USSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a term of seven years.

ARTICLE 115. Procurators of Republics, Territories and Regions, as well as Procurators of Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions, are appointed by the Procurator of the USSR for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 116. Area, district and city procurators are appointed for a term of five years

by the Procurators of the Union Republics, subject to the approval of the Procurator of the USSR.

ARTICLE 117. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator of the USSR.

CHAPTER X. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

ARTICLE 118. Citizens of the USSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment.

ARTICLE 119. Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with full pay for workers and employees and the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

ARTICLE 120. Citizens of the USSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of workers and employees at state expense, free medical service for the working people and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

ARTICLE 121. Citizens of the USSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal, compulsory elementary education; by education, including higher education, being free of charge; by the system of state stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in the universities and colleges; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language, and by the organization in the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

ARTICLE 122. Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, pre-maternity and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

ARTICLE 123. Equality of rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an infeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.

ARTICLE 124. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

ARTICLE 125. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law:

- a) freedom of speech;
- b) freedom of the press;
- c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;

d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

ARTICLE 126. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the USSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations—trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state.

ARTICLE 127. Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

ARTICLE 128. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

ARTICLE 129. The USSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

ARTICLE 130. It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to abide by the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to observe the laws, to maintain labor discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

ARTICLE 131. It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperous and cultured life of all the working people.

Persons committing offenses against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

ARTICLE 132. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is an honorable duty of the citizens of the USSR.

ARTICLE 133. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason to the country—violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the state, espionage—is punishable with all the severity of the law as the most heinous of crimes.

CHAPTER XI. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

ARTICLE 134. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies—of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Territories and Regions, the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics, and Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Autonomous Regions, area, district, city and rural (stanitsa, village, hamlet, kishlak, aul) Soviets of Working People's Deputies—are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

ARTICLE 135. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the USSR who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

ARTICLE 136. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

ARTICLE 137. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

ARTICLE 138. Citizens serving in the Red Army have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

ARTICLE 139. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies, from rural and city Soviets of Working People's Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

ARTICLE 140. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

ARTICLE 141. Candidates for election are nominated according to electoral areas.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

ARTICLE 142. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors.

CHAPTER XII. ARMS, FLAG, CAPITAL

ARTICLE 143. The arms of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consist of a sickle and hammer against a globe depicted in the rays of the sun and surrounded by ears of grain with the inscription "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" in the languages of the Union Republics. At the top of the arms is a five-pointed star.

ARTICLE 144. The state flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is of red cloth with the sickle and hammer depicted in gold in the upper corner near the staff and above them a five-pointed red star bordered in gold. The ratio of the width to the length is 1: 2.

ARTICLE 145. The capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the City of Moscow.

CHAPTER XIII. PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 146. The Constitution of the USSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes cast in each of its Chambers.

APPENDIX II

THE DECLARATIONS OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, NOV. 1, 1943

ANGLO-SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUÉ

The Conference of Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov, took place at Moscow from the 19th to 30th of October 1943. There were twelve meetings.

In addition to the Foreign Secretaries, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America: Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the

United States, Major-General John R. Deane, United States Army, Mr. Green H. Hackworth, Mr. James C. Dunn, and experts.

For the United Kingdom: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador, Mr. William Strang, Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay, and experts.

For the Soviet Union: Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. A. Sergeyev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Major General A. A. Gryslov, of the General Staff, Mr. G. F. Saksin, Senior Official of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

The agenda included all the questions submitted for discussion by the three Governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken: these questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by an exchange of views.

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been in close cooperation in all matters concerning the common war effort. But this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers, representing the respective Chiefs of Staff, in order to discuss definite military operations, with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared, and in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the unanimous recognition by the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the Conference and which was signed by the three Foreign Secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of their governments. This declaration, published today, provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war. It sets forth the principles upon which the four governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The Conference agreed to set up machinery for insuring the closest cooperation between the three Governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose, the Conference decided to establish in London a European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three Governments.

Provision was made for continuing, when necessary, tripartite consultations of representatives of the three Governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The Conference also agreed to establish an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy, to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for the addition to this council of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war.

This Council will deal with day-to-day questions, other than military operations, and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm, by a declaration published today, the attitude of their Governments in favor of restoration of democracy in Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their Governments to restore the independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make toward its own liberation. The declaration on Austria is published today.

The Foreign Secretaries issued at the Conference a declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German Government those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces will be taken back to the countries in which their abominable crimes were committed to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In the atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the Conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature, but also questions concerning the treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and the assurance of general peace.

DECLARATION OF FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership of all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

V. MOLOTOV
ANTHONY EDEN
CORDELL HULL
FOO PING-SHEUNG

Moscow,
30th October, 1943.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed, and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist régime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist régime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The three Governments, parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA

The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

STATEMENT ON ATROCITIES

Signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin

The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands; to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Italy.

Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the governments of the Allies.

APPENDIX III

SOVIET-CHINESE AGREEMENTS OF

AUGUST 14, 1945

The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic,

Desiring to strengthen the friendly relations existing between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic by means of an alliance of good neighborliness following military cooperation,

Having decided to render each other assistance in the struggle against aggression on the part of enemies of the United Nations in this world war and cooperation in the war against Japan until its unconditional surrender,

Expressing unswerving desire to cooperate in upholding peace and security for the good of the peoples of both countries and all freedom-loving nations,

Acting in accordance with the principles affirmed in the common Declaration of the United Nations on the First of January, 1942, the Declaration of the four Powers signed in Moscow on Oct. 30, 1943, and in formation of the International Organization of United Nations,

Have decided to conclude with this aim the present treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union;

President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic—Wang Shi-tse (Wang Shih-chieh), Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic.

These, after the exchange of their credentials in complete and due form, have agreed as below:

ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties have agreed together with the United Nations to wage war against Japan until final victory. The high contracting parties have promised to give each other all indispensable military and other assistance and support in this war.

ARTICLE II. The high contracting parties have pledged themselves not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan and not to conclude a peace agreement or armistice without mutual agreement with either the present Japanese Government or with any other Government or organ in power in Japan which will not clearly repudiate all aggressive intentions.

ARTICLE III. The high contracting powers have pledged themselves after the conclusion of the war against Japan to undertake mutually all existing measures in order to make it impossible to repeat the aggression and breach of peace by Japan. If one of the high contracting powers finds herself involved in military operations against Japan as a result of aggression and breach of peace against either contracting party, the other high contracting party will give the first contracting party involved in the military operations military and other assistance and support with the means at its disposal. This article remains in force until such time as, following the demand of the two high contracting parties, the responsibility shall be laid on the organization of the United Nations for the prevention of further aggression on the part of Japan.

ARTICLE IV. Each of the high contracting parties pledges itself not to conclude any

alliance whatsoever and not to take part in any coalition whatsoever directed against the other contracting party.

ARTICLE V. The high contracting parties, taking into consideration the interests of security and economic development of both parties, agree to work together in close and friendly cooperation after the conclusion of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial entity and noninterference in the internal affairs of both contracting parties.

ARTICLE VI. The high contracting parties agree to give each other all possible economic assistance in the post-war period in view of the lightening and speeding up of the national rehabilitation of both countries in order to make their contribution to the prosperity of the world.

ARTICLE VII. Nothing in this treaty should be interpreted in a way which would prejudice the rights and duties of both high contracting parties as members of the organization of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VIII. The above treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The exchange of ratification documents will take place in Chungking as soon as possible.

The treaty comes into force immediately upon ratification and remains in force for a period of thirty years. Unless one of the high contracting parties should make before expiration of the treaty a declaration of its desire to denounce the agreement, the agreement will remain valid for an unlimited period. Each of the high contracting parties can terminate this agreement by giving one year's notice to the other high contracting party.

In confirmation of the above the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this treaty.

Drawn up in Moscow on the 14th of August, 1945, which corresponds to the 14th day of August of the thirty-fourth year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally valid.

As plenipotentiary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

MOLOTOV.

As plenipotentiary of the National Government of the Chinese Republic.

WANG SHI-TSE.

(WANG SHIH-CHIEH).

RAILROAD AGREEMENT

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, desiring to strengthen friendly relations and economic ties between the two countries on a basis of full equality and rights and interests of both parties, have agreed as to the following:

ARTICLE I. After expulsion of the Japanese armed forces from the three eastern Provinces of China the main trunk lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway leading from a station in Manchuria (Manchouli [Lupin]) to the station of Pogradichnaya and from Harbin to Dalny [Dairen] and Port Arthur shall be joined into one railway system under the name of the Chinese Changchun Railway. This railway system will become the joint property of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic and will be jointly exploited by them. Only that land and those branch lines will be the joint property and will be jointly exploited which have been constructed by the Chinese Eastern Railway line in the period of Russian and joint Soviet and Chinese administration as well as the South Manchuria Railway during the period of Russian administration, which are intended for the direct requirements of these railways as well as subsidiary undertakings servicing these railways and constructed in the periods of time mentioned above.

All other railways and subsidiary undertakings will be the full property of the Chinese Government. The joint exploitation of the above mentioned railways will be carried out by one single administration under Chinese sovereignty as a purely commercial transport undertaking.

ARTICLE II. The contracting parties agree that the rights of common property of the above railway line belong to both parties equally and must not be infringed upon by either in full or in part.

ARTICLE III. The contracting parties with the aim of joint exploitation of the above railway agree to set up a Sino-Soviet company of the Chinese Changchun Railway Company. An administration of ten members is being constituted for this company, five of them being appointed by the Chinese and five by the Russians. The administration will have its seat in the town of Changchun.

ARTICLE IV. The Chinese Government out of the members of the administration of the Chinese citizens appoints a chairman of administration and assistant of administration.

The Soviet Government out of the Soviet citizens members of the administration appoints a deputy chairman of administration and a deputy assistant chairman of administration.

In decisions concerning administration, the chairman's vote counts as two. The legal quorum of administration is seven people.

All important questions which the administration agrees to defer must be handed over to the decision of the Governments of the contracting parties for just and friendly solution.

ARTICLE V. A commission of revision will be attached to the administration consisting of six members, of which three are appointed by the Chinese Government and three by the Russian Government. The president of the revision committee will be elected from among the Soviet members. The deputy chairman will be elected from among the Chinese members. The deputy chairman's vote counts as two. The quorum of the commission is five members.

ARTICLE VI. For current matters the administration will appoint a managing director of the Chinese Changchun Railway from among the Soviet members and a deputy managing director from among the Chinese members.

ARTICLE VII. The revision commission will appoint a chief controller and his deputy. The chief controller will be appointed from among the Chinese citizens and the deputy chief controller from among the Soviet citizens.

ARTICLE VIII. The directors and deputy directors of services and departments of the railway as well as station masters of the more important stations are to be appointed by the administrator. The administration has the right to suggest candidates for these posts. Single members of the administration can also suggest candidates, following the consent of the administrator of the railway.

Should the chief of a service or department be a Chinese citizen, the deputy chief must be a Soviet citizen. Should the chief of a service or department be a Soviet citizen, his deputy must be a Chinese citizen. Chiefs of service and departments will be appointed from among Soviet and Chinese citizens on a 50-50 basis.

ARTICLE IX. The Chinese Government has the responsibility of guarding the railway. For the guarding of the railway premises, equipment and other installations and in order that goods in transit should not be liable to destruction or loss or theft, the Chinese Government will set up and control a railway police force. The railway police must at the same time maintain normal order on the railway. As to the duties of the police in carrying out the requirements of this article, these will be drawn up by the Chinese Government after consultation with the Soviet Government.

ARTICLE X. Only in a period of war against Japan can the railway be used for the transport of Soviet troops. The Soviet Government has the right to transport on this railway by transit without customs administration military equipment in sealed carriages guarded by the railway police force, and the Soviet Union will not have its own armed escort.

ARTICLE XI. Goods transported on the railway by transit from one Soviet station to another and also from Soviet territory to the port of Dalny [Dairen] and Port Arthur or vice versa will not be subject to customs or any other duties by Chinese authorities. Such goods on arrival in Chinese territory are liable to customs examination.

ARTICLE XII. The Chinese Government pledges to supply the railway with coal according to a special agreement.

ARTICLE XIII. The railway line is subject to taxes in the same way as other Chinese State railways.

ARTICLE XIV. The contracting parties have agreed to supply the Chinese Changchun Railway administration with working capital in sums agreed upon in Statutes of the Railway. Profits and loss from the exploitation of the line shall be divided between the two parties.

ARTICLE XV. The contracting parties within one month from the signing of the above agreement will appoint a representative each, who, in Changchun, will work out a statute on the joint exploitation of the road. This statute must be drawn up within two months and will then be submitted to confirmation by both Governments.

ARTICLE XVI. The property which will go over to joint possession of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Republic and will be liable to joint exploitation according to Article I of the present agreement must be defined by a commission which must consist of three representatives of each Government.

This commission must be set up in Changchun within one month of the signature of the present agreement. This commission must end its work within three months of the beginning of joint exploitation of the signature of the present agreement. This commission must end its work within three months of the beginning of joint exploitation of the railway and present its finding for a confirmation by both Governments.

ARTICLE XVII. The present agreement has been concluded for a period of thirty years. After expiration of this period the Chinese Changchun Railway with all its property will revert to the full possession of the Chinese Government at free cost.

ARTICLE XVIII. The present agreement comes in force from the day of ratification. Drawn up in Moscow the 14th of August, 1945, which corresponds to the 14th of August, the thirty-fourth year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies of each the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally void.

Molotov, for the Soviet Union.

WANG SHI-TSE (WANG SHIH-CHIEH), for the Chinese Republic.

AGREEMENT ON PORT ARTHUR

Both contracting parties, in accordance with the Soviet-Chinese treaty on friendship and alliance, and as a supplementary section to it, have agreed upon the following:

(1) With the aim of strengthening the security of China and the USSR and the preventing of aggression again by Japan, the Government of the Chinese Republic agrees to joint utilization by both of the contracting parties of Port Arthur as a naval base.

(2) The exact frontiers of the area of the naval base noted in the point above are defined in the description and map appended.

(3) The contracting parties have agreed to turn Port Arthur into a purely naval base at the disposal of the battleships and merchant ships of China and the USSR alone. A Chinese-Soviet military commission will be established on questions of the joint use of the above-named naval base. It is to consist of two Chinese and three Soviet representatives. The chairman of the commission is appointed by the Soviet side and the vice-chairman by the Chinese side.

(4) The defense of the above-noted naval base is given the Government of the USSR by the Chinese Government. The Government of the USSR, with the aim of the defense of the naval base, establishes the necessary equipment, and the cost is borne by the Government of the USSR.

(5) Civil administration in the given area belongs to China, and in making appointments for responsible leading posts the Chinese Government shall take into account the interests of the USSR in the given area. The civil administration in the town of Port Arthur is appointed and dismissed by the Chinese Government by agreement with the Soviet military command.

Suggestions which the Soviet military command in this area makes to the Chinese civil administration with the aim of securing defense will be carried out by the Chinese administration. In disputable cases the question will be put for examination and decision by a Chinese-Soviet military commission.

(6) The Government of the USSR has a right to maintain in the area noted on Point 2 its Army, Naval and Air Forces and determine their location.

(7) The Soviet Government has also the task of establishing a maintenance of light-houses, signals and other equipment necessary for the security of navigation in the given area.

(8) When the agreement comes to an end all the equipment and public equipment put up by the USSR in the given area is handed over without compensation and becomes the property of the Chinese Government.

(9) The period of the present agreement is for thirty years. The agreement comes into force from the day of its ratification. The plenipotentiaries signed the above agreement and put their seals upon it.

Done in Moscow Aug. 14, 1945, which is equivalent to Aug. 14, 1934, of the Chinese Republic.

In two copies each in the Russian and Chinese languages and both texts have equal validity.

On behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, MOLOTOV.

On behalf of the Presidium of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, WANG SHI-TSE.

AGREEMENT ON PORT DAIREN

In view of the fact that the treaty of friendship and alliance has been concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Republic, also of the fact that the USSR has guaranteed respect for Chinese sovereignty of the three eastern Provinces as an inseparable part of China, in order to insure the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Dairen as an import and export port of commodities, the Chinese Republic hereby expresses its consent:

(1) To proclaim Dairen a free port open to trade and shipping of all countries.

(2) To set aside for leasing to the USSR piers and warehouses in the said free port on the basis of separate agreement.

(3) Administration in Dairen will be exercised by China.

The chief of the port shall be appointed from among Soviet citizens by the manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway by agreement with the Mayor of the town of Dairen. The assistant chief of the port shall be appointed in the above way from among Chinese citizens.

During peacetime Dairen shall not be included in the sphere of operations of regulations on naval base contained in the agreement on Port Arthur of Aug. 14, 1945, and will become subject to the military regime established in this port only in event of war with Japan. Goods coming from abroad to this free port and transported over the Chinese Changchun Railway directly to the USSR, also goods coming from the USSR over the above railways through the free port for export, or materials and equipments for the port installation coming from the USSR, are exempted from customs duties.

The above goods must be transmitted in sealed cars. Chinese import duties shall be levied on goods entering China through the free port. Goods exported from other parts of China to the free port are subject to export duties during the period while such continue to be levied in China.

The present agreement has been concluded for a term of thirty years. The present agreement comes into force as from the day of its ratification.

In testimony of which plenipotentiaries signed the present agreements and have fixed their seals thereto.

Done in Moscow Aug. 14, 1945, which corresponds to Aug. 14, 1934, in the Chinese Republic. In two copies each in Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

Signed on the authorization of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, MOLOTOV.

President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, WANG SHI-TSE.

AGREEMENT ON EASTERN PROVINCES

Agreement on relations between the Soviet commander in chief and the Chinese administration after the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the three eastern Provinces of China in connection with the present joint war against Japan.

Relations between the Soviet commander in chief and the Chinese administration should correspond to the spirit of friendship and Allied relations existing between the two countries.

(1) After the entry of Soviet troops as a result of hostilities into the territory of the three eastern Provinces of China, supreme authority and responsibility in the zone of hostilities in all questions relating to the prosecution of the war for the period necessary for operations shall rest with the commander in chief of the Soviet armed forces.

(2) Representatives of the National Government of the Chinese Republic and its local personnel shall be appointed for the restored territories who shall:

(A) Establish and direct in accordance with Chinese laws the administration on the territory clear of the enemy;

(B) Render assistance in establishing cooperation in the restored territories between the Chinese armed forces both regular and irregular and the Soviet armed forces;

(C) Insure active collaboration between the Chinese administration and the Soviet commander in chief and in particular issue instructions to local organs to this effect, being guided by the requirements and wishes of the Soviet commander in chief.

(3) To insure contact between the Soviet commander in chief and the representatives of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, a Chinese military mission will be appointed with the headquarters of the Soviet commander in chief.

(4) In the zones under the supreme authority of the Soviet commander in chief the administration of the National Government of the Chinese Republic for the restored territory shall maintain contact with the Soviet commander in chief, through the representative of the National Government of the Chinese Republic.

(5) As soon as any part of the restored territory ceases to be a zone of direct hostilities the National Government of the Chinese Republic shall assume full authority as regards civilian affairs and shall render the Soviet commander in chief every assistance and support through its civil and military organ.

(6) All persons belonging to the Soviet armed forces on Chinese territory shall be under the jurisdiction of the Soviet commander in chief. All Chinese nationals, both civilian and military, shall be under Chinese jurisdiction. This jurisdiction shall also extend to the civilian population on Chinese territory, even in the event of crimes and offenses against the Soviet armed forces, with the exception of crimes and offenses committed in the zone of hostilities which are subject to jurisdiction of the Soviet commander in chief. In disputable cases questions shall be decided in agreements between the Soviet commander in chief and the representative of the National Government of the Chinese Republic.

(7) A separate agreement shall be concluded concerning financial questions involved in the entry of Soviet troops to the territory of the three eastern Provinces of China.

(8) The present agreement comes into force immediately upon ratification of the treaty of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China signed on this date. Done in Moscow on Aug. 14, 1945, which corresponds to Aug. 14, 1934, of the Chinese Republic.

In two copies, each in Russian and Chinese languages, both the texts having equal force.
For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, MOLOTOV.

President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, WANG SHIH-CHIEH.

AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT

Agreement on the rendering of assistance to the Central Government of China, on China's sovereignty over Manchuria and on the events in Sinkiang:

Honorable Mr. Minister, in connection with the signing on this date of the treaty of friendship and alliance between China and the USSR. I have the honor of placing on record that the following provisions are understood by both contracting parties in the following way:

(1) In accordance with the spirit of the above treaty and for the implementation of its general ideas and purposes the Soviet Government is ready to render China moral support and assistance with military equipment and other material resources, this support and assistance given fully to the National Government as the Central Government of China.

(2) In the course of negotiations on the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, also on the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Soviet Government regarded the three eastern Provinces as part of China and again confirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the three eastern Provinces and recognition of their territorial and administrative integrity.

(3) As to latest events in Sinkiang, the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article V of the treaty of friendship and alliance, it has no intention to interfere with China's internal affairs. In the event that you, Mr. Minister, confirm your agreement with such understanding of the above points, the present note and your answer to it shall constitute a part of the above treaty of friendship and alliance. Accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my very high respects.

Molotov.

In his note of reply Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Shi-tse declared his complete agreement with such understanding of the above stated points on the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.

AGREEMENT ON OUTER MONGOLIA

The note from the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shi-tse to People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Molotov:

MOSCOW, Aug. 14, 1945.

Mr. People's Commissar:

In view of the desire for independence repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government declares that after Japan's defeat, if a plebiscite of the people of Outer Mongolia confirms this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia in her existing boundaries.

The above statement will be binding after the ratification of the treaty of friendship and alliance signed by the Chinese Republic and the USSR on Aug. 14, 1945.

I beg you, Mr. People's Commissar, to accept the assurances of my very high respect.

The note from People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov to Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic Wang Shi-tse:

Mr. Minister,

Hereby I confirm receipt of your note in which you state that "in view of the desire for independence repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia the Chinese Government declares after Japan's defeat, if a plebiscite of peoples of Outer Mongolia confirms this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. The above statement will be binding after the ratification of the treaty of friendship and alliance signed by the Chinese Republic and the USSR on Aug. 14, 1945.

The Soviet Government, with satisfaction, has taken note of the above note of the Government of the Chinese Republic and declares on its part that it will respect the state of independence and territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic [Outer Mongolia]. I beg you, Mr. Minister, to accept the assurances of my very high respect.

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N.B. Bibliographical entries in the Notes are not indexed save where direct quotations are used, critical comments are made, or additional data are given. Abbreviations: T. = treaty with; W. = war with; c. = cited; d. = death of; q. = quoted on.

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This book was set on the Linotype in Janson, a recutting made direct from the type cast from matrices (now in possession of the Stempel foundry, Frankfurt am Main) made by Anton Janson some time between 1660 and 1687.

Of Janson's origin nothing is known. He may have been a relative of Justus Janson, a printer of Danish birth who practiced in Leipzig from 1614 to 1635. Some time between 1657 and 1668 Anton Janson, a punch-cutter and type-founder, bought from the Leipzig printer Johann Erich Hahn the type-foundry which had formerly been a part of the printing house of M. Friedrich Lankisch. Janson's types were first shown in a specimen sheet issued at Leipzig about 1675. Janson's successor, and perhaps his son-in-law, Johann Karl Edling, issued a specimen sheet of Janson types in 1689. His heirs sold the Janson matrices in Holland to Wolfgang Dietrich Erhardt, of Leipzig.



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